In re the Matter of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0824

In re the Matter of:

Hannah Marie Lagoon,
Appellant,

vs.

Steve Lagoon,
Respondent.

Filed February 3, 2020
Reversed and remanded
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-DA-FA-19-308

Hannah Lagoon, Columbia Heights, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Steve Lagoon, Cottage Grove, MN (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Klaphake, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Hannah Marie Lagoon filed a petition seeking an order for protection
(OFP) against her father, respondent Steve Lagoon, based on alleged sexual abuse that
occurred when she was a teenager. But after an evidentia ry hearing, the district court
dismissed her request, stating that the alleged harm needed to be “within the recent past.”
Because we conclude that the district court a pplied an incorrect legal standard in denying
the OFP, we reverse and remand for a new hearing.
FACTS
In March 2019, appellant Hannah Marie Lagoon (daughter) filed a petition seeking
an ex parte OFP against her father, respon dent Steve Lagoon (father). In her petition,
daughter—now 30-years old—alleged that fath er sexually abused he r in 2004 when she
was 14. According to daughter’s petition, the abuse continued “for a long time.” Daughter
alleged that she filed a police report regarding the abuse in February 2018 and feared that
father would retaliate against her. And, ex acerbating her fear, daug hter explained that
father came to TeaSource, a place she frequented , to get personal info rmation from her.
The district court granted daugh ter’s petition and issued an ex parte OFP against father.
After father received the OFP, he requested an evidentiary hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court heard testimony from daughter, her
witnesses, father, and his witness. Daughter testified that she petitioned for an OFP due to
past sexual violence perpetrated by her fath er, of which she had recently come to
understand the impact. When daughter began describing the past sexual abuse, the district

3
court interrupted her, noting that it had read he r application and explaining that it needed
to hear about “at this time, why you’re asking for an [OFP].” In response, daughter testified
that she was seeking an OFP because of father’s persiste nce in trying to contact her,
including the incident with father at TeaSource.1
Father also testified. He explained that he had only seen daughter three times in the
past year, and that he did not think he had attempted to contact her since he learned of the
abuse allegations in December 2018.2 And according to father, the encounter at TeaSource
was neither coercive nor intimidating.3 Father explained that he respected the seriousness
of the situation, would honor da ughter’s wishes to be “left alone,” and that it hurt him to
see daughter go through this.4
Based on the testimony, the district court made the following ruling:
[Daughter], it is clear to me that you have suffered a
tremendous amount of trauma, and I believe you when you say
that you are scared. But the lega l standard here is that I have
to find some sort of harm, threatened harm, or harassment
within the recent past. That doesn’t mean I don’t believe you
or do believe you about the allegations that you’re making, but
I cannot find right now evidence of actual harm or threatened
harm or harassment within the recent past. So I am dismissing
the Order For Protection.

1 In support of her petition, daughter submitted several messages she received from father.
Additionally, daughter’s witn esses described her showing signs of fear during the
TeaSource encounter and expressing fear because of her family’s attempts to contact her.
2 On cross-examination, father acknowledged that he attempted to contact daughter on her
birthday, after he learned of the abuse allegations.
3 Father also presented testimony from his wi fe, which corroborated his version of the
encounter at TeaSource.
4 Although father testified that he was “shoc ked” by daughter’s allegations, he did not
explicitly deny them during the hearing. But in his brief to this court, father denied all of
daughter’s accusations.

