Christensen Law Office, PLLC, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0530

Christensen Law Office, PLLC,
Respondent,

vs.

Carl Green,
Appellant,

Carl E. Christensen, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed January 13, 2020
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-16-7605

Carl E. Christensen, Christopher J. Wilcox, Christensen Law Office , PLLC, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Carl Green, Minnetonka, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Smith, John, Judge.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant, a former client of respondent law firm, challenges the grant of summary
judgment to the law firm on appellant’s malpractice and fraud counterclaims. Appellant
argues that the district court administrator erred when it rejected appellant’s notice to
remove the assigned district court judge based on appellant’s failure to pay the filing fee .
Appellant also argues that the district court erred in considering the law firm’s summary
judgment motion and supporting documents because they were filed after the 28 -day
deadline provided in Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.03(a). We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2015, appell ant Carl Green entered into an attorney fee agreement with
respondent Christensen Law Office. The agreement provided that Green would pay the
attorneys an hourly rate with a retainer of $8,500. Christensen Law represented Green in
three matters. When the retainer fee was dep leted, Green refused to pay the balance he
owed, and Christensen Law withdrew its representation.
When Christensen Law continued to seek payment from Green, Green sued the law
firm in conciliation court for fraud, malpractice, and breach of covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Christensen Law filed an affidavit stating that it had a claim against Green
that arose from the same circumstances that would exceed the conciliation c ourt’s
monetary jurisdiction. Accordingly, the case was removed to district court.
In May 2016, Christensen Law sued Green for breach of contract, monies for
services rendered, account stated, and unjust enrichment. The next day, the district court

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filed a notice of judicial assignment for the case. Green filed a notice to remove the
assigned judge within the 10 days required by Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 63.03. However,
Green’s notice was rejected by the court administrator because he failed to pay the first-
paper filing fee.
In January 2017, Green moved to dismiss Christensen Law’s claims against him for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that, because Christensen Law’s claims did not
exceed the conciliation court’s monetary limit, the matter should have been re solved in
conciliation court. At a motion hearing held the next month, the district court denied
Green’s motion to dismiss, holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.
In June 2017, the district court consolidated Green’s conciliation court action with
Christensen Law’s breach of contract , monies for services rendered, account stated, and
unjust enrichment action because the actions arose from the same circumstances. The next
month, Christensen Law moved for summary judgment. After a motion hearing, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Christensen Law on its breach of
contract claim and on Green’s malpractice and breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claim. The only remaining matter was Green’s fraud claim.
On November 21, 2018, Christensen Law served a second motion f or summary
judgment on Green. In its motion, Christensen Law moved for summary judgment on
Green’s fraud claim and all claims that could have been brought in the consolidated cases.
Christensen Law attempted to file its documents with the court the same day, but the filing
was rejected for n on-payment of the filing fee. The motion and related documents were
refiled and accepted on November 23, 2018. Following a motion hearing, the district court

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granted Christensen Law’s summary judgment motion and dismissed Green’s remaining
claim with prejudice.
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court administrator did not err in rejecting Green’s notice of
removal.

Green argues that the district court administrator erred by rejecting his notice to
remove the district court judge for failure to pay the filing fee.
Generally, this court will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the
district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Green did not raise this
issue in district court. Although Green questioned the district court’s authority to preside
over the consolidated actions, at no time did he challenge the requirement that he pay the
filing fee for his notice to remove the district court judge to be considered by the district
court. Accordingly, he forfeits this assertion of error. See id.
Even if Green had raised the issue below, the court administrator properly rejected
his notice to remove the district court judge . “Whether a removal notice complies with
Minn. R. Civ. P. 63.03 is a question of law.” Citizens State Bank of Clara City v. Wallace,
477 N.W.2d 741, 742 (Minn. App. 1991). Rule 63.03 provides t hat a party may f ile a
notice to remove within ten days after receiving notice of the assigned judge. Minn. R.
Civ. P. 63.03. When a removal notice is filed in compliance with rule 63.03, the case must
be reassigned and any further action by the originally assigned judge is unauthorized .
McLelland v. Pierce, 376 N.W.2d 217, 218 (Minn. 1985).

