Thomas Randal Schreyer, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0547

Thomas Randal Schreyer, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed December 16, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-CV-18-310

Steven P. Groschen, Kohl meyer Hagen Law Office, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacqueline A. Destache, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After getting his van stuck in a foot of snow, appellant Thomas Randal Schreyer

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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was arrested for driving while impaired. He challenges the resulting revocation of his
driver’s license, alleging that the officer unjustifiably seized him by opening his van door
and administered a preliminary breath test in violation of his constitutional rights. Because
the officer’s conduct was lawful and the breath test was justified, we affirm.
FACTS
On an early, snowy morning in February 2018, an officer was patrolling in
New Ulm. Driving conditions were poor. Little plowing had been do ne after significant
snowfall, which resulted in about a foot of snow in the intersections. Having helped many
other stranded cars that night, the officer noticed a van stuck in the snow. Two people were
standing just ahead of the van and one pers on (appellant Thomas Randal Schreyer) was
sitting in the van’s driver’s seat. The van was still running. The people ahead of the van
appeared to be trying to attach a tow rope to the van from a truck parked in front of it.
Concerned that the van was a hazard to onco ming traffic, the office r turned on his rear
emergency lights and parked nearby in the street.
The officer walked up to see if the people needed any help. He went to the driver’s
side door of the van and tapped on the window , trying to get Schreyer’s attention. But
Schreyer avoided all eye cont act, staring ahead with both hands firmly on the steering
wheel. The officer then went to the front of the van and tried tapping the windshield. And
Schreyer turned his head away, seemingly tryi ng to avoid eye contact with the officer.
Noting this, the officer became concerned fo r the driver’s welfare and tapped on the
driver’s window again. Schreyer did not respond.
Finding this behavior unusual, the officer opened the door to check if Schreyer was

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okay. When asked for identification, Schreyer struggled to get it out. The officer also
noticed that Schreyer appeared lethargic, “had a look of stupor,” was speaking slowly, and
had bloodshot, watery eyes. And the officer smelled alcohol. When asked if he had been
drinking, Schreyer said he had three, maybe four beers that night.1 At the officer’s request,
Schreyer submitted to a preliminary breath test , which he failed. As a result, the officer
arrested Schreyer for suspicion of driving while impaired.
The respondent commissioner of public safety revoked Sc hreyer’s driver’s license
following the incident. Schreyer filed a petiti on to reinstate his license, and the district
court held an implied-consent hearing. The officer testified consistent with the facts above.
After the hearing, the district court denied Schreyer’s request for license reinstatement. In
its written order, the district court explained that Schreyer was not seized when the officer
opened his van door but that, if he was, the seizure was lawful under the emergency-aid
exception to the warrant requirem ent, and that the preliminary breath test was supported
by reasonable suspicion. Schreyer appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Schreyer challenges the district court’s denial of his petition to reinstate his driver’s
license arguing that the officer’s conduct infringed on his Fourth Amendment rights.
Because the officer obtained ev idence in violation of his ri ghts, according to Schreyer, it
should be excluded and his driv er’s license should be reinstated. Specifically, Schreyer
first argues that the officer illegally seized him by opening his van door—a seizure that

1 The officer did not have Schreyer complete field sobriety tests because of the deep snow,
and Schreyer told the officer he had a previous head injury.

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was not justified by the emergency-aid excep tion to the warrant requirement. Second,
Schreyer contends that the officer’s admini stration of a preliminary breath test was
unlawful because it was not supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee individuals the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const.
art. I, § 10. And courts generally exclude evid ence obtained in viol ation of this right.
State v. Trahan , 886 N.W.2d 216, 223 (Minn. 2016 ). Although we presume that a
warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable, State v. Stavish , 868 N.W.2d 670, 675
(Minn. 2015), this presumption may be overcom e in some circumstan ces if an exception
applies. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006). Because
ultimately, the “touchstone of the F ourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
Below, we first address the seizure issue, concluding that the officer did not seize
Schreyer. We then turn to the question of whether reas onable suspicion supported the
officer’s administration of the preliminary breath test.
I. The district court did not err by conclu ding that Schreyer was not seized when
the officer opened the van door.