4
After encouraging father to have no further contact with daughter, the district court vacated
the ex parte OFP and dismissed the action. Daughter appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Daughter, who is self-represented, conten ds that the district court abused its
discretion in denying her OFP by using an incorrect legal standard. The district court has
discretion to determine whether to grant relief—including an OFP—under the Minnesota
Domestic Abuse Act (the Act). McIntosh v. McIntosh, 740 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. App. 2007);
see also Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 (2018). But when a district court bases its decision on an
erroneous view of the law, it has abused its discretion. Thompson ex rel. Minor
Child v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Minn. 2018).
Under the Act, victims of domestic abus e may seek relief by filing a petition for an
OFP. Id. at 498. In order to obtain relief, a petitioner must first show that domestic abuse
occurred. Id. at 498-99. The Act defines “domestic abuse” in the following ways:
(a) “Domestic abuse” means the following, if committed
against a family or household member by a family or
household member:

(1) physical harm, bodily injury, or assault;

(2) the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily
injury, or assault; or

(3) terroristic threats . . . cr iminal sexual conduct . . . or
interference with an emergency call . . . .

Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd . 2(a). A petitioner may es tablish domestic abuse by
demonstrating that the facts fall within any one of the three definitions of domestic abuse.

5
Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 499 (stati ng that “[e]ach definition is independent of the
others”).
The supreme court has determined that th e plain language of subdivision 2(a)(1) of
the Act—defining domestic abuse as “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault”—does not
require that the physical harm, bodily injury, or assault occur within a specific time frame.
Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 499. Stated differently, in order to satisfy the first definition of
domestic abuse under the Act, “a petitioner ne ed only show that ‘physical harm, bodily
injury, or assault’ has actually occurred, regardless of when it occurred.” Id. at 500. Once
a petitioner has established domestic abuse, the district court may then consider “all of the
relevant circumstances” when deci ding whether to grant the OFP. Id. “Relevant
circumstances” can include “the timing, frequen cy, and severity of any alleged instances
of ‘domestic abuse,’ along with the likelihood of further abuse.” Id.
Here, in denying daughter’s re quest for an OFP, the distri ct court stated that “the
legal standard here is that I have to find some sort of harm, threatened harm, or harassment
within the recent past.” (Emphasis added.) Daughter argues that this is an incorrect legal
standard because the definitions of domestic abuse found in subdivisions 2(a)(1) and
2(a)(3) of the Act do not require that harm be in the “recent past.”
We agree. Before considering all releva nt circumstances when deciding whether to
grant or deny an OFP, the district court must first determine whether the petitioner
established that domestic abuse, as defined by the Act, occurred. And the supreme court’s
decision in Thompson is clear: to meet th e definition of domestic abuse found in

6
subdivision 2(a)(1), it does not matter when the alleged abuse occurred. 5 Id. at 500.
Daughter’s claimed abuse—past sexual assault—presumably falls within the definition of
domestic abuse that requires “physical harm, bodily injury, or assault” and has no temporal
requirement.6 Accordingly, the district court applied an incorrect legal standard by stating
that the alleged harm needed to be in the “recent past.”
Because the district court applied an inco rrect legal standard, it abused its discretion
by vacating the temporary order and dismi ssing daughter’s petition for an OFP. See
Bauerly v. Bauerly, 765 N.W.2d 108, 110 (Minn. App. 2009) (stating that it is an abuse of
discretion to misapply the law). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing,
during which the district court permits testimony regarding the alleged past sexual abuse.
And although the district court may consider all “relevant circumstances” when ultimately
deciding whether to grant the OFP, it must first evaluate da ughter’s allegations of past
sexual abuse when deciding if daughter established that domestic abuse occurred.7
Reversed and remanded.

5 The facts in Thompson also deal with abuse allegations from a few years prior to a petition
for an OFP. In that case, the petitioner filed a petition for an OFP in 2015 based largely on
abuse that occurred in 2011-12. 906 N.W.2d at 497.
6 To the extent that the domestic abuse alleged by daughter may be more properly classified
under the definition found in subdivision 2(a)(3), which includes criminal sexual conduct,
we note that the plain language of that provision does not include a temporal requirement.
See Thompson, 906 N.W.2d at 499 (stating that “[i]t would be inappropriate for us to read
a temporal requirement, or the word ‘imminent ,’ into a statutory definition when no such
requirement appears in the text”).
7 Because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect
legal standard, we do not address daughter’s other arguments.