Theodore Swantz, Relator,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0652

Theodore Swantz,
Relator,

vs.

Premier Transportation,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed February 18, 2020
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 36890946-4

Theodore Swantz, Lakeland, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Premier Transportation, Minneapolis, Minnesota (respondent)

Lossom Allen, Anne B. Froelich, Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and
Bryan, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Relator Theodore Swantz challenges the determination of an unemployment-law
judge (ULJ) that he is in eligible for unemployment be nefits because he quit his
employment and none of the st atutory exceptions to unempl oyment ineligibility applies.
Swantz argues that he is entitled to receive unemployment benefits because (1) he did not
quit but instead only took a leave of absence, or, alternatively, (2) he was compelled to quit
by a medical condition and hi s employer did not offer re asonable accommodations. We
affirm.
FACTS
Swantz worked as a limousine driver for respondent Premier Transportation starting
on January 1, 2008. In October 2017, Swantz had an epileptic seizure. Because of the
seizure, Swantz’s driver’s license and his department of transportation (DOT) certificate—
both of which were required to work as a li mousine driver—were suspended. To get his
license and the DOT certificate reinstated, Swan tz needed to be seizure-free for 90 days
and receive medical clearance from his doctor. While his license was suspended, Swantz
did office work for Premier. He also received unemployment benefits after he applied and
indicated that he was on a leave of absence. After 90 days passed without a second seizure,
Swantz got his license and certificate reinstated and resumed driving.
A year later, in October 2018, Swantz suffered another seizure. His license and DOT
certificate were again suspended, and Swantz’s doctor told him that, this time, even if he
was seizure-free for another 90 days, he might not be able to resume driving professionally.

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On November 5, 2018, after receiving the news from his doctor, Swantz had a phone
conversation with J.C., the owner of Premier. Swantz informed J.C. that his doctor said
that he probably would not be able to drive professionally again. Swantz did not ask for a
leave of absence or for any other accommodati on. J.C. offered Swantz a position in the
shop cleaning cars and do ing other tasks. Swantz said he would not be able to drive the
vehicles in and out of the shop, but J.C. told him that Premier had other people who could
handle moving the vehicles. Swantz replied that he would think about it.
Swantz did not contact Premier again for over a month. During this time, he applied
for unemployment benefits with respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and
Economic Development (DEED). J.C. testified that, after the November 5 phone call, she
thought Swantz’s employment with Premier was over. Swantz testified that he thought that
he was still a Premier employee. But on a DEED questionnaire that he filled out, Swantz
stated that he quit on October 29, 2018. He also stated on that questionnaire that he did not
request an accommodation from Premier for his medical condition.
On December 7, 2018, Swantz called J.C. about getting some forms filled out for
classes that he planned to take. During the call, Swantz told J.C. that he missed his job and
was thinking of taking some classes in sale s and marketing. He expressed interest in
returning to Premier in a differe nt capacity after completing hi s classes. J.C. told Swantz
again that Premier had work available in its shop, but Swantz responded that he was not
interested. J.C. testified that Swantz said that “he was better than [working in the shop].”
Swantz testified that he rejected the positi on because he could not work in the shop since

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he could not operate a power washer or other power equipment. Swantz admitted, however,
that he and J.C. never discussed what his duties in the shop would be.
DEED subsequently denied Swantz’s a pplication for unemployment benefits. It
determined that Swantz quit his employment and did not request an accommodation for his
medical condition. Swantz appe aled the DEED determinati on, and a hearing was held
before a ULJ.
At the hearing, Swantz testified that he never told J.C. that he quit and that he had
been confused when he stated on the unemployment questionnaire that he did not request
an accommodation. J.C. testified that she offe red alternative positions to Swantz but that
he declined them, so she believed that he had quit. The ULJ found Swantz’s testimony not
credible and J.C.’s testimony credible. The ULJ concluded that Swantz was not on a leave
of absence, that he quit his employmen t, and that no exception to unemployment
ineligibility applies. Swantz filed a request fo r reconsideration with the ULJ, and, upon
reconsideration, the ULJ affirmed his previous decision.
Swantz appeals by writ of certiorari.
D E C I S I O N
Appellate courts may only “reverse or modify the [ULJ’s] decision if the substantial
rights of the [relator] may have been pr ejudiced because the findings, inferences,
conclusion, or decision” vi olate constitutional provisions, exceed the department’s
statutory authority, were made after an unlawfu l procedure, are based on an error of law,
are unsupported by the record evidence, or are arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2018). Ap pellate courts review factual findings “in the light most

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favorable to the decision and will not disturb those findings as long as there is evidence in
the record that reasonably tends to sustain them.” Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc. , 888
N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016) (quotations om itted). “Credibility determinations are the
exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed on appeal.” Skarhus v. Davanni’s
Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Minn. App. 2006). “T he determination that an applicant is
ineligible for unemployment benefits based on the facts of the case is reviewed de novo.”
Posey v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. App. 2016).
I.

