State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0643

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Alonzo Richardson,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2020
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-5695

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kirk M. Anderson, Anderson Law Firm, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
A Ramsey County jury found Robert Alonzo Richardson guilty of first-degree
assault based on evidence that he slashed another man’s face with a razor blade during an
altercation on a light-rail platform. Richardson testified that he acted in self -defense, and

2
his attorney urged the jury to find him not guilty for that reason, but the jury return ed a
verdict of guilty. On appeal, Richardson makes four arguments for reversal. We conclude
that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Richardson did not act in self-defense, that the
district court did not err by excluding evidence of the victim’s blood-alcohol concentration,
that the district court did not err by giving the jury a supplemental instruction after the
foreperson indicated that the jury was deadlocked, and that the district court did not err by
denying Richardson’s motion for a downward durational or dispositional departure from
the presumptive sentencing range. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from an incident on a light-rail platform at the Capitol/Rice Street
station d uring the evening of January 31, 2017. A video -recording created by a
surveillance camera captured the following: Richardson walked along the platform past
two men who were standing under a shelter. Richardson stopped to talk with the two men
for approximately one minute and then walked away , continuing in the same direction in
which he previously had been walking. One of the two men, F.B., continued talking to or
yelling at Richardson as he walked away. Approximately 20 seconds later, Robinson
suddenly turned around and walked quickly back toward F.B. and his friend . Robinson
and the two men scuffled . After approximately 30 seconds of fighting, the three men
parted, and Richardson walked away while blood dripped from F.B.’s face.
The state charged Richardson with first -degree assault, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.221, subd. 1 (2016). The case was tried to a jury over three days in May 2018. The
state introduced video-recordings into evidence and called five witnesses: F. B., two S t.

3
Paul police officers, a Metro Transit police officer, and the physician who treated F.B. for
his injuries shortly after the incident.
F.B. testified that he dr ank vodka on the day of the incident . He admitted that he
antagonized Richardson and asked Richardson to fight him. He also admitted that he threw
the first punch but said that he did so after Richardson pushed him. The Metro Transit
police officer testified about his interview of Richardson after the incident. Richardson
told the officer that he approached the two men and asked them where he could buy a ticket
and that one of the men said that he wanted to fight him. Richardson told the officer that,
while he was walking away in search of a ticket -vending machine, he turned around and
walked back toward the two men “due to what they were saying, the name calling. ”
Richardson told the officer that he removed a razor blade from his coat pocket because he
was afraid of F.B. and the other man. The physician who treated F.B. testified that F.B.
suffered a deep facial laceration and nerve damage. He also noted that F.B. was “incredibly
drunk” when he was being treated.
During the defense case, Richardson testified that he asked F.B. and his friend where
he coul d buy a ticket when F.B. began insulting him. He testified that , after a brie f
conversation, he continued walking on the platform until he saw a sign pointing in the
opposite direction toward a ticket-vending machine, which caused him to turn around and
walk back toward where F.B. and his friend were still standing . Richardson testified that
he did not want a confrontation with the two men but anticipated it . Richardson testified
that F.B. threw the first punch at him and that he swung back. He testified that F.B.’s friend
joined the confrontation and hit him from behind , which made him believe that the two

4
men might throw him onto the light-rail tracks. Richardson testified that he had a razor
blade in his pocket at the time of the altercation but did not remember when he reached for
it. He testified that he used the razor blade because he was being attacked by two men and
was afraid.
At Richardson’s request, t he district court instructed the jury on the law of self -
defense. The jury began its deliberations at 3:10 p.m. on the third day of trial. On the
afternoon of the following day, which was a Friday , the jury foreperson submitted a note
saying that the jury was deadlocked. The district court instructed the jury to continue its
deliberations. Later that day, the foreperson submitted another note saying that the jurors
were still at an impasse and did not expect any change in their positions. The district court
told the jurors to recess for the weekend and to continue their deliberations the following
week. On the following Monday, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
Before sentencing, Richardson moved for a downward dispositional and durational
departure from the presumptive sentencing range. The district court denied the motion and
imposed a presumptive sentence of 122 months of imprisonment. Richardson appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Richardson first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
He does not contend that he did not assault F.B. ; r ather, he contends that the state ’s
evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that h e did not act in self -
defense.

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A person is guilty of first -degree assault if he “assaults another and inflicts great
bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1. But a person may use reasonable force
against another person “in resisting . . . an offense against the person. ” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.06, subd. 1(3) (20 16). A person may use reasonable force in self-defense if four
circumstances are present:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation by the defendant,
(2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he or another
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, (3) the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief, and (4) the
absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid danger.

