State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0805

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jarred Isaac Mosdal,
Appellant.

Filed May 18, 2020
Reversed
Worke, Judge

Fillmore County District Court
File No. 23-CR-18-390

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brett Corson, Fillmore County Attorney, Melissa Hammell, Assistant County Attorney,
Preston, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Pr esiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Rodenberg, Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions fo r stalking and violating an order for
protection (OFP) and a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO). Because we conclude
that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, we reverse.
FACTS
Appellant Jarred Isaac Mosdal and K.M. we re married in 2002. In 2012, Mosdal,
K.M., and their six children moved from Mont ana to rural Fillmore County. In March
2018, K.M. moved out of the family home with the children. K.M. obtained an OFP against
Mosdal because she had not fe lt safe living in the family home. On March 21, 2018,
Mosdal violated the OFP. Mosdal pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor; as a result, the district
court issued a DANCO.
Mosdal began running to deal with the trauma of losing his family. During the
months of April and May, he ran over 100 mi les and lost approximately 50 pounds. In
early April 2018, K.M. saw Mosdal running along highway 250 as she was driving the
children home from school. Highway 250 is approximately one-third mile from Mosdal’s
home. Mosdal then posted on his Facebook page something to the effect of: “Saw a pretty
girl while I was running today and hope to see her again sometime.” K.M. continued to
see Mosdal running after she picked the children up from school. She reported the sightings
to law enforcement and was advised to alter her route. K.M. changed her route and avoided
seeing Mosdal.

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K.M.’s mother regularly host s Sunday brunch at her home. Mosdal participated in
the brunches before the separation and often prepared cinnamon rolls. On April 22, 2018,
Mosdal went to K.M.’s mother’s home well before her guests, including K.M., arrived and
delivered cinnamon rolls.
On May 5, 2018, Mosdal ha d visitation with the children at a visitation center in
Rochester. During this time, K.M. went to Mosdal’s home to pick up items for the children.
Mosdal had not given K.M. perm ission to go to his home wh ile he was not there nor did
he have any knowledge that K.M. was going to his home. K.M. saw a notebook on a table
and photographed pages. One notation read: “K at 2:45.” A second notation read: “Walked
one mile home. No more suburban at 3:53 p.m. Library.” K.M. frequently took the
children to the library on Fridays.
In early May 2018, A.J. show ed K.M. a rental property. A.J. had not advertised the
rental, but a relative told K.M. about it. K.M. did not end up renti ng it. Later, Mosdal
inquired about renting the property. A.J. reported Mosdal’s inquiry to law enforcement.
On May 15, 2018, K.M. and Mosdal attended a hearing at the courthouse. When
Mosdal left, he believed that he was drivi ng behind K.M.’s vehicle. Mosdal called 911,
informed dispatch of the OFP, and stated that he wanted to make a record that he was not
following K.M. and was keeping a quarter- to a half-mile distance behind her.
On June 13, 2018, Mosdal was charged with stalking and violating the OFP and the
DANCO. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.749, subd. 2(2), 518B.01, subd. 14(b), 629.75, subd. 2(b)
(2016). At Mosdal’s jury tr ial, the state argued that the aforementioned incidents
constituted Mosdal stalking K.M. by monitoring her and violating the protective orders by

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having contact with her. The jury found Mosdal guilty. The district court sentenced
Mosdal to 365 days in jail, stayed for two years, and imposed a fine. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Mosdal raises three issues on appeal; he argues that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain his convictions, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and the district court
abused its discretion in an evidentiary ruling.
In considering a claim of insufficient evid ence, this court’s review is limited to a
thorough analysis of the record to determin e whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the conviction, is suffi cient to allow the jury to reach the verdict
that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). This court assumes that
“the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State
v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). This court will not disturb the verdict if the
jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the
charged offense. Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
To prove that Mosdal stalked K.M., the st ate had to prove that Mosdal “follow[ed],
monitor[ed], or pursu[ed] [her], whether in person or through any available technological
or other means.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(2). The state also had to prove that
K.M. “under the circumstances” felt “frighte ned, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or
intimidated” by Mosdal’s conduct, which he knew or had reason to know would make her
feel that way. See id., subd. 1 (2016).

