Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Christgau v. Fine 27 N.W.2d 193
- Stassen v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC 814 N.W.2d 25
- Skarhus v. Davanni's Inc. 721 N.W.2d 340
- Kangas v. Industrial Welders & Machinists, Inc. 814 N.W.2d 97
- Kennedy v. American Paper Recycling Corp. 714 N.W.2d 738
- Rowe v. Department of Employment & Economic Development 704 N.W.2d 191
- Smith v. Masterson Personnel, Inc. 483 N.W.2d 111
- Cole v. Holiday Inns, Inc. 347 N.W.2d 72
- Johnson v. Metropolitan Medical Center 395 N.W.2d 380
- King v. University of Minnesota 387 N.W.2d 675
- Godbout v. Department of Employment & Economic Development 827 N.W.2d 799
- Jackson ex rel. Sorenson v. Options Residential, Inc. 896 N.W.2d 549
Opinion text
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0621
In the Matter of: Tracy Toulouse.
Filed October 21, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge
Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 36143453-3
Tracy Toulouse, Minnetonka, Minnesota (pro se relator)
Anne B. Froelich, Department of Employment and Economic Develop ment, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent department)
Considered and decided by Rodenb erg, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and
Stauber, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by app ointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, rela tor Tracy Toulouse challenges t he decision of an
unemployment-law judge (ULJ) dismissing her unemployment-benefi t s a p p e a l a s
untimely. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator applied for unemployment benefits with respondent Depar tment of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED mailed a dete rmination of
ineligibility to relator on Decem ber 26, 2017, informing her th a t s h e w a s i n e l i g i b l e t o
receive unemployment benefits. The letter further indicated th at the ineligibility
determination “will become final unless an appeal is filed by Tuesday, January 16, 2018.”
On March 5, 2019, nearly 14 months after the statutory deadlin e, relator submitted
her appeal to DEED. She provided no indication that she made any earlier appeal attempt,
stating only that, at the time the appeal was due in January 2018, she “was experiencing an
unexpected family crisis while working, and caring for [her] daughter.”
A ULJ dismissed the March 5, 2019 appeal as untimely, conclude d that the
determination of ineligibility was final, and concluded that th e ULJ did not have
jurisdiction to issue a decision on the merits. Relator requested that the ULJ’s decision be
reconsidered. She stated that, although she had not changed addresses, she did not receive
the determination of ineligibility in the mail because of issue s with her mail carrier. The
ULJ affirmed the earlier decision.
This appeal followed.
3
D E C I S I O N
Relator argues that the ULJ erred in dismissing her March 5, 20 19 appeal. She
asserts that she did not receive actual notice of the determina tion of ineligibility and that
she had “good cause” for not filing a timely appeal. Although relator challenges the
underlying determination of ineligibility, when a ULJ dismisses an appeal as untimely, the
only question before this court is whether the ULJ erred in dis missing the appeal.
Christgau v. Fine, 27 N.W.2d 193, 199 (Minn. 1947).
The timeliness of an appeal is a question of law, which we rev iew de novo. Stassen
v. Lone Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC , 814 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. App. 2012). When
reviewing a ULJ’s findings of fact, we refrain from disturbing those factual findings when
the evidence substantially sustains them. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344
(Minn. App. 2006). We may reverse or modify the decision of a U L J i f a r e l a t o r ’ s
substantial rights were prejudice d “because the findings, infer ences, conclusion, or
decision” are “affected by other error of law” or “unsupported by substantial evidence in
view of the entire record as submitted.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d)(4), (5) (2018).
“A determination of . . . ineligibility is final unless an appeal is filed by the applicant
. . . within 20 calendar days” after the determination was sent. Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd.
2(f) (2018). If an appeal is made by electronic transmission, it is considered filed the day
it is received by DEED. Minn. Stat. § 268.035, subd. 17 (2018) . If submitted by mail, it
is considered filed on the date of the postmark. Id. A written statement delivered or mailed
to DEED that could be reasonably interpreted to mean that the a pplicant disagrees with a
specific decision is deemed an a ppeal. Minn. Stat. § 268.103, subd. 2 (2018). Specific
4
words need not be used for the written statement to be consider ed an appeal. Id. “All
information requested by the commissioner when an appeal is fil ed by electronic
transmission must be supplied or the communication does not con stitute an appeal.” Id.,
subd. 1(c) (2018).
