State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0782

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Edward White,
Defendant,

Midwest Bonding, LLC,
Appellant.

Filed February 3, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File Nos. 27-CR-15-28151, 27-CR-16-11051, 27-CR-17-6334

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

James McGeeney, Doda & McGeeney, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Florey, Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Midwest Bonding, LLC seeks re instatement of $120, 000 in bail bonds
that it posted on behalf of de fendant Michael Edward White. After he failed to appear at
his sentencing hearing, Midwest searched for White for more than 12 months and hired a
third-party search agency, which followed an ultimately unhelpful tip that White had fled
to Georgia. Once White was finally arrested, Midwest asked the district court to reinstate
its forfeited bonds. But the district court denied its request. Because we conclude that the
district court erred in its analysis, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
The state charged defendant Michael Edward White with felony failure to register
as a predatory offender in 2015.1 And in 2016, he was charge d again for the same crime.
In August 2016, appellant Midwest Bonding, LLC (Midwest) posted two bonds—$30,000
and $40,000—on White’s behalf. Then, for a third time, White was charged with felony
failure to register in March 2017. He was again released on a $50,000 bond, posted by
Midwest. The next month, White pleaded guilty2 but then failed to appear at his sentencing
hearing. Because White failed to appear, the district court ordered that the three bonds,
totaling $120,000, be forfeited.

1 White is required to register for life as part of his sentence from a 2003 conviction for
first-degree criminal sexual conduct and first-degree burglary.
2 In return for pleading gu ilty to the charge from 20 16 (in court file number
27-CR-16-11051), the state dismissed the two other charges from 2015 and 2017 (in court
file numbers 27-CR-15-28151 and 27-CR-17-6334).

3
In order to reverse the bond forfeiture, Mi dwest tried to find White and return him
to the authorities.3 Midwest called White using the c ontact information he provided but
was unable to reach him. Nor did the postal service have a forwarding address for him.
And Midwest’s search of the Minnesota jail re gistries revealed that White was not in
custody. When these efforts were un successful, Midwest hired a professional
fugitive-recovery agency, at an additional expense. The agency also tried to locate White
using his provided contact information and its investigative software. Then, the agency
got a lead from a confidential informant who said that White was in Georgia, where his
mother lived. But, after contacting local au thorities to help apprehend White there, it
learned he left his mother’s the month before. Local police in Georgia continued to search
for White by canvassing the neighborhood and conducting surveillance. When that search
was unsuccessful, Midwest’s fugitive recovery agency offered a “substantial financial
reward” and advertised White’s wanted stat us on social media. Finally, after about
13 months on the run, police arrested White.4
After White was found, Midwest moved to reinstate and discharge the three bonds,
totaling $120,000. In suppor ting documentation, Midwest described their efforts to find
White as outlined above. But the district c ourt denied Midwest’s re quest. The district
court noted in its order that Midwest could request a hearing on the decision and Midwest

3 While searching for White, Midwest requested and received multiple extensions from the
district court on its deadline to pay the bonds.
4 After his arrest, White appeared in district court before being released again on bond,
posted by another bail bond company. But White again failed to appear at his rescheduled
sentencing hearing. Agents with the other bail bond comp any eventually found White
hiding in the wall of a home in Minneapolis.