State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). “The degree of force used in self-
defense must not exceed that which appears to be necessary to a reasonable person under
similar circumstances.” State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. 1997).
A defendant bears the burden of introducing evidence to support a claim of self -
defense. Id. If the defendant has satisfied that burden , “the state has the burden of
disproving one or more of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, this court undertakes “a
painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, was s ufficient” to support the conviction. State v.
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). This court “must assume
the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State
v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 384 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). We will “not disturb
the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the

6
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the
defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100.
Richardson contends that F.B. was drunk and that he tried to walk away from F.B.
and his friend but that he needed to walk past the two men a second time to get to the ticket-
vending machine. He contends that he tried to avoid the two men as he walked past but
that F.B. “positioned himself” in Richardson’s path and punched him. He contends that he
“tried to defend himself with his hands” but was fighting with two men and feared that they
might push him onto the light-rail tracks. Richardson does not specifically identify which
element or elements of self-defense the state did not disprove.
In response, the state contends that the jury likely rejected Richardson’s theory of
self-defense for two reasons. The state first contends that Richardson could have retreated
from the confrontation and avoided any injury to himself. The state also contends that
Richardson did not use reasonable force because F.B. and his friend did not have weapons
but Richardson used a razor blade to cause multiple, deep lacerations, wh ich caused
permanent injuries.
In analyzing the evidence, we “must assume the jury believed the stat e’s witnesses
and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 384. Accordingly,
we need not credit Richardson’s testimony that he believed that his life was in danger and
that the only means of protecting himself was to use a razor blade on F.B.’s face. Having
considered the witnesses ’ testimony, and having reviewed the video -recordings of the
interactions between Richardson and F.B. and his friend, we have no difficulty concluding
that the state’s evidence is sufficient to disprove Richardson’s theory of self-defense.

7
The evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to find that all of the elements of self-
defense are not present. The surveillance video-recording shows that Richardson walked
away fro m F.B. after their initial conversation but suddenly turned around and quickly
walked back toward F.B. and his friend in a manner that clearly suggested that a physical
confrontation was about to occur. The video evidence is consistent with the testimony of
an investigating police officer, who testified that Richardson told him that he turned around
because of “the words that were being said. ” The evidence does not indicate that
Richardson did not engage in aggression or provocation, does not indicate that he actually
and reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm
before the physical fighting occurred , and does not indicate that he had no reasonable
possibility of retreat to avoid a danger of death or great bodily harm to himself. See
Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d at 694.
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to support Richardson’s conviction of first-degree
assault.
II. Evidence of Blood-Alcohol Concentration
Richardson next argues that the district court erred by excluding his evidence of
F.B.’s blood-alcohol concentration.
Before trial, Richardson filed a motion in limine seeking permission to introduce
F.B.’s medical records , which showed that, on the day of the incident, he had a blood -
alcohol concentration of 0.24 grams per deciliter. The state opposed the motion on the
ground of lack of relevance. At the outset of trial, the district court denied the motion and
ruled that Richardson could not introduce the medical records pertaining to F.B.’s blood -

8
alcohol level. The district court reasoned that the medical records, which measured F.B.’s
blood-alcohol concentration in grams per deciliter, were likely to confuse the jury because
jurors likely are more familiar with the more commonly used measurement of grams per
milliliter. But the district court stated that Richardson was not otherwise limited in
introducing evidence that F.B. was intoxicated at the time of the incident.
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. ” Minn. R. Evid. 401. With some
exceptions, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, ” and “[e]vidence which is not relevant
is not admissible.” Minn. R. Evid. 402. Furthermore, relevant evidence “may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Minn. R. Evid. 403. This court
applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s weighing of relevance
and undue prejudice. State v. Morrow, 834 N.W.2d 715, 726 (Minn. 2013); State v. Schulz,
691 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. 2005).
Richardson does not challenge the district court ’s reasoning that the evidence at
issue, by itself, could be confusing. Rather, Richardson contends only that any such
confusion could have be en avoided. He contends that the physician who testified for the
state about F.B.’s injuries “or some other witness” could have explained the measurement
shown in F.B.’s medical records and how it relates to other means of measurement. In
response, the state contends that Richardson did not proffer any other evidence that might

9
have explained the medical records in the way that Richardson now contends could have
been done. But Richardson’s trial attorney suggested to the district court that the physician
who treated F.B. could explain the medical records, presumably on cross-examination. In
any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the probative
value of the medical records was outweighed by “the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury .” See Minn. R. Evid. 403. Furthermore, evidence of
F.B.’s intoxication was introduced into evidence in other ways. F.B. admitted to drinking
the day of the incident, and he appears unsteady in the video-recording. And the physician
who testified for the state about F.B.’s injuries said that F.B. was “incredibly drunk. ”
Consequently, it appears that the introduction of the medical records would not have had
any impact on the jury’s verdict.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Richardson’s motion in limine for
leave to introduce F.B.’s medical records.
III. Supplemental Jury Instruction
Richardson also argues that the district court erred by giving the jury a supplemental
instruction that misstated the applicable law concerning a jury ’s duty to continue
deliberating when it is deadlocked.
This issue arose on the second day of deliberations, when the jury foreperson
submitted a note to the district court saying that the jury was deadlocked. In a conference
with counsel, the district court proposed to repeat one of the jury instructions that
previously was given and, in addition, to give an instruction that the district court borrowed
from a Florida jury instructi on guide. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 4.1. Richardson

