State of Minnesota, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0803

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jude Thomas Mary O’Neill,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2020
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-4884

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Rebecca Barberio (certified stude nt attorney), Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Travis M. Keil, Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Pr esiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; Ross,
Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
The supreme court’s directive to review a district court’s finding that a defendant is
competent to stand trial to “determine if th e district court gave proper weight to the
evidence produced and if its finding of competency is adequately supported by the record”
requires us to defer to a district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.

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O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
The state charged Jude O’Neill with fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle, and
the district court conducted a contested comp etency hearing. Three mental-health experts
agreed that O’Neill suffers fro m a cognitive impairment but di sagreed as to its effect on
his competency. The district court relied on the court-appointed evaluator’s reports and
testimony, found O’Neill competent to stand trial, and found him guilty after a bench trial.
O’Neill challenges the competen cy finding on appe al, arguing that the district court
erred by choosing one expert’s opinion over the two other experts’ opinions. Because the
standard of review directs us to afford deference to the district court’s factually supported
findings, and because the dist rict court made its competen cy determination while acting
within its discretion, we affirm.
FACTS
The state charged Jude O’Neill with one felony count of fleeing a peace officer in a
motor vehicle for an incident in February 2018. The district court ordered a psychological
evaluation under Minnesota Rule of Crimin al Procedure 20.01 to determine O’Neill’s
competency to stand trial. C linical forensic psychologist D r. Jill Rogstad concluded that
O’Neill was competent. O’Neill requested and received a cont ested hear ing under
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.01, subdivision 5(a)(1), during which the district
court received previously creat ed psychological reports ab out O’Neill and heard expert
testimony, which we now summarize.

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Prior Evaluations
Clinical neuropsychologist Dr. Ronald Federici eval uated O’Neill in September
2009 when O’Neill was 12 years old. At that time, Dr. Federici c oncluded that O’Neill
exhibited global developmental delays because of an alcohol- or drug-related birth-defect
syndrome; cognitive impairment affecting hi s speech, comprehension, and expressive
skills; a learning disability; and attention and concentration deficits. Six years later, after
the state charged O’Neill with a motor-vehicle theft in 2015 unrelated to this appeal, Dr.
Federici wrote to the district court opini ng that O’Neill’s impairment impacted his
“thinking, reasoning, attention, organization[, and] thought[-]process patterns.” The doctor
believed that O’Neill did “not understand any aspect of the court proceedings even though
he may ‘present’ that he is competent or understands” and that he should be civilly
committed.
Dr. Jill Rogstad also evaluated O’Neill and reported her opinion in connection with
the 2015 motor-veh icle theft. She opined that O’Ne ill could correctly identify various
court-related roles and that he also generally understood legal concepts and court processes.
She believed that O’Neill could evaluate legal options reasonably. Dr. Rogstad concluded
that O’Neill was competent to stand trial in that case because O’Neill showed that he could
meaningfully confer with de fense counsel, understood his attorney’s advocacy role, and
showed his willingness to help prepare his defense.
Doctors Federici and Rogstad evaluated O’Neill again in 2016. Dr. Federici noted
consistent developmental delays and doubted that O’Neill c ould think or reason at a high
level. He opined that O’Neill was therefore “‘ not competent’ per th e neuropsychological

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standards as opposed to the legal-court st andards.” By contrast, Dr. Rogstad again
believed that O’Neill was competent, observing that he factually and rationally understood
courtroom principles, criminal proceedings, witness roles, privileged communications, and
the allegations against him.
In July 2017, forensic psychologist Dr. Paul Reitman evaluated O’Neill in
proceedings otherwise unrelated to this appeal. He believed that O’Neill could understand
core legal concepts but was unable to enga ge in higher-level re asoning or grasp more
complex legal concepts. Dr. Reitman opined that O’Neill was not competent to participate
in his own defense. Dr. Reitman reiterated that opinion in Octo ber 2017, but he did
recognize the possibility that O’Neill might regain comp etency. He noted that O’Neill
expressed to his therapist that he worried “that if he is found competent to stand trial that
he is going to go to prison.” In a March 2018 report, Dr. Reitman observed that O’Neill
had “emerging concrete understanding of the legal concepts” but still could not understand
court proceedings.
Final Report and Testimony
In the proceedings underlying this appeal, Dr. Rogstad evaluated O’Neill again and
reported her findings in April 2018. She found that O’Neill was presenting himself in a
“markedly discrepant” fashion from her previous encounters with him. This time, O’Neill
claimed to be unable to recall details of his offense and said he ha d probably injured his
head since Dr. Rogstad last ex amined him. And he could no longer define the role of the
jury. She found that O’Neill was not fully cooperating, observing that he frequently
claimed either that he did not know or could not remember information. But Dr. Rogstad