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The state claims that it proved that Mosdal followed, monitored, or pursued K.M.
because he “repeatedly showed up where [she] was, was about to be or had recently been.”
The incidents include Mosda l: (1) running near his home while K.M. drove by him,
(2) posting a public comment on his Facebook page, (3) bringing cinnamon rolls to K.M.’s
mother, (4) inquiring ab out the rental property, and (5) driving behind K.M. The state
asserts that Mosdal’s notebook shows that Mosdal was “pur posely following, monitoring
or pursuing” K.M. But we conclude that the evidence is insuffi cient to support the
conviction.
First, Mosdal ran near his home; he di d not monitor or pursue K.M. because after
she changed her route she never saw him running again. Second, Mosdal did not monitor
or pursue K.M. by posting on his Facebook page, because it was for public viewing and he
could not be sure that she would see it. Thir d, Mosdal did not monitor or pursue K.M. to
know that her mother regularly hosted Sunday brunch; Mosdal went to the brunches during
the marriage and brought cinnamon rolls. Fourth, Mosdal did not monitor or pursue K.M.
when he believed that he wa s driving behind her because th ey were leaving the same
hearing, he reported the incident and stated that he would soon be turning and not following
her, and he was not even sure it was K.M.
The single incident that might constitute Mosdal monitoring K.M.’s behavior would
be Mosdal inquiring about the rental property after K.M. looked at it. The evidence showed
that the rental property was not advertised, but it did not show how Mosdal learned that the
property was available. But even if Mosdal monitored K.M. to discover that she looked at
this property, K.M. did not te stify that this condu ct made her feel fri ghtened, threatened,

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oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated. K.M. was not even the person who reported
Mosdal’s inquiry about the pr operty to law enforcement. There is no record evidence
satisfying the element of the offense that Mosdal’s inquiry caused K.M. to feel “frightened,
threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated.” See id. And this is the same for the
other incidents of alleged stalking conduct.
K.M. testified that when she saw Mosdal running, she “was surprised and then kind
of had sort of a nervous, sick-to-my-stomach sort of feeling.” She testified that the
Facebook post made her feel “[u]ncomfortable.” K.M. testified that the notebook entries:
“[M]ade me very nervous, I gue ss.” K.M. did not know that Mosdal was driving behind
her after the hearing. K.M. testified that all of the incidents caused her to be “very aware
of [her] surroundings.” She also testified that she felt that she had to be on alert due to the
uncertainty of not knowing when she and Mosd al would cross paths. But the evidence
does not show that K.M. felt “frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or
intimidated.” See id. Therefore, the state failed to prove that Mosdal stalked K.M.
We also conclude that the state failed to prove that Mosdal violated the OFP and the
DANCO. The OFP prevented Mosdal from having contact with K.M. “whether in person,
with or through other persons, by telephone, mail, e-mail, through electronic devices, social
media, or by any other means.” The OFP also required Mosdal to stay 500 feet away from
K.M.’s residence. Similarly, the DANCO orde red Mosdal to have no direct or indirect
contact with K.M. The eviden ce fails to show that Mosdal ’s conduct constituted contact
with K.M. See State v. Phipps, 820 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. App. 2012) (“The phrase ‘no
contact’ is clear and understandable. The co mmon meaning of the word ‘contact’ is [a]

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coming together or touching, as of objects or surfaces, [t]he state or condition of touching
or of immediate proximity, or [c]onnection or interaction; communication.” (quotation
omitted)).
K.M. admitted that when she saw Mosd al running, the only contact was “eye
contact.” Mosdal posted a public comment on his Facebook page; it was not addressed to
K.M. and he had no way of knowing that she would see it. Mosdal brought cinnamon rolls
to K.M.’s mother before K.M. arrived for brunch, and there is no evidence that Mosdal
asked K.M.’s mother to relay a message to K.M. Mosdal’s inquiry about the rental property
was through contact with A.J.’s boyfriend. Mosdal driving behind K.M. cannot equate to
contact when they were in separate vehicles and K.M. did not even know that Mosdal was
behind her. The evidence fails to establish that Mosdal had contact with K.M.
The DANCO also restrained Mosdal from “harassing, stalking, or threatening”
K.M. However, the state failed to meet its burden to establish the elements of the stalking
statute. Accordingly, we conclude that th e evidence is insufficien t to sustain Mosdal’s
convictions. Because we reverse Mosdal’s convictions on the basis of insufficient
evidence, we do not reach his additional claims on appeal.
Reversed.