State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0759

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey Alan McRaven,
Appellant.

Filed March 30, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-2258

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney , Jean Burdorf, A ssistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Jeffrey Alan McRa ven participated in a braw l in which several people
were shot and sustained serious injuries, which included one victim being paralyzed from

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the waist down. A jury convicted McRaven of second-degree riot. McRaven appeals his
conviction arguing that the jury instruction given by the district court misstated the law by
not specifying that he had to be an intentiona l participant in the braw l. Because the jury
instruction requires a showing of knowing participation in a public disturbance, we affirm.
FACTS
Officers were called to a Minneapolis hom e in November 2017 after reports of a
loud fight and gunshots. The fight began after appellant Jeffrey Alan McRaven, his
brother, and another individual started arguing outside the home following a dispute over
vaping devices. Initially, McRaven watched while his brother and another individual threw
punches at each other. Two more individuals arrived soon af ter and joined the brawl.
McRaven eventually joined in the brawl as well. One of th e individuals was shot in the
spinal cord and paralyzed. Another individual jumped on top of this person to protect them
from further gunfire and was also shot several times. McRaven ran. While McRaven was
running away, another person started shooting at him. Witnesses testified at trial that they
heard several gunshots throughout the brawl. Police found a gun in the street where the
brawl occurred.
McRaven was charged with attempted s econd-degree murder, first-degree assault
(great bodily harm), second -degree assault (dangerous weapon), illegal possession of a
firearm, and second-degree riot.
The case proceeded to a ju ry trial. McRaven testif ied that he went to the
Minneapolis home that night because he heard that his brother was drunk and going there
to fight a person. McRaven said that, after he arrived at the home, a person came outside

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and pointed a gun at McRaven’s brother. A nother individual then arrived by car and
charged towards his brother. Mc Raven admitted that he and se veral others intervened in
the brawl to prevent his brother from being attacked. Two witnesses testified that McRaven
fired a gun eight times before he fled, but McRaven testified that he did not shoot a gun
during the brawl. According to McRaven, he heard two different types of gunshots but he
did not see the shooter. And McRaven acknowledged that there were three or more people
assembled during the brawl, that the group a ssembled was disturbing the peace, and that
somebody in the fight was armed with a weapon.
Before the case was submitted to the jury, defense counsel objected to the district
court using the standard criminal jury instru ction for the charge of second-degree riot
arguing that it did not include the proper intent element. The district court rejected defense
counsel’s argument and instructed the jury in accordance with the standard jury instruction.
The jury found McRaven guilty of second-degree riot, but it was unable to reach a
verdict on the remaining counts. The district court stayed execution of a 15-month prison
sentence and placed McRaven on probation for three years. McRaven appeals.
D E C I S I O N
McRaven argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by instructing the jury
consistent with the standard criminal jury instruction for second-degree riot. He contends
that the instruction misstated the law because it did not specify that, to find him guilty, the
jury needed to conclude that he knowingly and intentiona lly participated in the brawl or
that he intended his presence in the brawl to further an intentional act that disturbed the
peace.

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A district court’s instructions to the jury must explain the law to be applied in the
case fairly and adequately without miss tating the law in a material way. State v. Koppi,
798 N.W.2d 358, 362 (Minn. 2011). Reviewing courts give the district court great latitude
in the language used to instruct the jury. State v. Gatson , 801 N.W.2d 134, 147
(Minn. 2011). When reviewin g jury instructions, appella te courts must read the
instructions as a whole to conclude whether the instruction correctly states the law in a way
that the jury can understand. State v. Peou , 579 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Minn. 1998).
Accordingly, we review jury instruc tions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Peltier ,
874 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2016).
McRaven challenges the instruction langua ge used in describing the second element
of the riot offense:
The elements of riot in the second degree are:

First, the defendant was one of three or more persons
assembled together.

Second, those assembled disturbed the public peace by an
intentional act or threat of unlawful force or violence to person
or property.

Third, the Defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon or
knew that any other participant was armed with a dangerous
weapon. A “dangerous weapon” is a firearm, whether loaded
or unloaded, any device designed as a weapon and capable of
producing death or great bodily harm, any combustible or
flammable liquid or other device or instrumentality that in the
manner used or intended to be us ed is calculated or likely to
produce death or great bodily harm or any fire that is used to
produce death or great bodily harm.

Fourth, the Defendant’s act took place on or about
November 18, 2017 in Hennepin County.

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(Emphasis added.); See generally , 10 Minnesota Practice , CRIMJIG 13.115 (2015).
McRaven contends that this instruction suggests that a person does not need to participate
in the assembly to be found guilty. He argues that the district court should have changed
“those assembled” to “Mr. McRaven” to specify that the jury needed to conclude that he
disturbed the peace by an intentional act or threat of unlawful force.
We disagree. The district court’s jury instruction doe s not misstate the
second-degree riot statute. The second-degree riot statute states:
When three or more persons assembled disturb the public
peace by an intentional act or threat of unlawful force or
violence to person or property, each participant who is armed
with a dangerous weapon or know s that any other participant
is armed with a dangerous weap on is guilty of riot second
degree.

Minn. Stat. § 609.71, subd. 2 (2016). The statute, as reflected in the jury instruction here,
requires knowing participati on by McRaven with out substituting his name for “those
assembled.” It does so by requiring that McRaven be one of the “three or more persons”
assembled and that this assembly “disturb[ed] the public peace.” Id.
Further, the statute and the jury instruc tion require that McRaven either have a
weapon or know another participant is armed. This element, as the district court astutely
noted, requires knowing particip ation and alleviates the conc ern that mere presence is
sufficient to sustain a conviction for second-degree riot.
And factually, the record reflects that McRaven’s actions went beyond mere
presence. McRaven’s participation in the brawl is established by his own testimony. The
record, including his own admission, portrays McRaven as an active participant in the

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brawl. The incident clearly disturbed the public peace by occurring outside with physical
fighting, several gunshots fire d, and victims sustaining serious injuries. Further, at least
one individual involved in the brawl had a gun, which McRaven knew. The supreme court
has upheld a conviction for second-degree riot on much less information than is present
here. See State v. Winkels, 283 N.W. 763, 766 (Minn. 1939).1
In sum, the district court’s jury instru ction on second-degree ri ot did not misstate
the law.
Affirmed.

1 The language of the riot statute has changed in some respects since Winkels, but it is
sufficiently similar for the reasoning in the case to be persuasive.