In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: J. R. S. and T. A. S., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0784

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
J. R. S. and T. A. S., Parents.

Filed November 12, 2019
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-JV-18-3657

Matthew D. Jorud, Jorud Law Office, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for appellant J.R.S.)

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Sarah Este p-Larson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Otter Tail County Human Services)

Anna Solheid, Alexandria, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ross, Pr esiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Jesson, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant mother, whose you ng children tested positive for high levels of drugs,
challenges the district court’s termination of her parental rights. Because the record
supports the district court’s findings that at least one statutory ground was proven by clear
and convincing evidence, that the county made reasonable efforts, and that it is in the
children’s best interests to terminate mother’s rights, we affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant mother J.R.S. and father had two children, a six-year-old and a newborn
baby. The Otter Tail County Department of Human Services (the county) received a report
that the baby tested positive at birth for methamphetamine and amphetamine. The county
offered chemical-health services to the family but shortly after that, the family moved out
of the county.
After the family moved back to the area, the county received another
child-protection report. The family was homeless and staying with mother’s grandparents.
Father screamed at the baby and the grandpa rents were afraid of mother and father,
according to the reporter. During its investigation of this report, the county discovered that
father was required to register as a predat ory offender. And while trying to arrange a
meeting with the family, the county received yet another report that the younger child, then
six months old, was admitted to the hospital for skull fractures from being dropped on his
head.
While at the hospital, staff observed erra tic behavior by the parents: father was
yelling and swearing at staff while mother kept falling asleep. The parents took the child
home from the hospital the next day. But later that evening, police arrested father for
selling controlled substances, fleeing police, and obstructing justice. The county
investigated, and the family’s relatives shared additional concerns about the children’s
safety and well-being because of the parents’ drug use. Initially, the county sought to assist
the family on a voluntary basis, which included requests to undergo drug testing. But the
parents refused both the tests and the assistance.

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As a result, the county requested emergency protective care of the children and filed
a petition alleging the children were in need of protection or services. The district court
granted the request, and the county assumed custody of the children. Both children tested
positive for methamphetamine, 1 with the older child’s test results more th an double the
level required for a result to be deemed positive. The younger child also tested positive for
THC, a compound found in marijuana. The children were adjudicated as children in need
of protection or services later that month.
The county developed out-of-home placemen t plans for the family to address the
reasons the children were removed from the hom e, as well as the children’s needs. The
county referred the family for a number of services to work on their plan goals, including
help with housing and rent payments, and services for chemical health, mental health, and
parenting.
Initially, mother followed the plan and did well. Because of her progress, the county
returned the children to her on a trial home vi sit in September 2017. Given the family’s
progress, the county returned full custody to mother in March 2018 but still provided
protective supervision and services.
In June 2018, a child-protection worker went to the family home for a case-closure
meeting. The home smelled like marijuana, although mother deni ed using drugs.
Following that meeting, the county had trouble engaging the family and mother refused
urinalysis testing. That fall, the county received additional child-welfare reports involving

1 The children were drug tested through a hair follicle test.

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the older child about his behavior and attendan ce at school, his mother not answering the
door when he got off the school bus, and an incident where he was brought to school by
police because the home was being searched.
As a result, at a December review hearing, the agency requested the whole family
be drug tested. Because the parents tested positive for high levels of amphetamine and
methamphetamine immediately after the hearing, the children were ta ken back to foster
care, and the county filed a termination-of-p arental-rights (TPR) petition. Shortly after
that, the county received the results of the children’s drug tests, which were positive for
high levels of methamphetamine.
Trial on the TPR petition took place four months later. During two days of
testimony, the district court heard from the two child-protection workers assigned to the
family, the guardian ad litem, and mother. On the second day of trial, the parents arrived
late, and the county requested they submit to immediate ur inalysis testing. Mother
complied after a court orde r to do so and tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamine. The county called mother as the last witness and she testified that she
made progress on her case plan and had an earlier period of sobriety but that she was now
struggling and could not provide what the children needed. At the time of the trial, the
children had been in foster care for a total of 603 days.
The district court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights, finding that the
statutory grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence, that the county made
reasonable efforts for reunification, and that it was in the children’s best interests to have
all parental rights terminated. Mother appeals.

