State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0647

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Steven Leon Reyes,
Appellant.

Filed January 13, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-18-3836

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Ashley A. Nelson, Assistant County
Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christen Chapman, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Slieter ,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant Steven Leon Reyes seeks review of his final judgment of conviction for
felony domestic assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2018), and challenges the
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probation conditions imposed by the district court during sentencing. Because we conclude
the district court did not err when it failed to specify the legal standard required for the
search condition, we affirm in part. We also affirm the district court’s decision to require
Reyes to submit to random chemical testing as directed by probation. But because neither
Minnesota caselaw nor statute authorize a district court to impose probation conditions that
are supervised by law enforcement, we reverse in part and remand for the district court to
clarify that Reyes need not submit to random chemical testing as directed by law
enforcement.
FACTS
In November 2018, Reyes intentionally hit the victim, who is the mother of his
children, while engaged in a verbal and physical altercation. The state charged Reyes with
domestic assault and two additional counts. Reyes pleaded guilty to domestic assault and
the state dismissed the other counts.
At the sentencing hearing in January 2019, the district court imposed a sentence of
18 months and stayed execution for five years on certain conditions. The district court
imposed many conditions, two of which Reyes challenges on appeal. First, Reyes must
“[c]ooperate with searches of [his] person, residence, vehicle, workplace, property, and
things as directed by [his] probation officer” (search condition). Second, Reyes “must
submit to random testing as directed . . . by probation and/or law enforcement”
(random-testing condition).
The presentence investigation report provided to the parties before the hearing
included the search and random -testing conditions, but the random-testing condition
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specified “as directed by [p]robation.” The district court inquired of both counsel whether
there were any corrections or co mments about the report. Although Reye s’s counsel
responded with a requested change to the “no contact” condition, Reyes did not object to
the search or random-testing conditions.
After the district court imposed the sentence and stated the probation conditions,
Reyes’s counsel briefly commented on the random-testing condition.
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: And, Judge, this is going to
sound like I’m nitpicking here, but special condition H, you
said “submit to random [testing] as directed by probation
and/or law enforcement.” I know there was a case that came
down about a couple of weeks ago unpublished, State versus
Cournoyer, where—

THE COURT: I would expect that law enforcement would
follow the law.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay.

THE COURT: And I’m certain that the County Attorney’s
Office and the City Attorney’s Office have directed law
enforcement to follow the law.

APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Okay. Thank you.

This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, Reyes raises two issues. First, Reyes argues the search condition violates
the Fourth Amendment because searches of a probationer must be supported by reasonable
suspicion. Second, Reyes argues the random-testing condition violates the Fourth
Amendment because it allows law enforcement to require him to submit to random testing.
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Reyes failed to raise either issue during district court proceedings. 1 Generally, this
court will not decide an issue that was “not raised before the district court, including
constitutional questions of criminal procedure.” Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357
(Minn. 1996). We may consider an issue for the first time on appeal “when the interests of
justice require consideration of such issues and doing so would not unfairly surprise a party
to the appeal.” Id.
We question whether the interests of justice favor appellate review. On one hand,
Reyes has a remedy in district court because he may move “at any time [to] correct a
sentence not authorized by law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. On the other hand, the
state does not contend that either issue is not properly before this court and the state
submitted a brief arguing that the probation conditions are authorized by law. Thus, unfair
surprise is not a concern. In the interests of expediting resolution of this dispute, which
does not raise complex legal issues or require development of a record in the district court,
we consider both issues. See State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 874 (Minn. 2011) (“[W]e
may choose to address . . . issues that were not raised at the district court, when the interests

