State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0713

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

David Joshua John Skotte,
Appellant.

Filed March 2, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-32204

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Ab igail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant David Joshua John Skotte appeals after a court trial under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 26.01, subd. 4, at which he was convicted of ineligible person in possession of a firearm

2
and giving a peace officer a false name. Appellant argues that the district court erroneously
denied his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant with one coun t of ineligible person in possession of a
firearm and one count of giving a false name to a peace officer. Appellant moved to
suppress a firearm that police seized from his vehicle. 1 The district court denied his
suppression motion after a two-part evid entiary hearing and post-hearing written
arguments.
Officer Neitzel and Sergeant Wilson testified at the evidentiary hearing concerning
the events that unfolded after Officer Neitzel conducted a traffic stop of appellant’s vehicle.
Officer Neitzel testified that, when he asked appellant for identification, appellant stated
that he did not have any. Appellant said that his name was Blake Lee ******
2 and that his
birthday was July 11, 1994. Officer Neitzel testified that he sm elled burnt marijuana
coming from the vehicle as he spoke with appellant.
When Officer Neitzel entered the name Blake Lee ****** into his squad car’s
computer, it retrieved a driver’s license photo of that person. Officer Neitzel testified that
the person in the driver’s lic ense photo did not look like appellant. Sergeant Wilson
testified that he then had appellant get out of his vehicle, compared appellant to the driver’s
license photo for Blake Lee ******, and determined that the person depicted in the photo

1 Methamphetamine was also seized but did not form the basis of any conviction.

2 Appellant used the actual legal name of a person, but we refrain from including that full
name here.

3
was not appellant. Appellant eventually gave Officer Neitzel and Sergeant Wilson his real
name and revealed that he had used a false name because he had an active arrest warrant
for a first-degree drug case. Officer Neitzel and Sergeant Wilson confirmed that the arrest
warrant was active, and they arrested him.
Officer Neitzel testified that, “[d]ue to the smell of marijuana in the vehicle,” the
officers decided to “do a probable cause sear ch on the vehicle.” Officer Neitzel further
testified that the search was based on appell ant’s “history and the smell of marijuana.”
Sergeant Wilson similarly testif ied that the officers searched appellant’s vehicle because
Officer Neitzel had smelled burnt marijuana co ming from the vehicle. Sergeant Wilson
testified that he found a nine-millimeter handgun while searching the trunk of appellant’s
vehicle. No marijuana was found in the vehicle.
The district court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, because the officers
performed a lawful vehicle search based on probable cause. The parties agreed to a court
trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. Appellant stipulated to the state’s case in
order to obtain review of the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district
court found appellant guilty on both counts and sentenced him to 63 months in prison.
This appeal followed, cha llenging only the district court’s denial of appellant’s
suppression motion.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the
gun seized from his vehicle because the eviden ce was obtained as the result of an illegal
search.

4
“When facts are not in dispute, . . . [appe llate courts] review a pretrial order on a
motion to suppress de novo and determine whether the police articulated an adequate basis
for the search or seizure at issue.” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted). We “indepe ndently determine[], as a matter of law, whether the
evidence against appellant must be suppressed.” State v. Marsh , 931 N.W.2d 825, 829
(Minn. App. 2019). When an appellant stipulates to the evidence against him pursuant to
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, appellate “rev iew is further limited to the pretrial order
that denied [the appellant]’s motion to suppress.” State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149
(Minn. 2009).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions give individuals the right to be
free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art.
I, § 10. The Minnesota Constitution furt her requires that the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 ( 1968), apply to traffic stops. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d
353, 364 (Minn. 2004). “[E]ach incremental in trusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied
to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop,
(2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” Id. at 365.
“Warrantless searches are generally unr easonable unless they fall within a
recognized warrant exception.” Ortega, 770 N.W.2d at 149. The “automobile exception”
allows police to “search a car without a warrant, including closed containers in that car, if
there is probable cause to belie ve that the search will result in a discovery of evidence or
contraband.” State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 2016) (citation and quotation
omitted). “Probable cause exis ts when ‘there are facts a nd circumstances sufficient to

5
warrant a reasonably prudent [per son] to believe that the vehi cle contains contraband.’”
Lester, 874 N.W.2d at 771 (quoting State v. Johnson, 277 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 1979)).
“The U.S. Supreme Court has held that ‘[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully
stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may
conceal the object of the search.’” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Minn. 1999)
(quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2 157 (1982)). “It has
long been held that the detection of odors alone, which trained police officers can identify
as being illicit, constitutes probable cause to search automobiles fo r further evidence of
crime.” State v. Pierce, 347 N.W.2d 829, 833 (Minn. App. 1984). One such odor is that
of burnt marijuana. State v. Hodgman, 257 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Minn. 1977).
Officer Neitzel testified that he smelle d burnt marijuana coming from appellant’s
vehicle. Both officers testifie d that they searched appellant’s vehicle based on that odor.
The district court, in its or der denying appella nt’s motion to suppress, credited Officer
Neitzel’s testimony that he smelled burnt marijuana coming from appellant’s vehicle.
Appellant’s argument focuses on the fact that no marijuana was found during the
vehicle search, which calls into question whether Officer Neitzel smelled burnt marijuana.
But whether the officer smelled burnt marijuana is a fact question. Appellate courts defer
to a district court’s credibility determination on questions of fact and review those findings
under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008)
(citation omitted). There is record evidence supporting the district court’s factual finding,
and we therefore defer to it because it is not clearly erroneous.

6
The smell of burnt marijuana is sufficient probable cause to justify a vehicle search.
Hodgman, 257 N.W.2d at 315. After smelling burnt mariju ana, Officer Neitzel and
Sergeant Wilson had probable ca use to search appellant’s vehicle under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement. The district court did not err in denying appellant’s
suppression motion.
Affirmed.