State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0562

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey George Ackerson, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed April 13, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Renville County District Court
File No. 65-CR-18-110

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David Torgelson, Renville County Attorney, Olivia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Segal, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
In an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence for first-degree arson,
appellant Jeffrey George Ackerson, Jr. argues th at the district court abused its discretion

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by denying his motion for a sentencing departure. Because the district court did not abuse
its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2018, on a very cold winter day, Ackerson set fire to his home while the
family dog was inside. The fire destroyed the house and the family dog died. Three weeks
after the incident, Ackerson confessed that he lit a cigarette using a culinary torch, locked
the torch in the “on” position, and threw the torch on the house floor. At the time, Ackerson
was in a room that he used for woodworking. The floor was covered with a thick layer of
sawdust. The sawdust ignited when the torch hit the floor. After starting the fire, Ackerson
walked out of the house, passing his sleeping dog on his way out.
In October 2018, Ackerson pl eaded guilty to one count of first-degree arson of a
dwelling under Minn. Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1 (2016), and one count of cruelty to animals
resulting in death under Minn. Stat. § 343.21, subds. 7, 9(d) (2016). In exchange for
pleading guilty, the state dismissed one count of insurance fraud under Minn.
Stat. § 609.611, subd. 1(a)(2) ( 2016). At the plea hearing, Ac kerson stated that he acted
impulsively when he started the fire. He explained that he did so because he was struggling
financially and emotionally.
Prior to sentencing, Ackerson moved for a departure. A dispositional advisor from
the public defender’s office filed a memorand um in support of Ackerson’s motion. The
advisor recommended a dispositional departur e to probation based on her view that
Ackerson is particularly amenable to proba tion and her opinion that his offense was less
serious than the typical arson offense. Alternatively, the advisor recommended a durational

3
departure, emphasizing again her opinion that Ackerson’s offense was less serious than the
typical first-degree arson offense.
The district court held a he aring on the motion. At th e hearing, the dispositional
advisor testified on behalf of Ackerman. In support of a dispositional departure, the advisor
testified that 62% of defendants with a cr iminal history score of zero, like Ackerson,
received a mitigated dispositional departure for first-degree arson. Her testimony was
based on a review of 61 offenders se ntenced from 2012 to 2016 under Minn.
Stat. § 609.561, subd. 1, for first-degree arson. The advisor further testified that Ackerson
is “particularly amenable” to probation because he took re sponsibility for his actions,
showed remorse, and had successfully comp leted probation in the past. The advisor
acknowledged that Ackerson had a probation violation for alcohol use when he was
previously on probation, but the probation violation did not change her opinion regarding
his amenability to probation. The advisor also emphasized that Ackerson has a history of
mental-health problems, making him psychol ogically “more vulnerable” than the typical
defendant and perhaps in need of treatment that he would not receive in prison. The advisor
also testified that, in her opinion, Ackerson’ s offense was less seri ous than the typical
offense because Ackerson set fire to his own single-family home, as opposed to a multi-unit
building, and only his property was damaged.
The state, in opposition to the departure motion, presented the testimony of a deputy
state fire marshal and a firefighter from the local fire department. The deputy fire marshal
testified that he spoke with Ackerson the day of the fire a nd Ackerson “basically” denied
starting the fire. The deputy spoke with him again the ne xt day and Ackerson gave the

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same response. According to the deputy, Ac kerson did not admit to starting the fire until
approximately three weeks la ter when fire investigator s presented Ackerson with
“evidence that proved that he had been lying.” The deputy also testified that, in his opinion,
the fire at the Ackerson home was more serious than typical. According to the deputy, the
frigid temperature and wind chill made responding to the fire more difficult and dangerous.
The firefighter who testified was one of several firefighters who responded to the
fire. He agreed with the deputy that th e extreme cold made fi ghting the fire more
dangerous. He noted that tw o members of the fire respon se team sustained injuries
resulting from fighting the fire in the cold. He explained that the fire was also more
dangerous for firefighters than the typical fi re because the house was under renovation at
the time, making it more likely that the roof would collapse. He further testified that “a
lot” of firefighting equipment was damaged as a result of fighting the fire.
The state also called Ackerson’s insurance agent, who testified that Ackerson texted
him about the fire not long after it started. The insurance agent furt her testified that he
submitted a fire-loss insurance claim on behalf of Ackerson and that Ackerson received a
payment from his insurance company.
No other witnesses testified at the depa rture hearing. The judge continued the
sentencing to a later date to consider the ev idence before pronouncing a sentence. The
parties reserved final arguments until the sentencing hearing.
A week later, the district court heard fina l arguments from Ackerson and the state.
Ackerson argued for a dispositional departure. Ackerson emphasized that the majority of
defendants with a criminal-h istory score of zero, like hi m, received a dispositional

