In re the Marriage of: Amanda Lynn Johnson, n/k/a Amanda Lynn Leathers, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0790

In re the Marriage of: Amanda Lynn Johnson, n/k/a Amanda Lynn Leathers, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Benjamin Patrick Johnson,
Respondent.

Filed April 27, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-12-1405

Robert A. Manson, Robert A. Manson, P.A., Roseville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kyle L. Prouty, J. Virgil Bradley, Cornerstone Family Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minneso ta
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Larkin,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the district court’s order de nying her request for
expanded parenting time. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
her request, we affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant-mother Amanda Lynn Leathers and respondent -father Benjamin Patrick
Johnson were divorced on January 3 , 2013, pursuant to a stipulated judgment and decree.
Mother and father have one minor child, N.L., who was born in 2007. The district court
awarded mother and father joint legal and joint physical custody of the child and
established an equal parenting-time schedule.
In December 2015, father moved the district court to modify custody and parenting
time. In August 2016, t he district court issued an order granting father sole physical
custody of the child and designating father’s residence as the child’s primary residence. It
declined to modify legal custody of the child, and it limited mother’s regular parenting time
to Wednesdays from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. and every other Saturday and Sunday from
10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
The district court’s August 2016 order provided that, nine months after the filing of
that order, mother could request a hearing to review parenting time and to determine
whether an expansion of parenting time was warranted. The district court indicated that at
that hearing, it would consider mother’s compliance with the following expectatio ns:
(1) maintain stability in safe housing, (2) continue to receive r egular mental-health
treatment, (3) abstain from use of alcohol and nonprescribed mood-altering substances ,
(4) arrive no more than 15 minutes late to parenting-time exchanges, and (5) “ke[ep] Father
immediately updated regarding any change in residence, as well as provide[] the identity
of all individuals with whom she shares a residence.” Mother did not appeal.

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In June 201 7, mother moved the district court to restore the previous, equal
parenting-time schedule. The district court denied that motion in an October 2017 order.
In doing so, i t expressed concern that mother had not complied with the expectations set
forth in the August 2016 order. In particular, it found that her hous ing was not stable, that
she had been more than 15 minutes late to several parenting-time exchanges, and that she
“did not timely disclose to Father her changes in residence or the identity of the individ uals
with whom she shares it.” The district court continued the parenting -time schedule
established in the August 2016 order. The district court stated that, 12 months after the
filing of the October 2017 order, mother could again request a hearing to determine whether
an expansion of parenting time was warranted. The district court indicated that it would
once again consider whether mother had complied with the five expectations that it had set
forth in the August 2016 order. Mother did not appeal.
In December 2018, mother requested expanded parenting time. At the hearing on
that request in February 2019 , mother argued that the current parenting-time schedule did
not provide her enough time with the child. Father testified at the hearing and opposed
mother’s request.
The district court issued an order in April 2019, denying mother’s request for
expanded parenting time. It made findings regarding mother’s compliance with the f ive
expectations set forth in its August 2016 order. As to housing, the district court noted that
the parties’ testimony was conflicting. M other testified that, for the past one-and-one-half
years, she had been liv ing in an apartment with a zero -tolerance policy for alcohol and
drugs. But f ather alleged, a nd mother admitted, that mother had spent much of her

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parenting time at her current boyfriend’s apartment. Father also testified that the child told
him that she had not been to mother’s apartment since Thanksgiving 2018 (more than two
months before the February 2019 hearing). The district court took judicial notice that a
domestic-abuse no -contact order was issued against mother’s boyfriend in protection of
mother in October 2018, and that it was vacated approximately one month later when
mother’s boyfriend pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. Mother claimed to be unaware
of the criminal charge against her boyfriend. Upon further questioning by the district court,
she recalled that there may have been charges against her boyfriend that were eventually
dismissed.
As to mother’s mental and chemical health, the district court found that mother
“appears to regularly receive mental health treatment” and “testified that she is in alcohol
treatment programming and that she has not consumed alcohol” since the denial of her
previous motion for expanded parenting time. As to mother’s tardiness for parenting-time
exchanges, the district court noted the parties’ dispute regarding that issue. Mother
acknowledged that she had been late to some exchanges but maintained that she was early
for most of them. Father, by contrast, asserted that on 15 occasions, mother was either late
or did not arrive at all.
Lastly, the district court considered the communication between the parties. Its
findings regarding that expectation were not limited to whether mother updated father
regarding her residence and instead focused on the parties’ communication regarding
parenting issues. Father test ified regarding two events that had occurred since the district
court issued its previous order. First, father alleged that without his knowledge, mother

