State of Minnesota,

1
STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT

A19-0786

Court of Appeals Hudson, J.

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs. Filed: April 7, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Michael James Schwartz, Jr.,

Appellant.

________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and

Melissa Manderschied, Bloomington City Atto rney, Maureen S. O’Brien, Assistant City
Attorney, Bloomington, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Appellate Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

________________________
S Y L L A B U S
The crime of driving, operating, or being in physical control of a motor vehicle with
“any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule I or II” in the driver’s body, under
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7) (2020), does not require the State to prove that the driver
knew or had reason to know that the controlled substance was in their body.
Affirmed.

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O P I N I O N
HUDSON, Justice.
The question presented in this case is whether Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7)
(2020), requires the State to prove knowledge as an element of the crime. Appellant
Michael James Schwartz, Jr., was charged w ith violating the statute, which makes it “a
crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle . . .
when the person’s body contains any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule
I or II, or its metabolite, other than mariju ana or tetrahydrocannab inols.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(7). Schwartz entered a guilty plea and was convicted. On direct appeal,
Schwartz argued that his guilty plea was invalid because his plea colloquy did not include
an admission that he knew or had reason to k now that a Schedule II controlled substance
was in his body when he was operating the vehicle. The court of appeals determined that
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7), is a strict liability offense that does not require the State
to prove knowledge as an element of the crime. We agree with the court of appeals and,
therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On October 15, 2016 , Bloomington police
responded to a citizen’s report of an unresponsive male sitting in a parked vehicle with the
motor running. When the officers arrived, the reporting party explained that the driver,
later identified as Appellant Michael James Schwartz, Jr., had awakened, left the vehicle,
and was now standing nearby. When the o fficers made contact with Schwartz, they
smelled an odor of alcohol and observed that he was having difficulty standing. Schwartz

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admitted to consuming alcohol and failed a series of field sobriety tests. The officers placed
him under arrest for driving while impaired. Th e officers then discovered a glass pipe in
Schwartz’s pocket and an open alcoholic beverage in his vehicle. Suspecting that Schwartz
was also under the influence of a controlled substance, the officers obtained a search
warrant for a blood sample. A test of the sample revealed the presence of amphetamine, a
Schedule II controlled substance. See Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 3(d)(1) (2020).
Schwartz was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a Schedule I or Schedule
II controlled substance in his body, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7). He
agreed to plead guilty. During the plea colloquy, Schwar tz admitted that he operated the
motor vehicle before his contact with the poli ce, consumed alcohol before driving, failed
field sobriety tests, and possessed a glass pipe. Schwartz also agreed that his blood sample
“revealed the presence” of amphetamine in his body. The district court accepted
Schwartz’s guilty plea. Because it was his third DWI offense, Schwartz was adjudicated
guilty of second-degree driving while impaired, a gross misdemeanor offense.
On direct appeal, Schwartz sought to withdraw his guilty plea under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.05, subd. 1. Schwartz argued that his guilty plea was invalid because he never
admitted that he knew or had reason to know that amphetamine was present in his body at
the time he was operating the vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction. State
v. Schwartz, 943 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Minn. App. 2020). Given the language of the statute,
the Legislature’s inclusion of an affirmative defense, and the public-welfare nature of the
offense, the court of appeals concluded that the Legislature demonstrated a clear intent to
dispense with the mens rea re quirement for this offense. Id. at 417. Thus, the court of

