State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0568

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Stanley Paul Wenell-Jack,
Appellant.

Filed May 11, 2020
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-CR-17-592

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
In a direct appeal from his final ju dgment of conviction for third-degree
controlled-substance possession, appellant ar gues that the district court abused its

2
discretion when it denied his motions to reopen the omnibu s proceedings based on the
state’s late disclosure of evidence. Appellant also raises two other challenges in his pro se
supplemental brief. Because the district c ourt did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellant’s motions to reopen, and because appellant’s othe r challenges lack merit, we
affirm.
FACTS
In August 2017, law enforcement obtaine d a warrant authorizing a search of
appellant Stanley Wenell-Jack, room 11 in an International Falls motel, and a 1998 black
Honda Civic. The warrant application include d information about the suspected sale and
use of methamphetamine at the motel fro m concerned citizens, law enforcement
surveillance, and two confidential reliable informants (CRI), among other sources.
Upon executing the search warrant and entering room 11, law enforcement
encountered Wenell-Jack inside the room. During their search, police discovered an
“open and unloc ked” safe containing (a) $3,914 in cash, (b) the Honda Civic’s title, and
(c) two baggies containing almost four grams of a substance later tested and found to be
methamphetamine. Also during the search, polic e seized (d) packaging material, (e) drug
paraphernalia, (f) a digital scale, (g) a baggie of marijuana, (h) two tablets of Lorazepam,
a controlled substance, (i) the keys and title to a 2001 Pontiac Grand Am, (j) the keys to a
1993 Lincoln Continental, and (k) a third baggie containing about ten grams of a substance
later tested and found to be methampheta mine. The state charged Wenell-Jack with
second-degree controlled-substance sale (count one), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.022,

3
subd. 1(1) (2016), and fifth-degree contro lled-substance possession (count two), in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2016).
Wenell-Jack moved to dismis s the complaint, challenging probable cause, and he
moved to suppress evidence seized during the execution of the search warrant, arguing that
the warrant was vague, that no nexus existed between Wenell-Jack and room 11, the search
exceeded the scope of the warra nt, and the search was otherwise “illegal.” Wenell-Jack
also moved to suppress statements he made to law enforcement after his arrest, arguing
that police had interrogated him without giving a Miranda warning.
At the September 2017 omnibus hearing, the state conceded that police had
taken Wenell-Jack’s statements in violation of Miranda and agreed the statements should
be suppressed. The parties offered no eviden ce at the omnibus he aring and later filed
written submissions on the remaining issues. At an October 2017 hearing, Wenell-Jack
asked to discharge his public defender. After inquiring, the district court discharged the
public defender and granted We nell-Jack’s motion to proceed pro se. Later that month,
Wenell-Jack filed new motions, often in detaile d handwritten letters to the district court,
raising additional issues and challenging the warrant on grounds like those raised in his
initial omnibus motions.
In December 2017, the district court issued two orders. First, the district court
appointed Wenell-Jack advisory counsel. Second, the district court denied Wenell-Jack’s
motions to dismiss and suppress evidence, and upheld the search warrant. Then, in early
January 2018, Wenell-Jack filed new motions to dismiss, to suppress evidence, and raised
two discovery-related issues. We nell-Jack also moved for a hearing in the same filing,

4
relying on Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1978).1 Wenell-Jack argued
that police obtained the search warrant in “bad faith” because the supporting affidavit
contained “material misrepresentations, falsehoods, and omissions of fact.”
The district court considered Wenell-Jack’s new motions in a third written order in
early January. The order denied the two discovery motions and reserved all other
challenges.2 In late January, the district court issued a fourth order, denying Wenell-Jack’s
motion for a Franks hearing because it was untimely and lacked any supporting affidavits
showing law enforcement obtained the search warrant under false pretense. The late
January order also considered and denied all other pendi ng motions in Wenell-Jack’s
correspondence to the court, af ter determining that the district court had addressed the
issues in previous orders.
In April 2018, Wenell-Jack moved to suppress evidence, to compel the state to
disclose the identities of two CRIs, for other discovery related to the search warrant, for in
limine rulings, and for reconsideration of omnibus rulings. In late April, the district court
denied all of these motions.
At a May 2018 hearing, Wenell-Jack, with help from advisory counsel, waived his
right to a jury trial and agreed to submit the charges in a stipulated-facts trial so that he

1 The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen a defendant seeks to invalidate a
warrant, the two-prong Franks test requires a defendant to show that (1) the affiant
deliberately made a statement that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth, and (2) the
statement was material to the probable cause determination.” State v. Andersen ,
784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

2 The district court denied Wenell-Jack’s discovery motions to (1) return personal property
being held as evidence, and (2) disclose the identity of one CRI.

