State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0820

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jerry Dean Beckman,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2020
Affirmed
Ross, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-17-3314

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presid ing Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Segal,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
ROSS, Judge
The state charged Jerry Beckman with driving while impaired and possessing a
pistol while under the influence of alcohol after a state trooper found him slumped over in

2
his stalled car, observed numero us signs of his intoxication, found two handguns in his
possession, and administered a breath test re vealing an alcohol c oncentration of 0.08.
Beckman challenges his resulting convictions, arguing primarily that, because his car was
out of gasoline, he was not in physical control of his ca r, and also maintaining that
jurisdictional, substantive, and procedural defects require us to vacate his convictions. We
affirm because being out of gas did not precl ude a finding that Beckman was in physical
control of his car, because the evidence was sufficient for the ju ry to find either that he
drove or physically controlled the car whil e he was impaired, and because Beckman’s
remaining arguments are unpersuasive.
FACTS
The state charged Jerry Beckman with tw o counts of driving while impaired and
two counts of carrying a pistol under the influence of alcohol, see Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20,
subd. 1(1), (5), 624.7142, subd. 1(4), (6) (2016). Beckman moved the district court to
dismiss the charges, loosely challenging probable cause and raising several jurisdictional,
substantive, and procedural challenges. The district court rejected Beckman’s
probable-cause challenge and legal arguments. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where
Beckman represented himself.
Minnesota State Patrol Trooper Aaron Myre n testified that he responded to a report
of a stalled sport utility vehicle on the should er of Interstate 94 in Otter Tail County at
about 8:15 on a morning in October 2017. The trooper found a Ford Explorer with its only
occupant, Beckman, slumped over in the dr iver’s seat. Trooper Myren knocked on the
window. Beckman awoke, sat up, grasped the key in the ignition, turned the key to

3
“initiate[] the power to the first stage of th e ignition,” and slightly lowered his window.
The trooper “was overwhelmed with a very strong odor of an alcoholic beverage.”
Beckman told the trooper that he had been traveling from North Da kota toward Fergus
Falls but that he could not remember where he was. Trooper Myren administered field
sobriety tests, during which Beckman stumbled and struggled to follow directions. The
trooper told Beckman that he was under arre st, and Beckman disclosed that he had one
firearm on his person and one inside the car. Trooper Myren seized a semiautomatic
handgun from Beckman’s jacket and another fro m a vest in the Explorer’s second row of
seats. Then he took Beckman to the jail, read him the imp lied-consent advisory, and at
9:35 a.m., administered a breath test that revealed Beckman’s alcohol concentration
of 0.08.
Beckman also testified. He told the jury that he was a musician who had performed
in Fargo the night before his arrest. He admitted to drinking “one glass of beer per set” at
the performance. His band finished performing at 12:30 a.m., and Beckman began driving
back to his home in Fergus Falls . He said that he had been awake for 20 hours before he
ran out of gas at about 2:00 a.m. He then of fered a story, summarized here in his closing
argument:
I sat there for a while trying to figure out what I could
do at that time of morning. I sat in my vehicle and rested for
about two hours until I started shivering with no heat in the
vehicle. Exhausted and disguste d, I got out and opened the
back door to my vehicle, opened up my guitar case and took
out two small travel size plastic bottles of Windsor Canadian
Whiskey that had been in there for over a month. I locked up
the vehicle and started walking. I drank the whiskey to at least
warm up on the inside. After I had walked awhile, I was cold

4
and too tired for that long of walk in cowboy boots with holes
in the soles. I also realized th at I was all dressed in black and
hard for traffic to see. My on ly comfort was knowing that in
the case of any wild animals such as coyotes out chasing deer
attacking me while I was walking at that time of the morning,
at least I was not totally defenseless. That was the only time a
gun was out of my vehicle until the officer demanded that I
step out. I turned back towards the vehicle deciding to try to
flag down someone. No one stopped. I decided to rest until
I . . . could call a tow truck during business hours.

