Court of A ppeals Chutich, J. St. Paul Park Refining Co. LLC, Respondent, vs.

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STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A19-0573
Court of A
ppeals Chutich, J.
St. Paul Park Refining Co. LLC,
Respondent,
vs.
Filed: November 4, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
Brian Domeier,
Appellant.
______________________________
Robert B. Bauer, Matthew J. Schaap, Dougherty, Molenda, Solfest, Hills & Bauer P.A.,
Apple Valley, Minnesota, for respondent.
Erik F. Hansen, Elizabeth M. Ca
dem, Burns & Hansen P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
appellant.
________________________
S Y L L A B U S
Under paragraph 2 of Minnesota Statutes section 541.02 (2018), a claim of adverse
possession to any portion of a se parately assessed parcel requires the adverse claimant to
pay taxes for at least five consecutive years unless a statutory exemption under paragraph 3
applies.
Affirmed.

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O P I N I O N
CHUTICH, Justice.
This case considers whether a person claiming part of a parcel under adverse
possession must, before initiating the claim, pay real estate taxes previously assessed on
the land. In particular, the issue here is th e correct interpretation of Minnesota Statutes
section 541.02, and its provision in paragraph 2 that a claim of adverse possession to “real
estate assessed as tracts or parcels separate from other real estate” requires the adverse
claimant to have paid taxes “on the real esta te in question” for at least five consecutive
years. Appellant Brian Domeier (Domeier) asserts adverse possession over a portion of
two separately assessed parcels in Washington County owned by respondent St. Paul Park
Refining Co. LLC (the Refinery). The district court ruled against Domeier’s claim for both
parcels and granted summary judgment to the Refinery.
Relying on the standard developed in Grubb v. State , under which taxes must be
paid only if the claim is to “all or substant ially all” of the separately assessed parcel,
433 N.W.2d 915, 920 (Minn. App. 1988), the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the Refinery on Domeier’s adverse possession claim for the
west parcel. St. Paul Park Refin. Co. LLC v. Domeier , 938 N.W.2d 288, 293–94 (Minn.
App. 2020). The court reversed the grant of summary judgment to the Refinery on
Domeier’s adverse possession claim for the eas t parcel, concluding that the percentage
claimed did not trigger the tax-payment requirement in section 541.02. Id. at 294.
Domeier sought review of the court of appeals’ decision that his adverse possession
claim to the west parcel failed. He contends that he was not required to pay taxes because

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his claim to just over half of the west parcel was not “substantially all” of the parcel under
the Grubb standard. He alternatively asserts that the plain meaning of the statute requires
tax payment only for a claim to an entire separately assessed parcel.
We granted Domeier’s petition for review. Because the plain language of the
statute, read as a whole with its exemptions, requires tax payment on a portion of a parcel,
we affirm the decision of the court of appeals that Domeier’s claim of adverse possession
to the west parcel fails, although on different reasoning.
FACTS
Since 1998, Domeier has owned property near the parcels at issue here, and has used
a portion of those parcels by, for example, clearing trails, hiking, removing invasive plants,
and extracting sand for construction. In 2003, Domeier acquired property adjoining the
two parcels. In 2010, the Refinery acquired fee title to the two separately assessed parcels,
identified by Washington County Parcel ID Numbers 36.028.22.34.0039 (the west parcel)
and 36.028.22.43.0001 (the east parcel) (collectively, the parcels). And in 2016, the
Refinery discovered Domeier’s presence on th e parcels because he had by then planted
trees and a garden and erected a deer fence. The Refinery sued Domeier, claiming trespass
and ejectment. Domeier then counterclaim ed for adverse possession, trespass, and
ejectment, alleging that he possessed “a substantial portion” of the parcels.
The Refinery moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that under Minnesota
Statutes section 541.02, Domeier’s failure to pay taxes on the parc els precluded adverse
possession. Domeier acknowledged that he had not paid taxes on th e parcels. At the
district court’s request to define his claim precisely, Domeier commissioned a land survey

