State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0825

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ricardo nmn Medina,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2020
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-16-1517

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Karen B. McGillic, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brian J. Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appe llate Public Defender, Chang Y. Lau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;
and Slieter, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant Ricardo Medina appeals from hi s conviction for aiding and abetting first-
degree aggravated robbery. He argues that the state’s circumst antial evidence is

2
insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had the requisite mental state
to have aided and abetted an aggravated robber y. He also argues that the district court
plainly erred when it instructed the jury on the knowledge element of first-degree
aggravated robbery using the language provided in the model jury instructions. We affirm.
FACTS
On October 18, 2016, N.R., a confidential informant, was working with police with
the purpose of completing a controlled buy of methamphetamine from S.L. An officer
with the Central Minnesota Violent Offender Task Force met with N.R. before the planned
controlled buy and searched N. R.’s person and vehicle. Th e officer thereafter supplied
N.R. with $600 to purchase one-half of one ounce of methamphetamine and placed a small
“listening device” in N.R.’s pocket so that police could hear and audio-record the
transaction.
Officers set up surveillance around S.L.’s home and noticed a green motorcycle
parked outside a detached garage on the property. When N.R. learned of the motorcycle,
he became concerned that it belonged to appellant. Appellant was unhappy with N.R., who
owed a substantial amount of money—as mu ch as $7,500—to appellant and appellant’s
acquaintance, T.R., for prior drug transactions. As a result, officers considered moving the
controlled buy to a different location, but N.R. ultimately decided to proceed with the
original plan after noticing that the motorcycle was no longer in S.L.’s yard.
Around 6:00 p.m., N.R. drove to S.L .’s home and parked his car nearby while
officers surveilled the house. N.R. walked to ward the back of the property and followed

3
S.L. into the detached garage. After N.R. en tered the garage, officers were unable to see
what was happening but were able to listen to the meeting by way of the listening device
hidden in N.R.’s pocket. Officers observed appellant and a man later identified as E.A.
enter the garage shortly after N.R. entered it. O f f i c e r s w e r e a b l e t o h e a r a n a r g u m e n t
between N.R. and appellant, including a statem ent by N.R. that one of the people in the
garage should take the money he had.
Approximately 20 minutes later, N.R. exite d S.L.’s garage, got into his car, and
contacted the officer with whom he had been working. N.R. informed the officer that,
while N.R. was in the garage, appellant punched him in the face and E.A. pointed a gun at
him “gangster style.” N.R. also stated that the $600 was taken from him during the
altercation in the garage. No methamphetamine was purchased. The officer met with N.R.
and observed a cut below N.R.’s left eye that was not there before the controlled buy.
Based on the information provided by N. R., officers obtained a search warrant and
entered S.L.’s home. While searching the home, officers discovered drugs and drug
paraphernalia, but were unable to locate the gun allegedly used by E.A. during the
altercation.
Police arrested appellant several days later. Appellant was charged with first-degree
aggravated robbery, conspiring to commit fi rst-degree aggravated robbery, aiding and
abetting first-degree aggravated robbery, se cond-degree aggravated robbery, aiding and
abetting second-degree aggravated robbery, simple robbery, and aiding and abetting simple
robbery.

4
At trial, officers testified that, after E.A. and appellant entered the garage, they could
hear “some sort of a scuffle or commotion” over the recording device. The officers testified
that the name “Ricky” was spoken, and that Ri cky “appeared to be the aggressor.” After
this initial commotion, officers testified that they believed “that there was a gun involved,”
that N.R. said something like “Here’s the money. Take it,” and that it “sounded like [the
individuals in the garage] were in the process of taking the money from [N.R.].” Officers
testified that the conversation in the garage concerned whether N.R. owed money to “the
Medina organization” and how he was going to repay the organization.
In addition to the officers’ testimony, the state played for the jury the audio
recording that was obtained from the listening device in N.R.’s pocket. The transcript of
that recording reads, in relevant part, as follows:
MALE:[1] I don’t have f---in ti[m]e for you.
N.R.: I’ll have cash for you tomorrow . . . .
. . . .
N.R.: . . . I don’t think that you are a punker, you’d whoop my
a-- in a second.
N.R.: I don’t want to fight you and I don’t want trouble.
APPELLANT: So, you think we are a joke huh?
N.R.: I never said that, never once. Never once. Never once
APPELLANT: Why wouldn’t you f---in.
N.R.: I am just trying to cont act [T.R.] every day for the last
four days.
APPELLANT: Really?

(Commotion going on)

MALE: Oh Ricky . . . .

1 The transcript identifies “A ” as N.R., “Female” as S.L ., “Male #1” as unknown, and
“Male #2” as appellant. Male #1 is therefore presumably E.A.