1 We recognize that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in certain circumstances, has held that
an appellant does not always forfeit a sentencing issue, even though the issue was not raised
during district court proceedings. See State v. Henderson, 706 N.W.2d 758, 759-60 (Minn.
2005) (identifying circumstances where sentencing issues are not forfeited and exercising
discretion to review sentencing issue that was not raised in district court proceedings). To
date, the supreme court has not identified probation conditions as such a circumstance.
Because we review the issues raised by Reyes on the merits, we do not decide whether the
circumstances identified in Henderson apply to the probation conditions challenged by
Reyes.
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of justice require their consideration and when doing so would not work an unfair surprise
on a party.”).
This court reviews a sentence imposed or stayed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Franklin, 604 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 2000). Probation conditions must be reasonably
related to the purposes of sentencing and probation without being unduly restrictive. Id.
This court will carefully review the district court’s discretion in imposing probation
conditions “when [those] conditions restrict fundamental rights.” State v. Friberg ,
435 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Minn. 1989).
First, Reyes challenges the search condition. Reyes argues that the district court
failed to specify the legal standard for conducting a search, relying on State v. Anderson ,
which held that the Fourth Amendment requires a probation officer’s search of a
probationer’s home to be supported by reasonable suspicion. 733 N.W.2d 128, 140 (Minn.
2007). In its brief submitted to this court, the state agrees that reasonable suspicion is
required for searches of a probationer’s home. See generally State v. Bursch, 905 N.W.2d
884, 890 (Minn. App. 2017) (noting that probationers have a diminished expectation of
privacy).
We reject Reyes’s contention that a district court must specify the legal standard for
a search of a probationer’s person, residence, vehicle, workplace, or property, when
requiring a probationer to submit to these searches as part of a stayed sentence. While a
sentencing court must “[s]tate precisely the terms of the sentence,” see Minn. R. Crim. P.
27.03, subd. 4(A), it need not also state the leg al standard established by caselaw because
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the probation officer is presumed to know the standard. Thus, we affirm the search
condition imposed on Reyes during sentencing.
Second, Reyes challenges the random-testing condition. The parties appear to agree
that random testing is limited to chemical testing for illegal substances or alcohol. Reyes
gives two reasons for reversing the random-testing provision, which we consider in turn.
Reyes initially argues that requiring him to submit to random chemical testing by
probation is unconstitutional because the privacy implications of breath and urine tests are
significant and outweigh the government’s interest in supervising probation. The state
responds that “the government’s need to ensure compliance with [the] conditions of
probation” outweighs the privacy implications of random chemical testing.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Reyes to
submit to r andom chemical testing by probation. Minnesota Statutes section 609.135,
subdivision 1(a)(2) (2018), permits the district court to impose terms of probation and
requires “the supervision to be under the probation officer of the court.” And a probation
officer has a “special relationship” with those under his or her supervision. Anderson,
733 N.W.2d at 137. Probation officers assist probationers to achieve rehabilitation and to
effectively do so, probation officers need “up-to-date knowledge of the probationer’s
personal habits, relationships, and activities.” State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365, 368
(Minn. 1980). Also, a probation system “presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 873-74, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3168 (1987). Thus,
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random chemical testing by probation is reasonably related to the purposes of probation
without being unduly restrictive.
Reyes also contends that requiring him to submit to random testing for illegal
substances or alcohol by law enforcement is not a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment.2 The state responds that in Samson v. California, the United States Supreme
Court held that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting
a suspicionless search of a parolee” and this court should extend Samson’s holding to
probationers. 547 U.S. 843, 857, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006).
We conclude that Samson is distinguishable. In State v. Heaton, this court declined
to follow Samson with regard to suspicionless searches of a parolee’s home and instead
followed the reasonable suspicion standard articulated in Anderson. 812 N.W.2d 904, 908
(Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. July 17, 2012). We reasoned that Samson turned
on a California statute requiring a parolee to agree in writing to submit to searches “at any
time” by a parole officer or peace officer “with or without” a search warrant. Id . Heaton’s
reasoning applies here. Minnesota law has no parallel to the California statute analyzed in
Samson.

2 We previously addressed this issue in an unpublished opinion, and concluded the district
court abused its discretion when it imposed a probation condition requiring an appellant to
submit to random testing by “any licensed peace officer.” See State v. Cournoyer , No.
A18-0434, 2019 WL 114198, at *4 (Minn. App. Jan. 7, 2019). Unpublished opinions are
not precedential, but may be persuasive. See State v. Roy, 761 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Minn.
App. 2009) (adopting an unpublished opinion’s reasoning because it was persuasive and
concerned the “exact issue” facing this court in Roy), review denied (Minn. May 19, 2009).
We find Cournoyer’s reasoning to be very persuasive.
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As mentioned above, Minnesota statutes grant discretion to the district court to
impose the terms of probation and allow “the supervision to be under the probation officer
of the court,” “the commissioner of corrections,” or “by some other suitable and consenting
person.” Minn. Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a)(2). But Minnesota statutes do not authorize a
district court to impose probation supervision by law enforcement. See id. Nor has
Minnesota caselaw recognized a “special relationship” between law enforcement and
probationers. See Earnest, 293 N.W.2d at 368.
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by requiring Reyes to
submit to random chemical testing for illegal substances or alcohol by law enforcement as
a condition of probation. Thus, we reverse the random-testing condition in part and remand
for the district court to clarify that random testing may be performed only by probation.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.