5
could obtain appellate review of th e district court’s omnibus rulings. See Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 4. As part of the stipulated-fa cts trial, the state agreed to dismiss count
two, fifth-degree controlled-substance posse ssion, and to proceed only on count one,
second-degree controlled-substance sale, with a lesser-included offense of third-degree
controlled-substance possession, Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016). On June 21,
the district court issued a written order fi nding Wenell-Jack guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt and convicting him of second-degree controlled-substance sale.
Wenell-Jack moved for a new trial. At a July 17 hearing on the motion, Wenell-Jack
claimed that the state had incl uded evidence in its stipulated-evidence submission that it
had not disclosed before, specifically, three supplemental police reports. After a long
discussion on the record, the district court said , “We don’t know as a matter of fact [the
reports] were ever disclosed to the defense,” although it was “likely they were, but we don’t
know that at this point.” The court then acknowledged that a stipulated-facts trial requires
that “both parties, in partic ular the defendant, agree to what is being submitted to the
Judge,” and “not just agree that it’s going in on stipulated evidence.”3 Because the parties
disagreed about the submitted ev idence, the district court granted Wenell-Jack’s motion
for a new trial. After the hearing, the distri ct court confirmed its oral ruling in a written
order that vacated the conviction, ordered the state to disclose discovery, and reset the case
for a pretrial conference before a different judge.

3 During the same hearing, Wenell-Jack as ked the district court to reopen omnibus
proceedings, but the district court reasoned that it had previous ly determined the
search-warrant issues and denied this request on the record.

6
While awaiting a new trial, Wenell-Jack moved to compel the state to provide
discovery; in response, the state disclosed 64 pages of written discovery on the same day
Wenell-Jack filed his written motion. The dist rict court denied Wenell-Jack’s discovery
motion as moot three days late r, and stated that, if Wenell-Jack found additional grounds
to compel discovery, he should file a new mo tion describing the discovery he believed to
be missing.
Wenell-Jack filed another discovery motion about three w eeks later. During a
hearing in September, Wenell-Jack challenge d the search warrant again, while also
claiming that he was missing discovery from the state, with out describing or identifying
what he believed was missing. The district court ultimately took the search-warrant
challenges and the newly raised discovery issu es under advisement. In an October 2018
written order, the district court found that the state had corrected any discovery violations,
and Wenell-Jack had not been prejudiced because the trial da te had been continued. The
district court also found that the state’s late-disclosed evidence did not “negate the validity
of the search warrant” and ruled the search-warrant application and the warrant itself were
valid. Finally, the order clarified that the dist rict court had addressed all other requests in
previous orders and reaffirmed the denial of any repeat motions.
At the pretrial hearing in December 2018, Wenell-Jack waived his right to a jury
trial, and the parties again agreed to submit the case to the district court in a stipulated-facts
trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, on the amended charge of third-degree

7
controlled-substance possession under Mi nn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1). 4 In a written
order filed January 10, 2019, the district court found Wenell-Jack guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt and convicted him of third-degree controlled-substance possession. At a
sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a 45-month executed prison sentence.
Wenell-Jack appeals. Although the state did not file a brief, the appeal proceeds on
the merits under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Wenell-Jack’s
motions to reopen the omnibus proceedings after the state disclosed additional
discovery.

We review a district court’s decision on whether to reopen omnibus proceedings for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Papadakis, 643 N.W.2d 349, 356- 57 (Minn. App. 2002).
Reopening omnibus proceedings “is justified in order to give [a party] a full and fair
opportunity to meet its burden of [proof],” fo r example, when a party raises new issues
after the hearing. State v. Needham , 488 N.W.2d 294, 296-97 (Minn. 1992) (concluding
that reopening omnibus proceedings was nece ssary so state could present additional
evidence because it lacked notice of defendant’s challenge to adequacy of Miranda
warning).
During Wenell-Jack’s firs t stipulated-facts trial, the state included three
supplemental police reports in its submissi on that Wenell-Jack claimed had never been
disclosed to him. Wenell-Jack’s new-tria l motion challenged the state’s discovery

4 The state dismissed count two, fifth-degree controlled-substance possession, at the onset
of the first stipulated-facts trial.