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found that he asked “relevant and thoughtful questions that conv eyed his retention,
application, and use of the material in question,” demonstrating that he could learn.
Suspicious about O’Neill’s inconsistent presentation from her previous encounters
with him, Dr. Rogstad administered thre e tests to gauge O’Neill’s testing “response
style.” O’Neill’s performance on the first test raised Dr. Rogstad’s “concerns about a
feigned . . . or irrelevant . . . response st yle.” O’Neill tested below benchmarks on two
of three trials in the second test, leadin g Dr. Rogstad to believe that O’Neill was
feigning incompetence becaus e “even persons with genuine brain injuries and other
neuropsychological deficits can perform adequately.” O’Neill’s responses on the third test
led Dr. Rogstad to believe that he was deliberately suppressing correct answers or picking
answers randomly. She found that the tests s howed inconsistent effort and a deliberate
attempt to fake an impairment. Dr. Rogstad did not believe that any intervening event
caused the change in O’Neill’s presentation, finding that his behavior was “more consistent
with a willful lack of cooper ation and feigned deficiencies .” She reasoned that O’Neill’s
refusal to answer direct questions despite hi s ability to convey the same information later
also showed his malingering.
Dr. Rogstad concluded that O’Neill c ould communicate and express his ideas
clearly; could understand, appreciate, apply, and use legal concepts in a rational, self-
serving manner; could understand his charges, consequences of legal alternatives, and
adjudicative process; and “could engage in a logical decision-making process when
discussing his specific legal situations and hypothetical scenarios.” Dr. Rogstad opined that
O’Neill was competent for trial.

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Dr. Federici disagreed. He believed O’Neill could not exercise common sense,
rational judgment, or problem solving. Co mparing his 2009 and 2016 evaluations, Dr.
Federici opined that O’Neill’s condition wa s deteriorating and would continue to
deteriorate. He believed that O’Neill could answer questions but lacked real understanding.
O’Neill’s memory-test results were so low that Dr. Federici believed that O’Neill’s ability
to learn new material “just doesn’t exist for him.” Dr. Federici clarified that his
incompetency opinion was based on “a neuropsychological and a medical perspective [of]
competency of brain damage,” and he acknowledged that he was not familiar with the legal
meaning of competency.
Dr. Reitman also believed that O’Neill was incompetent. He testified that O’Neill’s
significant neuropsychological conditions produced “profound impairments in the higher
executive cognitive functions.” He surmised that O’Ne ill could learn only through
repetition and could not solve new problems. Dr. Reitman believed that O’Neill understood
general court roles but “lack[ed] the ability to engage in comprehension of higher level
cognitive functioning” and “the ability to engage in more than one step [of] inductive [or]
deductive reasoning.” Dr. Reitman disagreed with Dr. Rogstad’s opinion that O’Neill was
malingering and advocated for sending O’Neill to a program to determine whether he could
be restored to competency.
District Court’s Competency Finding
The district court found that O’Neill is cognitively impaired by fetal exposure to
drugs or alcohol. It declined to rely on Dr. Federici’s incompetency determination because
Dr. Federici was not a forensic psychologist and his evaluation and conclusion did not