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appeals determined that Schwar tz’s guilty plea was valid. Id. We granted Schwartz’s
petition for review.
ANALYSIS
The validity of a guilty plea is a questio n of law that we review de novo. State v.
Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Although a defendant does not have an absolute
right to withdraw a valid guilty plea, a court must allow a de fendant to withdraw a guilty
plea, even after sentencing, if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”
State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007); Mi nn. R. Crim. P. 15. 05, subd. 1. A
manifest injustice occurs when a district court accepts an invalid guilty plea. Theis,
742 N.W.2d at 646. A guilty plea that is not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent is considered
invalid. Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d. 900, 903 (Minn. 2002). “Accuracy requires that the
plea be supported by a proper factual basis, that there must be sufficient facts on the record
to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls within the charge to which he desires
to plead guilty.” State v. Iverson , 664 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 2003) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Schwartz argues that he should be allowe d to withdraw his guilty plea because he
did not admit to all the elements of the crime of driving with a Schedule I or II controlled
substance in his body. Specifically, Schwartz contends that his guilty plea is not accurate
because he never admitted that he knew or ha d reason to know that amphetamine was in
his body at the time he was operating the vehicle.
Schwartz’s argument presents us with a qu estion of statutory interpretation. The
interpretation of a statute is a legal question that we review de novo. State v. Ndikum ,

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815 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Minn. 2012). The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain
and effectuate legislative intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020).
A.
Our analysis begins with the language of th e statute, which provides that “[i]t is a
crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any motor vehicle . . .
when the person’s body contains any amount of a controlled substance listed in Schedule
I or II, or its metabolite, other than mariju ana or tetrahydrocannab inols.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(7). As wr itten, the statute contains no specific intent or knowledge
requirement. See generally Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(1) (2020) (“When criminal intent
is an element of a crime . . . such intent is indicated by the term ‘intentionally,’ the phrase
‘with intent to,’ the phrase ‘w ith intent that,’ or some form of the verbs ‘know’ or
‘believe.’ ”).1 Nevertheless, Schwartz urges us to conclude that the statute requires the
State to prove an element of knowledge—that is, a motor ve hicle operator must know or
have reason to know that a Schedule I or II substance was in their body while operating the
vehicle to sustain a gross misdemeanor conviction under the statute.
In general, criminal offe nses require both a volitional act and criminal intent,
referred to as mens rea. See Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law, § 5.1, at 253 (5th ed. 2010).

1 One scholar has argued that the Legislatur e “create[d] an interpretative default rule
of strict liability” by including section 609.02, subdivision 9(1), in the Minnesota Criminal
Code of 1963. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Mens Rea in Minnesot a and the Model Penal
Code, 39 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1457, 1465 (2 013). Professor Sampsell-Jones observes
that “subdivision 9 of section 609.02 appears to set a default rule of strict liability—that if
a statute includes no mens rea term, then no mens rea requirement is intended.” Id. at
1469–70. But as he explains, “the rule is less than clear” and, as a result, courts have tended
to “ignore the legislatively enacted default rule.” Id. at 1465, 1470.

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“Mens rea is the element of a crime that requires the defendant know the facts that make
his conduct illegal.” Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 818 (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If a criminal statute does not require the defendant to know the facts that
make the conduct illegal, the crime is considered to be a strict liability offense. Id.
Strict liability criminal offenses are “generally disfavored.” In re Welfare of C.R.M.,
611 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 2000). As we explained in C.R.M., “[t]he rulings of the
United States Supreme Court and this court . . . highlight the long established principle of
American criminal jurisprudence that in common law crimes and in felony level offenses
mens rea is required.” Id. at 808. When examining a criminal statute that does not include
an express mens rea requirement, we undertak e a “careful and close examination of the
statutory language” to determine whether the Legislature intended to create a strict liability
offense. Id.; see also State v. Loge , 608 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 2000); Ndikum,
815 N.W.2d at 820. In doing so, we are “ guided by the public policy that if criminal
liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or fe lony liability, is to be imposed for conduct
unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.” State v. Neisen,
415 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn. 1987). Therefore, we must first look to the language of the
statute to determine whether the Legislatur e intended to impose strict liability without
proof of knowledge. C.R.M, 611 N.W.2d at 805.
To begin, it is significant that the Le gislature included an express knowledge
requirement for other offenses contained within the same stat ute. “When the Legislature
uses limiting or modifying language in one part of a statute, but omits it in another, we
regard that omission as intentional and will not add those same wo rds of limitation or