Swantz argues that he should receive une mployment benefits, similar to how he
received benefits after his firs t seizure, because, he claims, he was again on a leave of
absence. Individuals on a leave of absence may be eligible for unemployment benefits.
Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 13a(a) (2018). “A leave of absence is a temporary stopping
of work that has been approved by the employer.” Id., subd. 13a(c) (2018).
The ULJ determined that Swantz was not on a leave of absence. The record supports
that determination. Even if Swantz believed that he was on a leave of absence from work,
which is a claim the ULJ did not find credible, Swantz still needed to obtain approval from
his employer to be on a leave of absence. See Minn. Stat. § 268.085, subd. 13a(c). Swantz
testified that he never requested a leave of ab sence. J.C. testified that she did not believe
Swantz was on a leave of absence and that she believed Swantz’s employment ended on
November 5, 2018, because he had turned down the position in the shop. J.C. also testified
that Swantz had told her that he did not th ink he would be able to drive professionally
again. The ULJ found cr edible J.C.’s testimony that Swan tz was not on a leave, and we

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will not disturb that credibility determination. On this record, the ULJ did not err by finding
that Swantz was not on a leave of absence.
II.

Swantz also argues that he should receive unemployment benefits because Premier
“did not offer any work [he] could do” and th at “[he] did not want to stop working.” He
states that Premier could have “offered to train [him] on something else.”
“A quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at
the time the employment ended, the employee’s.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2(a) (2018).
An applicant who has quit his employment is ineligible for unemployment benefits unless
one of ten exceptions applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1 (2018). “A discharge from
employment occurs when any words or actions by an employer would lead a reasonable
employee to believe that the employer will no longer allow the employee to work for the
employer in any capacity.” Id., subd. 5(a) (2018). An employee who was discharged from
employment is generally eligible for unemp loyment benefits unless the employee was
discharged because of employment misconduct. Id., subd. 4 (2018).
One of the ten exceptions to the rule that an employee who quits is ineligible for
unemployment benefits is the medical exce ption. An applicant who quits employment
“because the applicant’s serious illness or in jury made it medically necessary that the
applicant quit” may be entitled to unemplo yment benefits. Minn . Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 1(7). “This exception on ly applies if the applicant informs the employer of the
medical problem and requests accommodation and no reasonable accommodation is made
available.” Id.

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Swantz’s argument appears to be that he did not quit but rather was forced to stop
working due to his medical condition. He argue s that Premier failed to accommodate his
medical condition by only offering him positions that he could not accept.
The record supports the UL J’s determination that Sw antz quit his employment.
While Swantz certainly did not choose to get sick, the reco rd supports the ULJ’s finding
that it was Swantz’s decision not to continue his employment at Premier. Swantz admitted
in his testimony that Premier did not discharge him. Premier twice offered him a position
in the shop, which he either explicitly rejected or failed to accept in a timely manner.
Swantz argues that he could not accept the position in the shop due to his medical condition,
but he never looked into whether it would have been possible with accommodation for him
to work in the shop. Premier even propos ed possible accommodations for him: when
Swantz voiced concerns about not being able to drive the vehicles for the job in the shop,
J.C. indicated that other em ployees could handle moving th e vehicles. The record shows
that Premier had positions ava ilable for Swantz but that he declined. On th is record, the
ULJ did not err by determining that Swantz qu it, as defined under Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 2(a).
The record also supports the ULJ’s determination that the medical exception does
not apply. Swantz’s failure to explore possible accommodatio ns also prevents him from
receiving unemployment benefits under th e medical exception to unemployment
ineligibility. The medical exception applies only if the unemployment applicant informed
the employer of the medical problem and re quested accommodation. Swantz never asked
for an accommodation, even after J.C. offere d him a position in th e shop and mentioned

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possible accommodations. Swantz testified that he never asked for a leave of absence and
that he never had a discussion with J.C. about accommodations for him to work in the shop.
Swantz also stated on the DEED questionnaire that he did not request an accommodation.
While Swantz testified at the hearing that he may have been confused about the question
on the questionnaire, he still did not identify a time when he requested an accommodation
from Premier. Swantz did tell J.C. in the Dece mber phone call that he was interested in
working in sales and marketing, but he did so with the understanding that he needed to
obtain some additional qualifications firs t. Because Swantz never requested an
accommodation, he does not meet the requi rements of the medical exception to
unemployment ineligibility, as determined by the ULJ.
The record supports the ULJ’s determinatio n that Swantz is in eligible to receive
unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.