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focus on legal competency. It also rejected Dr. Reitman’s opinion, reasoning that Dr.
Reitman relied heavily on colla teral sources and failed to adequately demonstrate how
specific data points factored into his opinion . The district court also observed that Dr.
Reitman was inconsistent in his evaluations , once concluding that O’Neill coul d not be
restored to competency and three months la ter concluding that his competency could be
restored.
The district court was most convinced by Dr. Rogstad’s opinion because she had
performed three forensic evaluations, thoroughly explained her reasoning, and focused her
evaluations on O’Neill’s ability to rationally consult with hi s attorney, comprehend court
proceedings, and participate in his defense. It was particularly persuaded by the test results
indicating that O’Neill was feigning incompeten cy by suppressing co rrect answers. It
found the circumstances of Dr. Rogstad’s 2015 and 2016 evalua tions particularly
compelling because O’Neill had previously demonstrated that he significantly understood
his court proceedings despite his cognitive impairment. The di strict court also observed
that Dr. Reitman’s report provided evidence supporting Dr. Rogstad’s conclusion because
one of Dr. Reitman’s collateral contacts ha d reported that O’Neill was worried that a
finding that he was competent would likely re sult in his being sentenced to prison. The
district court ultimately concluded that the state had met its burden, and it found O’Neill
competent to stand trial.
Trial, Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal
The district court found O’Neill guilty at a bench trial, sentenced him to serve
15 months in prison, and stayed execution of the sentence for three years conditioned on

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probationary terms. O’Neill appeals from hi s conviction, challengi ng only the district
court’s pretrial competency determination.
ISSUES
I. What deference do we give the district court’s findings as we review whether
it gave proper weight to the evidence and whether its finding of competency is adequately
supported by the record?

II. Did the district court give proper weight to the evidence and render a
competency finding that is adequately supported by the record?
ANALYSIS
O’Neill challenges the district court’s dete rmination that he was competent to stand
trial, arguing that the district court failed to give proper weight to the evidence and that its
determination lacks adequate record support. Because the parties dispute how we ought to
review the district court’s comp etency finding, we first clar ify the scope and standard of
our review. And because we conclude that th e district court’s finding is proper and
adequately supported, we affirm the dist rict court’s compet ency decision and,
consequently, O’Neill’s conviction.
I
At its core, this case concerns O’Neill’ s constitutional rights. Criminal defendants
have the constitutional right not to be deprived by the state of liberty or property without
due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XI V. A state’s failure to follow procedures
sufficient to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried while he is incompetent to stand trial
deprives him of his right to due process. Pate v. Robinson , 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S. Ct.
836, 838 (1966); State v. Curtis , 921 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2018). Minnesota’s

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competency proceedings begin when either a party or the district court questions the
defendant’s competency, triggering the district court’s duty to determine whether reason
exists to doubt the defendant’s competency. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3. If reason
exists, the district court must suspend the proceedings and, in the case of a felony, order an
examination of the defendant’s mental condition. Id., subds. 3(b), 4(a). If any party objects
to the examiner’s report, the district court must hold a he aring to decide whether the
defendant is competent based on the greater weight of the evidence. Id., subds. 4(b), 5(a),
(c). “If the court finds the defe ndant competent, the criminal proceedings must resume.”
Id., subd. 6(a). How an appellate court reviews that finding is the central issue in this case.
The state supreme court has characterized th e standard of appellate review of the
district court’s competency finding this way, rephrasing a characterization it made ten years
earlier:
We independently review the record to determine if the district
court gave “proper weight” to the evidence produced and if “its
finding of competency is adequately supported by the record.”
State v. Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007) (quoting State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d
276, 283 (Minn. 1997)). The parties disagree sharply as to how this standard applies.
O’Neill asserts that we afford “[n]o deference” to the district court’s findings, akin to de
novo review. At oral argument, the state likened the standa rd to clear-error review. We
must interpret this supreme court cas elaw, a task we undertake de novo. See State v.
Robideau, 796 N.W.2d 147, 150 (Minn. 2011). For the following reasons, we conclude that
the Ganpat standard requires us to accept the district court’s factual findings after a hearing,
unless they are clearly erroneous.