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had attempted to make arrangements to visit the child at father’s home while father was at
work on a day when mother did not have scheduled parenting time. Mother denied that
allegation, but she admitted that she had told the child that she could pick the child up from
father’s house while father was at work, even though that arrangement had never been
acceptable to father. Second, father alleged that mother had given the child a cell phone
and encouraged the child to keep it a secret from father. Mother admitted that she had
given the child a cell phone without telling father, but she asserted that it was not a secret.
The district court noted mother’s testimony that she was in jail for two days in
October 2018, purportedly because of a bench warrant originating from a traffic ticket from
two years earlier. It took judicial notice that the bench w arrant was actually issued based
on mother’s failure to follow the terms of probation and that the underlying offense was
tampering with a motor vehicle, and not a traffic offense, as mother had indicated. Mother
did not inform father that she had been in jail.
The district court determined that father was more credible than mother. It
explained:
The Court has serious concerns regarding Mother’s request to
expand parenting time. A major component of expanding
parenting time is the ability to trust the other parent. . . . While
Mother appears to have demonstrated progress in maintaining
housing and attending mental and chemical health treatment,
the information before the Court indicates that Mother has tried
to undermine Father’s parenting. Mother avers that she has
tried to openly communicate with Father . . . , however, the two
major incidents wi th the secret phone and secret pick up
indicate otherwise. Through her behavior, Mother is
effectively teaching the child that deception and subterfuge is
acceptable, so long as she is not caught.

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Moreover, Mother has failed to honestly communicate
with Father. Mother has not informed Father regarding her
frequent parenting time at [her boyfriend’s] condo, Mother did
not inform Father about the criminal incident with [her
boyfriend], and Mother did not inform Father that she had
spent time in jail. . . . The fact that Mother testified to the
belief that jail time is not an important enough event to
communicate to the other parent is in itself seriously
concerning.
From the record, it is difficult for the Court to assign
any meaningful degree of confide nce in the fact that a
substantial change of circumstances has occurred since the
Custody Order rendering an expansion [of] parenting time in
the child’s best interests. What the Court does know with
confidence is that Mother was not being forthright with the
Father, or for that matter, the Court about what exactly occurs
during the child’s parenting time.
The district court concluded that an expansion of mother’s parenting time was not
in the child’s best interests and continued the existing parenting -time schedule. Mother
appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Mother contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to expand
parenting time. “The district court has broad discretion in determining parenting -time
issues and will not be reversed absent an abu se of that discretion.” Dahl v. Dahl , 765
N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App. 2009). The district court abuses its discretion when it
misapplies the law or makes findings of fact that are unsupported by the record. Id. This
court upholds the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
A district court must modify parenting time if modification would serve the best
interests of the child and the modification would not change the child’s primary residence .

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Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b) (2018). When the district court issues a parenting -time
order, it “may reserve a determination as to the future establishment or expansion of a
parent’s parenting time.” Id., subd. 1(a) (2018). “In that event, the best interest standard
. . . shall be applied to a subsequent motion to establish or expand parenting time.” Id.
In arguing that the district court erred, mother quotes Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd.
5(c) (2018), which states that a district court may not restr ict parenting time unless it finds
that parenting time is likely to endanger the child or that the parent has failed to comply
with court-ordered parenting time. Mother maintains that the district court’s findings are
not sufficient to show endangerment. For the reasons that follow, mother’s reliance on the
endangerment standard is unavailing.
The district court restricted mother’s parentin g time in its August 2016 order . In
that same order, it provided mother an opportunity to expand her parenting time in the
future. Mother did not appeal that order. The order challenged here is not the August 2016
order restricting mother’s parenting time. This appeal is taken from the April 2019 order
denying mother’s motion to expand parenting time. Therefore, the endangerment standard
in Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(c), does not apply. Instead, the best -interests standard in
Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subds. 1(a), 5(b), is the proper standard.
Mother argues that she met the five expectations that the district cour t set forth in
its previous orders. And she takes issue with the district court’s findings regarding the fifth
expectation regarding communication. Mother does not challenge th e accuracy of th ose
findings, but she points out that they address circumstances that are beyond the scope of
the communication expectation set forth in the August 2016 order. She asserts that the

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district court “appears to now expect [mother] to also be trusted by [father] and to be honest
and transparent in her dealings” and “see ms to interject a requirement that somehow
[mother] must inform [father] of all that is going on in the parenting time with the child
and in her life.” Mother argues that such requirements are unrealistic, and she accuses the
district court of attempting to “micromanage” the parties’ relationship.
Mother is correct. The district court’s findings were not limited to the
communication expectation set forth in the August 2016 or der, which simply required
mother to update father immediately on any change in residence and to provide the identity
of the individuals with whom she shared a residence. Nevertheless, even if mother satisfied
the expectations set forth in the August 2016 order, she is not necessarily entitled to
expanded parenting time. The district court never indicated that those expectations would
be the only relevant circumstances.
In denying mother’s request for expanded parenting time, t he district court found
that mother had “failed to honestly communicate” with father regarding her frequent
exercise of parenting time at her boyfriend’s residence, the criminal incident involving her
boyfriend, and her incarceration for two days. The district court also found that mother
had attempted to make arrangements to pick up the child from father’s home and had given
the child a cell phone without father’s knowledge , which demonstrated an attempt to
undermine father’s parenting authority and taught the child that deception was acceptable.
The district court d id not err in considering all of those circumstances in its best-interests
analysis, even though they did not precisely align with the district court’s articulated
expectations.

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In sum, our review of the record reveals support for the district court’s findings of
fact and its well-reasoned application of the best -interests standard. The law “leaves scant
if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best -
interests considerations.” Vangsness v. Vangsness , 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App.
2000). We discern no reason to do so in this appeal.
Affirmed.