7
modification to parts of the statut e where they were not used.” General Mills, Inc. v.
Comm’r of Revenue , 931 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Minn. 2019). Here, another section of the
same statute makes it “a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of
any motor vehicle . . . when . . . (3) the pers on is under the influence of an intoxicating
substance and the person knows or has reason to know that the substance has the capacity
to cause impairment.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(3) (emphasis added). We interpret
the use of the modifying language—“knows or has reason to know”— in subdivision 1(3)
of the same statute as a deliberate choice by the Legislature. We interpret the omission of
such language in subdivision 1(7) as equally intentional and decline to add the same words
where the Legislature did not. See Johnson v. Cook County, 786 N.W.2d 291, 295 (Minn.
2010) (“We may not add words to a statute that the Legislature has not supplied.”).
This conclusion is suppor ted by our decision in State v. Loge, where we held that
the absence of a knowledge requirement in the open container statute was evidence of the
Legislature’s intent to establish a strict liability offense. 608 N.W.2d at 157. In that case,
we explained that the Legislature made di stinctions between knowledge requirements
among the various traffic-related statutes that “guide[d] our interpretation” of the open
container statute. Id. We acknowledged the presence of knowledge requirements in other
traffic statutes and concluded that “[i]f th e legislature had intende d [the open container
statute] to have a knowledge requirement, it could have added the word ‘knowingly.’ ” Id.
Here, the legislative intent to create a strict liability offense is ev en clearer than in Loge
because the different knowledge requirements are contained within the same subdivision
of the same statute. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(3) (making it a crime to operate a

8
motor vehicle “under the influence of an in toxicating substance and the person knows or
has reason to know that the substance has the capacity to cause impairment”).
Next, we consider the Legislature’s addition of an affirmative defense to the statute.
Minnesota Statutes § 169A.46, subd. 2 (2020), provides that a driver charged under some
provisions of section 169A.20 can raise the affirmative defe nse that the presence of a
controlled substance in his or her body is due to, and taken in accordance with, a doctor’s
prescription. Indeed, the court of appeals c oncluded that, by establishing an affirmative
defense, the Legislature demonstrated “that the absence of any specified mens rea element
in [the statute] was not an inadvertent omission.” Schwartz, 943 N.W.2d at 415. We agree
with this conclusion. An a ffirmative defense is “[a] defe ndant’s assertion of facts and
arguments that, if true, will defeat the plainti ff’s or prosecution’s claim, even if all the
allegations in the complaint are true.” Affirmative Defense, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019). By providi ng an affirmative defense, the Legislature proactively addressed
concerns about imposing strict criminal liability for any blameless conduct.
Based on the inclusion of an express knowle dge requirement for other offenses in
the same statute and the availability of an affirmative defense, we conclude that the
Legislature intended to create a strict liability offense under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20,
subd. 1(7).
B.
Our analysis, however, does not end there. “[T]he existence of a mens rea
[requirement] is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American
criminal jurisprudence.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978). For

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this reason, we have “interpret[ed] statutes as containing a mens rea requirement even when
they do not expressly contain one.” Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 819; see id. (cataloguing
decisions when we have read a mens rea, scienter, knowledge, or criminal intent
requirement into a statute that is silent as to mens rea).
Thus, when interpreting a criminal statut e that does not contain language indicating
intent or knowledge, we must look beyond the language of the statute itself and determine
whether imposing strict liability for the specific criminal offense at issue is consistent with
our precedent and “long establis hed principle[s] of American criminal jurisprudence.”
C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 808 (explaining that we cannot rely solely on the omission of
statutory language such as “knowledge,” “belief,” or “intent,” to supply a clear expression
of legislative intent to create a strict liability offense); see also U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
at 438 (“Certainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from the
statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement.”).
There are two categories of criminal offe nses where strict liability is generally
accepted: (1) public welfare offenses and (2) crimes when the circumstances make it
reasonable to charge the defendant with know ledge of the facts that make the conduct
illegal.2 In this case, the court of appeals concluded that Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7),

