In the Matter of the Welfare of: E. P. T., Child.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0579

In the Matter of the Welfare of:
E. P. T., Child.

Filed January 13, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-JV-18-2797
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-JV-18-4295

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Leslie J. Rosenberg, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant E.P.T.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Joseph J. Walsh, Mille Lacs County Attorn ey, Sarah E. Erickson, Assistant County
Attorney, Milaca, Minnesota (for respondent county)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judg e; Connolly, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
A juvenile, who sexually ab used his much younger sister and bribed her with candy
to allow the abuse to continue , challenges the district court’s decision to adjudicate him
delinquent. Because the distri ct court did not abuse its di scretion in determining that

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adjudication is in the juvenile’s best interests and that he pos es a risk to public safety, we
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant E.P.T. was accuse d of sexually abusing his y ounger sister for about a
year. His sister reported the abuse to a child-protection worker during an unrelated
investigation. At the time, E.P.T. was about 13 or 14 years old and his sister was about
five. E.P.T. spoke with police about the report and confessed many instances of sexual
contact with his sister. The contact included E.P.T. touching his sister’s unclothed vagina
and buttocks with his mouth, hands, and erect penis. E.P.T. reported that his sister asked
him to stop touching her. But he bribed her with candy to let him continue.
The abuse occurred while the parents and other family members were home, where
they lived on the grounds of a community camp. E.P.T. wa s one of ten children in the
family at the time of the abuse and the oldest of seven children living with their mother and
father.1
After investigating, police arrested E.P.T. and the state charged him with one count
of first-degree criminal sexua l conduct and one count of se cond-degree criminal sexual
conduct.2 After his release from custody, E.P.T .’s parents arranged for him to live
indefinitely with family friends in another town and executed a delegation of parental
authority.

1 E.P.T.’s three older siblings lived together in the family’s previous home.
2 Under Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1(a), .343, subd. 1(a) (2016), respectively.

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Six months after he was charged, E.P.T. pleaded guilty to seco nd-degree criminal
sexual conduct in exchange fo r the county dismissing the first-degree charge. He
participated in several assessments, which were disclosed to the district court. And he
continued attending outpatient therapy with his established th erapist. E.P.T. started a
sex-offender-treatment program but stopped after a month because his parents thought the
programming was too difficult for him to understand. 3 Later, E.P.T. started a different
sex-offender-treatment program—intended fo r adolescents—and was doing well in it.
That program generally includes nine to 12 months of outpatient programming and six
months of aftercare.
After reviewing various professional evalua tions of E.P.T. and considering their
recommendations, probation submitted a predisposition report. The report recommended
that E.P.T. be adjudicated delinquent, placed on indefinite probation, required to register
as a predatory offender, and complete a sex-offender-treatment program.
At a disposition hearing, three months afte r E.P.T.’s plea, the district court heard
arguments and testimony regarding both adjudication and disposition. 4 His probation

3 Father explained that the program was developed for adult participants and was delivered
unmodified to E.P.T. so it did not seem effective for his age. This opinion was bolstered
by mother, who homeschools the children and has researched educational curriculum for
that purpose.
4 Adjudication refers to whether the district c ourt determines that th e juvenile should be
adjudicated delinquent or whether a continua nce without adjudication is appropriate.
Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1. Adjudication as a delinquent may subject the
juvenile to longer-term court ove rsight than a continuance. Compare Minn.
Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (2016), with Minn. Stat. § 260B.193, subd. 5(a) (2016). And
disposition is separate from adjudication. See generally Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05,
subd. 1 (“The adjudication or continuance without adjudication shall occur at the same time
and in the same court order as the disposition.”). A juvenile-delinquency disposition refers

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officer and parents testified. The proba tion officer testified consistent with her
predisposition report. She explained th at she believed her recommendations were
appropriate because of the se riousness of the offense, th e duration and frequency of the
abuse, the age of the victim, the impact on the victim, and th e length of tim e needed for
treatment. E.P.T.’s parents testified that they wanted to be proac tive and keep everyone
safe by having E.P.T. continue therapy and stay with the family friend indefinitely. And
the parents explained that the children, includ ing the victim, missed ha ving E.P.T. in the
home and that the victim was “doing very go od.” The district court also acknowledged
that it reviewed the many assessments filed in the matter. Generally, the parties agreed as
to the recommended disposition, but disagreed as to whether E.P.T. should be adjudicated
delinquent, rather than be granted a continuance without adjudication.
The district court took the matter under ad visement. At a subsequent disposition
hearing, and in a written order, the district court denied E.P.T.’s request for a continuance
and adjudicated him delinquent. In doing so, it concluded that adjudication was in his best
interests and managed the risks to public safety. The district court also ordered E.P.T.’s
disposition to include probation, regi stration as a predatory sex offender, 5 completion of

to the requirements for reha bilitation that the offender must meet, and may include
out-of-home placement and appropriate treatment. See id. at subd. 2; see also Minn.
Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 1 (2016).
5 While the district court’s order does not indi cate for how long E.P.T. must register, we
read the statute to require ten years of registration. See Minn. Stat. § 243.166,
subd. 6(a), (d) (2016) (requiring an individu al adjudicated delinquent for the relevant
offenses to register for ten years unless the individual has been previously adjudicated for
an offense requiring registration).