The jury was unconvinced by Beckman’s version of events and found him guilty of
carrying a pistol with an alcohol concentra tion exceeding 0.04, carrying a pistol while
under the influence of alcohol, and driving, operating, or being in physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. It did not find him guilty of the
remaining charge, driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. The district court
entered convictions for one drunk-driving offense and one pistol-possession-under-the-
influence offense. It sentenced Beckman to 90 days in jail, mostly stayed on conditions of
probation for two years.
Beckman appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Beckman raises a sufficiency-of-the-evi dence challenge to his drunk-driving
conviction. He also raises numerous argume nts in a supplemental brief. None of the
arguments merit reversal.
I
Beckman raises his insuffici ent-evidence challenge in the face of alternative
prosecution theories. The prosecutor argued to the jury that Beckman was guilty because

5
of both his pre-gasoline-depletion activity (“He was consuming alcohol prior to driving,
not while walking on a road at 8:00 in th e morning on an empty stomach.”) and his
post-gasoline-depletion activity (“He could have easily have gotten gas and gotten back in
his motor vehicle and driven back along the Interstate along with all the other motorists.”).
Beginning first with the latter, we reject Beckman’s argument for the following reasons.
Sufficient direct evidence established Beckman’s physical control.
Beckman frames his “physical-control” argument as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by examining the
record “to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
conviction,” allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State
v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). It is a crime for a person
to exercise physical control over a motor ve hicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1). To the extent Beckman maintains that one who is sitting
in a car that is inoperable by virtue of its la ck of gasoline cannot be in physical control of
the car, his insufficient-evidence argument requi res us to interpret and apply the statute,
and we do so de novo. See State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. 2017).
Beckman’s physical-control argument is unavailing. “[A] person is in physical
control of a vehicle if he has the means to initiate any movement of that vehicle, and he is
in close proximity to the opera ting controls of the vehicle.” State v. Fleck , 777 N.W.2d
233, 236 (Minn. 2010). Prohibiting intoxicated persons from exercising “physical control”
of a car curbs situations wher e an intoxicated person might take some action to render a
parked car a dangerous instrument. State v. Starfield, 481 N.W.2d 834, 837 (Minn. 1992).

6
The jury heard evidence that Beckman was seated inside his car on the highway after
having driven from Fargo to where he had stopped near Fergus Falls. It also heard evidence
that he sought assistance after having run out of gas both by walkin g to get help and by
trying to flag down a passing car. Even if th e jury credited his claim that he consumed
whiskey while walking after the car ran out of gas (suggesting that he became intoxicated
only after he was no longer actually driving), the evidence established that he was
intoxicated from the time he got back into the car through the time the trooper awakened
him. Given the possibility that someone might stop and help him refuel the car, he fits that
category of drivers targeted by the “physical control” prohibition.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Beckman’s reliance on State v. Starfield. In that
case, a deputy found an intoxicated woman, keys in pocket, behind the steering wheel of a
car “stuck in a snow-filled ditch.” Id. at 835. A jury found her gu ilty of being in physical
control of the vehicle while un der the influence of alcohol. Id. at 836. The supreme court
held that the district court correctly refused to instruct the jury that the state had to prove
that her vehicle was operable. Id. at 839–40. Nor are we persuaded by Beckman’s reliance
on State v. Fleck. In Fleck, officers found a man intoxicated and asleep behind the wheel
of his parked car with his keys readily acce ssible. 777 N.W.2d at 235. The supreme court
concluded that these circumstances allowed the jury to reasonably find that the man “was
in a position to exercise dominion or control over the vehicle and that he could, without
too much difficulty, make the vehicle a source of danger.” Id. at 237.
Those cases do not support Beckman’s position.

7
He attempts to distinguish Starfield on the notion that, while Starfield’s car allegedly
had a tire blown out, 481 N.W. 2d at 835, Beckman’s car was out of gas, meaning that it
was much more difficult for Beckman to re medy his car’s inoperability. The reverse is
more reasonable; while the Starfield court considered that Starfield “might have enlisted
the aid of a passerby to extricate her car from the ditch,” id. at 838, a passerby could have,
with less effort than changing a flat tire and returning a car to the road, refueled Beckman’s
car. Beckman attempts to distinguish Fleck on the notion that, unlike the defendant in that
case, see 777 N.W.2d at 235, Beckman could not have rendered his car drivable by turning
a key. But Fleck did not rest on the car having been readily operational. The supreme court
observed that, although Fleck told officers that his car was operable, the officers did not
verify the statement and, in fact, an officer who attempted to start the car later found that
it would not start. Id.
The evidence does not support Beckman’s assertion that he could have rendered the
car operable only with great difficulty. The jury knew the story and was free to infer from
the evidence that the only thing standing be tween Beckman being slumped over drunk in
his car and Beckman driving drunk down the highway was any would-be passerby’s
charitable assistance. The jury received sufficient direct evidence to decide whether
Beckman was in physical control of his car, and the evidence supports its verdict.
Alternatively, the circumstances tending to prove that Beckman drove while under
the influence preclude any rational hypothesis other than guilt.
We could also rest our decision on the state’s alternative contention that the
evidence permitted the jury to find that Beckman actually drove under the influence. Of

