State of Minnesota,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-0717

Hennepin County District Court McKeig, J.
Concurring, Chutich, Anderson, Thissen, JJ.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: April 29, 2020
Office of Appellate Courts
Stafon Edward Thompson,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Rachel Moran, University of St. Thomas Legal Services Clinic, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
for appellant.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. The district court did not err in concluding that the language of the federal
district court order reflected a limited remand.
2
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the issue of
whether appellant’s sentences should be served consecutively was beyond the scope of the
remand order.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
McKEIG, Justice.
Appellant Stafon Edward Thompson appeals from a state district court order that
revised his sentence from two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of release
to two consecutive terms of life with the possibility of release after 30 years. According to
Thompson, when the federal district court partially granted his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus and remanded for resentencing, the state district court should have held a hearing
on the issue of whether his sentences should be served consecutively. Because the
language of the federal district court’s order indicated a limited remand, the state district
court did not abuse its discretion when it strictly followed the terms of the remand order.
We therefore affirm.
FACTS
In 2009, after a 3-we ek trial, a Hennepin County jury found Stafon Edward
Thompson guilty of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat.
§ 609.185(a)(1) (2018), for the brutal killings of Katricia Daniels and her 10-year-old son,
Robert Shepard. The 2009 sentencing statutes mandated that Thompson be sentenced to
life without the possibility of release (LWOR). See Minn. Stat. § 609.106, subd. 2(1)
(2008). The district court did not order a presentence investigation or hear any argument
3
on the issue of consecutive sentencing. The district court heard eight victim-impact
statements and asked Thompson if he would like to address the court, but Thompson
declined. In accordance with Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines 2.F.2.a(1)(ii), the district
court ordered that Thompson serve two LWOR sentences consecutively. We affirmed
Thompson’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. State v. Thompson, 788 N.W.2d
485 (Minn. 2010).
Two years after we affirmed Thompson’s convictions and sentences, the United
States Supreme Court held that mandatory LWOR sentences for juvenile homicide
offenders violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). After Miller, qualifying juvenile ho micide
offenders could challenge the duration of their confinement as unconstitutional by a writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2018).1
In 2013, Thompson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota, claiming that he was incarcerated in violation
of the Constitution.2 He asked the federal district court to “[r]everse the sentence imposed”

1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), “a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court” can file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court “on the ground that he
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
Although the writ was used at common law to secure immediate release from confinement,
it is no longer so limited. Now, “the writ is [also] available . . . to attack future confinement
and obtain future releases.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973); see also
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 64–65 (1968).

2 Thompson filed a federal habeas petition rather than a state postconviction petition
because of our decision in Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013). In
Chambers, we held that Miller was not retroactive for offenders like Thompson, whose
4
and remand to the state district court for resentencing. The federal district court dismissed
the petition and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Thompson v. Roy, No. 13-CV-1524 (PJS/JJK), 2014 WL 1234498, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar.
25, 2014), aff’d, 793 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, judgment vacated, ___ U.S.
___, 136 S. Ct. 1375 (2016). Thompson petitioned for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.
While Thompson’s petition was pending, the Supreme Court held that the rule
announced in Miller applies retroactively. Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___,
136 S. Ct. 718, 732 (2016); see also Jackson v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272, 274 (Minn. 2016)
(acknowledging that Montgomery “holds that the Miller rule applies retroactively”). The
Court remanded Thompson’s case to the Eighth Circuit for reconsideration in light of
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 1375, and the Eighth Circuit remanded to the federal district
court, Thompson v. Roy, 641 F. App’x 681, 682 (8th Cir. 2016).
On remand, a federal magistrate judge recommended that Thompson’s petition for
a writ of habeas corpus be granted in part and denied in part. More specifically, the
magistrate judge recommended that the sentence vacatur be “limited” to the “without
possibility of release provision” of Thompson’s sentences, as opposed to “a complete
reversal of [his] sentences.” Thompson v. Roy, No. 13-CV-1524 (PJS/HB), 2016 WL
7242566, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2016), adopted by 2016 WL 7231599 (D. Minn. Dec.

