State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0555

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Adam Eldon Switala,
Appellant.

Filed April 20, 2020
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-17615

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant Adam Eldon Switala challenges his convictions of first -degree
controlled-substance crime (sale) and second -degree controlled -substance crime

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(possession). Switala argues that the state presented insufficient evidence that he
constructively possessed the controlled substances found by law enforcement. Because the
circumstances proved are consistent with Switala’s guilt and inconsistent with any
reasonable hypothesis except guilt, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Switala with first-degree controlled -substance crime (sale), in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2016); and second-degree controlled -
substance crime (possession), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016).
The case was tried to a jury, and the following facts are based on the evidence presented at
trial.
A police officer on patrol in Brooklyn Park stopped a vehicle for failure to signal a
left-hand turn. The officer approached the vehicle, identified the female driver, and
identified Switala as the front-seat passenger, though he initially provided the officer with
a false name.
Based upon an odor of marijuana , the officer searched the vehicle and found a
backpack on the floor where Switala sat which, it was later determined, contained a pouch
with methamphetamine. The driver’s credit card was also in the pouch. The officer then
arrested Switala and the driver.
While detained at the law enforcement center, Switala spoke on the phone with his
mother, who apparently has knowledge of the nature and economics of controlled-
substance transactions. She suggested that Switala was in debt after surrendering
“whatever was in the car” to law enforcement, and Switala responded that he was not in

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debt because “everything was bought and paid for.” His mother then asked about the value
of what was on him at the time of the stop, and Switala said “that cost $500 total, Mom.”
He went on to explain that “the price of drugs has plummeted” and that the vehicle’s driver
“didn’t have anything on her” at the stop.
The jury found Switala guilty of first-degree controlled-substance crime (sale) and
second-degree controlled-substance crime (possession). This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Switala contends that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support the
guilty verdict because the cir cumstances proved allow for a reasonable hypothesis that
another person possessed the methamphetamine found in the backpack. The state does not
dispute that Switala was convicted based upon circumstantial evidence. We agree.
“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence warrants particular scrutiny.” State
v. Bolstad, 686 N.W.2d 531, 539 (Minn. 2004). Appellate courts must therefore apply a
two-step analysis when reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence . See State v.
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, the reviewing court must identify
the circumstances proved and “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict.” See id. at 598-99 (quotation omitted). In doing so, the reviewing court must
defer “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence
in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State .” See State v.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
The reviewing court must then “determine whether the circumstances proved are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt , not

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simply whether the inferences that point to guilt are reasonable.” See State v. Palmer ,
803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted) . The state’s evidence does not
need to exclude all inferences other than guilt, but it must “exclude all reasonable
inferences other than guilt .” State v. Tscheu , 758 N.W.2d 849, 857 (Minn. 2008). The
circumstances proved must also be viewed as a “complete chain that, in view of the
evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a
reasonable doubt any reasonable inference oth er than guilt. ” State v. Al -Naseer,
788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010).
To convict a defendant of unlawful possession of a controlled-substance, “the state
must prove that defendant consciously possessed, either physically or constructively, the
substance and that defendant had actual knowledge of the nature of the substance.” State
v. Florine , 226 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975). Physical possession involves direct
physical control. State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn. App. 2016). The parties
agree that Switala’s convictions were based on a theory of constructive possession and that
Switala did not physically possess the drugs found in the minivan. Therefore, constructive
possession applies. Constructive possession may be established either (1) by proof that the
item was in a place under the defendant’s “exclusive control to which other people did not
normally have access” or (2) by proof of a strong probability that the “defendant was at the
time consciously exercising dominion and control over it,” even if the item was in a place
to which others had access. Id. at 353-54 (quoting Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611). The
methamphetamine here was found in a place potentially accessible to others, so we must

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assess whether Switala consciously exercised dominion and control over the
methamphetamine in the backpack at the time of the stop.
Circumstances Proved
The circumstances proved at trial were:
Switala was the front seat passenger in a vehicle driven by a female;

an officer found a backpack on the floor of the vehicle near Switala’s feet;

inside the backpack was a separate pouch with over 27 grams of
methamphetamine, some marijuana, and the driver’s credit card;

the ba ckpack also contained several plastic baggies , a digital scale, a pair of
men’s jeans, and a stick of Old Spice brand deodorant;

Switala made several references to controlled substances in the backpack during
a call to his mother from jail, including a statement that everything in the bag
was “bought and paid for,” that everything in the bag was worth $500, and that
the price of drugs had “plummeted”; and

Switala provided police a false name.

No Reasonable Hypothesis Other Than Guilt

Switala asserts that the jury could have reasonably inferred from the circumstances
proved that he did not have dominion and control over the methamphetamine and that the
vehicle’s driver or another person could have constructively possessed the
methamphetamine because (1) it was found in a separate pouch within the backpack with
the driver’s credit card; (2) a hypodermic needle with liquid was found in the driver’s purse;
(3) the driver owned the vehicle; and (4) his phone calls with his mother are too vague to
demonstrate his guilt. Switala contends that, taken together, these circumstances create a

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rational hypothesis that the driver or someone else constructively possessed the
methamphetamine. We disagree.
Switala’s hypothesis is unreasonable because it disregards the circumstances proved
which demonstrate he constructively possessed the methamphetamine. First, “[p]roximity
is an important factor in establishing constructive possession.” See State v. Porte ,
832 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted). The methamphetamine was
found on the floor of the front passenger seat where Switala was sitting. Second, the
backpack contained men’s jeans and deodorant, which suggest the backpack belonged to
Switala and not to the female driver. Third, Switala gave law enforcement a false name
and made several statements to his mother that referenced his knowledge of controlled
substances in the backpack . The statements to his mother are direct evidence of his
controlled substance possession, which reinforces the argument that there are no reasonable
inferences other than Switala’s guilt. See State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 -40 (Minn.
2016) (statement “I want him dead” direct evidence of defendant’s intent).
Moreover, a defendant “may constructively possess contraband jointly with another
person.” State v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309, 316 n.7 (Minn. 2004); State v. Lorenz, 368 N.W.2d
284, 287-88 (Minn. 1985) (concluding evidence sufficient to infer defendant jointly
possessed marijuana found in defendant’s bedroom with owner of the house). Even if the
circumstances proved allow for the reasonable hypothesis that the vehicle’s driver
constructively possessed the methamphetamine, this hypothesis is not inconsistent with
Switala having jointly possessed the controlled substances with the driver.

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Thus, the circumstances proved are consistent with the jury’s conclusion that
Switala possessed the methamphetamine in the backpack, and this conclusion is
inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than Switala’s guilt.
Affirmed.