A “ULJ must dismiss an untimely appeal from an eligibility determination for lack
of jurisdiction” if a party fails to appeal within the statutor y time provided. Kangas v.
Indus. Welders & Machinists, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Minn. App. 2012). The ULJ may
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the appeal was timely or may summarily
dismiss the appeal if it is clearly untimely. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(c) (2018).
The 20-day statutory deadline for appealing from unemployment-benefits decisions
is “absolute and unambiguous.” Kennedy v. Am. Paper Recycling Corp., 714 N.W.2d 738,
379-40 (Minn. App. 2006). Mitiga ting circumstances create no e xtensions or exceptions
to the statutory deadline. Rowe v. Dep’t of Emp’t & Econ. Dev. , 704 N.W.2d 191, 195
(Minn. App. 2005); Smith v. Masterson Pers., Inc. , 483 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Minn. App.
1992); Cole v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 72, 73 (Minn. App. 1984).
Relator argues that she did not receive actual notice of the determination in the mail.
The record reflects that the determination was mailed to relato r at the address she gave to
DEED, and relator agrees that her address did not change. The ULJ found that “the event
log shows that [relator] did not change her address” listed on her unemployment benefits
account, and concluded that DEED sent the determination to the address on file. See Minn.
Stat. § 268.032(b) (2018) (stating that if any required determination issued is sent by mail
to an applicant, the determination “must be sent to the last known address”).
5
Actual notice is not required for the statutory time period to begin to run. Johnson
v. Metro. Med. Ctr., 395 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Minn. App. 1986). Because DEED mailed the
determination to relator’s listed address on December 26, 2017, and relator filed her appeal
on March 5, 2019, 14 months late r, her appeal was untimely rega rdless of whether she
received actual notice of the ineligibility determination.
Relator argues that she had “good cause” for filing an untimely appeal because she
received “conflicting notices sen t by the unemployment agency d uring the time frame in
question” and because she was “experiencing an unexpected family crisis” at the time the
a p p e a l w a s d u e . T h e s t a t u t o r y d e a d l i n e s a r e c l e a r a n d u n a m b i g uous. There are no
exceptions to the rule. See King v. Univ. of Minn. , 387 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Minn. App.
1986) (noting that “statutes designating the time for appeal . . . should be strictly construed,
regardless of mitigating circumstances”). Even if we were to consider whether relator had
“good cause,” her argument is unfounded. When relator appealed in 2019, she did not
claim that she had not received the determination of ineligibil ity. To the contrary, she
attributed the late filing to a “family crisis” at the time the appeal was due. We see nothing
in the record to explain why, if she had never received the det ermination of ineligibility,
she attempted to appeal from that determination. And nothing i n the record shows that
relator submitted anything to DEED before her March 5, 2019 app eal to indicate her
disagreement with the ULJ’s ineligibility determination.
Relator also asserts that her constitutional due-process rights were violated because
she was not personally served with the ineligibility determination, citing Godbout v. Dep’t
of Emp’t and Econ. Dev., 827 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. App. 2013), in support of her argument.
6
In Godbout, we did not impose a personal-service requirement but instead required DEED
to provide “clear notice to the unemployment benefit recipient of the potential
consequences of failing to maint ain a current mailing address w ith DEED for four years
after the receipt of benefits.” Id. at 803. The rec ord here reflects that DEED directed
relator to keep the address on her account up to date for at le ast four years. Because this
court has determined in a published opinion that personal service is not required, relator’s
argument is without merit. See Jackson v. Options Residential , 896 N.W.2d 549, 553
(Minn. App. 2017) (holding that “ we are bound by precedent esta blished in . . . our own
published opinions”).
Regardless of the merits of re lator’s challenge to the underlying determination, she
failed to file her appeal within 20 days of the determination o f ineligibility. The ULJ did
not err in dismissing her appeal as untimely.
Affirmed.