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The Ganpat standard recognizes a bifurcated analysis first of whether the facts required
the district court to inquire further into a defendant’s co mpetency and second whether
the inquiry uncovered facts sufficient to support the district court’s findings.
A careful consideration of Ganpat and related caselaw informs us that the Ganpat
standard recognizes a bifurcated analysis first of whether the facts required the district court
to inquire further into a defendant’s competency and second whether the inquiry uncovered
facts sufficient to support the district court’s findings. We arrive at this conclusion by
observing that the Ganpat standard identifies two distinct issues: whether “the district court
gave proper weight to the evidence produced and [whether] its finding of competency is
adequately supported by the record.” 732 N.W.2d at 238 (emphasis added) (quotation
omitted). The second issue—th e adequacy of record supp ort—highlights a clear-error
review. See, e.g., State v. Barshaw, 879 N.W.2d 356, 366 (Minn. 2016) (“A finding of fact
is not clearly erroneous if it is reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.”); State v.
Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266 (Minn. 2014) (“[W]e review a postconviction court’s factual
determinations under a clearly erroneous standard, and do not reverse those determinations
unless they are not factually supported by the record.”); State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211,
223 (Minn. 2010) (holding that the district court’s pretrial findings were “supported by the
record and are not clear error”). We easily conclude that the Ganpat standard of review, at
least as to one of its components, is a clear-error standard.
The meaning of “proper weight to the evidence” is less clear. The Ganpat court did
not explain how to apply the “proper weight” inquiry to a post-hearing competency finding
or demonstrate how the inquiry occurs. Tracing Ganpat’s dual-inquiry language to its first
use adds little clarity. Ganpat, decided in 2007, addressed a defendant’s challenge to a

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post-hearing determination and expressed for the first time this full formulation of the
proper-weight-and-adequate-support standard. 732 N.W.2d at 238. The Ganpat court
articulated the standard citing the 1997 opinion of State v. Mills, where the supreme court
reviewed a district court’s final competency finding without expressly stating any standard
of review. 562 N.W.2d at 281. But in affi rming the district court, the supreme court
concluded “that the trial court gave proper weight to the evidence relating to competence
and that its finding of competency is adequately supported by the record.” Id. at 283
(emphasis added). The Mills court did not say what it meant by “gave proper weight.”
O’Neill cites State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848, 855 (Minn. 1976), for his proposition
that we must afford “[n]o deference . . . to the district court’s findings on the [competency]
matter.” We think O’Neill misapplies Bauer because that case addressed a separate issue,
but it is clear that the distinction is helpful in demonstrating why the Ganpat standard does
not promote de novo review of the district court’s factual findings. The rules mark a legally
significant difference between a district court on the one hand deciding whether to inquire
further into a defe ndant’s competency, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3, and on the
other making a final competency determination, see id. , subd. 5(c). The Bauer court
recognized this key dis tinction. It explained that the fi rst issue focuses on the “narrow”
question of whether the district court should inquire further into a defendant’s competency,
an issue which “is not whether the defendant [is] competent to stand trial.” Bauer,
245 N.W.2d at 852 (emphasis added). Bauer addressed only the former issue of the district
court’s duty to inquire further, see id., while O’Neill’s appeal raises only the latter, ultimate
issue of whether, after that inquiry, the facts establish that the defendant is competent.

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A deeper look at caselaw informs us that the “proper weight” issue originated in the
context of a district court’s decision not to initiate competen cy proceedings. In Drope v.
Missouri, the United States Supreme Court addresse d whether a district court’s failure to
inquire further into a defendant’s competency on undisputed facts offended his due-process
right to a fair trial. 420 U.S. 162, 174–75, 95 S. Ct. 896, 905 (1975). When the defendant
had attempted suicide midtrial and the district court was aware of his strange behaviors and
relevant psychiatric opinions suggesting his need for treatment, the Drope Court concluded
that “the record reveal[ed th e district court’s] failure to give proper weight to the
information suggesting incompetence which came to light during trial.” Id. at 164–66, 169,
179, 95 S. Ct. at 900–02, 907 (emphasis a dded). The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted
Drope’s “proper weight” standard in Bauer, addressing the district court’s denial of defense
counsel’s midtrial motion for a competency examination. 245 N.W.2d at 852–53, 856.
Defense counsel in Bauer had informed the district court of the defendant’s paranoia and
delusional thinking. Id. at 852. Likening Bauer’s circumst ances to those of the defendant
in Drope, the Bauer court reasoned,
Here, too, there is no dispute as to the evidence possibly
relevant to defendant’s mental condition that was before the
[district] court. We therefore review the record to determine
whether [the district court] gave proper weight to the
information suggesting incompetence in concluding that there
was not sufficient doubt of the defendant’s fitness to stand trial
so as to require further inquiry.
Id. at 856 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Here we see the “proper weight” reference
in its precise setting, which reveals that the Ganpat “proper weight” reference was
shorthand for assessing whether the facts require the district court to inquire further into a