10
objected and urged the district court to use only the Minnesota pattern jury instruction that
previously had been given. The district court overruled that objection and gave the
following supplemental instruction:
So, members of the jury, I know that you all have
worked hard to try to reach a verdict in this case. And as you
know, we are all aware that it ’s legally permissible for a jury
to disagree. And there are two things a jury can lawfully do:
Agree on a verdict or disagree on what the facts of the case
may truly be.

There is nothing to disagree about on the law. The law
is as I told you. If you disagree over what you believe the
evidence showed, then only you can resolve this conflict if it is
to be resolved.

And so I am going to send you back to continue
discussing this case and I want to remind you, you should
discuss this case with one anot her and deliberate with a view
toward reaching agreement, if you can do so without violating
your individual judgment.

You should decide the case for yourself but only after
you have discussed the case with your fellow jurors and
carefully considered the ir views. You should not hesitate to
reexamine your views and change your opinion if you become
convinced that they are erroneous. But you should not
surrender your honest opinions simply because other jurors
disagree or merely to reach a verdict.

And with those rules in mind, members of the jury, I am
going to send you back to continue your discussions and that
you – you may now retire with the bailiff and continue.

In general, a district court must instruct a jury in a way that “fairly and adequately
explain[s] the law of the case ” and does not “materially misstate[] the applicable law. ”
State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011). If a jury appears to be deadlocked, it

11
“may be discharged without a verdict if the court finds there is no reason able probability
of agreement.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(4). Accordingly, a district court may
not instruct a jury that it must continue deliberating if there is no reasonable probability of
agreement. See id.
If a trial court believes a jury is unable to agree, it “may
require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or
repeat an instruction. . . . The court shall not require or threaten
to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of
time or for unreasonable inte rvals.” State v. Kelley , 517
N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1994) (quoting A.B.A. Standards for
Criminal Justice § 15 -4.4(b) (1986)). “[I]t is reversible error
in Minnesota to coerce a jury towards a unanimous verdict. A
court, therefore, can neither inform a j ury that a case must be
decided, nor allow the jury to believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not
an available option. ” State v. Jones , 556 N.W.2d 903, 912
(Minn. 1996) (citations omitted).

State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 337-38 (Minn. 1998) (alterations in original). This court
applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court ’s supplemental
instruction concerning a jury’s obligation to continue deliberating if it may be deadlocked.
State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 550 (Minn. 2012).
The district court ’s supplemental instruction in this case does not violate the
principles summarized above. The supplemental instruction reiterated the earlier -given
instruction that jurors should “deliberate with a view toward reaching agreement ” but
without “violating [their] individual judgment ” or “surrender[ing] [their] honest opinion
simply because other jurors disagree or merely to reach a verdict.” See 10 Minnesota Dist.
Judges’ Ass’n, Minnesota Practice —Jury Instruction Guides , § 3.04, at 42 -43 (6th ed.
2015). The supplemental instruction also informed the jury that “it’s legally permissible

12
for a jury to disagree” and that jurors could either “[a]gree on a verdict or disagree on what
the facts of the case may truly be. ” The supplemental instruction informed the jury, “If
you disagree over what you believe the evidence showed, then only you can resolve this
conflict if it is to be resolved. ” Nothing in the supplemental instruction “require[d] or
threaten[ed] to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for
unreasonable intervals,” tended “to coerce a jury towards a unanimous verdict, ” informed
the jury “that a case must be decided, ” or “allow[ed] the jury to believe that a ‘deadlock’
is not an available option.” See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 338 (quotations omitted).
Richardson also contends that the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial after
the jury foreperson indicated for a second time that the jury was deadlocked. The district
court instructed the jury to recess for the weekend and to continue their deliberations the
following week. But, contrary to Richardson’s argument on appeal, his trial attorney did
not ask the district court to declare a mistrial. In the absence of any request for a mistrial,
we review only for plain error. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02; State v. Pak , 787 N.W.2d
623, 629 (Minn. App. 2010). The question is whether the district court ’s decision to
instruct the jury to recess for the weekend and return on Monday instead of sua sponte
declaring a mistrial is plainly and obviously inconsistent with the applicable law. Under
the applicable law, a jury “may be discharged without a verdict if the court finds there is
no reasonable probability of agreement. ” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(4). At the
time of the jury’s second note concerning a possible deadlock, it had been deliberating for
the equivalent of approximately one full day. The record does not plainly indicate that

