In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0677

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:

B. R. and A. V., Parents.

Filed December 30, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-JV-19-8

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorn ey, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent
Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services)

John E. Mack, Joel A. Novak, New Lo ndon Law, New London, Minnesota (for
appellant A.V.)

Penny Johnson, Willmar, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After attacking an observer on the first day of his termination-of-parental-rights trial
and admitting to the termination petition on the second day, appellant father A.V. now

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
seeks to withdraw his admission and vacate th e order terminating his parental rights.
Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that his
admission was sufficient to sup port termination and that allowing withdrawal of that
admission was not required, we affirm.
FACTS
Mother and appellant father, A.V., had two children.1 At the beginning of this case,
the children were nine months and almost tw o years old, and mother was their primary
caretaker. Mother was arrested for selling methamphetamine in January 2018. At the time,
father was incarcerated and not caring for the children. After mother’s arrest and because
father was unavailable to parent, the children were taken into emergency protective care
by Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services (the county).
The county filed a petition alleging that th e children were in ne ed of protection or
services (CHIPS) based on the “instab ility and chaos” ste mming from mother’s
methamphetamine use2 and father’s incarceration. The children were adjudicated CHIPS
and remained in foster care throughout this case.
During the county’s involvement with the fa mily, father participated in parenting
classes and other programming in prison and completed paperwork the county sent him.

1 Because mother and father were not married when the ch ildren were born, mother had
sole legal and physical custody of the children. Father was adjudicated as the father of the
older child in February 2018. During the child protection case, father submitted to genetic
testing, which suggested he wa s the younger child’s father. But at the time of the trial,
father’s paternity was not yet adjudicated as to the younger child.
2 The termination order also references father’s metham phetamine use but there is little
other evidence of his drug use in the record provided.

3
He also wrote letters to the children and drew pictures fo r them. He was released in
September 2018. After release, he did not attend any visitation with his children. Nor did
he cooperate with the county. He failed to show up to prescheduled meetings or respond
to the county’s phone calls, voicem ails, and letters. Father was incarcerated again in late
October 2018 and remained there through the rest of the case.3
After the children were in foster care for about a year, in January 2019, the county
filed a petition seeking to terminate mother’s and father’s parental rights. In the petition,
the county alleged five statutory grounds and corresponding facts to support termination.
Father first appeared in court for an admit/deny hearing on the termination petition. Both
parents denied the petition and, eventually, the district court held a two-day trial.
During the first day of trial, father assaulted a man observing the trial. Father later
explained that he knew the man and was upset the man was at the trial. As a result of the
assault, the district court found father in contempt of court and ordered him to serve 90 days
in jail, in addition to any other criminal consequences stemming from the assault.
At the end of the second day of trial, father expressed his interest in admitting to the
petition. The district court allowed the admi ssion to proceed. In his admission, father
testified to facts supporting te rmination of his rights. The district court summarized his
testimony as follows:
As a result of his impulsive decisions, he has been incarcerated
for the vast majority of th e children’s lives. He has
acknowledged that his extensive criminal history has impacted

3 The record we have is imprecise as to the ex act dates of father’s incarceration. But this
finding was included in the district court’s or der and father did not contest it nor provide
the full trial record for us to confirm it.

4
his ability to be physically pr esent in order to parent his
children. [Father] admits he had the opportunity to have
supervised visits with his children during the period he was not
incarcerated from early September to late October of 2018.

The district court found this to be a sufficient factual basis and accepted father’s admission
to the petition. And the court found father knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived
his rights to a determination on the evidence by the court. In additi on, it determined that
the county made reasonable e fforts for reunification with fath er and that termination of
father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The district court’s order then
terminated father’s parental rights.
Father later moved to withdraw his admissi on alleging that it was coerced or given
under duress. At a hearing on the motion, he told the district court that he felt that his
lawyer did not represent him “right.” He appeared to argue that he felt that he was coerced
into or under duress in making his admission because his attorney told him that, on the last
day of trial, he was likely to lose his parental rights. Father also addressed the reasons he
assaulted the man in court and explained his belief that he cooperated with child protection.
The district court denied father’s motion, fi nding that he “did not allege any facts that
warrant relief pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. Prot. [P.] Rules 45.04 or 46.02.”
4 Father appeals.