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departure. He also argued that a dispositiona l departure should be granted because he is
particularly amenable to probation. Acke rson noted that he took responsibility for his
actions by pleading guilty, and he claimed to be remorseful. He also asserted that his
conduct was the result of a mental breakdown. He argued that he is more likely to receive
the mental health services that he needs while on probation than in prison. Alternatively,
Ackerson argued that a durational departure was warranted because his offense was less
serious than typical.
The state opposed a durational departure, arguing that the fire was more serious than
typical. The state emphasized that the fire caused significant hardship to the fire
department and that the fire destroyed th e entire house. The state also opposed a
dispositional departure, arguing that Ackerson is not particularly amen able to probation.
The state noted that Ackerson did not confess until three weeks after he started the fire and
asserted that he had not show n any genuine remorse. The state also disagreed that a
dispositional departure should be granted ba sed on Ackerson’s mental health concerns,
noting that no testimony was offered that Acke rson had applied for or been accepted into
any treatment program in the community. The state also argued that Ackerson no longer
had the support of his family, a factor to be considered in determining whether to grant a
dispositional departure.
The district court considered the parties’ arguments and the record, and concluded
that it could not find a legal justification fo r a downward departure. The district court
denied Ackerson’s departure motion and impo sed a 41-month sentence—the lower limit
of the presumptive range of 41 to 57 months for Ackerson’s offense.

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Ackerson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
The Minnesota Sentencing Guid elines establish presump tive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (20 18). A district court “may” depart from the
presumptively appropriate guidelines sentence only if “identifiable, substantial, and
compelling circumstances” warrant doing so. State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618, 623
(Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). However, even if mitigati ng factors are present, the
district court is not obligated to depart from the guidelines. State v. Bertsch ,
707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006). We “afford the [district] court great discretion in the
imposition of sentences and reverse sentenci ng decisions only for an abuse of that
discretion.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court imposed a sentence within the presumptive guidelines range.
When the district court imposes a sentence within the presumptive guidelines range, we
generally will not interfere “as long as the record shows th e sentencing court carefully
evaluated all the testimony and information pr esented before making a determination.”
State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted). It would be
a “rare case” which would warrant reve rsal of the refusal to depart. State v. Kindem ,
313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
Ackerson argues that the district court a bused its discretion when it denied his
motion. Ackerson contends that the dist rict court’s decision to deny a dispositional
departure should be reversed because Ackerson established that he is particularly amenable
to probation. He argues that he is particul arly amenable to probation because “there is

7
community programming to address his mental health crisis, he accepted responsibility for
his behavior by confessing, he showed remors e for the impact on his family and the fire
department, and he showed great respect to th e court.” He also argues that the district
court’s decision to deny a durational departure should be reversed because his offense was
significantly less serious than th e typical offense. He contends that his offense was less
serious than the typical arson offense because he set fire to his ow n house as opposed to
someone else’s house, and he acted impulsively.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied Ackerson’s requ est for a departure. While Ackerson made
arguments in support of a departure, there were also reasons for denying a departure.
First, there is evidence in the record that suggests that Ackerson is not particularly
amenable to probation. The supreme court, in State v. Trog, identified a number of factors
that are relevant to whether an individual is particularly amenable to probation.
323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). The factor s include “the defendant’s age, his prior
record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends
and/or family.” Id. Here, the record demonstrates th at Ackerson did not cooperate until
nearly three weeks into the investigation when he was c onfronted with evidence of his
involvement. The record also contains evidence of a prior probation violation and evidence
calling into doubt Ackerson’s claim of remorse. And, while Ackerson maintains that he
would benefit from mental health treatment in the community, there is nothing in the record
to indicate that Ackerson has been admitted into an outpa tient treatment program.

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Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Ackerson’s dispositional departure motion.
Similarly, the record demonstrates that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied his request for a durational departure. A downward durational departure is
justified when the offender’s conduct is significantly less serious than that typically
involved in th e commission of the offense. State v. Rund , 896 N.W.2d 527, 532
(Minn. 2017). But here, there is evidence to support that the fire was actually more
serious—not less serious—than the typical ar son because the fire destroyed the entire
structure, the family dog died, and the weather conditions created dangerous conditions for
the firefighters and first responders.
In sum, the district court carefully cons idered Ackerson’s request for a departure
and determined a departure was not warranted by the record. See State v. Johnson ,
831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating that the sentencing court does not abuse
its discretion so long as it considers all the evidence presented before imposing a sentence)
review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). The district court did not abuse its broad discretion
when it imposed a sentence within the presumptive guidelines range.
Affirmed.