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sex-offender treatment, and other conditions re lating to contact with children. E.P.T.
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
E.P.T. challenges the district court’s order adjudicating him delinquent, arguing that
the record lacked evid ence that adjudication was in his be st interests and that he posed a
risk to public safety. We review a district court’s determination of whether to continue an
adjudication in a delinquency proceeding for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of J.L.Y.,
596 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. App. 1999), review dismissed (Minn. Feb. 15, 2000). And
district courts have br oad discretion to decide whether to adjudicate. In re Welfare of
J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).
In a juvenile-delinquency proceeding, a district court has two options with regard to
adjudication. It may adjudicate a juvenile delinquent or continue the case without
adjudication. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A court may continue without
adjudication when it is in the best interests of the child and doing so does not harm public
safety. Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7(a); see also Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 15.05,
subd. 4(A). But in all other cases, the statute authorizes a district court to adjudicate the
juvenile delinquent. See Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7.
At the disposition hearing, E.P.T. argued for a continuance without adjudication,
under rule 15.05. He explained this was ap propriate because his parents were supporting
his needs and protecting the victim, and he a nd the victim were doing well. The county
argued against a continuance because of the se riousness of the crime, E.P.T.’s apparent
minimization of his conduct in the evaluati ons, the anticipated length of his treatment

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programming, and some concern that the family might pull E.P.T. from treatment early if
he was no longer ordered by th e court to participate. But the district court denied the
request for a continuance and made explicit findings that adjudication was in E.P.T.’s best
interests and mitigated safety risks to the public. In its conclusion, the district court
summarized:
The lesser restrictive alternative of a stay of
adjudication was considered and rejected primarily because it
cannot meet the many needs of the [c]hild. Secondarily, a stay
of adjudication cannot reasonably assure the safety of the
public. The [c]ourt concludes th a t i n t h i s c a s e a s t a y o f
adjudication is inimical to public safety.

The record thoroughly supports the dist rict court’s conclu sion. E.P.T. has
significant ongoing mental-health needs and used grooming behaviors to continue abusing
his sister and hide it for over a year. His fi ve-year-old sister was particularly vulnerable.
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The abuse occurred in the family’s home while his mother was in another room, which
presents serious community protection concerns if he returns to his family without other
precautions. And E.P.T. withdrew from the first sex-offender-treatment program over
concerns it was too difficult. In light of thes e facts, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that adjudication is in E.P.T.’s best interests because it best serves
his rehabilitation needs. And the facts the district court considered—the seriousness of the
offense, his opportunistic conduct, the impact on the victim, and the culpability of E.P.T.—
are all indicators that a continuance without adjudication would pose a risk to public safety.

6 We also note that the victim suffers from pos ttraumatic stress disorder and is in therapy
because of the abuse.

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Still, E.P.T. contends that the district court erred in its adjudication decision because
it adopted the state’s assertion that adjudication was necessary to ensure his completion of
sex-offender treatment. Specifically, his treat ment program was expected to take longer
than a year and a continuance without adjudication is statutorily required to be shorter. See
Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7 (describing how a continua nce without adjudication is
limited to only two 180-day peri ods). But E.P.T.’s parents likely sparked this concern
when they pulled him from his first treatment program after only a month of programming,
deeming it too difficult for him. E.P.T. tried to assuage any fear that he may discontinue
treatment again by noting that the family’s involvement with child protection can provide
oversight to ensure E.P.T. completes his program. But the purposes of delinquency and
child protection are different and the family’s continued child prot ection involvement is
also not a certainty. And regardless of the concern about E.P.T. actually completing his
programming, the district court did not solely base its adjudication decision on the length
of time necessary for treatment.7
In sum, substantial evidence supports the district court’s concerns for public safety
and the child’s best interests. Thus, E.P.T.’s statement that “no facts” in the record support
a concern for public safety or the child’s best interests is incorrect. Because E.P.T. did not
meet the statutory criteria to justify a con tinuance without adjudication and the record

7 E.P.T. also criticized a deferential review of matters like this, contending that it is unfair
for this court to “[abandon] any authority to review a district court’s order refusing to stay
adjudication.” But while the abuse-of-discretion standard is deferential, it does not prevent
our review.

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contains evidence that supports the district court’s conclusion, the court did not abuse its
discretion in adjudicating E.P.T. delinquent.
Affirmed.