5
N.R.: I could show you on my phone. Oh Ricky that is enough
buddy, Ricky please Ricky, Ricky come on please bud. Please
Rick. Rick I have been trying to contact him, Ricky come on
man. No more.
APPELLANT: I told you. I told you.
N.R.: No more buddy please. I am going to try my hardest.
Here I will give you the money I got. Here. Please can I just
go, I will do my deposit I will do what I can I will give you a
car title. I don’t want to do this no more.
FEMALE: [E.A.]
APPELLANT: No more?
N.R.: Yeah please Rick.
APPELLANT: Huh ah you f---ed up right?
N.R.: Yeap [sic].
APPELLANT: What the f--k.
N.R.: I am not (inaudible) how f--k my face is f---ed up ahh
f--k it hurts.
APPELLANT: Now, how much do you owe [T.R.]?
N.R.: Seven grand.
APPELLANT: Seven grand. Who does [T.R.] owe that
money to?
N.R.: You.
APPELLANT: Me. Who do I owe it to?
N.R.: Your guy.
APPELLANT: That’s right. And if I don’t pay them, who do
they come get?
N.R.: You.
APPELLANT: And I pay it. Okay?
N.R.: Okay.
APPELLANT: All right.
N.R.: All right . . . .
. . . .
N.R.: Ricky you are no joke, I know it dude. I want no more
trouble just want to get you paid off on. I am going to go sell
a car, I want to go.
APPELLANT: It’s not that, brother, it’s not that, it is the f---
in sh-t that I have been hearing.
N.R.: What? What do [you hear], you will never hear another
word about me or you again . . . .
. . . .
N.R.: . . . six hundred, she took it. I promise. I will have a
little more money tomorrow. Like, $400.

6
APPELLANT: You gonna take this serious?
N.R.: I will take it serious.
(Inaudible)
APPELLANT: If anything happens to me, cause of you,
there’s my brother, my nephews . . . .
. . . .
APPELLANT: [phone ringing] . . . What’s up, well I am here
with him right now. All right. Listen Bro, Here’s what I’m
going to do now. I already f---ed him up. (Inaudible) What
else do you want me to do . . . .
. . . .
APPELLANT: . . . On your eye, (inaudible) Okay. You gonna
say that you got into a fight. Okay, with who and you are gonna
say I don’t know, some guy with, I don’t give a f--k what you
tell em, that is not here. You got that?
N.R.: I will cover it . . . .
. . . .
MALE: $200 a week. It shows that you are dedicated to take
care of this [debt].

N.R. testified at trial that he was in debt to appellant and T.R. in October 2016. N.R.
further testified that, after he entered the garage, appellant and E.A. came through the door
and that appellant “punched [N.R.] in the face and basically . . . told [N.R.] [he] need[ed]
to pay up and behave.” N.R. testified that E.A. pointed a handgun at his head, but that
appellant later told E.A. to “put it away.” N.R. testified about the $600:
PROSECUTOR: And what happened to that six hundred?
N.R.: [S.L] took it.
PROSECUTOR: Did you have a choice about whether or not
to give it to her?
N.R.: No. At that point, I just wanted out of there so yeah.
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Did you figure you didn’t have a
choice because you were scared?
N.R.: Oh, definitely, at that point. I was scared sh--less.

S.L. also testified for the state as part of a plea agreement. S.L. testified that N.R.
told her that he had “six big ones” and wanted to purchase methamphetamine. S.L. testified

7
that she then told appellant a nd E.A. that she planned to meet with N.R. on October 18.
She acknowledged that N.R. was at her home th at afternoon, and that appellant and E.A.
were also there. She testified that, while the four individuals were in her detached garage,
there was “a little bit of chaos.” S.L. denied taking the $600, seeing anyone hit N.R., or
seeing a gun. She said that, after the alterc ation, she and appellant left her residence on
appellant’s motorcycle. When S.L. and appella nt returned to S.L.’s neighborhood, they
saw that S.L.’s house was “lit up like the Fourth of July” with police. S.L. testified that
she and appellant again fled on appellant’s mo torcycle, this time us ing “back roads” to
drive to appellant’s apartment.
At the close of the state’s case, appella nt moved for acquittal on all seven counts,
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to show that the $600 had been forcefully taken
from N.R. or that appellant had conspired with anyone or aided anyone in taking the money
from N.R. The state then voluntarily dismisse d the charge of conspiracy to commit first-
degree aggravated robbery. The district co urt ruled that it would not submit the second-
degree aggravated-robbery charge to the jury, but otherwise denied appellant’s motion.
The jury found appellant not guilty of fi rst-degree aggravated robbery and simple
robbery, but found him guilty of aiding and abetting firs t-degree aggravated robbery and
aiding and abetting simple robbery.
Before sentencing, appellant moved the dist rict court to vacate the verdicts based
on inconsistent jury verdicts. The district court denied the requested relief and sentenced

8
appellant to 108 months in prison on his aiding and abe tting first-degree aggravated
robbery conviction.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Sufficient evidence supports the guilty verdict for aiding and abetting first-degree
aggravated robbery.

