State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0532

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jonathan Yemane,
Appellant.

Filed March 16, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-20980

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jordan W. Rude, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Charles A. Ramsay, Daniel J. Koewler, Ramsay L aw Firm, PLLC, Roseville, Minnesota
(for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the enhancement of his felony driving while impaired (DWI)
conviction, arguing that one of the prior convictions used for enhancement resulted from
an unconstitutional warrantless blood test. Because the prior conviction was a “qualifying
incident” under Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.03, subd. 22, .24, subd. 1 (2018), we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2013, a police officer found appellant Jonathan Yemane apparently asleep
in the driver’s seat of a car with the engine idling and lights and emergency flashers on in
a parking garage. The officer woke appellant by knocking on the car window; when
appellant opened it, the officer noticed his bloodshot eyes, his sluggish movements, and
the odor of alcohol. Appellant’s responses to question s about his recent drinking we re
unintelligible. He tried but failed to blow into a preliminary breath test (PBT) device.
Appellant was arrested and taken to the police station, where he was read the
implied-consent advisory then in use ; it advised that it was a crime to refuse a bl ood test.
After consulting an attorney by phone, appellant agreed to a blood test, which revealed an
alcohol concentration greater than 0.08. He was charged with one count of second-degree
gross misdemeanor DWI —alcohol concentration greater than 0.08 and one count of
second-degree gross misdemeanor DWI—two or more aggravating factors . He pleaded
guilty to having an alcohol concentration greater than 0.08 and therefore was not convicted
on the aggravating -factors count. This was appellant’s second DWI conviction: his first
had occurred in August 2010, and he had a third in April 2013.

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In August 2018, police found appellant after he had struck two other vehicles in a
parking lot. They noticed his bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, poor balance, and smell of
intoxicating beverages. Appellant failed to complete some field sobriety tests and s cored
poorly on others. His alcohol concentration was 0.23. He was charged with two counts of
felony DWI: count 1—operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and count
2—operating a motor vehicle within two hours of having a BAC of at least 0.08.
Following the denial of appellant’s motion to have his March 2013 offense excluded
as a qualifying offense and a stipulated -facts trial, he was fou nd guilty of felony DWI,
based in part on the March 2013 offense. On appeal, he challenges the denial of his motion
to exclude the March 2013 offense.
D E C I S I O N
Applying the impaired-driving statute to undisputed facts involves a question of law
subject to de novo review. See State v. Wiltgen, 737 N.W.2d 561, 566 (Minn. 2007). The
facts here are undisputed.
“A person who violates section 169A.20 (driving while impaired) is guilty of first -
degree driving while impaired if the person: (1) commits the violation within ten years of
the first of three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents.” Minn. St at.
§ 169A.24, subd. 1 . “Qualified prior impaired driving incident” includes prio r impaired
driving convictions. Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 22. Appellant makes a collateral attack
on the conviction for his March 2013 offense. That conviction was based on a guilty plea,
and “when a guilty plea is at issue, the concern with finality served by the limitation on

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collateral attack has special force.” Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 497, 114 S. Ct.
1732, 1739 (1994) (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that the conviction for the March 2013 offense may not be used to
enhance his present offense because, in March 2013, he was advised that refusal to submit
to a blood test was a crime before submitting to the blood test on which his guilty plea was
based and it was later determined that such refusals could not be prosecuted criminally
without a warrant. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016); State v.
Trahan, 886 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Min n. 2016). But, even though advising a defendant that
refusing a warrantless blood test is a crime now precludes prosecution f or driving with a
particular alcohol concentration, “prosecution [may] still proceed for the general offense
of driving while under the influence, based on other evidence of impairment.” State v.
Schmidt, 712 N.W.2d 530, 539 (Minn. 2006). We agree with the district court’s conclusion
that here, “there was ample other evidence to sustain a prosecution and conviction for
driving while impaired under a different subdivision of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, even if the
district court had suppressed the unconstitutional blood draw.”1

1 Both parties and the district court rely on a recent unpublished decision of this court
addressing a very similar situation, State v. Nordstrom , No. 17-0875, 2018 WL 1787 680
(Minn. App. Apr. 16, 2018) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his Wisconsin conviction
for driving while under the influence of an intoxicant, obtained after he was told by
Wisconsin law enforcement that refusing a blood test was a crime and agreed to the blood
test, could not be used to enhance a Minnesota conviction because the Supreme Court later
determined that the blood test violated constitutional rights). Moreover, in 2013, appellant
was not convicted on the general DWI charge only because he agreed to plead guilty to the
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) charge.

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Because co llateral attacks of criminal convictions undermine the finality of
judgments, they are allowed only in “unique cases.” State v. Warren , 419 N.W.2d 795,
798 (Minn. 1988), quoted in Schmidt , 712 N.W.2d at 538 n. 4. A change in the law
following a conviction is not a unique case. There is no basis to reverse the district court’s
denial of appellant’s motion to exclude the March 2013 conviction.
Affirmed.