In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. N. L. and W.-S. D., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0634

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. N. L. and W.-S. D., Parents.

Filed October 7, 2019
Affirmed
Hooten, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-JV-18-911

Samuel Johnson, Johnson Brothers Law, Lindstrom, Minnesota (for appellant J.N.L.)

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kathryn M. Timm, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent Anoka County)

Susan Drabek, Circle Pines, Minnesota (for respondent W.-S.D.)

Connie Krantz, Stillwater, Minnesota (Guardian ad Litem)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
HOOTEN, Judge
Appellant-mother requests the reversal of the order terminating her parental rights
(TPR) on the basis that the district court failed to complete the TPR trial within 30 days,
as required by Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.02, subd. 1(c). We affirm.
FACTS

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
Mother has two children who are subject to this child -protection appeal . The
children’s father consented to their adoption and does not appeal the district court’s
decision.
In January 2018, Anoka County Social Services placed the children in emergenc y
protective care after father called the Blaine Police Department to r eport that he was
having mental -health issues and cou ld not care for his children. When police officers
could not reach mother, and because it had been two days since mother left the c hildren
with father, the children were placed in emergency protective care.
The district court adjudicated the children in need of protection or services and
approved an out -of-home placement plan on January 25, 2018 . Mother’s case plan
required her to remain sober, address her chemical dependency and mental health issues,
and acquire and main tain stable housing. Over the course of the following months,
mother failed to submit to random urinalysis tests as required, failed to follow thr ough
with drug -patch monitoring, failed to attend inpatient treatment as recommended, and
failed to attend a psychological assessment. She admitted that she used
methamphetamine daily. After she made little progress on her case plan, the county
petitioned the district court to terminate mother’s parental rights.
The TPR trial began on November 14, 2018, took place over four days in the
following four months, and concluded on March 20, 2019. After the first day of trial, t he
district court continued the trial to Decembe r 12 , 2018, and left the record open for
mother to submit a parenting assessment. By the second day of trial , mother had not
submitted the parenting assessment. The district court noted that it had “a couple of cases
3
going on . . . so please be as flexible as you can” when scheduling the next trial date . At
the start of the third day of the trial, on January 9, 2019, m other requested a continuance
in order to seek new counsel. When the district court denied her request for a
continuance, mother de cided to retain her attorney. When scheduling the next trial date,
the district court asked mother how much time she needed to complete the parenting
assessment. Mother requested an additional 30 days, and the district court set the final
trial date for March 20, 2019.
Following the final trial date, the district court terminated mother’s parental rights.
Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Mother does not challenge the district court’s decision to terminate her parental
rights on the merits. Instead, she argues that she is entitled to a new trial because her
TPR trial occurred over more than 30 days.
The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure provide, “Unless otherwise
provided by these rules, a trial regarding a termination of parental rights matter . . . shall
be concluded within thirty (30) days from the date of commencement of the trial and
whenever possible should be over consecutive days.” Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.02, subd.
1(c). The rules also provide:
The court may, either on its ow n motion or upon motion of a
party or the county attorney, continue or adjourn a trial to a
later date upon written findings or oral findings made on the
record that a continuance is necessary for the protection of the
child, for accumulation or presentati on of evidence or
witnesses, to protect the rights of a party, or for other good
cause shown, so long as the permanency time requirements
set forth in these rules are not delayed.
4

Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.02, subd. 2. This court reviews de novo t he interpretation of a
juvenile-protection rule. In re Welfare of R.S., 805 N.W.2d 44, 48–49 (Minn. 2011).
In this case, mother argues that this court should reverse the termination of her
parental rights and remand for a new trial. Her argument fails for three reasons. First,
mother points to no authority to support her argument that the remedy for failing to
comply with the timing requirement is a new trial. Indeed, not only do t he rules
themselves not provide a remedy , here because mother herself sough t continuances and
delays of the trial, she seems to be arguing that the district court erred by granting her
requests to extend the proceeding.
Second, although the length of mother’s trial was beyond what is allowed by the
rules, mother does not challe nge any of the district court’s findings leading to the
termination of her parental rights. And she does not identify how the extended duration
of her trial caused her any harm or how a new trial would remedy any such harm. See In
re Welfare of D.J.N., 5 68 N.W.2d 170, 176 (Minn. App. 1997) (refusing to reverse
termination of parental rights for harmless error). Moreover, g ranting mother’s request
for a new trial would only further frustrate the policy of promptly resolving child-
protection cases. See In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Minn.
2014) (stating that proceedings involving endangered children “are expedited because a
quick resolution is essential for the best interests of children w ho are in need of
protection” and that “[t]he principle that child protection cases are to receive priority and
be resolved quickly is a thoroughly engrained policy”).
5
Third, while the rules provide that a trial shall conclude within 30 days of
commencement, the rules also provide that a district court may grant continuances when
necessary. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.02, subd. 2. Here, t he district court granted three
continuances. The record shows that these continuances in part were due to the district
court’s schedule conflicts. But the recor d also reveals that the district court granted a
continuance based upon mother’s need to complete a parenting assessment and her
request for an additional 30 days to complete the assessment. The district court approved
mother’s request, giving her additio nal time to c omplete the parenting assessment.
Although mother never submitted the parenting assessment, the district court ’s grant of
the continuance allowed mother the opportunity to present evidence in defense of her
parental rights. See Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 39.02, subd. 2. On this record, we cannot say
that the district court’s grant of the continuances was improper under rule 39.02.1
Affirmed.

1 Effective September 1, 2019, the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure
were amended, and those amendments apply to pending cases. Order Promulgating
Amendments to Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure , No. ADM10 -8041 (Minn. May
13, 2019). The amended rules were not in effect when the district court made the
decisions being challenged on appeal and are not cited in this opinion. Mother has not
argued or established that the result would be different under the amended rules. See
Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 5 2019 advisory comm. cmt . (indicating that amendments “are not
intended t o substantively change the rule’s meaning” and courts “may grant a
continuance in appropriate circumstances,” but “should not grant a continuance that
would defeat the federal and state time requirements for permanency determinations”).
Because appellant has not established that the amen ded rules would require us to reach a
different result, and because granting a new trial would further delay the permanency
determination in this case, we conclude that a new trial is not appropriate.