2 The second category of strict liability crim inal offenses—where it is reasonable to
charge the defendant with knowledge of the facts that make the conduct illegal—occurs in
the context of sexual conduct with ch ildren under the age of consent. See, e.g., State v.
Morse, 161 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1968) (fi nding that Minnesota’s statutory rape
offense, which was silent as to the mens rea requirement, did not require the State to prove
a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age). Strict criminal liability may also be imposed
in production-of-child-porno graphy cases when the defend ant confronts the underage
victim personally. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. , 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.2

10
is a public welfare offens e and therefore strict lia bility is appropriate. Schwartz,
943 N.W.2d at 416. We agree with this conclusion.
We have “recognized that in limited circumstances a legislature may dispense with
mens rea through silence—in statutes creating ‘public welfare’ offenses.” Ndikum,
815 N.W.2d at 819. Public welfare statutes are regulatory in nature and govern “potentially
harmful or injurious items, in cluding dangerous or deleteri ous devices or products or
obnoxious waste materials.” Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 819–20 (quoting Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S 600, 607 1994). Unlike common law offenses, public welfare offenses do
not involve positive aggression or action, but are based on “neglect where the law requires
care, or inaction where it imposes a duty.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255
(1952). When determining whether a criminal statute governs a public welfare offense,
courts have traditionally considered two factor s: (1) whether the it ems regulated are so
inherently dangerous that a defendant is reas onably on notice of the possibility of strict
regulation; and (2) the severity of the criminal penalty imposed for violations of the statute.
See Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d at 819–22; C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 809–10.
1.
First, we must consider whether the items regulated by the statute are so inherently
dangerous that the defendant is on notice of the possibility of strict regulation. Ndikum,
815 N.W.2d at 820. For exampl e, the United States Suprem e Court has recognized that
the sale of contaminated food, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), the distribution

(1994) (explaining that a defendant can reasona bly be required to as certain the age of a
person the defendant meets in person).

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of illegal narcotics, United States v. Balint , 258 U.S. 250 (1922), and the possession of
unregistered hand grenades, United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), are public welfare
offenses. In addition, we have recognized that the possession of an open bottle of alcohol
in a vehicle is a public welfare offense. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 157.3
By contrast, there are also items that, a lthough potentially dangerous, are not so
inherently dangerous that the possessor is reasonably on notice of their strict regulation.
For example, in Ndikum, we considered whether a statute prohibiting the possession of a
pistol in public without a permit was a public welfare offense. 815 N.W.2d at 817. In that
case, we concluded that the State was required to prove kno wledge to sustain a gross
misdemeanor conviction under the statute. Id. We explained that because one “may legally
keep guns in their homes, transport guns to work, possess guns at work, hunt with guns,
and keep guns in their vehicles,” the defendant could not be considered to be on notice that
the possession of a gun without a permit was subject to strict regulation. Id. at 822.
Likewise, in C.R.M., we declined to in terpret a statute that prohibited carrying a
knife on schools grounds to be a strict liability public welfare offense. 611 N.W.2d at 810.
In that case, we stated that “great care is taken to avoid interpreting statutes as eliminating
mens rea where doing so criminalizes a broad range of what would otherwise be innocent
conduct.” Id. at 809. Further, we stated that “ knives as common hous ehold utensils are
clearly not inherently dangerous, as they ca n be used for a myriad of completely benign

3 The court of appeals has held that failing to produce proof of insurance, a
misdemeanor crime, is also a public welfare offense. See State v. Maynard, 573 N.W.2d
707, 710 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 1998).