4 These citations to the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure refer to the rules
prior to the recent amendments, effective September 1, 2019. Order Promulgating
Amendments to the Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure , No. ADM10-8041 (Minn.
May 13, 2019) (order). Unde r the previous Minnesota Ru les of Juvenile Protection
Procedure, rule 45.04 (now, rule 21.04) described the grounds for a new trial and rule 46.02
(now, rule 22.02) concerned the grounds for relief from a final order. This case was
governed by the previous Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protecti on Procedure but the
citations in this opinion, except as explained above, refer to the current rules. But none of

5
D E C I S I O N
Father seeks to have the order terminating his parental rights vacated and this case
remanded to the district court. Minnesota c ourts do not terminate parental rights “except
for grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of H.G.B. , 306 N.W.2d 821, 825
(Minn. 1981). But a district court has discretion to order termination of parental rights. In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 20 14). And we will affirm a
termination of parental rights when (1) clear and convincing evidence supports at least one
statutory ground for termination, (2) termina tion is in the best interests of the children, 5
and (3) the county has made reasonabl e efforts to reunite the family. In re Welfare of
Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). This court reviews the district
court’s factual findings for clear error and the statutory basis for an abuse of discretion. In
re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). With this standard
of review in mind, we turn to father’s arguments.
Father first argues that his admission wa s insufficient to terminate his parental
rights. He then asserts that the district court should have allowe d him to withdraw his
admission. In addressing each of these argumen ts, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion with respect to either issue.

the rules cited in this opinion are substantively different following the recent amendments.
The amendments merely renumbered the rules referenced in this opinion.
5 In this appeal, father does not challenge the district court’s determination that it is in the
children’s best interests to terminate his parental rights.

6
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that father’s
admission was sufficient to terminate his parental rights.

Father first contends that his admission was insufficient to terminate his parental
rights. The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure set out the requirements for
an admission to a petition in a termination- of-parental-rights matter. An admission must
be made under oath and include a factual ba sis for the admission. Minn. R. Juv. Prot.
P. 56.03, subd. 1, 4. And a district court accepting an admission must determine whether
the person admitting acknowledges an understanding of: (1) their trial rights, including the
right to trial, to testify, and to subpoena witnesses; (2) the statutory grounds set forth in the
petition; and (3) that the facts they are admitting establish the statutory grounds set forth in
the petition. Id., subd. 3. Finally, when a district court accepts an admission, it must find
that the admitted statutory grounds were proven. Id., subd. 6(a).
To assess father’s admission, we first revi ew his trial-rights waiver. We then turn
to his factual admissions, and finally consid er whether those facts support at least one
statutory basis for termination.
Trial-Rights Waiver
We begin with a threshold question: whether father acknowledged an understanding
of his trial rights in his admission. During his admission colloquy, fa ther said that he
wanted to move forward with his agreement to the petition, and that he knew he did not
have to but that he thought it was best. Wh en his attorney and the court explained the
consequences of admit ting to or agreeing with the petiti on, and the conse quences of an

7
involuntary termination, he indicated that he understood. His attorney asked him if anyone
was threatening him to make the agreement. Father responded, “no.”
We also note that father expresse d his wish to admit to the petition after the close
of the trial record. This indicates that father had al ready enjoyed many of the benefits of
his trial rights 6—including his right to trial, to subp oena witnesses, a nd to testify on his
own behalf—before deciding to waive them. And father’s attorney explicitly asked him
about his desire to waive one of his few remaining rights: “do you understand that the part
that I said about then the [j]udge won’t rule on whether they presented enough? She’ll just
accept your agreement.” Father responded, “yes, I do.” Because father acknowledged an
understanding of his trial rights and what he was giving up by admitting to the petition, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that this requirement
of the admission framework was satisfied.
Factual Admissions
Next, we review father’s factual admissio ns. Central to this case was father’s
repeated incarceration, which pr evented him from being able to provide for or parent his
children. Father was incarcerated for all but tw o months of this case and was, in his own
words, “not present” for most of the CHIPS case. He admitte d that he first met his older
child when the child was six months old but th at father was then in carcerated again until
his younger child was born. According to father, he would sometimes “babysit” the

6 We do not know which of these rights father chose to exercise because he did not provide
a full trial transcript, which was his burden as the appellant. Noltimier v. Noltimier ,
157 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Minn. 1968).

8
children for mother but said that it was “stressful” being alone with two children. And he
agreed that, while he improved his paren ting skills some during the case through
programming in prison, he still needed to make more progress. Father acknowledged that
he still “carr[ies] a little bit” of “impulsiveness” that has gotten him in trouble in the past
and testified that: “I need my criminal things to be, ah, rehabilitated more, my criminal
thinking. . . . Right now they’re not at their hundred.”
Father also admitted that he was possibl y facing future incarc eration because he
assaulted a man in court during the trial. When the district court asked him if he was going
to be able to care for his children in the reasonably foreseeable future, he responded, “that’s
the thing I don’t know. . . . but I mean, if you go based on my histor y it might be that I
probably won’t. That’s why I’m making this decision.” Because father testified to the
factual basis for his admission, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
this requirement was also satisfied.
Statutory Basis Supported by Factual Admissions
Following our review of father’s factua l admissions, we consider whether they
support at least one basis for termination of his parental rights. The district court found
that five statutory grounds for term ination were proven in this case. 7 Because only one
statutory basis is necessary fo r us to affirm termination, S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385, we

7 A person may admit to all of the statutory gr ounds or only some if there is a settlement
agreement for a partial admission. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 56.03, subd. 4. Here, there was
no settlement agreement and no discussion of which statutory bases father was admitting
to, in the case of a partial admission. Th erefore, father’s was a full admission under
rule 56.03, subd. 4.