13
there was no reasonable probability of juror agreement. In fact, the jury reached an
agreement on the following business day.
Thus, the district court did not err by giving a supplemental instruction concerning
the jury’s duty to continue deliberating and by not sua sponte declaring a mistrial.
IV. Motion for Sentencing Departure
Richardson last argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a
downward departure from the presumptive sentencing range.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide for presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.C (2016). For any particular offense, the presumptive
sentence is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and
offense severity characteristics. ” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.13 (2016). Accordingly, a
district court “must pronounce a sentence of the applicable disposition and within the
applicable [presumptive] range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling
circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2016); see also State
v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). “Substantial and compelling circumstances are
those d emonstrating that the defendant ’s conduct in the offense of conviction was
significantly more or less serio us than that typically involved in the commission of the
crime in question. ” State v. Hicks , 864 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Minn. 2015) (quotations
omitted).
The guidelines recognize two different types of departures: dispositional and
durational. The supreme court summarized the two as follows:

14
A dispositional departure places the offender in a different
setting than that called for by the presumptive guidelines
sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.5.a. For example, a
downward dispositional departure occurs when the
presumptive guidelines sentence calls for imprisonment but the
district court instead stays execution or imposition of the
sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.5.a.(2). A dispositional
departure typically focuses on characteristics of the defendant
that show whether the defendant is “particularly suitable for
individualized treatment in a probationary setting. ” State v.
Wright, 310 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Minn. 1981); see also State v.
Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (citing the “defendant’s
age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude
while in court, and the support of friends and/or family ” as
relevant factors that may justify a dispositional departure).

By contrast, a durational departure is a sentence that
departs in length from the presumptive guidelines range.
Minn. Sent. Guidelines 1.B.5.b. A durational departure must
be based on factors that reflect the seriousness of the offense,
not the characteris tics of the o ffender. State v. Chaklos , 528
N.W.2d 225, 228 (Minn. 1995). A downward durational
departure is justified only if the defendant ’s conduct was
“significantly less serious than that typically involved in the
commission of the offense. ” State v. Mattson , 3 76 N.W.2d
413, 415 (Minn. 1985). The requirement that aggravating or
mitigating factors must relate to the seriousness of the
offense—and not to the characteristics of the offender —
narrows the range of factors that may justify a durational
departure.

State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623-24 (Minn. 2016) (first two citations altered).
The guidelines provide non-exclusive lists of mitigating and aggravating factors that
may justify a departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3 (2016). If a district court departs
from the presumptive sentence, the district court is required to state the reason or reasons
for the departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1.c. But if the district court does not depart,
the district court is not required to state reasons for imposing a presumptive sentence. State

15
v. Johnson , 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17,
2013); State v. Van Ruler , 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985). This court generally
applies an abuse -of-discretion standard of review t o a district cour t’s denial of a
defendant’s motion for a downward departure. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253 (Minn.
App. 2011); see also State v. Bertsch , 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006). Only a “rare
case” will warrant reversal of a district court ’s refusal to depart from the sentencing
guidelines. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
In this case, Richardson moved in the alternative for both a dispositional departure
and a durational departure. In support of his argument for a dispositional departure ,
Richardson relied on his amenability to probation and individualized treatment, his remorse
and acceptance of responsibility for his conduct, and his assertion that the victim was the
aggressor and that he attempted to d efend himself . See Minn. Sent. Guidelin es
2.D.3.a.(1), .(5), .(7). In support of the durational departure, Richardson relied on some of
the same reasons as well as his assertion that his offense was less onerous than usual
considering the victim ’s injuries and vulnerability . See Minn. Sent. Guidelines
2.D.3.a.(1), .(5). In denying Richardson’s motion, the district court acknowledged that the
jury struggled with the issue of self-defense but stated that Richardson did not appear to be
particularly amenable to probation because he had failed t o appear for sentencing when it
first was scheduled.
Richardson contends that the district court erred by disregarding multiple mitigating
factors. He acknowledges that his failure to appear for sentencing “could have an effect
on whether the district court felt he was amenable to probation” but contends that “it should

16
not have any effect on the other issues involved in the motions.” Richardson repeats some
of the arguments he made to the district court. He also contends that the district court erred
by ignoring his need for chemical -dependency and mental -health treatment. Richardson
has not identified any reason why this court should question the district court ’s denial of
his request for a departure. The mere fact that mitigating factors may exist does not mean
that the district court abused its discretion by not departing from the presumptive
sentencing range. This case is not the “rare case” that justifies intervention with the district
court’s exercise of discretion. See Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Richardson’s motion for a downward
departure from the presumptive sentencing range.
Affirmed.