direct appeals were final at the time Miller was decided. Id. at 331. That holding was later
overruled by Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); see Jackson
v. State, 883 N.W.2d 272, 278–79 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that Montgomery “overruled
our retroactivity analysis from Chambers”).
5
14, 2016). After conducting a de novo review of the record, the federal district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation “in its entirety,” vacated the
“without possibility of release” provision of Thompson’s sentences, remanded to Hennepin
County District Court for resentencing, and denied the petition “in all other respects.”
Thompson, 2016 WL 7231599, at *1.
A hearing before the Hennepin County District Court was scheduled. The dist rict
court deferred the hearing because of our pending decisions in State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d
237 (Minn. 2017), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 640 (2018) and Flowers v. State,
907 N.W.2d 901 (Minn.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 194 (2018). After we
decided Ali and Flowers, the district court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs
addressing whether a hearing was required on the issue of whether the sentences should be
served consecutively.
After discussing federal habeas corpus principles, federal and state case law on
juvenile offender sentencing, and the federal district court order, the district court
concluded that the federal district court had ordered a limited remand and therefore
determined that a hearing on the issue of whether the sentences should be served
consecutively was beyond the scope of the remand order. The district court cancelled all
further hearings, mooted all pending motions, and, without a resentencing hearing, revised
6
Thompson’s sentence to two consecutive terms of life with the possibility of release after
30 years.3 This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
This case presents two issues. First, whether the district court erred in concluding
that the language of the federal district court order indicated a limited remand. Second,
whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the issue of whether
Thompson’s sentences should be served consecutively was beyond the scope of the remand
order. We consider each issue in turn.
I.
We have previously said that trial courts generally have “broad discretion to
determine how to proceed on remand.” Dobbins v. State, 845 N.W.2d 148, 156 (Minn.
2013) (citing Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, LLP, 704 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 2005). But
we have also said that, “[o]n remand, it is the duty of the district court to execute the
mandate of [the remanding court] strictly according to its terms.” State v. Roman Nose,
667 N.W.2d 386, 394 (Minn. 2003). These statements reflect the distinction between two
types of remand: general and limited.
The distinction between general and limited remands is well recognized in the
federal courts. For example, in United States v. Campbell, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained that:

3 The parties do not dispute that the district court acted within its authority in revising
Thompson’s two LWOR sentences to two terms of life with the possibility of release after
30 years.
7
Remands . . . can be either general or limited in scope. Limited remands
explicitly outline the issues to be addressed by the district court and create a
narrow framework within which the district court must operate. General
remands, in contrast, give district courts authority to address all matters as
long as remaining consistent with the remand.

168 F.3d 263, 265 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v.
Walker, 918 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2019) (discussing general and limited remands);
United States v. Malki , 718 F.3d 178, 182–83 (2nd Cir. 2013) (same); United States v.
Young, 66 F.3d 830, 835–37 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Klump, 57 F.3d 801,
803 (9th Cir. 1995) (“This court’s remand was general, not limited.”). “A general remand
permits the district court to redo the entire sentencing process, including considering new
evidence and issues.” United States v. McFalls, 675 F.3d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 2012). “A
limited remand, by comparison, does not allow a de novo resentencing and instead
constrains the district court’s authority to the issue or issues adjudicated.” Id.
According to the federal courts, the issue of whether a remand order is general or
limited is a legal question that is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Watson ,
189 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The scope of the remand is a question of law that we
review de novo.”). When determining whether a remand is general or limited, federal
courts consider the remand language in the context of an entire opinion or order. See
Campbell, 168 F.3d at 266–67; United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he scope of the remand is determined not by formula, but by inference from the
opinion as a whole.”). For example, in United States v. Patterson, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that a remand was limited because the opinion
as a whole focused solely on one aspect of sentencing. 147 F.3d 736, 737 (8th Cir. 1998).
8
Although we have not previously used the terms “general” and “limited” when
discussing remand orders, our statements in Dobbins and Roman Nose implicitly reflect
the well-reasoned distinction between general and limited remands drawn by the federal
appellate courts. We are also persuaded that the issue of whether a remand order is general
or limited is a legal question that should be reviewed de novo.
Having clarified the relevant legal standards, we turn to the language of the federal
district court’s remand order to determine whether it involved a general or limited remand.
The federal district court order adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
“in its entirety.” The report recommended that the sentence vacatur be “limited” to the
“without possibility of release provision” of Thompson’s sentences, as opposed to “a
complete reversal of [his] sentences.” It would be unreasonable to read this language as
suggesting that the federal district court vacated Thompson’s sentences in their entirety or
remanded for de novo resentencing. Consequently, the district court did not err in
concluding that the language of the federal district court order indicated a limited remand.
II.
We next consider whether the district court abused its discretion when it concluded
that the issue of whether Thompson’s sentences should be served consecutively was
beyond the scope of the remand order. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that there
was no abuse of discretion.
When a remand is limited, it is the duty of the district court to execute the mandate
of the remanding court strictly according to its terms. Roman Nose, 667 N.W.2d at 394;
see McFalls, 675 F.3d at 604 (stating that a limited remand “does not allow a de
9
novo resentencing and instead constrains the district court’s authority to the issue or issues
adjudicated”). Here, the remand order was limited to the singular issue of the possibility
of release. 4 Consequently, the district court’s limited revision of the sentences from
LWOR to life with the possibility of release after 30 years—without reconsidering the issue
of whether the sentences should be consecutive—was not an abuse of discretion. 5
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Affirmed.

