State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0564

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin Guy Adams,
Appellant.

Filed February 18, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Segal, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-18-1977

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Anna Light, Assistant County Attorney,
Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SEGAL, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of first -degree burglary, second -degree
burglary, and being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm, based on his claims that

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the district court abused its discretion in determining that a prosecution witness could only
be impeached with unspecified prior felony convictions and that the district court
improperly entered convictions for both first -degree and second -degree burglary. We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
On February 9, 2018, M.Y. discovered that one of his houses had been burglarized.
The back door appeared to have been pried open and the contents of the home were
scattered about both inside and outside the house. M.Y. was not living at the residence at
the time, so he was unsure of exactly when the burglary occurred. While he was examining
the contents scattered outside, his neighbor, appellant Justin Guy Adams, approached him.
M.Y. asked Adams if he had seen anythin g suspicious, and Adams responded that he had
seen a white van that seemed out of the ordinary. Adams walked away before M.Y. could
ask him any follow-up questions.
M.Y. contacted the South St. Paul Police Department to rep ort the burglary. A
sergeant responded and took photos of the residence. The sergeant asked M.Y. to make a
list of the items that were stolen. M.Y. reported that scrap metal, tools and several firearms
were missing. A detective was assigned to investig ate the case. As contained in the trial
testimony, M.Y. informed the detective that his neighbors, M.B. and D.D., had information
about the burglary. D.D. told the detective that he saw Adams leaving M.Y.’s residence
early one morning and that he appeared to be carrying items. M.B. similarly reported that
she had seen Adams leaving M.Y.’s residence and that she recognized him by his voice.

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The detective later spoke with Adams. When the detective informed Adams that he
was a suspect in the burglary a nd there was a witness who had seen him leaving M.Y.’s
residence, Adams responded that the witness had recently had surge ry and was a “looney
tune.” The detective had not told Adams the identity of the witness. He asked Adams who
he was referring to and Adams answered, “D.D.” M.Y. later informed the detective that
he had located some of the stolen tools at a pawn shop. The d etective searched the
automated pawn system and discovered that, in early February, Adams pawned several of
the stolen items. He also discovered that Adams had recently scrapped copper and brass,
which M.Y. had reported as being stolen during the burglary. The detective asked Adams
where he got the items, and Adams claimed that he found the items in a bag in the alleyway
behind M.Y.’s home. He denied entering M.Y.’s residence or stealing the items.
Adams was charged with first-degree burglary, second-degree burglary, and being
an ineligible person in possess ion of a firearm. At the jury trial, M.B. and D.D. both
testified about having seen Adams early that morning, leaving the victim’s home . The
detective testified about his investigation and his discovery that Adams had pawned several
of the stolen items and scrapped metal. Finally, B.H. testified that Adams sold one o f the
stolen guns to his roommate in March 2018. The jury found Adams guilty on all counts.
The district court entered convictions for all three counts: first -degree burglary, second -
degree burglary, and being an ineligible person in possession of a fir earm. Adams was
then sentenced to 68 months in prison for first-degree burglary and 60 months in prison for
being an ineligible person in possessio n of a firearm. The district court imposed no
sentence for the second-degree burglary count. This appeal follows.

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D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting D.D.’s prior
convictions as unspecified felonies.

Adams argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that D.D.
could be impeached with prior, unspecified felony convictions, but could not disclose the
actual nature of the convictions, which were for burglary and possession of burglary tools.
Evidence of prior convictions may be admitted to impeach the credibility of a witness if
the district court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). When the conviction does not involve
“dishonesty or false statement,” the district court has the discretion to restrict the use of the
prior conviction. State v. Lanz -Terry, 535 N.W.2d 635, 639 (Minn. 1995). We will not
reverse a district court’s ruling on the impeachment of a witness absent a clear abuse of
discretion. State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 651 (Minn. 2011).
D.D., t he prosecution witness who testified that he saw Adams leaving M.Y.’s
house, has four prior convictions for burglary and possession of burglary tools. Prior to
trial, defense counsel indicated that he wished to impeach D.D. with his prior convictions.
Defense counsel requested that he be permitted to specify that the convictions were for
burglary, but the prosecutor argued that the convictions should only be admitted as prior,
unspecified felony convictions. The district court ruled that defense counsel could only
refer to the convictions as felonies generally. At trial, defense counsel asked D.D. if he
had three prior convictions for burglary. The state objected and the district court held a
discussion outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel again requested that he be