8
course driving a motor vehicle under the infl uence, like merely physically controlling it
under the influence, is also illegal. Minn. St at. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1). The state presented
only circumstantial evidence that Beckman was under the influence while he was driving.
When the state proves an element by circumst antial evidence, we c onsider the evidence
more strictly, first identifying the circumstances proved by the state and then considering
whether those circumstances allow for a reasonable inference other than guilt. State v.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Min n. 2017). We have no difficu lty concluding that the
circumstantial evidence met the state’s alternative theory.
The circumstances proved are that Beckman drank beer before leaving Fargo, drove
his car from Fargo into Otter Tail County, was slumped behind the wheel intoxicated
almost eight hours after he left Fargo, an d did not know where he was on the route.
Although Beckman attempted to persuade the jury that he merely sipped beer before
driving and “drank two small bottles” of whiskey only after he ran out of gas and left the
car, we consider “only those circumstances that are consistent with the verdict.” State v.
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013). Part s of Beckman’s story are inconsistent
with the verdict. The parts th at suggest he was not really intoxicated while he drove and
that he became intoxicated only after drivi ng are both inconsistent with the verdict.
Considering only the circumst ances proved that are consistent with the verdict, no
reasonable innocent hypothesis exists. It is true that, af ter finding Beckman guilty of
driving, operating, or being in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol, the jury did not find him guilty of driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08
or more. But the two decisions can be reconciled on the possibility that the jury was simply

9
not convinced from the chemical-test evid ence but was convinced by evidence of
Beckman’s alcohol-induced physical impairment, like, for example, passing out in a car on
the shoulder of an interstate highway and sleeping it off for six hours and still being unable
to successfully co mplete simple field sobriety test s. The circumstances proved preclude
any rational hypothesis other than Beckman having driven under the influence.
II
Beckman raises numerous arguments in his supplemental brief, several which
the district court already addressed and rejected in a thorough and well-reasoned
memorandum. The state asks us to reject Beckman’s supplemental arguments as untimely,
but Beckman filed his supplemental brief w ithin 30 days of the public defender’s
office’s principal filing as required by Minn esota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.02,
subdivision 5(17). We address Beckman’s su pplemental arguments on their merits and
conclude they warrant no relief.
 Beckman cites the Uniform Commercial Code for the apparent proposition
that he did not consent to his own prosecution. The UCC does not govern
criminal prosecutions, see Minn. Stat. §§ 336.1-101 to 336.10-105 (2016),
and the state’s charges did not arise from any contract in goods.
 Beckman argues he had the right to face his accuser but that no such person
exists in a drunk-driving case. The United States and Minnesota
Constitutions afford criminal defendants the right to confront the witnesses
against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. Trooper Myren
testified at Beckman’s trial, and Be ckman personally cross-examined him,
asking, “Was I at any time disrespectfu l to you as a patrol officer?” and
whether it was the trooper or Beckma n who first brought up the possibility
of Beckman being armed. Beckman’s confrontation rights were vindicated.
 Beckman argues that his pretrial demand for a bill of particulars was ignored.
Discovery is governed by Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 9, and we
discern no discovery violation on the record.

10
 Beckman argues that the district cour t ignored his motion to dismiss. The
district court addressed Beckman’s arguments in a 19-page memorandum.
 Beckman argues there were no threats, damages, or injured parties. None of
Beckman’s charges required proof of th reats, injury, or property damage.
Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5), 624.7142, subd. 1(4), (6).
Beckman asserts finally that the charging document “named a fictional person[, i.e.,]
‘THE ALL CAPITAL LETTERS NAME.’” He seems to refer to a portion of his citation
identifying him as “JERRY DEAN BECKMAN” rather than “Jerry Dean Beckman.” He
cites no authority saying that depicting a defendant’s name in all capital letters identifies a
fictional person and not the de fendant. The letters of the En glish alphabet, capitalized or
not, are merely “written symbol[s] or ch aracter[s] representing a speech sound.” The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1008 (5th ed. 2011). We are
mindful that some have suggested that words presented in all capital letters perhaps suggest
shouting or even outrage, but we are aware of no source that suggests that capitalized letters
identify some other articulation than the sounds represented by their corresponding
lowercase characters. We have, for example, decided all appeals since 1993, including this
one, in the building inscribed, “MINNESOTA JUDICIAL CENTER,” but people always
find us.
Affirmed.