Benjamin L. Tapia,

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STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-0627

Court of Appeals Gildea, C.J.

Benjamin L. Tapia,

Appellant,
Filed: October 21, 2020
vs. Office of Appellate Courts

Dakota County Sheriff, Tim Leslie,

Respondent.

________________________

Steven K. Budke, Leverson Budke, P.A., Eagan, Minnesota, for appellant.

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Helen R. Brosnahan , Assistant Dakota
County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota, for respondent.
________________________

S Y L L A B U S
1. A 2014 amendment that removed the offense of motor vehicle theft from the
definition of “crime of violence” in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2018), applies to
appellant’s 2017 application for a permit to carry.
2. Appellant has established that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering
respondent to issue appellant a permit to carry.
Reversed; writ of mandamus issued.

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O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
The question in this case is whether appellant Benjamin Tapia, who was adjudicated
delinquent for theft of a motor vehicle in 1998, is eligible to possess a firearm because the
Legislature in 2014 removed that offense from the definition of “crime of violence” in
Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2018). Respondent Dakota County Sheriff voided Tapia’s
permit to carry a firearm upon learning of his 1998 adjudication. Tapia petitioned the
Dakota County District Court for a writ of mandamus to order the Sheriff to issue a permit.
The district court denied Tapia’s petition and a divided court of appeals affirmed. Because
the 2014 amendment applies to Tapia, we conclude that he is entitled to a permit . We
further conclude that Tapia has satisfied all the requirements for a writ of mandamus. We
therefore reverse the court of appeals and grant the petition for a writ of mandamus.
FACTS
This case arises out of the denial of a permit to carry a pistol. A brief discussion of
Minnesota law regarding permits to carry is helpful to understanding the facts of this case.
Minnesota residents may apply for a permit to carry with the sheriff of the county in which
the applicant resides. Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2(a) (2018). Subject to exceptions not
at issue here, the sheriff must issue a permit if the applicant meets certain requirements.
Id., subd. 2(b) (2018). One of these requirements is that the applicant must not be
“prohibited from possessing a firearm under . . . section[] . . . 624.713.” Id., subd.
2(b)(4)(v). Section 624.713 makes certain people ineligible to possess a firearm (“an
ineligible person”), including those who have been convicted or adjudicated delinquent of

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a “crime of violence.” Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2018). “Crime of violence,” in
turn, is defined as a “felony conviction” of an offense listed “and an attempt to commit any
of these offenses.” Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5.
In 1998, Tapia was adjudicated delinquent of theft of a motor vehicle. At the time,
this offense was included as a “crime of violence.” Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (1996).
In 2014, the Legislature removed theft of a motor vehicle from the definition of “crime of
violence” (“the 2014 Amendment”). See Act of May 16, 2014, ch. 260, § 1, 2014 Minn.
Laws 937, 937 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2018)). In total,
the 2014 Amendment added three crimes and removed three crimes from the definition of
crime of violence . Id. The 2014 Amendment concludes by stating: “This section is
effective August 1, 2014, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date.” Id.
On March 21, 2017, Tapia applied to the Dakota County Sheriff’s Office for a
permit to carry a firearm. At this time, the Sheriff did not have access to juvenile records.
On April 19, 2017, the Sheriff issued Tapia a permit. The following year, the Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension granted the Sheriff access to juvenile records through its Gun
Permit Background Check database. On July 17, 2018, the Sh eriff sent Tapia a letter
voiding his permit based on his 1998 juvenile adjudication.
Tapia petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Sheriff to issue a permit. The
district court denied Tapia’s petition and a divided court of appeals affirmed. Tapia v.
Leslie, 939 N.W.2d 320 (Minn. App. 2020) . The court of appeals interpreted the 2014
Amendment to mean “a crime that was removed from the list but occurred before August 1,

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2014[] is still considered a crime of violence under the statutory scheme.” Id. at 323. We
granted Tapia’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
We must decide whether Tapia is entitled to a permit to carry a firearm. And if so,
we must then determine whether Tapia is entitled to a writ of mandamus. We address each
issue in turn.
I.
In order to determine whether Tapia is entitled to a carry permit, we need to interpret
the 2014 Amendment. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v.
Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016). We “interpret statutory language to
ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Bowen, 921 N.W.2d 763, 765
(Minn. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018). Our review
begins by determining whether the statute , on its face , is ambiguous. State v. Townsend,
941 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. 2020). A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than
one reasonable interpretation. Id. If the Legislature’s intent is apparent from the plain and
unambiguous language of the statute, we do not engage in any further statutory
construction. Id.
As we previously explained, whether Tapia meets the requirements to receive a
permit to carry depends on whether Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), prohibits him from
possessing a firearm because he was adjudicated delinquent of a crime of violence. While
theft of a motor vehicle was included in the definition of crime of violence in 1998 when
Tapia w as adjudicated delinquent for that offense, see Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5

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(1996), the Legislature removed it from the definition in the 2014 Amendment. See Act of
May 16, 2014, Ch. 260, § 1, 2014 Minn. Laws 937, 937 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 624.712,
subd. 5 (2018)). Determining whether the 2014 Amendment applies to Tapia ’s 2017
application for a permit to carry requires us to interpret the effective date language of the
2014 Amendment, which reads as follows:
This section is effective August 1, 2014, and applies to crimes committed on
or after that date.

