State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0684

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Demetrius Lamont Chestnut,
Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2020
Reversed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-12986

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jennifer Lauermann, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
Demetrius Lamont Chestnut sprayed mace at a physician in an examination room at
a Minneapolis hospital. He pleaded guilty to fourth -degree assault of emergency medical

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personnel. The district court ordered him to pay $2,000 in restitution to the physicia n
because she lost a pair of diamond earrings in the aftermath of the assault. We conclude
that the evidentiary record of the restitution hearing lacks any evidence to support the
restitution award. Therefore, we reverse.
FACTS
On April 12, 2018, Chestnut went to Fairview Riverside hospital in Minneapolis for
medical care because of numbness in his feet. While speaking with medical staff , he
became upset and cried because he believed that his condition might require amputation.
A hospital staff member called security because she was concerned for Chestnut’s mental
stability. Chestnut tried to leave the hospital, but hospital staff placed him in a wheelchair
and took him to a secure room in the emergency department. While alone in the room,
Chestnut banged his head against the wall. Two physicians later entered the room to
examine Chestnut. Chestnut sprayed a canister of mace at one of the physicians, which
caused injuries to her eyes. Chestnut explained later that he “just couldn’t think” when he
sprayed the mace.
The state charged Chestnut with two counts of fourth -degree assault of emergency
medical personnel, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 2(2) (2016). In December
2018, the parties entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Che stnut pleaded guilty
to the first count and the state dismissed the second count. At the sentencing hearing, the
state submitted a victim-impact statement of the physician, who stated, among other things,
that she missed work because of injuries suffered in the incident and that, in the aftermath
of the assault, she lost a pair of diamond earrings that her since-deceased parents had given

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her upon her graduation from medical school. The district court sentenced Chestnut to 365
days in the workhouse, with 335 days stayed, and placed him on probation for two years.
The district court also ordered Chestnut to pay $2,500 in restitution to the physician.
Chestnut later challenged the restitution award and requested a restitution hearing .
He submitted an affidavit in which he stated, among other things, that he did not cause the
physician to lose her earrings. Chestnut was the only witness at the restitution hearing. He
testified about the incident and stated that he had no information concerning the physician’s
loss of her earrings. The physician did not testify and was not present. Chestnut’s attorney
argued that there was no causal connection between the crime and the physician’s loss of
her earrings, in part because there was a lack of evidence conc erning how or where the
physician lost her earrings. In response, the prosecutor relied on the victim -impact
statement and the pre -sentence investigation report. But the prosecutor did not actually
introduce the victim -impact statement and the pre -sentence investigation report into
evidence at the restitution hearing.
Two weeks later, the district court reduced the restitution award by $500 because
the hospital had compensated the physician for her lost wages. The district court denied
Chestnut’s challenge with respect to the physician’s earrings. The district court relied on
“the information already contained in the record” and found that “the loss of earrings was
directly related to Defendant’s attack on the victim and the emergency cleaning process
necessitated by his attack.” Chestnut appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
Chestnut argues that the district court erred by ordering him to pay $2,000 in
restitution to the physician to compensate her for the loss of her earrings. With the
assistance of counsel, he makes four specific arguments for reversal. First, he argues that
the state did not introduce any evidence to prove the physician’s financial loss. Second, he
argues that the state did not properly request restitution pursuant to the statutory procedures
and timelines. Third, he argues that the state did not prove that his crime was the direct
cause of the physician’s financial loss. Fourth, he argues that the district court relied on
inadmissible hearsay statements in the victim -impact statement and th e pre -sentence
investigation report. He also makes additional arguments in a pro se supplemental brief.
In its informal responsive brief, the state concedes error in two respects. First, the
state acknowledges that the rules of evidence apply to a restit ution hearing. See Minn. R.
Evid. 1101(c); State v. Willis, 898 N.W.2d 642 , 648 (Minn. 2017). The state agrees that
the restitution award is based on statements in the victim-impact statement and the pre -
sentence investigation report and that those two d ocuments were “not entered as exhibits
at the restitution hearing.” Accordingly, the state asserts, “ The district court’s reliance on
these documents is not consistent with the requirements of Willis.” We construe this part
of the state’s brief to be a c oncession that Chestnut’s first and fourth arguments are
meritorious.
Second, the state acknowledges the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Boettcher,
which held that “a district court may order restitution only for losses that are directly caused
by, or follow naturally as a consequence of, the defendant’s crime.” 931 N.W.2d 376, 381

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(Minn. 2019). The state agrees that “the district court did not make a direct causation
finding as articulated in Boettcher.” We construe this part of the state’s brief to be a
concession that Chestnut’s third argument is meritorious insofar as the district court’s
finding is inadequate, but not necessarily a concession that the facts known to the district
court would not satisfy the direct-causation standard.
The state’s responsive brief concludes, “Respondent respectfully requests this Court
reverse the district court’s restitution order and remand for proceedings consistent with
Willis and Boettcher.” In his reply brief, Chestnut argues that this court should “simply
vacate the district court’s restitution order,” without remanding for further proceedings. In
addition, he reiterates his second argument and argues further that the proper remedy for
that alleged error does not include a remand.
For purposes of this opinion, we accept the state’s concessions. Consequently, the
only issue to be resolved is the appropriate appellate remedy. A remand may be an
appropriate remedy in light of the errors alleged in Chestnut’s second, third, and fourth
arguments. See Boettcher, 931 N.W.2d at 381; Willis, 898 N.W.2d at 648. But a remand
is not appropriate in light of the error alleged in Chestnut’s first argument. Because
Chestnut satisfied his burden of producing evidence challenging the original res titution
award, the state bore the burden of proving “the amount of loss sustained by a victim as a
result of the offense and the appropriateness of a particular type of restitution.” See Minn.
Stat. § 611A.045, subd. 3(a) (2018). The state has conceded that it simply did not introduce
any evidence into the record of the restitution hearing. The state does not offer any
justification for its failure to introduce any evidence. The state also does not cite any

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caselaw for the proposition that a remand is appropriate after the state has failed to satisfy
its burden of persuasion. Thus, we conclude that, under the circumstances, the state should
not have a second opportunity to satisfy its burden of persuasion.
Reversed.