9
begin with Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2) (2018). Under this
subdivision, the district court found that father “substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comp ly with the duties imposed . . . by the parent and child
relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd . 1(b)(2). These dutie s include providing
“food, clothing, shelter, education, and othe r care and control necessary for the child’s
physical, mental, or emotional health and development.” Id.
Father’s admission established that he continuously neglected his duties as a parent.
Father testified that he was incarcerated for most of the CHIPS case. And while a district
court cannot terminate a parent’s rights solely based on incarceration, it “may consider the
fact of incarceration in conjunction with other evidence suppo rting the petition for
termination.” In re Child of Simon, 662 N.W.2d 155, 162 (Minn. App. 2003). In addition
to incarceration, courts have also considered a parent’s failure to provide any meaningful
parenting to their children and the absence of evidence that a parent has the skills or
knowledge necessary to parent their children. See id. at 163 (affirming termination of an
incarcerated father’s parental rights when hi s failure to comply w ith the duties of the
parent-child relationship was demonstrated by evidence in addition to his incarceration).
Ultimately, father’s absen ce prevented him from providin g for his children. He
testified that he sometimes babysat his children which suggests that he never cared for them
fulltime, never scheduled their doctor appointments, and never tended to their educational
needs. Generally, father’s admission colloquy demonstrates that he has never meaningfully
parented these children, that he felt doing so would be “stressful,” and that he did not have
the skills to parent them, even when not incarcerated. And he admitted he would likely not

10
be ready to parent his children in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Father also acknowledged that his admi ssion to the facts above would result in
termination of his parental rights, based on his inability to provide for their needs. Father’s
attorney inquired whether he understood that if he moved forward with the admission, his
parental rights “will be terminated with regard to these children” and father replied that he
understood. And the district court also asked him whether he thought that, while he made
progress, it was not enough to stop his past be haviors that resulted in his incarceration.
Father responded that he is still impulsive. And he agreed that his criminal activity and
incarceration contributed to his inability to parent the children like they deserved and that
he could have done better as a parent.
In sum, the district court’s determinati on that father’s admission was sufficient to
demonstrate that he neglected to comply with his duties as a parent to these children is not
an abuse of discretion. And because only on e statutory basis for termination is required
for us to affirm, we do not address the four remaining statutory bases.
Father’s Arguments
Yet, father advances three central arguments as to why his admission was
insufficient.8 First, he contends that the distri ct court did not take into account his

8 Father also argues that this termination was voluntary and not involuntary, as the district
court’s order states. But in father’s admission, his attorney asked, “[a]s I explained to you,
it will be considered by law to be an involunta ry termination. Do you understand that?”
And father answered, “yes.” And the attorney continued, “[a]nd that changes the rules for
future children . . . they can use that in the future if you were to have children . . . a
presumption.” Father indicated that he understood. His acknowledgement here
demonstrates that this was an involuntary termination.

11
circumstances at the time of termination but instead relied too heavily on his history. See
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 90 (noting that the distri ct court must find that, at the time of
termination, a parent is not able and willing to assume parental responsibilities and this will
likely continue in the foreseeable future). But at the time of termination, father was in jail
so his argument here does not comport with rea lity as reflected in th e record provided to
us.
Relatedly, according to father, he was only serving 90 days in jail for attacking the
man at trial so the district court erred in conc luding that he will be unable to parent in the
reasonably foreseeable future. But father ac knowledged that he was not sure whether he
was facing criminal charges or additional jail time from the attack. As a result, at the time
of termination, father was unable to parent his children and would likely continue to be
unavailable for the foreseeable future.
Father argues, third, that the county fa iled to make reasona ble efforts for his
reunification with his children. Before termin ating parental rights, a district court must
make a finding that the county made reasonabl e efforts to reunify the children with their
parents. Minn. Stat. §§ 26 0.012(h), 260C.001, s ubd. 3(1) (2018). And district courts

Moreover, voluntary terminations are gove rned by Minnesota Statutes section
260C.301, subd. 1(a) (2018), which requires “written consent” of the parent and a showing
of why “good cause” supports the termination. Here, there was no written consent and no
discussion of good cause. And the county’s termination petition was not amended to reflect
the voluntary statutory ground above instead of the five involuntary grounds. Therefore,
this termination is indeed involuntary. S e e I n r e W e l f a r e o f C h i l d o f W . L . P .,
678 N.W.2d 703, 712 (Minn. App. 2004) (“The caselaw makes it clear that circumstances
that justify involuntary termination do not necessarily justify voluntary termination. . . . we
cannot apply a blanket rule th at an admission to an in voluntary termination petition
converts the petition into a voluntary termination.”).