4 The issue of whether Thompson’s sentences should be consecutive is not inherently
bound to the possibility-of-release issue. Although two consecutive life sentences with the
possibility of release may, in some cases, amount to de facto life without the possibility of
release, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has not held that the Miller/Montgomery rule
applies to sentences other than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.”
Flowers, 907 N.W.2d at 906.

5 The substantive issue of whether Thompson’s consecutive sentences are
commensurate with his culpability and criminality under the standard articulated in State
v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 451–52 (Minn. 1999), is not properly before us. Nothing in
our decision today forecloses Thompson from seeking otherwise available relief under the
Minnesota postconviction statute, Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2018).
C-1
C O N C U R R E N C E
CHUTICH, Justice (concurring).
I agree that the language of the federal district court order reflected a limited remand
and, therefore, the issue of whether Thompson’s sentences should be served consecutively
was beyond the scope of the remand. But as the court acknowledges, nothing in our
decision today forecloses Thompson from seeking otherwise available relief under the
Minnesota postconviction statute. I write separately to affirm two key legal principles that
pertain to the validity of Thompson’s sentences: (1) truth and fairness are best discovered
by powerful statements on both sides of a question and (2) children are constitutionally
different from adults in their level of culpability.
I.
Our adversarial system “is premised on the well-tested principle that truth—as well
as fairness—is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.”
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We jealously guard the protections created by the adversarial process in
sentencing because a criminal “defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the
procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may have no right to object
to a particular result of the sentencing process.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358
(1977).
Here, as the majority recognizes, the district court did not order a presentence
investigation or hear any argument on the issue of consecutive sentencing before imposing
two consecutive sentences of life without the possibility of release upon Thompson, who
C-2
was 17 years old when he committed the crimes. Useful arguments on both sides of the
consecutive-sentencing question were not presented in Thompson’s first sentencing
hearing because, as a practical matter, a defendant can only serve one sentence of life
without the possibility of release before he or she dies. Under the law applicable at that
time, whether the two sentences were imposed consecutively or concurrently did not matter
one whit.
But now that the United States Supreme Court has announced a new substantive
rule that applies retroactively to Thompson, see Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___,
136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016), the consecutive nature of Thompson’s life sentences may well
be affected by the currently developing jurisprudence. Without presaging any particular
result, under the unique circumstances of this case, I believe that providing the parties an
opportunity to present “powerful statements” regarding the factors set forth in State v.
Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 451–52 (Minn. 1999), is necessary to preserve the adversarial
process that is the bedrock of our criminal justice system and to provide procedural fairness
to Thompson.
II.
Another vital legal principle is relevant to Thompson’s sentencing. As I explained
in State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237, 248–54 (Minn. 2017) (Chutich, J., dissenting), the
principle that children are constitutionally different from adults in their level of culpability
is firmly established by a line of decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Beginning
with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), these decisions culminated in a substantive
rule that prohibits a court from sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of release
C-3
unless the court determines that he or she belongs to “the rarest of juvenile offenders, those
whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___,
136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016).
I acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court has not yet expressly extended
this substantive rule to juveniles who receive a series of consecutive sentences that are the
functional equivalent of life without the possibility of release. But in my view, such silence
does not justify inaction when the underlying principles and logic of the Roper-
Montgomery line of cases apply with equal strength to a sentence that is the practical
equivalent of life without parole. Accordingly, I believe that the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits a court from sentencing a juvenile to consecutive
sentences of life with the possibility of release after 30 years unless the court determines
that he or she belongs to the rarest of juvenile offenders—those whose crimes reflect
permanent incorrigibility.
Other courts recognize this principle. For example, in State v. Zuber, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the force and logic of the concerns discussed in the
Roper-Montgomery line of cases “apply broadly: to cases in which a defendant commits
multiple offenses during a single criminal episode; to cases in which a defendant commits
multiple offenses on different occasions; and to homicide and non-homicide cases.”
152 A.3d 197, 212 (N.J. 2017). As part of its analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court
explained that the “proper focus belongs on the amount of real time a juvenile will spend
in jail and not on the formal label attached to his sentence.” Id. at 201. Accordingly, it
extended the Roper-Montgomery line of cases to a juvenile homicide defendant who
C-4
received an aggregate sentence of 75 years in prison and would not be eligible for parole
until he was 85 years old. Id. at 204, 214.
In sum, I agree that the issue of whether Thompson’s sentences should be served
consecutively was beyond the scope of the remand in this case. But because Thompson
may seek otherwise available relief under the Minnesota postconviction statute, I write
separately to reaffirm two critical legal principles that apply to Thompson’s sentences.
Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

ANDERSON, Justice (concurring).
I join in Part I of the concurrence of Justice Chutich.

THISSEN, Justice (concurring).
I join in the concurrence of Justice Chutich.