Schreyer argues that the officer seized him by opening his van door. We review
questions of law de novo in an implied-consent hearing. Harrison v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Minn. App. 2010). And we review findings of fact for clear
error and will not reverse unless “we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 642 N.W.2d 435, 440

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(Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court concluded that th e officer did not seize Schreyer when he
opened the van door because the officer was conducting a welfare check and a reasonable
person would have felt free to leave. In light of applicable precedent, we agree.
A person is seized when a reasonable person in their position would not feel free to
leave or an officer restrains their liberty by physical force or show of authority. In re
Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 (Minn. 1993). And seizures are assessed in light
of the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100
S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980).
Generally, when a police officer stops a vehicle, it is a seizure. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). But Minnesota courts have
held that it does not, without more, constitute a seizure for an officer simply to walk up and
talk to a driver sitting in an already stopped car. State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757
(Minn. 1980). This is particul arly true when an officer appr oaches a parked car to see if
the occupants need help. See State v. Klamar , 823 N.W.2d 687, 690, 693 (Minn.
App. 2012) (concluding that it was not a seiz ure but a welfare check for an officer to
approach a car stopped on the interstate with a passenger vomiting out the side). In fact,
“an officer has not only the right but a duty to make a reasonable investigation of vehicles
parked along roadways to offer such assistance as might be needed and to inquire into the
physical condition of persons in vehicles.” Kozak v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 359 N.W.2d
625, 628 (Minn. App. 1984).
Here, the officer noticed a van stuck in a snowy intersection of a main road shortly

6
after midnight. The officer was concerned abou t the driver’s well-b eing, as well as the
hazardous location of the stuck van. Under our caselaw, the officer had a responsibility to
reasonably investigate to see if he could help with the stuck van and to check on Schreyer
in the driver’s seat. Kozak is particularly instructive in th is regard. 359 N.W.2d at 627.
There, an officer approached a car stopped on a highway shoulder and found the driver
sleeping inside. Id. The officer pounded on the window and the driver awoke and opened
the door. Id. We reasoned that this was not a seizure because the officer was investigating
a stopped car and officers have a duty to investigate and offer assistance. Id. at 628. In
explaining why, we suggested that “[t]he occupant of an alread y parked car may be
intoxicated, he may be suffering from sudden illness or heart attack, or may be just asleep.
Surely, it is within a responsible peace officer’s duty as it relates to the public to determine
whether his assistance is needed.” Id. We note that this is especially true when there is a
foot of snow on the roads.
Still, Schreyer posits three reasons wh y a reasonable person in his position would
not have felt free to leave, resulting in a seizure. First, Schreyer contends that the officer’s
squad car parked nearby with its rear em ergency lights on was a show of authority
indicating he could not leave. But the suprem e court has held otherwise, explaining that
the use of emergency lights when investigating a stopped vehicle on a highway shoulder at
night does not, without more, turn the encounter into a seizure. State v. Hanson ,
504 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Minn. 1993).2

2 State v. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d 18 (Minn. App. 2005), upon which Schreyer relies, is not to
the contrary. There, police emergency lights indicated a seizure because they were used in

7
Next, Schreyer argues that he felt he was not free to leave with the truck ahead of
his van and his van stuck in the snow. But Schr eyer also concedes that the truck in front
of him and the snow blocked his van’s movement and that the officer’s squad car did not.
And a seizure occurs when an officer restrains one’s movement. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 21.
Finally, Schreyer contends that his body language (avoiding eye contact and turning
his head away) communicated that he did not wa nt to talk to the officer. But we have
previously concluded that it is unreasonable to require an officer to communicate with an
unresponsive driver through a closed car wind ow when the driver refuses to lower the
window. Overvig v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 730 N.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Minn. App. 2007),
review denied (Minn. Aug. 7, 2007). In sum, we agree with the district court that the officer
did not seize Schreyer. 3 And because Schreyer was not seized, his Fourth Amendment
rights were not infringed.
But even if Schreyer was seized, it was justified. An exception to Fourth
Amendment protections exists in emergencies. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 23. To determine
whether the emergency-aid exception applies, 4 we consider first, whether the officer is

a parking lot but here, as in Hanson, police emergency lights served as a warning to
oncoming traffic. Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 22. And in Lopez, the squad car partially blocked
the subject’s car by parking in front of it. Id. But here, the officer did not block Schreyer’s
van.
3 Schreyer also argues that the officer s hould have asked either the passenger who was
standing outside his van or the pickup-truck driver about Schreyer’s condition rather than
asking Schreyer himself. But the officer testified that he was concerned about Schreyer’s
well-being and whether he was okay with bei ng towed. And Schreyer offers no support
for the assertion that the officer should have relied on information from the people outside
the van rather than talk to Schreyer himself.
4 T h e r e i s s o m e o v e r l a p i n j u r i s prudence about the emergency-aid and
community-caretaker exceptions to the warrant requirement. While the parties did not