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defendant’s competency. And the Minnesota Supreme Court has continued applying
Bauer’s “proper weight” standard of review in other appeals when a defendant challenges
the district court’s failure to inquire further. See, e.g., Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 720
(Minn. 2011).
Drope and Bauer also explain why we afford no deference when reviewing a district
court’s further-inquiry decision. The Drope Court explained that the case turned on “the
inferences that were to be drawn from the undisputed evidence” and whether “the failure
to make further inquiry into [Drope’s] competence to st and trial[] denied him a fair
trial.” 420 U.S. at 174–75, 95 S. Ct. at 905 (emphasis added). The Bauer court likewise
recognized that the facts presen ted an issue “cast in the form of a factual determination,”
but it explained that it would not accord “the usual deference gi ven to a [district] court’s
findings” because the question focuse d on inferences to be drawn from undisputed
evidence. 245 N.W.2d at 855–56. A district court’s competen cy finding after a contested
competency eviden tiary hearing presents a situation entirely unlike a district court’s
preliminary determination of whether, as a ma tter of law and based on undisputed facts,
further inquiry into a defendant’s competency is warranted. The district court’s decision is
not merely “cast in the form of a factual determination,” id. at 855 (emphasis added),
because the court is tasked wi th actually making factual fi ndings on contested evidence.
We therefore reject O’Neill’s assertion that Bauer’s no-deference analysis extends to both
components of the Ganpat standard, properly construed.

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The Minnesota Supreme Court has applied a clea r-error review standard to a district
court’s post-inquiry competency findings.
The conclusions we have drawn from trac ing the origins of the “proper weight”
language are amply supported by the supreme court’s demonstrated review in competency
appeals. Those cases corroborate our understanding that we should review a district court’s
factual findings for clear error; that is what the supreme court has done, both explicitly and
implicitly. In Shoen v. State, for example, the supreme court affirmed the district court’s
postconviction finding that a defendant was competent, explaining “that the findings made
by the postconviction court relating to Shoen’s competency to stand trial are not clearly
erroneous, and we therefore defer to those findings.” 648 N.W.2d 228, 230–31 (Minn.
2002). Unlike the de novo issue presented in Drope and Bauer, the challenged decision in
Shoen came after an evidentiary hearing where Shoen bore the burden of proof. Id. at 230.
Inasmuch as the supreme cour t was tasked with reviewing the district court’s findings
related to competency rather than the district court’s deci sion whether to inquire further
about competency, the court applied the clear-error standard. We recognize that a
postconviction court’s findings are gene rally subject to clear-error review. See Carridine
v. State, 867 N.W.2d 488, 496 (Min n. 2015). But if a competen cy finding on contested
evidence were truly subject in stead to de novo review, the Shoen court would not have
deferred to the postconviction court’s findings.
It is clear that the Ganpat court was mindful of Shoen, citing it once to define
incompetency and again when it rejected Ganpat’s reliance on the case for a legal
proposition not relevant here. 732 N.W.2d at 238. In a footnote, the Ganpat court explicitly

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acknowledged its earlier conclusion that the di strict court in Shoen’s case made findings
relating to competency which “were not clearly erroneous.” Id. at 238 n.3. Had the Ganpat
court discerned any friction between its stated standard of review and Shoen’s clear-error
standard, or if it intended to chart a different course, it would have do ne so expressly. It
did not.
We acknowledge that the Ganpat standard is restated in Curtis, 921 N.W.2d at 346,
and that Mills’s holding referred to both proper weight and adequate support, 562 N.W.2d
at 283. But a holding derives primarily from what an appellate court does, not from its
abbreviated characterization about what it is doing. And as to what the supreme court was
doing, in none of these cases did it ever refuse to afford deference to the district court’s
factual findings after a hearing on disputed evidence. Curtis dealt with the issue of the
improper assignment of the burden, and indeed , as the court remanded, it explained that
“the district court is in the best position to apply the correct burden of proof to the evidence
in the record.” 921 N.W.2d at 346, 349. If the Ganpat standard mandated de novo review
of facts, then the supreme c ourt would not have re manded for the district court to weigh
the evidence.
And although Ganpat dealt directly with a district court’s competency finding, the
supreme court’s review appeared to focus ex clusively on the adequacy of record support
rather than its reweighing of evidence to determine whether the district court gave it the
“proper weight.” The Ganpat court observed that “[t]he district court’s findings were
supported by the opinions” of tw o doctors and that the expert opinion most favorable to
Ganpat was equivocal. 732 N.W.2d at 238. Absent from the court’s analysis is any