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D E C I S I O N
Mother argues that the district court erred in terminating her parental rights for three
reasons. First, she contends that the eviden ce is insufficient to prove the two statutory
bases: that she (1) failed to comply with her duties as a parent and (2) failed to correct the
conditions that led to her children’s removal. Second, she contends that the county did not
make reasonable efforts for reunification. Fi nally, she asserts that clear and convincing
evidence failed to support the district court’s determination that termination of her rights
was in the best interests of her children.
The district court has discre tion to decide whether to terminate parental rights. In
re Welfare of Child of A.M.C. , 920 N.W.2d 648, 654 (Minn. App. 2018). This court will
affirm a district court’s termination of pare ntal rights when at least one statutory ground
for termination is supported by clear and convi ncing evidence, termination is in the best
interests of the child, and th e county has made reasonable efforts for reunification. In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). And this court’s review
of a district court’s findings in a termina tion matter is limited “to whether the findings
address the statutory criteria, whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence,
and whether they are clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of D.D.G. , 558 N.W.2d 481, 484
(Minn. 1997).
To assess whether the evidence was clear and convincing, this court “must closely
inquire” into the sufficien cy of the evidence. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. ,
814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (quo tation omitted). And this court reviews the
statutory bases for an abuse of discretion and the factual findings for clear error. Id. “A

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finding is clearly erroneous if it is manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not
reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” Id. (quotation omitted). Finally, this
court reviews “a district court’s ultimate determination that termination is in a child’s best
interest for an abuse of discretion.” In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895,
905 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). With these standards in mind,
we review each of mother’s arguments in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its disc retion in finding that mother failed to
comply with her duties as a parent.

Mother argues that the evid ence was insufficient to pr ove a statutory basis for
termination. Because the record supports th e district court’s conclusion that clear and
convincing evidence demonstrated that mother failed to comply with her duties as a parent
in the parent-child relationship, we agree.2
We begin with the statutory language delineating failure to comply with parental
duties, found in Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(2) (2018). When
a parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly neglected to comply with their duties
in the parent-child relationshi p, “including but not limited to providing th e child with
necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the
child’s physical, mental, or emotional health and development,” term ination of parental
rights may be warranted. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2).

2 Because the record supports the first statutory basis, we do not need to address the second
basis. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385 (holding that only one statutory basis for termination
is necessary to terminate parental rights, when termination is in the best interests of the
children and the county made reasonable efforts for reunification).

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Here, the record amply supports the district court’s finding that mother failed in her
duties as a parent. While mother initially complied with her case plan and had her children
returned to her care, she relapsed. Before the children were removed the second time, the
oldest child was struggling at school and the pa rents requested he stop receiving therapy.
The presence of a stabbing victim in the family’s home in the middle of the night, with the
older child waking up to blood in the liv ing room and police searching the home for a
weapon, raised serious concerns for the children’s safety.
And when the children were removed from mother’s care the second time, they
tested positive for high levels of methamphetamine. The older child tested positive at seven
times the level of a positive test and the younger child’s result was 26 times higher. This
demonstrates that the children were exposed to chemicals that were likely to affect their
physical, mental, and emotional health. And following the children’s second removal from
the home, mother refused to cooperate with the county or address her drug use by getting
an updated chemical-health asse ssment or providing urinalyses . This shows that mother
was refusing to address the key issue that prevented her from being able to meet the
children’s needs. In sum, despite being given opportunities to be successful, mother failed
to comply with her parental duties.
Still, mother contends that the district cour t erred. First, she argues that the court
failed to consider the conditions as they existed at the time of the termination hearing. In
a termination proceeding, “the evidence relating to termin ation must address conditions
that exist at the time of the h earing” and the conditions must be expected to continue for
the foreseeable future. In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980).

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That evidence is starkly pr esent here. Mother’s methamphetamine use persisted
through the trial—she tested positive on the final day. And she testified at trial that her use
of methamphetamine “got worse” after the children were removed the second time and that
she was still struggling with sobriety.
Second, mother contends that the district court failed to consider that she completed
her case plan. But a completed case plan does not necessarily equate to a correction of the
conditions that led to a child’s placement. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89. And while mother
did well initially, her failure to continue engaging with services and her relapse led to the
termination proceedings.3
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that clear and convincing
evidence demonstrates that moth er failed to comply with he r duties as a parent in the
parent-child relationship.
II. The district court did no t err in finding that the county made reasonable efforts
for reunification.

Mother argues that the evidence was insu fficient to prove that the county made
reasonable efforts for reunification. In our car eful review of the evidence, we conclude
that the county’s efforts were supported by clear and convincing evidence.