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motivated by the need to render aid or assistance. Id. Here, the officer testified that he was
motivated by his belief that Sc hreyer may need help. And the district court found the
officer credible, a determination to which we defer. State v. Olson, 884 N.W.2d 906, 911
(Minn. App. 2016), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2016).
Under the second part of the emergency- aid-exception test, we consider whether a
reasonable person under the circumstances woul d believe that an emergency existed.
Lopez, 698 N.W.2d at 23. The an swer to this question is simple: yes. The officer
discovered a van stuck in the middle of a main street intersection w ith an unresponsive
driver. It is possible that the driver had a medical event that caused the van to become
stuck or perhaps the driver was injured. A reasonable person in this situation would believe
that something may be wrong with the driver su ch that checking on him would be
appropriate. See State v. Othoudt , 482 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 1992) (determining
whether an officer’s actions are objectively reasonable requires considering “whether with
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search, would a person of
reasonable caution believe that the action taken was appropriat e”). And the scope of the
officer’s investigation was not more intrusiv e than necessary to ch eck whether Schreyer
was okay because the officer merely opened the van doo r and talked to him. See Ries,
920 N.W.2d at 632 (limiting the scope of the search to the emergency involved).
In sum, we agree with th e district court that, u nder the totality of these

argue the community-caretak er exception, we note that the supreme court has
acknowledged that the exception applie s in an automobile context. Ries v. State ,
920 N.W.2d 620, 629-32 (Minn. 2018).

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circumstances, the officer was mo tivated to assist a stranded motorist. And the officer’s
conduct amounted to a welfare check, not a seiz ure. But even if it was a seizure, the
investigation was justified. Because the offi cer’s actions were jus tified, they did not
infringe on Schreyer’s Fourth Amendment rights.
II. The district court did not err by conc luding that the officer had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to administer a preliminary breath test.

Schreyer also argues that the officer ha d no reasonable, articulable suspicion to
justify administering a preliminary breath test. An officer may require a driver to take a
preliminary breath test if the officer has reas on to believe, based on the driver’s conduct,
that the driver is impaired. Minn. Stat. § 169A.41, subd. 1 (2018). We review questions
of reasonable suspicion de novo. Wilkes v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 777 N.W.2d 239,
242-43 (Minn. App. 2010). And courts consid er this question “from the perspective of a
trained police officer, who may make inferences and deductions that might well elude an
untrained person.” State v. Lemert , 843 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 2014) (quotation
omitted).
The district court determined that the pr eliminary breath test was justified because
the officer observed signs of intoxication and was justified in not administering field
sobriety tests here. We agree. The officer testified that Schreyer was lethargic, had a look
of stupor, spoke slowly, smelled like alcohol, had bloodshot and watery eyes, and admitted
to drinking. Based on the officer’s experi ence and training, he determined there was
reasonable suspicion to justify a preliminary breath test. His observations support this
conclusion, and the district court found the officer’s testimony credible, a determination to

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which we defer. Olson, 884 N.W.2d at 911.
Still, Schreyer makes two central arguments to support his claim that the officer did
not have reasonable suspicion. First, he argues that the officer did not observe him driving
in a manner that suggested he may be impair ed. And Schreyer notes that his van being
stuck in a snow bank does not necessarily su ggest he made an error driving, given the
snowy conditions. But the possi bility of an alternative explanation does not preclude the
officer from considering a fact in the totality of the circumstance.5 Schreyer also contends
that, while not required, field sobriety tests would have been useful. The officer testified,
however, that he did not administer the us ual field sobriety tests because the snowy
conditions made them unsafe and likely inaccurate. And even without field sobriety tests,
considering the other observed signs of in toxication, the officer had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify the preliminary breath test. Because the preliminary breath
test was justified, Schreyer’s Fourth Amendment rights were not infringed here.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in sustaining his license revocation.
Affirmed.

5 Additionally, Schreyer suggests without support that his bloodshot and watery eyes may
have been from the snowy conditions. This ar gument is unsupported in fact or caselaw.
See Klamar, 823 N.W.2d at 696 (concluding that bloodshot and watery eyes are indicia of
intoxication).