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purposes.” Id. at 810. Thus, we concluded that th e State was required to prove that the
defendant knew that he possessed a knife on school property. Id.
Here, Schwartz argues the nature of the co nduct prohibited by the statute—that is,
having any trace amount of a Schedule I or II controlled substance in one’s body while
operating a motor vehicle—is not so inhere ntly dangerous. We disagree. Unlike
possessing a pistol in Ndikum or carrying a knife in C.R.M., ingesting a Schedule I or II
substance and then operating a motor vehicle can be considered inherently dangerous due
to the effect the substances can have on a driver’s ability to safely operate a vehicle.
Moreover, using a Schedule I or II controlle d substance without a valid prescription is
plainly illegal under state and federal law. See Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd 2 (2020);
21 U.S.C. § 844. Therefore, we are not presented with a statute that “criminalizes a broad
range of what would otherwise be innocent conduct.” C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 809.
2.
Second, we consider the severity of the punishment imposed by the statute. Ndikum,
815 N.W.2d at 822. “Histo rically, the penalty imposed under a statute has been a
significant consideration in determining whet her the statute should be construed as
dispensing with mens rea.” Id. (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 616). In Staples, the United
States Supreme Court noted that public welfare offenses typically carry less severe criminal
penalties, like fines and short jail sentences, which “logically complement[]” the absence
of a mens rea requirement. Staples, 511 U.S. at 616; see C.R.M, 611 N.W.2d at 806–07.
“In a system that generally requires a ‘vicious will’ to establish a crime,” courts have noted
that “imposing severe punishments for offe nses that require no mens rea would seem

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incongruous.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 617; see also Ndikum , 815 N.W.2d at 822.
Accordingly, we are reluctant to apply strict liability for a criminal statute that imposes
felony-level penalties. See Ndikum , 815 N.W.2d at 822 (“Fe lony-level punishment is
incompatible with th e theory of a public welfare offense.”); C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d at 810
(noting our “heightened concern” in dispensing with the mens rea requirement for felony-
level crimes).
In the present case, the penalty for a conviction under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd.
1(7), varies depending on a defendant’s crimin al history and number of qualified driving
incidents. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 3 (providing that a person who violates section
169A.20 may be sentenced as provided in Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.24–.27 (2020)). As a first
offense, a violation of the statute can be charged as fourth-degree driving while impaired,
a misdemeanor offense. Minn. Stat. § 169A.27. But, if preceded by three qualified driving
incidents within 10 years or a similar traffic-related felony conviction, a violation of the
statute can be charged as first-degree driving while impaired, a felony offense punishable
by up to 7 years in prison. Minn. Stat. § 169A.24.
Schwartz urges us to adopt a new rule of law, namely that all criminal statutes that
are silent as to mens rea will not be interp reted as imposing strict liability if they are
punishable up to a felony. Because Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7), can be punished as
a felony if charged in the first-degree, Schwartz insists that we cannot construe the offense
as one of strict liability.
We recognize that a defendant can be char ged with a felony under the statute, but
Schwartz pled guilty to se cond-degree driving while im paired, a gross misdemeanor

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offense. Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.25, subd.2; 609.02, subd. 4 (2020). We have never gone so
far as to say that all charged felonies require proof of a criminal mens rea. Rather, we have
explicitly left open the possibility of imposi ng strict liability for gross misdemeanor and
felony offenses so long as the legislative intent to do so is clear. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 156
(“[I]f criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed
for conduct unaccompanied by fau lt, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.”
(emphasis added)). Schwartz’s per se rule would be a significant departure from our long-
standing precedent and, based on the circumstances before us today, we are not convinced
that such a drastic shift in the law is either necessary or appropriate.
Moreover, our reading of a knowledge requirement into the statute would
effectively subvert the delibera tive, policymaking role of th e Legislature. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s auth ority to balance competing interests when
establishing a strict liability offense. See Balint, 258 U.S. at 254 (holding that the illegal
sale of narcotics constituted a public welf are offense and that strict liability was
appropriate). As the Supreme Court explained in that case:
[The statute’s] manifest purpose is to require every person dealing in drugs
to ascertain at his peril whether th at which he sells comes within the
inhibition of the statute, and if he sells the inhibited drug in ignorance of its
character, to penalize him. Congre ss weighed the possible injustice of
subjecting an innocent seller to a pe nalty against the evil of exposing
innocent purchasers to da nger from the drug, and concluded that the latter
was the result preferably to be avoided. Doubtless considerations as to the
opportunity of the seller to find out th e fact and the difficulty of proof of
knowledge contributed to this conclusion.