Id.
This language is unambiguous as it applies to Tapia. It states that the 2014
Amendment “is effective August 1, 2014.” Id. Tapia applied for a permit in 2017. Thus,
Tapia’s application must be reviewed under the definition of “crime of violence” in effect
at the time he applied. Because the definition does not include theft of a motor vehicle,
Tapia is entitled to a permit.
In urging us to rule otherwise, the Sheriff asks us to focus only on the second part
of the effective-date language: “and applies to crimes committed on or after [August 1,
2014].” Id. According to t he Sheriff, Tapia cannot benefit from the 2014 Amendment
because his “crime”—the 1998 juvenile adjudication—occurred before A ugust 1, 2014 .
Essentially, the Sheriff interprets the word “crimes” in the effective-date provision to mean
“crime of violence.”1 In other words, the Sheriff argues that to take advantage of the 2014

1 Though not cited by the parties, some support for this reading may be found in a
footnote in State v. Martin, 941 N.W.2d 119, 123 n.4 (Minn. 2020) (interpreting identical
effective date language as applying to a predicate sexual assault offense and not the

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Amendment, one has to commit a crime of viole nce on or after August 1, 2014. 2 We
disagree.
In interpreting statutes, we “do not examine different provisions in isolation.” State
v. Gaiovnik , 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011). Rather, we read “ words and
sentences . . . in light of their context .” Id. Context is especially important when
interpreting a statutory amendment because an “amendment shall be construed as merging
into the original law . . . and the remainder of the original enactment and the amendment
shall be read together.” Minn. Stat. § 645.31, subd. 1 (2018).
Here, the 2014 Amendment modifies a definition, “ crime of violence,” found in
Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5. And the definition of crime of violence, like all of the
definitions in section 624.712, applies to “sections 624. 711 to 624.717.” Minn. Stat.
§ 624.712, subd. 1. The “crimes” therefore that are referenced in the effective -date
language are the crimes to which the definition applies. For example, in section 624.713,

substantive failure-to-register offense). Martin is not helpful here, however, because the
statutory issue we address in this case was not raised in Martin.

2 The Sheriff also argues that the 2014 Amendment does not apply retroactively and
thus cannot change the status of Tapia’s 1998 adjudication. Tapia, however, does not argue
that the 2014 Amendment retroactively appli es to anything that occurred before the 2014
Amendment was enacted. Instead, he argues that the 2014 amendment applies to his
current eligibility to possess a firearm. See State v. Schluter , 653 N.W.2d 787, 790–92
(Minn. App. 2002) (ruling that an amendment adding an offense to the “crime of violence”
definition meant that people previously convicted of that offense became “ineligible
persons,” and that this revision was not an ex post facto violation because it merely changed
the current “status” of felo ns), rev. denied, (Minn. Feb. 18, 2003) . The Sheriff asks us to
distinguish Schluter because it involved a criminal conviction for being an ineligible person
in possession of a firearm, while Tapia’s case is a civil case involving a permit to carry.
Because the same statutes govern Schluter and Tapia’s eligibility to possess firearms, the
Sheriff’s argument is unpersuasive.

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it is a crime to possess a firearm if one is ineligible to do so. Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 2
(listing penalties for felony and gross misdemeanor offenses). The amended definition of
crime of violence applies to these possession crimes if they are c ommitted on or after
August 1, 2014.
The Sheriff’ s interpretation is unreasonable because it ignores the context of the
statute. In the specific context of the statutes at issue here, the word “crimes” plainly refers
to possession crimes and other crimes within sections 624.711 -.717; it does not refer t o
crimes of violence. Accordingly, the effective-date language of the 2014 Amendment does
not prohibit application of the new definition of crime of violence to persons convicted of
a crime of violence before the effective date.3
The 2014 Amendment “is effective August 1, 2014.” See Act of May 16, 2014,
Ch. 260, § 1, 2014 Minn. Laws 937, 937. Tapia applied for a permit to carry in 2017, and
we review his entitlement to a permit under the definition of crime of violence in effect at
the time he applied for that permit. That definition does not include theft of a motor
vehicle. We therefore hold that Minn. Stat. § 624.713 does not prohibit Tapia from
possessing a firearm because subdivision 5 of section 624.712 no longer designates the
offense for which he was adjudicated delinquent as a crime of violence.

3 We recognize that the Legislature routinely uses effective date language similar to
that used here in amending Minnesota statutes. The result here is driven by the statutory
context of the 2014 Amendment, and we express no opinion on how similar language used
in other contexts ought to be interpreted.

