In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. D. and B. D., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0780

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. D. and B. D., Parents.

Filed October 14, 2019
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-JV-18-1978

Viet-Hanh Winchell, Galowitz Olson PLLC, Lake Elmo, Minnesota (for appellant-mother
J.D.)

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kayla M. Rodriguez, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Ramsey County Social Services Department)

Nicole Turner, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights to her
child. She argues that the district court erred in concluding that she failed to rebut the
statutory presumption that she is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child

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relationship and abused its discretion in determining that termination of her parental rights
is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother, J.D., gave birth to a child, J.L.D., in 2018. The following day,
the Minneapolis Police Department placed the child on a 72 -hour protective hold.
Respondent Ramsey County Social Services Department (RC SSD) petitioned for
termination of m other’s parental rights. T he district court issued an ex parte order for
emergency protective care and held an emergency -protective-care hearing. The district
court granted emergency protective care of the child to RCSSD and relieved RCSSD of the
requirement to make reasonable efforts to reunify the child with mother, based on the prior
involuntary termination of mother’s parental rights to her first child. A trial on the petition
to terminate mother’s parental rights was held on April 15, 2019. RCSSD also petitioned
to terminate the parental rights of father, B.D. That petition was tried separately from the
petition to terminate mother’s parental rights.
The district court concluded that mother failed to rebut the presumption of palpable
unfitness and that termination of m other’s parental rights i s in the c hild’s best interest s.
Based on tho se conclusions, the district court termin ated mother’s parental rights to the
child. The district court established the following factual record in support of its decision.
Mother gave birth to her first child in 201 7. That child tested positive for opiates
and methamphetamine at the time of birth and experienced withdrawal symptoms due to
prenatal exposure to dr ugs. Mother admitted that she had used heroin throughout her
pregnancy. She also told Anoka County Child Protection that she had used drugs and

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alcohol for years and that she began using heroin daily al most immediately after meeting
father about three ye ars earlier. Based on this information, the district court determined
that mother’s first child was in need of protection or services, and it granted temporary
legal custody of that child to Anoka County Child Protection. The district court ordered
mother to participate in a case plan with tasks aimed at reunifica tion. In an attempt to
comply with the case plan, mother entered a chemical-dependency treatment program, but
she left the program the next day . She then began a methadone program , but she never
completed the intake process. Also, she failed to submit urinalysis (UA) samples and a
psychological evaluation, as required by the case plan . Because of m other’s
noncompliance with the case plan, Anoka County Child Protection filed a petition for
termination of mother’s parental rights . The district court involuntarily terminated
mother’s parental rights to her first child on March 26, 2018.
Later in 2018, mother gave birth to the child who is the subject of this proceeding .
She told medical pro fessionals that she used heroin daily and that her most recent heroin
use was on the day of the child’s birth. The child experienced withdrawal symptoms due
to her prenata l exposure to drugs. Mother informed RCSSD that she used heroin daily
during her pregnancy and that she did not receive any prenatal care.
At the underlying termination trial, mother admitted that she continued to use heroin
while the current case was pending. Although she testified that she wanted to become
sober, she also stated that she had used heroin at least once a week since the c hild’s birth,
including the week before trial.

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Mother entered three chemical-dependency treatment programs between the child’s
birth and the trial. She left the first program after approximately one month, and the second
program after three days. Most recently, she entered treatment at Anoka Women’s
Transformation House on April 3, 2019, just 12 days before trial. In that time, mother took
three UA tests, all of which were positive. Mother’s individual treatment plan from
Transformation House indicated that she lacked relapse-prevention skills and coping skills
to change primary life areas. Mother also used a methadone clinic from the end of October
2018 until the end of January 2019, when she relapsed. She returned to the clinic in late
March 2019 and was attending it daily at the time of trial.
Mother admitted that she has a history of unstable housing. Before she entered
Transformation House, she was homeless. Mother t estified that, once she finis hed
treatment, she and the child would be able to move in with her mother, but only if she were
sober. She also stated that, if she completed inpatient treatment at Transformation House,
she would like to enter outpatient treatment. But she had not made specific plans regarding
outpatient treatment.
Mother had some opportunities to parent the child. She frequently visited the child
at the hospital during the first couple of weeks after the child’s birth. When she left her
first treatment program in early December 2018, she visited the child less frequently, until
she began treatment at Transformation House i n early April 2019. Mother ha s never
independently parented the c hild, nor did she independently p arent her first child. She
admitted that her chemical use significantly interfered with her ability to parent the child.