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indication of whether the evidence was “properly” weighed, despite the court’s conclusion
that the district court “gave proper weight to the evidence produc ed and correctly found
that Ganpat was competent to stand trial.” The Ganpat court’s analysis seems most fairly
described as a clear-error review.
Mills likewise does not involve the supreme court’s reweighing of the evidence but
instead shows that it was revi ewing the adequacy of the record supporting the district
court’s competency finding. The Mills court recounted how the trial record indicated
Mills’s ability to cooperate e ffectively, behave appropriat ely, make key decisions, and
work with her counsel. 562 N. W.2d at 283. This recounting reflects the supreme court’s
effort to identify evidence that supports the district court’s findings, not its effort to
undertake its own, de novo fact-finding.
In sum, caselaw informs us that the Ganpat standard neither has been nor should be
employed in a fashion that invites an appella te court to substitute its judgment for the
district court’s on factual findings derived from disputed competency-hearing evidence.
Legal competency is a factual determination and whether it is supported by the record
calls for clear-error appellate review.
Although it is not compelling on its ow n, we find additional support for our
conclusion in the nature of the disputed issue and the manne r in which appellate review
usually addresses issues of a similar natu re. Again, whether a defendant is legally
competent to stand trial is a question of fact that must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence and found by the district court. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subds. 5(c), 6(a)–(b)
(characterizing the district court’s determin ation as a finding). We routinely review a

17
district court’s resolution of a f actual issue only for clear error. See, e.g., State v. Diede,
795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011) (recognizing that factual findings regarding motion to
suppress are reviewed for clear error); State v. Chavarria-Cruz , 784 N.W.2d 355, 363
(Minn. 2010) (same). And more specifically, although “competency” falls under a variety
of definitions depending on context, appellate courts have historically reviewed
competency findings in othe r contexts for clear error. See, e.g. , In re Palmer’s Estate ,
57 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Minn. 1 953) (applying clear-error revi ew and affirming district
court’s determination that the testat or was incompetent to make a will); Younggren v.
Younggren, 556 N.W.2d 228, 232–33 (Minn. App. 1996) (applying clear-error review and
affirming district court’s determination of party’s competency to sign deeds and execute a
power of attorney). Because O’Neill’s competency was a question of fact, and because in
other matters involving competency findings we typically review only for clear error,
applying the clear-error standard to the distri ct court’s challenged de cision here reflects
consistency in appellate review.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions review final co mpetency findings for clear
error.
In addition to maintaining consistency within Minnesota in the approach to
competency findings in other areas of the law, applying a clear-error standard to the district
court’s findings of a criminal defendant’s comp etency is consistent with federal and state
courts nationwide. Federal jurisdictions unifo rmly review a district court’s competency
finding for clear error. See United States v. Mahoney , 717 F.3d 257, 26 5 (1st Cir. 2013);
United States v. Gigante , 166 F.3d 75, 83–84 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Green ,

18
544 F.2d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 856 (4th Cir.
2005); United States v. Porter , 907 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 855 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bennett , 908 F.2d 189, 195
(7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ghane, 490 F.3d 1036, 1040 (8th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pompey, 264 F.3d 1176, 1178
(10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Saingerard, 621 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010).
Similarly, most state jurisd ictions also apply clear-error review or its functional
equivalent to a district court’s competency finding. See Eathorne v. State, 448 So. 2d 445,
448–49 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (recognizing that competence is a finding of fact subject
to review for clear error or abuse of discretion); State v. Ferguson, 547 P.2d 1085, 1086
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (observing that determination of defendant’s competency is subject
to clear-error review); Roberts v. State, 488 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Ark. 2016) (same); People
v. Corichi, 18 P.3d 807, 813 (Colo. App. 2000) (stating that co mpetency is a question of
fact and finding will not be reversed if it is adequately supported by the evidence);
Alston v. State, 894 So. 2d 46, 54 (Fla. 2004) (holding that competency determinations are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion but that the district court must resolve factual disputes
and will not be reversed unless no reas onable person would take its position); State v.
Hawkins, 363 P.3d 348, 353 (Idaho 2015) (“A district court’s factual determination that a
defendant is competent to stand trial will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial,
competent ev idence.”); People v. Bryant , 54 N.E.3d 309, 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)
(recognizing that competency decision will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest
weight of the evidence); State v. Barnes , 262 P.3d 297, 309 (Kan. 2011) (reviewing for