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In this case, the district court filed a notice of judicial assignment on May 19, 2016.
Green filed his notice to remove on May 26, 2016, within the ten days required by rule
63.03. But, Green did not pay the filing fee within the ten days required by rule 63.03.
The court administrator returned Green’s request in a deficiency notice stating that his
notice to remove was returned because it was his first filing and therefore req uired a fee.
Nevertheless, Green did not pay the fee for the notice to remove or file a second notice to
remove.
Green argues that he should not have been required to pay a filing fee because
Minnesota statutes do not require a first-paper filing fee for a notice of removal.
Minn. Stat. § 357.021, subd. 2(1) (2018) provides:
In every civil action or proceeding in said court . . . the
plaintiff, petitioner, or other moving party shall pay, when the
first paper is filed for that party in said action, a fee of $285

. . . .

The defendant or other adverse or intervening party, or
any one or more of several defendants or other adverse or
intervening parties appearing separately from the others, shall
pay, when the first paper is filed for that party in said action, a
fee of $285 . . . .

The district court administrator may reject a filing if it is “tendered without a required filing
fee.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 5.04(c)(1).
In this action, the “first paper” filed by Green was the notice to remove. The record
shows that Christensen Law filed the summons and complaint on May 18, 2016, and the
case was assigned to a judge the next day. On May 26, 2016, Green filed his notice to
remove and did not file anything else in the matter until he filed his motion to dismiss for

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lack of subject matter jurisdiction in January 2017. The court administrator properly
rejected the filing because Green did not pay the filing fee required for the “first paper.”
See Minn. Stat. § 357.021, subd. 2(1).
Green seems to argue that only filing s similar to an answer require the first -paper
fee. However, the language of the statute does not provide for an exception to the first -
paper fee, except for applications for discharge of judgment. Id. Accordingly, Green was
required to pay the first-paper fee when he filed the notice to remove, and the district court
administrator did not err by rejecting his filing.
II. The district court did not err in consid ering Christensen Law’s summary
judgment motion even though it was filed after the 28-day deadline
provided in Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.03(a).

Green challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for untimely filing because
Christensen Law’s second summary judgment motion was not filed at least 28 days prior
to the hearing.
This court reviews a district court’s application of the law de novo. Harlow v. State,
Dep’t of Human Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016). Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.03(a)
provides:
No motion shall be heard until the moving party pays
any required motion filing fee, serves the following documents
on all opposing counsel and self-represented litigants, and files
the documents with the court administrator at least 28 days
prior to the hearing:
(1) Notice of motion and motion;
(2) Proposed order;
(3) Any affidavits and exhi bits to be submitted in
conjunction with the motion; and
(4) Memorandum of law.

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A district court may modify the time limits in the rules. Minn. R . Gen. Prac.
115.01(b). However, “in no event shall the motion be served less than 14 days before the
time fixed for the hearing.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.02; see Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.01(b)
(“The time limits in this rule are to provide the court adequate opportunity to prepare for
and promptly rule on matters, and the court may modify the time limits . . . .”). “Where a
court in its discretion relaxes the timeliness rules, there is no jurisdictional defect if there
is no prejudice to the parties.” Brault v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 538 N.W.2d 144, 149
(Minn. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Nov. 21, 1995).
The district court addressed Green’s argument that the district court should
disregard Christensen Law’s motion for summary judgment because it failed to follow the
28-day requirement set out in rule 115.03(a). The district court found that Green was
timely served with the summary judgment motion on November 21, 2018—28 days before
the hearing. But Christensen Law’s motion was rejected for failing to pay the filing fee
and the motion was refiled two days later, which fell outside the 28 -day requireme nt.
Despite this, the district court relaxed its timeliness rules because it found that Green
suffered no prejudice from the shortened time period , especially because Gree n did not
challenge the summary judgment motion on its merits.
Green does not explain to us how he was prejudiced by the district court’s decision
to relax the 28-day rule. He also fails to provide any support for his assertion that he was
prejudiced by the district court’s decision on Christensen Law’s summary judgment
motion. Appellate courts decline to reach issues that are inadequately briefed, State, Dep’t
of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) , and

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this court gives “[n]o extra benefits” to pro se litigants, State v. Seifert, 423 N.W.2d 368,
372 (Minn. 1988), superseded on other grounds by rule , Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subds.
5(17)–5(19). Because the district court was within its authority to relax the 28 -day
requirement in rule 115.03(a), and Green was not harmed by this relaxation because he
failed to challenge the summary judgment motion on its merits and failed to explain how
he was prejudiced, the district court did not err when it considered Christensen Law’s
summary judgment motion.
Affirmed.