12
should consider, among other things, whether the efforts were relevant and adequate to
meet the needs of the child and family, available and ac cessible, and realistic under the
circumstances. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). Here , the district court found that the county
made reasonable efforts for reunification with father.9
The district court’s finding is well-founded. Father testified that he was “not
present” for most of the CHIPS case. And a lthough he was released in September 2018,
he did not show up to prescheduled meeti ngs or respond to the county’s phone calls,
voicemails, and letters. In shor t, the county made reasonable efforts to reach father and
schedule visitation and other services. But fa ther did not follow through. And he was
incarcerated again in late October 2018 through the rest of the case.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
determining that father’s admi ssion was sufficient to support termination of his parental
rights. And because the admission supports at least one statutory basis and the county’s
reasonable efforts for reunification, we affirm.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in denying father’s request to
withdraw his admission.

Next, we consider father’s argument that the district court should have permitted
him to withdraw his admission. We review a district court’s denial of a party’s motion to
withdraw their admission under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure for

9 We acknowledge that the district court’ s written order only included a finding that
reasonable efforts for reunification were made as to the parent from whom the children
were removed, which we discer n to be mother. However, the district court made an oral
finding that, with regard to father, the count y “provided reasonable efforts to reunify or
otherwise finalize permanence.”

13
an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Children of M.L.A. , 730 N.W.2d 54, 60 (Minn.
App. 2007). A district court may permit a party to withdraw their admission at any time if
the party demonstrates that “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn.
R. Juv. Prot. P. 56.03, subd. 5(b).
“Manifest injustice” is not defined in th e Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection
Procedure, but we considered the same issue in a previous case, In re Welfare of M.K. ,
805 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Minn. App. 2011). There, we relied on the legal dictionary
definition for the phrase: “[a] direct, obvious and observable error in a trial court, such as
a defendant’s guilty plea that is involuntary or is based on a plea agreement that the
prosecution has rescinded.” M.K., 805 N.W.2d at 862 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1048
(9th ed. 2009) (definin g manifest injustice)). And we concluded that when the county
conditioned its provision of services on the parents admitting to a CHIPS petition, it was a
manifest injustice. M.K., 805 N.W.2d at 862. And, in another case, we determined that it
was a manifest injustice when the county thr eatened to place children against their best
interests if their parent did not admit to a termination petition. See M.L.A., 730 N.W.2d
at 61.
None of these instances are present here. In this appeal, father does not argue that
he was threatened or coerced into admitting the petition. In fact, in his admission, he
specifically stated that no one was threatening him. And he acknowledged that he did not
have to admit but thought it was his best option. He understood that his options were to
have the district court decide the case based on the evidence presented at trial or admit to
the petition, stating that he would “get the same effect of the termination” in either case.

14
Instead, father argues that he did not und erstand that he was admitting, that he
thought he was just having a conversation with the judge. But his attorney explained the
gravity of the decision: that if he went forward with the admission, it would be very difficult
to withdraw it in the future. And then father was put unde r oath and the district court
questioned him for roughly 12 pa ges of transcript. In short, father did not prove that
withdrawal was necessary to correct a manifest injustice.10
In conclusion, father’s arguments here do not rise to the level of a manifest injustice.
Thus, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of his request to
withdraw his admission. And because his ad mission was sufficient to terminate his
parental rights, we affirm.11
Affirmed.

10 We note that the district court concluded th at withdrawal of father’s admission was not
necessary under different rules than the one we examine here. But we affirm when a district
court arrives at the correct decision “regardle ss of the theory upon which it is based.”
Brecht v. Schramm, 266 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 1978).
11 Father also raised two new issues in his reply brief that were not argued in his principal
brief. Because the purpose of a reply brief is not to raise new issues, these arguments are
outside the scope of this appeal, and we do not consider them. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 128.02, subd. 4 (noting that a reply brief is intended to respond to arguments the
respondent raises in their brief and not to raise new issues); Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar
& Grill, Inc. , 654 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Min n. App. 2002) (describing how this court may
strike an argument from a reply brief when a ppellant raises a new argument that was not
raised in their main brief because the new argument is not properly before this court),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003).