4
did so, asking the court to reconsider reinst atement. The court d eclined, stating that
Midwest did not provide any new information that would warrant reconsideration or a
hearing. Midwest appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Midwest argues that the district court a bused its discretion when it declined to
reinstate and discharge White’s bail bonds. We review a district court’s denial of a petition
for reinstatement of forfeited bail bon ds for an abuse of discretion. State v. Askland ,
784 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Minn. 2010). And a distri ct court abuses its discretion when it bases
its conclusions on an err oneous view of the law. Almor Corp. v. County of Hennepin ,
566 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 1997).
Under Minnesota law, when a defendant is released on a bond and fails to perform
on the conditions of the bond, the bond will be defaulted. Minn. St at. § 629.58 (2018).
“The penalty for default is forfeiture of the amount of the bond to the court.”
State v. Storkamp, 656 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Minn. 2003). But, upon request, a district court
may forgive the bond forfeiture penalty or reduce the amount forfeited if doing so would
be “just and reasonable” under the circumstances of the case. Minn. Stat. § 629.59 (2018).
Generally, the surety—here, Midwest—has th e burden to show the circumstances that
make reinstatement just and reasonable. In re Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d 40, 46 (Minn. 1953).
And in considering whether to reinstate bond after forfeiture, Minnesota courts balance
four factors, taken from Shetsky. The factors are:
[1] the purpose of bail and the civil nature of the proceedings
and the burden of proof as well as the cause, purpose, and
length of defendant’s absence;

5
[2] the good faith o f t h e s u r e t y a s measured by the fault or
[willfulness] of the defendant;
[3] the good faith efforts of the surety—if any— to apprehend
and produce the defendant; and
[4] the prejudice—by way of delay or otherwise—to the state,
in its administration of justice.

Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the district court determined that the factors, considered together, weighed
against reinstatement of the forfeited bond. Bu t we discern the district court erred with
regard to two of these factors: the second fa ctor, good faith measured by the fault of the
defendant, and the fourth factor, prejudice to the state. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court erred by denying Midwest’s requested reinstatement. We review each of the
four Shetsky factors below.
Purpose of Bail and Cause, Purpose, and Length of Defendant’s Absence
In considering the purpose of bail, courts seek to ensure prompt administration of
justice, Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 46, and to facilitate that administration by encouraging
sureties to locate and return defendants. State v. Vang , 763 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Minn.
App. 2009). Likewise, “[t]he bail system seeks to reconcile the defendant’s interest in
pretrial liberty with the need for assurance that he will return for trial by making his release
conditional on his providing financial security for his appearance.” State v. Super ,
161 N.W.2d 832, 838-39 (Minn. 1968).
Here, Midwest posted White’s bonds an d White pleaded guilty but absconded
during the sentencing phase of his case. White was on the run from April 2017 to

6
May 2018. The district court found that th is significantly delayed his sentencing, which
ran contrary to the purpose of bail.
Yet, Midwest argues that the purpose of bail was fulfilled here because White only
absconded after pleading guilty, relying on Farsdale v. Martinez, 586 N.W.2d 423 (Minn.
App. 1998).5 In Farsdale, we concluded that forfeiting a bond after the defendant had
pleaded guilty would be contrary to the primary purpose of bail, which is to secure a
defendant’s presence at trial. 586 N.W.2d at 425 (emphasis added). We explained that
forfeiture after that would be punitive and only serve to incr ease the state’s revenue. See
Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 46 (“The primary purpose of bail in a criminal case is not to increase
the revenue of the state or to punish the surety . . . .”). But courts also consider the length
of a defendant’s absence and in Farsdale, the defendant was only on the run for two
months. 586 N.W. 2d at 426. White was on the run for much longer—13 months. And
courts consider the cause of a defendant’s ab sence—here, a clear attempt to avoid facing
justice for his admitted offense. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that this factor weighed against reinstatement.6

5 Midwest also relies on an unpub lished case for this argument, State v. Stellmach ,
No. A14-0920, 2015 WL 134174, at *1-3 (Minn. App. Jan. 12, 2015). There, we
concluded “that the purpose of bail was largely accomplished” when the “[d]efendant had
already pleaded guilty before fai ling to appear for sentencing.” Stellmach, 2015 WL
134174, at *2. But the defe ndant in that case was absent for only about 90 days as
compared to thirteen months here. Id. at *1.
6 According to Midwest, White was only on the run for eight months. But this is contrary
to the record. White failed to appear in April 2017 and he was arrested in May 2018. While
we acknowledge that the district court did not file its order forfeiting the bail bonds when
White failed to appear in April, this does not require us to ignore the intervening months
in our analysis of this factor. And regardle ss of whether it was thirteen or eight months,

