State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0669

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James Allen Buck,
Appellant.

Filed March 30, 2020
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-18-423

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Aaron P. Welch, Assistant County Attorney,
Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, C hief Appellate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
On appeal from his jury conviction of misdemeanor theft, appellant argues that
respondent State of Minnesota presented insufficient evidence to satisfy the intent element

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of the crime and that the district court committed plain error that affected his substantial
rights by failing to respond adequately to the jury’s question. We affirm.
FACTS
This dispute involves three neighbors in the communi ty of Sunburg. Two
neighbors, the Bloedels and Mr. Caskey, cut down three trees near their shared property
line. Appellant James Allen B uck lives within walking distance of Caskey and the
Bloedels. On May 10, 2018, the state charged appellant with misdemeanor theft under
Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2016), for taking a large trailer’s worth of wood from
Caskey’s property. The district court held a jury trial on February 19, 2019.
While deliberating, the jury submitted a written request to the district court about
the intent element of the offense.1 The question stated, “If a person doesn’t ‘know’ he has
no right to take wood at the time he is taking it but finds out later he has no right, does that
mean he meets the element -- this element?” The district court responded by saying:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I can’t answer that
question for you. So I’ve brought you up here to tell you that
I can’t. I can tell you further that that perhaps is the heart of
the question of what you are going to have to answer for us in
your job as juror and your sole job as a factfinder.

I will just reiterate the third element which says, “to
know requires only that the actor believes that a specified fact
exists.” So, within that definition, you will have to make the
determination as to what knowledge the defendant had at the
time.

1 Whether appellant “knew” is taken from the jury instruction explaining the intent element
of the crime. We refer to this as the intent element because section 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1),
uses the word “intent.”

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So, with that, with all the curious looks on your faces, I
am going to send you back to the jury room and deliberate
further.

Appellant did not object to the district court’s response at trial.
The jury found appellant guilty of misdemeanor theft. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
I. The state pr esented sufficient evidence to prove that appellant intentionally
took his neighbor’s firewood.

Appellant argues that the state pr esented insufficient evidence to prove the intent
element of the crime of theft. We disagree.
A person commits theft if he “intentionally and without claim of right takes, uses,
transfers, conceals or retains possession of movable property of another without the other’s
consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of the property.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1).
Parties generally show intent through circumstantial evidence. State v. Essex, 838
N.W.2d 805, 809 (Minn. App. 2013) , review denied (Minn. Jan. 21, 2014). Appellate
courts apply a heightened standard of review w hen a party intends to prove a disputed
element of an offense in part with circumstantial evidence. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d
638, 643 (Minn. 2017). To apply the circumstantial-evidence standard, an appellate court
follows a two-step analysis. State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014) . We first
identify the circ umstances proved, and “construe conflicting evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdic t and assume that the jury believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and
disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, we independently

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“determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, the ci rcumstances proved are t he following. Appellant asked Mrs. Bloedel
about the trees cut down on her property. Mrs. Bloedel told appellant that he could not
take her wood, but that she did not know about Caskey’s wood. Appellant never spoke to
Caskey about his wood or asked for his permission to take it. Caskey did not give anyone
permission to take any wood from his property. Midday at a later date , appellant and his
son loaded most of the wood from Caskey’s property into a trailer. Tread marks in the
snow showed that appellant drove directly back to his house. There, most of the wood
remained i n the trailer in appellant ’s yard. When approached by law enforcement,
appellant first “kind of denied having anything to do with the wood ,” but he eventually
admitted that the wood came from Caskey or the Bloedels. Caskey offered to consider the
matter settled if appellant returned to him the wood in the trailer and gave him $ 100 to
account for the wood missing from the trailer . Appellant refused to pay $100 and later
burned the wood himself. We conclude that these circumstances proved are consistent with
appellant’s guilt.
Appellant argues for additional circumstances proved. He argues that his
uncontradicted testimony shows that his conversation with Mr. Bloedel gave him the
impression that Mr. Bloedel was giving the wood away . But we “assume that the jury
believed the [s]tate’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses .” Id. (emphasis
added). Moreover, appellant also testified that he first talked to Mr. Bloedel about the
wood and then he talked to Mrs. Bloedel. And appellant admitted to taking Caskey’s wood,

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even though no evidence established that he had permission to do so. Even if we were to
consider this testimony, Mrs. Bloedel later told appellant that he could not have their wood.
So the circ umstances proved, even considering appellant’s uncontested reference to his
conversation with Mr. Bloedel, do not support a rational inference inconsistent with guilt.
Next, appellant argues that his belief that he had a claim to the wood is apparent
because he did not hide his actions. He took the wood in broad daylight, tracks in the snow
led directly to his house, and the deputy saw the trailer of wood in appellant ’s yard from
the road. But appellant took the wood midday on a work day for the neighbors and had
unloaded some of the wood by wheelbarrow by the time Caskey and the deputies arrived.
We conclude that t his evidence, when viewed with the other circumstances proved, does
not lend itself to a rational inference inconsistent with guilt.
II. The district court did not commit plain error by rereading the jury instructions
in response to the jury’s question about the intent element of theft.

Appellant next argues that the district court plainly erred because it should have
answered the jury’s question by instructing them that the state needed to prove appellant
“knew he did not have a claim of right to Caskey’s wood at the time he took it.” We are
not persuaded.
Appellant did not object to the district court’s answer at trial. An appellant generally
forfeits any relief by not objecting at trial. State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Minn.
2017). However, w e may review unobjected -to claims under the plain -error test. Id.
Appellant must establish “(1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected [appellant’s]
substantial rights.” Id. If the appellant establishes all three elements, “we may correct the

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error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id.
“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious; usually this means an error that violates
or contradicts case law, a rule, or an applicable standard of conduct.” State v. Vang, 847
N.W.2d 248, 261 (Minn. 2014). When the jury asks a question about the law, the district
court may “give additional instructions” or “reread portions of the origina l instructions.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 20(3)(a)-(b).
Here, the district court answered the jury’s question by rereading the intent element
of the offense in the jury instruction, consistent with rule 26.03. Moreover, the district
court told the jury, “So, within that definition, you will have to make the determination as
to what knowledge the defendant had at the time.” (emphasis added.) “At the time” is the
exact language appellant argues for on appeal.
Finally, appellant relies on State v. Shannon, 514 N.W.2d 790, 791 ( Minn. 1994),
to support his argu ment. But Shannon did not address the rule 26.03 issue of how the
district court should answer a jury’s question. We discern no error by the district court.
Because appellant has not shown how the district court plainly erred in its response
to the jury’s question , we need not analyze the other plain-error elements. See State v.
Mouelle, 922 N.W.2d 706, 718 (Minn. 2019).
Affirmed.