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permitted to specify that D.D.’s convictions were for burglary -related offenses, but the
district court did not change its ruling.
Adams argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that D.D.
could only be impeached with prior, unspecified felony convictions. He argues that the
district court erred by failing to address the Jones factors on the record and that an analysis
of those factors supports allowing D.D. to be impeached with his prior convictions for
burglary, rather than with unspecified felonies. In State v. Jones , our supreme court
identified five factors for the distri ct court to consider when determining whether a
defendant can be impeached with a prior conviction. 271 N.W.2d 534, 537 -38 (Minn.
1978). The factors are the impeachment value of the prior conviction, the date of the
conviction and defendant’s subsequent history, the similarity of the past crime with the
charged crime, the importance of the defendant’s testimony, and the centrality of the
credibility issue. Id.
The state argues that the Jones factors do not apply because D.D. was a prosecution
witness, not the defendant. We agree. In Lanz-Terry, the supreme court addressed the
impeachment of a prosecution witness with evidence of a prior conviction. 535 N.W.2d at
639. The supreme court observed that “ [w]hen evaluating whether to admit a prior
conviction of a prosecution witness, the major concerns are to protect the witness from
being harassed and unduly embarrassed, the jury from being confused and misled, and
everyone involved (court, jury, parties) from having to endure an unnecessarily prolonged
trial.” Id. The supreme court then analyzed the impeachment of the prosecution witness
without addressing the Jones factors. Id. at 639-41. Accordingly, the district court was

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not required to analyze the Jones factors when determining whether D.D. could be
impeached with his prior convictions.
Adams argues that he nonetheless should have been permitted to specify that D.D.’s
convictions were for burglary because the probative value of the convictions outweighed
any prejudicial effect. We disagree. Prior to trial, the district court asked defense counsel
why the nature of the convictions was relevant to impeach D.D.’s credibility. Defense
counsel argued that the nature of the convictions was relevant because Adams was on trial
for burglary and D.D. ha d prior convictions for burglary. During trial, defense counsel
again argued that the nature of the conviction was relevant because “there is a burglar living
across the street who’s been convicted of four felonies in the last ten years for burglary or
possession of burglary tools” and D.D. was “testifying about a man who is on trial for
burglary.” But the district court observed that Adams explicitly stated that he was not
presenting an alternative -perpetrator defense. The district court reasoned that b ecause
there was not an alternative -perpetrator defense, the probative value of the prior f elony
convictions was limited to impeaching D.D.’s credibility. The district court stated:
I don’t view that this impacts directly on somebody’s
credibility as a wi tness, the ability to tell the truth. I don’t
know why there is not an alternative perpetrator, but there isn’t.
Everybody admits that. This would appear to me to do
indirectly what you chose not to do directly, and I don’t know
anything about that choi ce. I don’t want to know anything
about that choice. But if the defense here was an alternate
perpetrator, then I would allow the thing. If it’s just as it goes
to [D.D.’s] credibility as a witness, I don’t think the fact that
he was convicted of burglary is relevant.

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Caselaw supports the district court’s determination. In Hill, the supreme court
observed that “it is the general lack of respect for the law, rather than the specific nature of
the conviction, that informs the fact -finder about a witnes s’s credibility, at least with
respect to convictions other than those involving dishonesty or false statements.” 801
N.W.2d at 652. Here, the probative value of the prior convictions was limited to informing
the jury about D.D.’s credibility. And based on the reasoning in Hill, the nature of the
convictions was not releva nt for this purpose. Indeed, allowing evidence that the
convictions were for burglary had the potential to confuse or mislead the jury because, as
the district court stressed, Adams wa s not presenting an alternative -perpetrator defense.
See Lanz-Terry, 535 N.W.2d at 639 (stating that when evaluating whether to allow the
impeachment of a prosecution witness with a prior conviction one of the “major concerns”
is the jury “being confused and misled”). On this record, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by determining that D.D. could be impeached with prior, unspecified felony
convictions, but could not identify the actual nature of the prior convictions.
II. The conviction for second-degree burglary must be vacated.
Adams argues that the district court erred by entering convictions for both first- and
second-degree burglary. “Upon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of
either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both. An included offense may be
. . . a lesser degree of the same crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04(1) (2018). We look to the
official judgment of conviction to determine if a defendant has been convicted of multiple
offenses. State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 76 7 (Minn. 1999). The jury found Adams
guilty of both first - and second -degree burglary. Because second -degree burglary is a

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lesser-included offense of first -degree burglary, the proper procedure was for the district
court to make a determination of guilt as to both offenses, but only formally convict Adams
of the more serious offense. Id. at 766. This would allow the district court to retain
jurisdiction over the lesser-included offense and later formally convict Adams if th e first-
degree burglary conviction was vacated. Id. The warrant of commitment indicates that the
district court convicted Adams of both first- and second-degree burglary. The state agrees
that this was error and that the conviction for second-degree burglary must be vacated. We,
therefore, reverse and remand to the district court to vacate the conviction for second -
degree burglary.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.