Id. Here, the manifest purpose of Minn. Stat . § 169A.20, subd. 1(7), as evidenced by its
language and surrounding prov isions, is to penalize drivin g with any amount of the

15
Schedule I or Schedule II controlled substance in one’s body regardless of knowledge. The
Legislature weighed countless considerations , including the danger to the public, the
inherent illegality of controlled substances, the difficulty of proving knowledge,4 and the
statutory scheme for charging DWIs,5 when drafting the statute. The text of the statute is
the ultimate embodiment of these balanced inte rests. And because “the legislature is

4 The Legislature is entitled to consider “the opportunity to discover and the difficulty
of proof” when imposing strict li ability for a criminal offense. See Loge, 608 N.W.2d at
157. As we noted in Loge, “if knowledge was a necessary element of the open container
offense, there would be a substantial, if not insurmountable, difficulty of proof.” Id. Thus,
we held that it was “reasonable to conclude th at the legislature, weighing the significant
danger to the public, decided that proof of knowledge . . . was not required” under the
statute. Id.
The same reasoning applies here. Requiri ng a prosecutor to prove that a driver knew
that his or her body contained any amount of a Schedule I or II controlled substance would
place a substantial burden on the State. It would mean that a viol ation of Minn. Stat.
§ 169A.20, subd. 1(7), could onl y be proven in situations where an officer witnesses a
driver taking the controlled substance immediat ely before or while operating a vehicle.
Schwartz contends that any increased difficulty for the State in prosecuting violations of
the statute is negligible b ecause the State can use circum stantial evidence to prove
knowledge. Yet, it may be that the Legislat ure sought to alleviate the evidentiary burden
on the State by dispensing with the mens rea requirement.

5 Under Minnesota law, a DWI cannot be charged as a felony unless the defendant
has been previously convicted of separate substance-related offenses or previously
committed qualified prior impaired driving incidents. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.24–.27. To
be convicted of a felony for violating Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7), a defendant would
have to have: (1) committed “three or more qualified prior impaired driving incidents”
within a 10-year time period; (2) have been previously convicted of felony first-degree
driving while impaired; or (3) have previously been convicted of a felony for substance-
related criminal vehicular homicide and injury. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1)–(3).
Thus, the Legislature may have been less concerned with di spensing with the mens rea
requirement because felony liability under the statute is contingent on the defendant having
been previously convicted of or co mmitted the same illegal conduct. Cf. C.R.M., 611
N.W.2d at 807 (recognizing that a “public welfare analysis ‘hardly seems apt’ for a felony”
because imposing strict liability undermines “the usual presumption that a defendant must
know the facts that make his conduct illegal”) (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 618–19).

16
entitled to consider what it deems expedient and best suited to the prevention of crime and
disorder,” we believe it best to defer to its policy judgment in establishing strict liability
for this offense. Loge, 608 N.W.2d at 157 (citation om itted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
C.
Based on our analysis above, we conclude the State was not required to prove that
Schwartz knew or had reason to know that his body contained a controlled substance while
operating the motor vehicle in order to su stain a gross misdemeanor conviction under
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(7). We ack nowledge that neither the United States
Supreme Court nor our own court “has undertak en to delineate a precise line or set forth
comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and
crimes that do not.” Staples, 511 U.S. at 619–20 (quotati on omitted). And we have not
attempted such a task today. Instead, consistent with our prior cases, we have conducted a
careful and close examination of the statutor y language in Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd.
1(7), and specifically considered the propriety of imposing strict liability given the public
welfare nature of the charged offense.
Because we have determined that there is a clear legislative intent to dispense with
a mens rea requirement and the statute governs a public welfare offense, we conclude that
strict liability is appropriate. Accordingly, we reject Schw artz’s challenge to the validity
of his guilty plea and affirm his conviction.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Affirmed.