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The social worker and the assigned guardian ad litem testified at trial that the child
was healthy and thriving in foster care. The child was bonding with her care providers and
her biological sister (m other’s first child), with whom she lived in the foster home . The
social worker and guardian ad li tem each opined that terminatio n of mother’s parental
rights is in the child’s best interests.
Based on that factual record, the district court concluded that m other’s “history of
drug abuse, failed treatments, continued use, and poor coping and relapse prevention skills
indicate that she has not sufficiently mitigated the conditions that led to child protection
involvement and that she will not be able to parent in the reasonabl y foreseeable future.”
Accordingly, the district court ruled that m other had failed to rebut the presumption of
palpable unfitness. It then found that terminatio n i s in the child’s best interest s and
terminated mother’s parental rights to the child. Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I.
A district court may involuntarily terminate parental rights if, among other things,
it finds by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory basis for termination exists. Minn.
Stat. § 260C.317, subd. 1 (2018). Upon finding that a statutory ground for termination
exists, the district court does not automatically terminate parental rights; rather, the district
court has discretion and also must find that termination is in the child’s best interest s. In
re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853 N.W.2d 127, 136 -37 (Minn. 2014). One statutory
ground for termination is that the parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018). “It is presumed that a

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parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship upon a showing
that the parent’s parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily terminated
. . . [.]” Id.
The statutory presumption is a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of
production to the parent. In re Welfare of Child of J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d 241, 245-46 (Minn.
App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2018). The parent must produce evidence that
could support a finding that the parent is suitable to be entrusted with the care of the child.
R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137. If the parent introduces such evidence, then the “presumption
is rebutted and has no further funct ion at the trial.” J.A.K., 907 N.W.2d at 246 (quotation
omitted). Whether a parent’s evidence satisfies the burden of production must be
determined on a case -by-case basis. Id. We apply a de novo standard of review to the
district court’s determination as to whether the parent presented evidence sufficient to rebut
the statutory presumption. Id.
Because mother’s parental rights to her first child we re involuntarily terminated,
mother is presumed to be palpably unfit , and she b ore the burden of production to rebut
that presumption. Mother argues that the evidence she presented at trial was sufficient to
rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness. Specifically, she relies on evidence that she
made efforts to find chemical-dependency treatment programs in which she could succeed,
that she enjoys spending time with the child, and that no one at RCSSD had any issues with
her behavior during her visits with the child.
Again, mother had to produce evidence that could support a finding that she is
suitable to be entrusted with the care of the child. See R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d at 137. Evidence

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that mother made efforts to find treatment programs, that she enjoys spending time with
the child, and that her behavior was acceptable while visiting the child in supervised and
controlled environments is not sufficient to support such a finding.
Mother also argues that the district court erred in finding that she did n ot rebut the
presumption because the district court found that the child’s father, B.D., had successfully
rebutted his presumption of palpable unfitness and denied th e petition to terminate his
parental rights. That argument is unavailing because the district court determines whether
a parent’s evidence satisfies the burden of production on a “case -by-case basis.” J.A.K.,
907 N.W.2d at 246 (quotation omitted). Therefore, the district court’s determination in
father’s case is irrelevant to its determination in mother’s case.
In sum, mother did not present evidence that could justify a finding that she is
suitable to be entrusted with the care of the child . The district court therefore did not err
in finding that she failed to rebut the presumption of palpable unfitness.
II.
Mother argues that the district court erred in concluding that termination of her
parental rights is in the c hild’s best interests. Even if a statutory basis for termination of
parental rights exists, a district court cannot terminate parental rights unless it is in the best
interests of the child. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn.
App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). “In analyzing the best interests of the
child, the court must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-
child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; and
(3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.

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App. 1992). We review the district court’s determination that termination is in the child’s
best interests for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Generally, a court presumes that it is in the best interest s of the child to be in the
custody of his or her natural parent. In re Welfare of Clausen, 289 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn.
1980). Nevertheless, the child’s competing interests include a stable environment. R.T.B.,
492 N.W.2d at 4. In balancing the three factors, “the interests of the parent and child are
not necessarily given equal weight.” Id. “Where the interests of parent and child conflict,
the interests of the child are paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
Here, the district court determined that termination of mother’s parental rights is in
the c hild’s best interest s after balancing the three relevant factors and considering the
opinions of the social worker and guardian ad litem. There is ample evidence in the record
to support that determination. The trial evidence showed that m other continued to use
heroin on a weekly basis and was not able to overcome her chemical dependency, despite
her many attempts at treatment. Furthermore, her housing situation was uncertain. In
contrast, the testimony of the social worker and gu ardian ad litem indicated that the c hild
was healthy, making progress, and bonding with her biological sister in her foster home.
Although mother and the child have an interest in preserving the parent-child relationship,
the child’s competing interest in a stable environment outweighs that interest. On this
record, t he district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of
mother’s parental rights to the child is in the child’s best interest.
Affirmed.