8
violation, leading the district court to vacate his conviction and grant a new trial. Before
the second trial began, the state disclosed additional discovery. During these proceedings,
Wenell-Jack twice moved to reopen the omni bus proceedings, making arguments similar
to those he made before the first stipulated -facts trial. The district court denied Wenell-
Jack’s motions to reopen and Wenell-Jack now argues that the district court abused its
discretion.
Despite our careful review of the reco rd, we cannot determ ine what new issue
Wenell-Jack sought to raise during reopened omnibus proceedings, or on what basis
Wenell-Jack claims the late-dis closed evidence affected the earlier omnibus rulings. It is
true that t he state must disclose “[a]ll material and informa tion to which a party is
entitled . . . in time to afford counsel the opportunity to make beneficial use of it.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 9.03, subd. 2(a). And if a party violates a discovery rule, the district court “may,
on notice and motion, order the party to permit the discovery, grant a continuance, or enter
any order it deems just in the circumstances.” Id., subd. 8.
We conclude that the district court di d not abuse its discretion in denying Wenell-
Jack’s motions to reopen for three reasons. First, the district court remedied any discovery
violations after the first trial and before the second trial. The district court vacated Wenell-
Jack’s first conviction, granted a new trial, and continued the second trial date to give
Wenell-Jack time to review the state’s additional discovery. Second, Wenell-Jack has not
shown that he was prejudiced by the state’s discovery violations in any way not remedied
by the district court. We will reverse a conviction based on a discovery violation, but only
if appellant shows resulting pr ejudice from that violation. State v. Jackson, 770 N.W.2d

9
470, 479 (Minn. 2009). Third, the district court found that the state’s late-disclosed
evidence is not relevant to the issues raised at Wenell-Jack’s omnibus hearing. The record
supports the district court’s determinati on, and Wenell-Jack doe s not challenge this
determination on appeal. We affirm the district court’s denial of Wenell-Jack’s motions to
reopen the omnibus proceedings.
II. Wenell-Jack’s pro se arguments lack merit.

In his pro se appellate brief, Wenell-Jack contends that the state’s discovery
violations were both a Brady violation and prosecutorial misc onduct. He also argues that
the prosecuting attorney made statemen ts amounting to unprofessional conduct. We
consider each issue in turn.
A. Brady violation

Wenell-Jack argues that the state’s disc overy violation included the failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence. The state has an affirmative duty in criminal cases to
“disclose evidence that is favorable and material to the defense” and a failure to do so is
often called a “Brady violation.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1196-
97 (1963); State v. Williams , 593 N.W.2d 227, 234 (Mi nn. 1999). To establish a Brady
violation, appellant must show:
(1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it
would have been either exculpatory or impeaching;
(2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the
prosecution, intentionally or otherwise; and
(3) the evidence must be material—in other words, the absence
of the evidence must have caused prejudice to the defendant.

10
Zornes v. State, 903 N.W.2d 411, 417 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “Because a Brady
materiality analysis involves a mixed question of law and fact, [appellate courts] review a
district court’s materiality determination de novo.” Id. (quotation omitted).
While Wenell-Jack has shown that th e state withheld evidence, he has not shown
that the state withheld evidence favorable or material to the defense. Wenell-Jack’s brief
to this court fails to identify specifically wh ich part of the late-disclosed evidence he
contends is favorable or exculpatory and we cannot discern it. But, as discussed above, the
state’s discovery violations were remedied; thus, even if we assume that the state disclosed
exculpatory evidence late, Wene ll-Jack received th e evidence before his second trial.
Therefore, we conclude that Wenell-Jack’s Brady-violation claim fails.
B. Prosecutorial misconduct

Wenell-Jack appears to argue that the prosecuting attorney made prejudicial
statements and therefore committed prosecutorial misconduct. When an appellant has not
objected during trial, we review a claim of prosecutorial miscon duct under a modified
plain-error standard. State v. Ramey , 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). The appellant
bears the burden of establishing plain error. Id.
Wenell-Jack’s brief to this court doe s not identify which of the prosecuting
attorney’s statements or acts amounted to misconduct. Instead, he generally claims that the
state “did engage in unprofessional conduct.” An appellant forfeits an assignment of error
that is based on “mere assertion” and unsu pported by argument or authority “unless
prejudicial error is obvious upon mere inspection.” State v. Andersen , 871 N.W.2d 910,
915 (Minn. 2015); see also State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn. 2015) (holding

11
an appellant forfeits an alleged error when failing to timely assert it). We discern no
obvious errors based on our review. If Wenell- Jack is again referring to the state’s late
discovery, we have addressed that issue above.
Affirmed.