19
abuse of discretion, including the lack of substantial competent ev idence supporting the
competency finding); Chapman v. Commonwealth , 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky. 2007)
(reviewing for clear error); State v. Johnson , 165 So. 3d 961, 966 (La. Ct. App. 2014)
(reviewing for manifest error); State v. Gerrier , 197 A.3d 1083, 1088 (Me. 2018)
(reviewing for clear error); Peaks v. State, 18 A.3d 917, 925 (Md. 2011) (same); People v.
Newton, 446 N.W.2d 487, 488 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (reviewing for abuse of discretion);
Bridges v. State, 807 So. 2d 1228, 1230 (Miss. 2002) (observing that competency finding
may not be overturned unless it is “manifes tly against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence” (quotation omitted)); State v. Lassek, 723 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Neb. 2006) (noting
that competency to stand trial is a question of fact which will not be reversed if there is
sufficient evidence supporting factual findings); Ogden v. State, 615 P.2d 251, 252 (Nev.
1980) (observing that competen cy is a question of fact and findings will be sustained if
there is substantial evidence supporting them); State v. Decato, 75 A.3d 1131, 1133 (N.H.
2013) (holding that district court’s competency determination will be reversed only if “no
reasonable fact finder could have found as the trial court did” (quotation omitted)); State
v. Purnell, 925 A.2d 71, 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (noting that district courts are
afforded deference but competency findings cannot be upheld in the absence of “sufficient
supporting evidence”); State v. Nelson, 634 P.2d 676, 679 (N.M. 1981) (determining that
competency finding will be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence); People v.
Phillips, 948 N.E.2d 428, 433 (N.Y. 2011) (provi ding that competency determinations
receive substantial deference if supported by the record); State v. Jackson, 273 S.E.2d 666,
669 (N.C. 1981) (indicating that district court’s competency finding is conclusive on appeal

20
if supported by competent evidence); State v. Heger , 326 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1982)
(recognizing that competency to stand trial is a question of fact and district court’s finding
will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous); State v. Buxton, 643 A.2d 172, 175 (R.I.
1994) (stating that district court’s competen cy finding will not be di sturbed absent clear
abuse of discretion); Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 338 (S.C . 2004) (reviewing findings
for sufficient amount of suppo rtive probative evidence); State v. Leming, 3 S.W.3d 7, 14
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (“[T]rial court’s findings are conclusive unless the evidence
preponderates otherwise.”); State v. Lafferty , 749 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1988) (holding
that competency findings are subject to clear-error review); State v. Beaudoin , 970 A.2d
39, 42 (Vt. 2008) (observing th at competency finding will not be overturned if supported
by credible evidence and not clearly erroneous); Grattan v. Commonwealth , 685 S.E.2d
634, 642 (Va. 2009) (recognizin g that competency to stand tr ial is a question of fact and
determination will not be reversed unless plainly wrong or lacking eviden tiary support);
State v. Smith , 878 N.W.2d 135, 138, 146 (Wis. 2016) (concluding that competency
determinations are reviewed under a clear-error standard).
Except for Iowa, which has described its approach as having been “somewhat
inconsistent as to the standard of review” in competency appeals, State v. Lyman ,
776 N.W.2d 865, 871 (Iowa 2010), we have found no jurisdiction applying a de novo,
fact-reweighing approach on appellate review.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we do not read Ganpat as requiring de novo review. We instead
review the district court’s factual findings to determine if they are clearly erroneous.