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and demarcated a claim to 3.22 acres (52.19 percent) of th e west parcel and 2.11 acres
(5.32 percent) of the east parcel. The district court then granted the Refinery’s motion.
Domeier did not acquire the adjoining property until 2003, which is less than the 15 years
required under paragraph 1 to establish a boundary line by adverse possession. See Minn.
Stat. § 541.02. Accordingly, the district court found that Domeier’s claim was not a
boundary line dispute, and did not meet th e boundary line exemption to tax payment set
forth in the statute. See id. (stating that the tax-payment requirement does not apply
boundary line disputes). Base d on the undisputed fact that Domeier never paid taxes on
the parcels, the district court found that hi s claim of adverse possession failed as a matter
of law.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision as to the west parcel, but
reversed as to the east parcel. The court concluded that Domeier’s claim to 52 percent of
the west parcel was “substantially all” of the parcel and therefore, under Grubb, required
tax payment. St. Paul Park Refin., 938 N.W.2d at 293–94 (discussing Grubb, 433 N.W.2d
at 920). Because Domeier’s claim to 5 perc ent of the east parcel was not a claim to
“substantially all” of the parcel, the court ruled that this claim did not require tax payment.
Id. We granted Domeier’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Kelly v. Kraemer Constr., Inc.,
896 N.W.2d 504, 508 (Minn. 2017). “A district court may grant summary judgment when
‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and one party ‘is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists when

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“there is sufficient evidence regarding ‘an essential element . . . to permit reasonable
persons to draw different conclusions.’ ” Id. (quoting DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60,
71 (Minn. 1997)). And we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id.
Domeier’s claim turns on st atutory interpretation, whic h we review de novo.
Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. 2013). The first step is to determine
whether the language of the statute is ambiguous. 500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis ,
837 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Minn. 2013). We inte rpret statutory language to “ascertain and
effectuate” the Legislature’s intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). “When we conclude that
a statute is unambiguous, our ‘role is to enforce the language of the statute and not explore
the spirit or purpose of the law.’ ” Christianson, 831 N.W.2d at 537 (quoting Caldas v.
Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc. , 820 N.W.2d 826, 83 6 (Minn. 2012)). In doing so, we
construe the law to “give effect to all its provisions.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16; Allan v. R.D.
Offutt Co., 869 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Minn. 2015). We presume that the “[L]egislature intends
the entire statute to be effective and cert ain.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2018). In
ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, we construe “words and phrases . . . according
to rules of grammar and according to thei r common and approved usage.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.08(1) (2018).
To succeed on a claim of adverse possession, an adverse claimant must show that
her possession was “actual, open, continuous , hostile, and exclusive” for 15 years. Todd
v. Weed, 86 N.W. 756, 756 (Minn. 1901). In 1 913, the Minnesota Legislature added an
additional requirement—the payment of taxes—for certain claims. See Act of Apr. 11,

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1913, ch. 239, § 1, 1913 Minn. Laws 331, 331 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat.
§ 541.02). Before enactment of the statute, paying taxes was strong—but not dispositive—
evidence of adverse possession, and similarl y non-payment of taxes was strong evidence
of no adverse possession. See Todd, 86 N.W. at 757; Dean v. Goddard , 56 N.W. 1060,
1062 (Minn. 1893).
The statute has remained substantively un changed since 1913 and is codified at
Minnesota Statutes section 541.02. It reads in full:
No action for the recovery of real es tate or the possession thereof shall
be maintained unless it appears that th e plaintiff, the plaintiff’s ancestor,
predecessor, or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question
within 15 years before the beginning of the action.

Such limitations shall not be a bar to an action fo r the recovery of real
estate assessed as tracts or parcels se parate from other real estate, unless it
appears that the party claiming title by adverse possession or the party’s
ancestor, predecessor, or gran tor, or all of them together, shall have paid
taxes on the real estate in question at least five consecutive years of the time
during which the party claims these lands to have been occupied adversely.

The provisions of the preceding pa ragraph shall not apply to actions
relating to the boundary line of lands, which boundary lines are established
by adverse possession, or to actions concerning lands included between the
government or platted line and th e line established by such adverse
possession, or to lands not assessed for taxation.