3 Mother also argues that the district court failed to consider that the county was at fault for
not closing the case sooner. We fail to see how this supports her assertion. Mother’s
argument rests on the assumption that if the county had closed her case sooner, her relapse
would have escaped detection, but that doe s not show how she fulfilled her duties as a
parent. And even if the county had closed the case earlier, it would have likely reopened
the case once it learned of her relapse.

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To assess a county’s reasonable efforts, we first consider whether the services
provided to a family were relevant, adequate, culturally appropriate, available, accessible,
consistent, timely, and realistic. A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 655. Here, the child-protection
workers testified about how their efforts were specific to the family’s needs at each stage
of the case. The guardian ad litem echoed thei r testimony and explained that all of the
services the county offered th e family were “astounding” and that the county “pulled out
all of the stops trying to accommodate [the family] in every way they could.”
We next turn to the “length of the time the county was involved and the quality of
effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K. , 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review
denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). Here, the case was open from October 2016 until termination
in April 2019—two and one-half years total. The county was consistently involved with
the family throughout that time and provided ongoing suppor t for mother. While mother
alleges that the county went several weeks without communicating with her, even though
“[a]t all times” she had a working phone number and voicemail, this argument is contrary
to the record. The child-protec tion worker testified that she met with the family at least
monthly from January to June 2018. The work er also noted the family was hard to reach
after the June 2018 meeting because there were frequent telephone number changes. And
the workers’ ongoing case notes support their testimony, contradicting mother’s claims.
Mother’s testimony regarding the county’s support is, perhaps, the most telling
evidence of reasonable reunification efforts. At trial, mother agreed with the state that the
county provided services that helped her drug use such that the children were able to return
home for some time. And mother agreed that the services were reasonable and appropriate.

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Mother even said that she felt like there were “too many services” and that the services
“were overdone.” Mother’s own admissions at trial undermine her argument that the
county’s efforts were insufficient.
In our review of the record, it is clear that the county provided reasonable—indeed
significant—efforts for reunification. The distri ct court’s conclusion in that regard is
supported by the record.
III. The district court did not abuse its di scretion in finding that termination of
parental rights was in the best interests of the children.

Mother argues that the district court erred in finding that termination of her parental
rights was in her children’s best interests be cause the children had a strong interest in
preserving their relationship w ith her. The district court concluded that the children’s
needs outweighed the mother’s in terests in preserving the parent-child relationship. We
agree.
A district court must balance three fact ors when considering the children’s best
interests: (1) the children’s interest in preserving the pare nt-child relationship; (2) the
parent’s interest in the same; and (3) any competing interests of the children. In re Welfare
of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). The competing inte rests can include a
stable environment, health considera tions, and the children’s preferences. J.R.B.,
805 N.W.2d at 905. But when the interests of the children and parent conflict, the interests
of the children are paramount. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
Here, the children had minimal interest in preserving the parent-child relationship
because mother exposed them to high levels of drugs and neglected their needs for safety

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and stability at home. We acknowledge mother’s hard work to get sober, but she relapsed
and subsequently refused to address her drug use. This significantly affected her children.
When they were removed the se cond time, the younger child’s drug test revealed higher
levels of methamphetamine in his system than mother’s.
While, as mother argues, she was the children’s primary caretaker while they were
in her care, the children were out of their home for a significant po rtion of their young
lives. The younger child was first removed at six months old and spent more than 600 days
in foster care in the two and one-half year s the case was open. And despite mother’s
interest in continuing the parent-child relationship, the children’s needs are paramount and
outweigh any of her interests. In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F. , 823 N.W.2d 656, 668
(Minn. App. 2012). The guard ian ad litem testified about how much the children were
struggling and how traumatic th is situation has been for th em, describing the time of the
trial as the “point of no return” in the parent-child relationship. 4 And mother herself
testified that she was struggli ng with her sobriety and that she could not offer what her
children needed right now—in cluding stability, consistency, and happiness—and she did
not know when she would be able to in the future.
Based on the substantial evidence in the re cord, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the children’s best interests outweigh mother’s and are best

4 The district court credited the guardian ad litem’s testimony, noting that her opinions
were “well-founded and supported by the facts.” A determination of the best interests of a
child involves credib ility determinations, In re Tanghe , 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn.
App. 2003), and this court defers to the cred ibility determinations of the district court,
Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).

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served by termination of parental rights. And because at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convin cing evidence, the co unty made reasonable
efforts for reunification, and termination is in the best interests of the children, we affirm.
Affirmed.