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II
Having clarified that we review the distri ct court’s factual findings for clear error,
we now consider whether the district cour t gave “proper weight” to the evidence and
whether its competency finding is adequately supported by the record. The state bore the
burden of proving O’Neill’s competency by a preponderance of the evidence. See Curtis,
921 N.W.2d at 348. O’Neill genera lly urges us to conclude that the district court erred
because the evidence of incompetency was strong while the evidence of competency was
weak. As we have explained, we will defer to the district court’s findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. The record reveals support for the finding and leads us to affirm the
district court’s competency decision.
The district court largely accepted Dr. Rogstad’s opinion as both the most thorough
and most focused on the specific competency issue presented. We afford broad deference
to a fact-finder’s determination of how to weigh expert testimony. See State v. Roberts ,
876 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. 2016). And the re cord does not suggest that the district
court’s crediting of Dr. Rogstad’s opinion was the product of caprice. Dr. Rogstad’s report
did not merely state a conclusion conflictin g with those reached by Drs. Reitman and
Federici. It described why she reached a different conclusion, evaluating and reporting on
whether O’Neill’s failure to answer questions resulted from actual incompetence or instead
resulted from pretense. Her te sting convinced her that O’ Neill’s markedly discrepant
presentations resulted from his feigning . She evaluated O’Neill and offered her
competency opinion based on varied factors: O’Neill’s re tention and application of
important information; his understanding and use of legal concepts; his comprehension of

22
his charge and its consequences; his grasp of legal alternatives and the adjudicative process;
his ability to act in a rational, self-serving manner; and his understanding of specific legal
situations and hypothetical sc enarios. Dr. Rogstad provided the district court adequate
evidence to support the competency finding.
O’Neill contends that the effects of his fe tal-developmental disorder are so severe
that they render him incompet ent. He cites many such effe cts, including below-average
comprehension, deficient communication, impaired decision-making, decreased memory,
a tendency to confabulate, a nd varying difficulties to contro l attention, emotion, and
impulse. He accurately indicates that the thr ee experts agreed that he demonstrates a
significant cognitive impairment with severe effects. But the existence of a cognitive
impairment satisfies only one of the comp etency-related conditions referenced by the
rule—the existence of a “mental illness or cognitive impairment.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01,
subd. 2. That condition does not reflect incompetence unless it also prevents the defendant
from rationally consulting with counsel, understanding the proceedings, or participating in
his defense. Id., subd. 2(a)–(b). Dr. Rogstad’s opinion afforded the district court sufficient
reason to find that these consequences were lacking.
O’Neill implies that the severity of his impairment, as established by Dr. Federici’s
testimony, necessarily indicates legal incompetence. The rule imposes no such bright line.
He also contends that the district court should have assigned greater weight to Dr.
Federici’s testimony because of his more extensive knowledge of O’Neill’s cognitive
disorder and its effects. But as the district court recognized, Dr. Federici is not a forensic
psychologist, was unfamiliar with competency in the legal context, and did not focus his

23
evaluation on O’Neill’s legal competency. And more important to our decision today, for
the reasons we have already indi cated, it is not our role on ap peal to decide what relative
weight to assign to each piece of evidence or to each competing expert opinion.
For the same reason we dismiss O’Neill’s re lated argument that the district court
should not have relied on Dr. Rogstad’s opi nion because she was less familiar with
O’Neill’s impairment than Dr. Federici. Sim ilarly uncompelling is his argument that the
district court improperly accepted Dr. Ro gstad’s opinion that O’Neill was feigning
incompetency in the face of Dr. Federici’s opinion that O’Neill’s symptoms would worsen
if left untreated or if aggravated by drug misuse. And we also are unpersuaded by O’Neill’s
implication that the district court was required to discredit Dr. Rogstad’s opinion because
her evaluative procedure was deficient. All these arguments essentially urge us to reassess
disputed facts and reweigh the conflicting expert opinions on appeal.
D E C I S I O N
The question of whether the district cour t “properly weighed” the evidence as that
phrase is meant in the caselaw is not at issue in this appeal, and, having reviewed the district
court’s factual findings for clear erro r under the relevant component of the Ganpat
standard, we hold that the district court’s co mpetency finding is adequately supported by
the record.
Affirmed.