7
Good Faith Measured by Fault or Willfulness of Defendant
Next, courts consider the good faith of Midwest, as measured by the fault or
willfulness of White, because his bad faith is attributable to Midwest. Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d
at 48. The district court found that this factor weighed “heavily” against reinstatement
because White failed to appear in court twice. But at the time of White’s second absence,
he was out on another company’s bond, not Midwest’s. Therefore, White’s second absence
is not attributable to Midwest. Because the district court incorrectly considered White’s
second absence as a reflection on Midwest, it erred in its determination on this factor.
Good-Faith Efforts to Find Defendant
Third, courts consider the good-faith efforts of Midwest to find White. Id. at 46.
Here, the district court credited Midwest’s efforts to locate White and found that this factor
weighed “slightly” in favor of reinstatement. Midwest notes that it contacted White’s
relatives, hired an outside agency to help find White, and even sought law enforcement’s
help when it learned he may be in Georgia. Minnesota courts have credited sureties when
they have expended similar efforts. See, e.g. , Farsdale, 586 N.W.2d at 426 (crediting
efforts of a surety that enlisted help from family, friends, and out-of-state law
enforcement); Vang, 763 N.W.2d at 355-56, 358-59 (cre diting efforts when the surety
enlisted the help of a recovery agent). The district court acknowledged Midwest’s efforts
as notable and concluded that this factor weighs in favor of reinstatement, with which
Midwest agrees.

the time that White was absent was substantial and, as the district court noted, significantly
delayed White’s sentencing.

8
Prejudice to State
Finally, courts consider whether the defe ndant’s absence caused any prejudice to
the state in prosecuting the defendant. Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62. This includes a delay
in administering justice and any expenses incurred in eventually apprehending the
defendant. Shetsky, 60 N.W.2d at 48. While it is Midwest’s burden to prove the first three
factors, the burden is on the state to prove this final factor. Askland, 784 N.W.2d at 62.
Midwest argues that the state’s failure to argue how it was prej udiced means that
this factor should weigh in fa vor of reinstatement and not ne utrally, as the district court
found. We agree. In consid ering this final factor, we find the supreme court’s reasoning
in Askland to be particularly instructive. 784 N.W.2d at 60. There, the state did not present
evidence that it was prejudiced, it did not argue that any witnesses or evidence were lost
during the defendant’s absence, and it did not argue that it incurred any undue expense to
retrieve or prosecute the defendant. Id. at 63. And because of these failures, the court
determined that the state failed to carry its burden on this factor. Id.
The facts involving prejudice (or lack thereof) in Askland are present here as well.
In fact, the state failed to respond at all: to Midwest’s petition for reinstatement in district
court and to this appeal. Under Minnesota cas elaw, a district court should find that this
factor weighs against reinstatement when a state demonstrates prejudice. See Shetsky,
60 N.W.2d at 45 (“The general rule is that relief from forfeiture will not be granted where
the prosecution has been deprived of proof by delay or has othe rwise been adversely
affected.”). We conclude that the converse is true. Because the state has the burden to
demonstrate that it was prejudiced, when it fa ils to put forth any evidence or argument

9
about prejudice, it weighs in favor of reinstatement. Thus , the district court erred in
concluding that this factor weighed neutrally.
In sum, because we discern that the district court erred in its analysis of two of the
Shetsky factors, we reverse the district cour t’s order denying reinstatement. And we
remand this case back to the district court for it to reconsider (in whole or in part)
Midwest’s reinstatement request, consistent with our analysis above.7
Reversed and remanded.

7 On remand, the district court may also consid er the fact that two of the bonds, totaling
$80,000, are tied to charges that were dism issed under the state’s plea agreement with
White.