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II.
We now turn to the issue of whether Tapia is entitled to a writ of mandamus
directing the issuance of his permit to carry. We review de novo the decision on a writ of
mandamus when the district court based that decision solely on a legal determination.
Madison Equities, Inc. v. Crockarell, 889 N.W.2d 568, 571 (Minn. 2017).
The parties dispute what standard should govern the issuance of a writ in this case.
Tapia points to a statute that allows persons “aggrieved by denial or revocation of a permit”
to carry to petition for a writ of mandamus from the district court . Minn. Stat. § 624.714,
subd. 12(a)–(b). Under that statute, the district court:
must issue its writ of mandamus directing that the permit be issued . . . unless
the sheriff establishes by clear and convincing evidence . . . that the applicant
is disquali fied [under subd. 2(b)] . . . or that there exists a substantial
likelihood that the applicant is a danger to self or the public if authorized t o
carry a pistol under a permit.

Id., subd. 12(b) (the “12(b) standard”).
The Sheriff points to Madison Equities, Inc. and argues that a writ is improper
because Tapia has another “adequate legal remedy.” 889 N.W.2d at 571. Under the
standard discussed in Madison Equities,4 a writ of mandamus is proper only if the petitioner
can show that “(1) the [official] failed to perform an official duty clearly imposed by law,
(2) which caused a public wron g specifically injurious to [petitioner], and (3) for which
there is no other adequate legal remedy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

4 Madison Equities did not establish this standard, but we refer to it as the “ Madison
Equities standard” here for ease of reference.

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Which standard to apply—the Madison Equities standard or the 12(b) standard—is
an issue of first impression for our court, and the parties do not clearly address the question
in their briefs. But we need not resolve this issue, because we conclude that Tapia is
entitled to mandamus relief under both standards.
The Sheriff has challenged Tapia ’s qualification under the 12(b) standard only on
the basis that Tapia is ineligible to possess a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 724.713. See
Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd s. 2(b), 12(b). Because we determined that Tapia is not an
ineligible person, we conclude that the Sheriff has not established that he is disqualified
and that Tapia is entitled to a writ of mandamus under the 12(b) standard.
Tapia is also entitled to a writ of mandamus under the Madison Equities standard.
Because Tapia is entitled to a permit to carry, the Sheriff failed to perform an official duty
clearly imposed by law when he voided Tapia ’s permit. See Minn. Stat. § 624.714
subd. 2(b) (stating that the sheriff “must issue a permit to an applicant if the person” meets
the statutory requirements (emphasis added)). Tapia was injured when the Sheriff voided
his permit because he is prohibited from going certain places with a pistol without a permit.
See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 1 (2018). The only element seriously at issue under the
Madison Equities standard is whether Tapia has an adequate remedy at law.
The Sheriff asserts that Tapia has an adequate alternative remedy because he may
petition a district court for restoration of his rights under Minn. Stat. § 609.165 subd. 1d
(2018) (the “Restoration Process”). Under the Restoration Process, “person[s] prohibited
by state law from” possessing a firearm may petition the court to restore their rights and
“[t]he court may grant the relief sought if the person sho ws good cause to do so.” Id.

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(emphasis added). In support, the Sheriff submitted three restoration petitions in which
persons similarly situated to Tapia successfully petitioned the district court for restoration.
Nonetheless, the Restoration Process is an inadequate remedy for a number of reasons.
As a preliminary matter, the Restoration Process does not even apply to a person in
Tapia’s position. Tapia is no longer an ineligible person by virtue of the 2014 Amendment;
thus, he is not a “person prohi bited by state law” from possessing a firearm as required
under the Restoration Process . See Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d . The Restoration
Process simply addresses a different situation; one in which the petitioner actually is
prohibited from possessing a firearm . Because the Restoration Process does not apply to
Tapia, it is not an adequate alternative to a writ of mandamus.
Moreover, the alternative relief must “actually compel the performance of the duty
refused.” State ex rel. Minneapolis Threshing -Mach. Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Meeker C nty.,
79 N.W. 960, 962 (Minn. 1899). The Restoration Process does not compel the performance
of the Sheriff’s duty to issue a permit.
Madison Equities supports our conclusion that the Restorati on Process is
inadequate. In Madison Equities, we ruled that a motion to reconsider a district court’s
stay of judgment was an inadequate alternative to a writ of mandamus because there was
“no guarantee that the district court would have granted Madison Equities leave to file the
motion.” 889 N.W.2d at 574. Similarly, the Restoration Process does not guarantee Tapia
a permit because the statute gives the court discretion to deny the petition. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.165 subd. 1d (stating that “[t]he court may grant the relief sought”).

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In sum, Tapia is entitled to a writ of mandamus under the 12(b) standard and under
the Madison Equities standard. We therefore reverse the court of appeals and grant Tapia’s
petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the Dakota County Sheriff to issue Tapia a permit
to carry.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and grant
Tapia’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
Reversed; writ of prohibition issued.