Paragraph 1 provides a 15-year statute of limitations on ejectment. In other words,
an adverse claimant must possess the land for at least 15 years. Paragraph 2, the focus of
the parties’ dispute here, provides an exception to the statute of limitations if the land at
issue is separately assessed as tracts or parcels and the adverse claimant has paid taxes on
the land for 5 consecutive years. That is, for la nd separately assessed as tracts or parcels,
no adverse possession claim can succeed, even if occupied for more than 15 years, if taxes

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have not been paid by the adverse claimant for 5 consecutive years. Paragraph 3 provides
several exemptions to the paragraph 2 exception—notably for boundary line disputes, the
most common subject of adverse possession. This exemption means, for example, that no
tax payment is required when the adverse possession claim involves boundary line disputes
between adjoining lands.
Having summarized the statute, we now tu rn to whether Dome ier’s claim to 52
percent of the west parcel is a claim to “real estate assessed as trac ts or parcels separate
from other real estate” that requires tax payment. Minn. Stat. § 541.02. Domeier contends
that to require tax payment for a claim to anything less than an entire parcel would
impermissibly insert “part or all of” into th e language preceding the phrase “real estate
assessed . . . separate from other real estate.” To do so, he says, would “add words to an
unambiguous statute under the guise of statutory interpretation.” 328 Barry Ave., LLC v.
Nolan Props. Grp., LLC, 871 N.W.2d 745, 750 (Minn. 2015). The Refinery responds that
the Legislature effectively codi fied our prior case law in wh ich we observed that paying
taxes on land supported a claim of adverse possession.
After carefully examining the statutory text, we conclude that under paragraph 2 of
section 541.02, a claim of adverse possession to any portion of a separately assessed parcel
requires the adverse claimant to pay taxes fo r at least five consecutive years unless a
statutory exemption under paragraph 3 applies. We reach this conclusion for the following
reasons.
First, Domeier’s proposed interpretation ignores the interaction of the tax-payment
requirement in paragraph 2 with the tax-payment exemptions in paragraph 3. Reading the

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statute as a whole can aid in determining the plain, unambiguous meaning of the statute.
See State v. Prigge , 907 N.W.2d 635, 640 (Minn. 2018). Here, the boundary line
exemption of paragraph 3, which excuses tax payment in certain cases, can have an effect
only if the tax-payment requirement in paragraph 2 would otherwise apply. See Minn. Stat.
§ 541.02 (“The provisions of [paragraph 2] sha ll not apply” to enumerated situations).
Accordingly, the exemptions of paragraph 3 help us to discern the meaning of paragraph 2,
namely, that tax payments must be made when a claim of adverse possession is made as to
any portion of a separately assessed parcel.
Second, all but one of our prior cases under the statute in volved boundary line
disputes between adjoining properties. For example, in Mellenthin v. Brantman , we
excused non-payment of taxes on a disputed strip between adjoining properties by noting
that our prior cases had given the boundary line exemption “full support.” 1 N.W.2d 141,
144 (Minn. 1941) (citing Kelley v. Green , 170 N.W. 922 (Minn. 1919), Fredericksen v.
Henke, 209 N.W. 257 (Minn. 1926), Riley v. Kump, 212 N.W. 13 (Minn. 1927), and Skala
v. Lindbeck, 214 N.W. 271 (Minn. 1927)). In contrast, in our only case that did not involve
a boundary line dispute— Bryant v. Gustafson —we concluded that the adverse claimant
was required to pay taxes. 40 N.W.2d 427, 433–34 (Minn. 1950).
If adverse possession of an entire separately assessed parcel is claimed, it is difficult
to envision how the claim could also reasonably be defined as a boundary line dispute.1 In

1 Domeier’s proposed construction of paragra ph 2, which he suggests applies only to
an entire separately assessed parcel, would ma ke paragraph 3’s exemptions superfluous.
Very few, if any, boundary lin e disputes involve an entire se parately assessed parcel.

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fact, none of our prior cases applying sec tion 541.02 involved a claim to an entire
separately assessed parcel. See Mellenthin, 1 N.W.2d at 144 (collecting cases); Ehle v.
Prosser, 197 N.W.2d 458, 462 (Minn. 1972).
Domeier cites several of our precedents in whic h we have broadl y stated that a
disputed portion of a parcel was excused from tax payment because the disputed portion
was “not separately assessed.” See, e.g., Skala, 214 N.W. at 272 (“The fact that defendant
paid no taxes on the [disputed la nd] is of no importance” because “[t]here is no proof . . .
that this land was separately assessed.”). Critically, as noted above, each of these cited
cases involved boundary line disputes between adjoining properties. See Mellenthin ,
1 N.W.2d at 144. We acknowl edge that we have used broa d language in the past when
describing such disputed lands, but none of these cases closely analyzed the statutory text
to support these statements. See Kelley, 170 N.W. at 923 (reciting the text of the statute
and summarily concluding that “[i]t is plain that the proviso as to payment of taxes has no
application to this case.”). Accordingly, any language in thes e opinions regarding
separately assessed parcels as the basis for the non-payment of taxes would be considered
dicta. See State v. Atwood , 925 N.W.2d 626, 629 (Minn. 2019) (“We are bound to our
prior statements or rulings on an issue only when the statement or ruling is necessary to the
decision in the case.”).
Nor do we agree with the court of appeals’ approach as set out in Grubb v. State,
433 N.W.2d 915 (Minn. App. 1988). In Grubb, the adverse possession claim was to over

Indeed, Domeier did not cite a single Minnesota case that involved a boundary line dispute
in which an entire separately assessed parcel was claimed.

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80 percent of the separately assessed parcel. Id. at 921. In reviewing the statute and our
precedents, the Grubb court concluded that a claim to “all or substantially all” of a
separately assessed parcel required tax payment. Id. at 918–20. This standard was adopted,
it appears, because the Grubb court was concerned that an adverse claimant could “avoid
the tax-payment requirement and consequent notice to the owner by claiming anything less
than all” of the separately assessed parcel. Id. at 920. The court of appeals here relied on
the Grubb “substantially all” standard to hold that Domeier’s claim to the west parcel
required tax payment.
Potential gamesmanship by the adverse cl aimant in adjusting the amount of land
claimed is a valid concern. Under the plain language of section 541.02 and our analysis
above, however, this concern is defused. A claim to any portion of a separately assessed
parcel requires tax payment if there is no bou ndary line dispute. Thus, the prospect of an
adverse possessor’s attempt to avoid the tax-payment requirement is not a concern.
In sum, because nearly all boundary lin e disputes involve only a portion of a
separately assessed parcel, so too must the tax-payment requirement. We therefore
conclude that, when reading the statute as a whole, the plain, unambiguous meaning of
“real estate assessed as tracts or parcels sepa rate from other real estate” in section 541.02
means any portion of a separately assessed parcel.2 Accordingly, the district court correctly

2 We recognize that this interpretation ra ises the question of whether the adverse
claimant must pay taxes on the whole, sepa rately assessed parcel, or just the portion
claimed. Because Domeier paid no taxes at al l on the parcels, we need not answer that
question here. We note, however, that we see no evidence that a county assessor would
conduct an independent assessment on th e portion claimed by adverse possession, and
subdivision laws suggest that this approach may be prohibited. See Minn. Stat. § 462.358,

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concluded that Domeier’s adve rse possession claim to the west parcel, on which he paid
no taxes, fails as a matter of law.3
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.

subd. 4b (2018). Nor would a proportional tax payment necessarily reflect the value of the
claimed land because a portion of a parcel—like a shoreline—could be a small portion by
area but a large portion of the total value of the parcel.

3 The Refinery did not seek review of th e court of appeals’ decision concerning the
east parcel, so that issue is not before us. We express no opinion as to the outcome of the
parties’ dispute regarding the east parcel when this matter returns to the district court.