Appellant argues that there is insufficient ev idence to support the jury’s verdict that
he is guilty of aiding and abe tting first-degree aggravated robbery. Appellant argues that
the state’s circumstantial evid ence is insufficient to prove his knowin g involvement in a
robbery.
When evaluating a claim of insufficien cy of the evidence, appellate courts
“carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences
drawn from them would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v.
Waiters, 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the conviction . . . [and] assume the jury
believed the State’s witnesses and disbelie ved any evidence to the contrary.” State v.
Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (citations and q uotation omitted). “[W]e will
not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence
and the requirement of proof beyond a reasona ble doubt, could reasonably conclude that
the defendant was guilty of the charged offense.” Id. But if a conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence, reviewing courts apply a higher level of scrutiny. Id.

9
Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the fa ctfinder can infer whether
the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 598 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). “A conviction supp orted by circumstantial evidence requires
us to apply a two-step [analysis] . . . .” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100. F i r s t , w e m u s t
“identify the circumstances proved, giving deference to the jury’s acceptance of the proof
of these circumstances and reje ction of evidence in the reco rd that conflicted with the
circumstances proved by the State.” Id. (quotation omitted). Second, we must
“independently examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the
circumstances proved, including inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “[A] conviction based on circumstantial evidence may stand only
where the facts and circumstances disclose d by the circumstan tial evidence form a
complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of
the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than
that of guilt.” State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted). We
apply the circumstantial-evide nce standard of review when the state presents solely
circumstantial evidence on one or more elements of an offense. State v. Porte, 832 N.W.2d
303, 309 (Minn. App. 2013).
Appellant contends that the circumstantial evidence is insufficient to prove that he
had the requisite mental state to have aided an aggravated ro bbery. He argues that there
exists an alternative reasonable inference that appellant hit N.R. because N.R. spoke ill of
appellant and not because appellant was intending to aid a robbery.

10
In order to convict appellant of aiding and abetting first-degree aggravated robbery,
the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant “played a knowing
role in the commissi on of the crime.” Bernhardt v. State , 684 N.W.2d 465, 477 (Minn.
2004) (quotation omitted). “Active participati on in the actual commi ssion of the offense
is not required to constitute the aiding and abetting of that crime, and appellant’s presence,
companionship, and conduct be fore and after an offense is committed are relevant
circumstances from which the jury may infer criminal intent.” Id. (quotation omitted); see
also State v. Smith, 901 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Minn. App. 2017) (an action contemporaneous
with an ongoing crime can suffice as knowing involvement so long as the actor is aware of
the ongoing crime and aids in its commission), review denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2017).
The first step of the circumstantial-ev idence test requires us to identify the
circumstances proved, giving deference to th e jury’s determinations and disregarding
evidence in the record that conflicts with the circum stances proved by the state. Ortega,
813 N.W.2d at 100. Deferring to the jury’s guilty verdict, the circ umstances proved are
that, appellant, E.A., T.R., S.L, and N.R. had all been involved in methamphetamine
transactions through the Medina organization. In October 2016, N.R. owed appellant’s
organization approximately $7,000 for metham phetamine previously purchased. On
October 18, 2016, S.L. told appellant that N.R. was coming to her house with “six big
ones” to buy methamphetamine. Before S.L.’s meeting with N.R., appellant parked his
motorcycle outside S.L’s home. N.L. was fearful of encountering appellant, but appellant’s
motorcycle was moved shortly before N.R. arrived and was no longer visible to N.R. when

11
N.R. arrived with the money. S.L. escorted N.R. into her garage, and appellant and E.A.
followed. Appellant and E.A. then confro nted N.R., who acknowledged his unpaid drug
debt. Appellant punched N.R. in the face, while stating, “I told you. I told you.” N.R., in
response, stated “No more buddy please. I am going to try my hardest. Here I will give
you the money I got. Here.” N.R. then ha nded over the $600 to S.L. because he “was
scared sh--less” and felt he had no other choice. N.R. parted with the $600 but received no
methamphetamine in exchange. At some point, E.A. pointed a gun at N.R.’s head. After
the physical altercation, appellant continued to threaten N.R. abou t N.R.’s debt to the
Medina organization. Before N.R. left the garage, appellant told him to lie about how he
sustained the cut under his eye, and E.A. told N.R. that he needed to make weekly payments
until his debt was paid off. N.R. emerged from the garage with an in jury to his face, but
without either the $600 or any methamphetamine . Appellant and S.L. then fled and later
did the same after seeing S.L.’s home surrounded by police.
The second step of the circumstantial-evid ence test requires us to “independently
examine the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances
proved.” Ortega, 813 N.W.2d at 100 (quotation omitted ). The inferences to be drawn
from the circumstances above are consistent w ith appellant’s knowing participation in an
aggravated robbery and are inconsistent with any other reasonable inference.
Concerning appellant’s knowledge that his confederates were committing or were
going to commit a robbery, it is reasonable to infer from the circumstances that appellant
possessed the requisite state of mind based on his close association with E.A. and S.L.

12
before, during, and after N.R. was assaulte d and the $600 was taken from him. From
appellant’s anger over N.R.’s failure to pay T.R. and appellant’s decision to attack N.R. in
S.L.’s garage at a time he knew N.R. would be arriving with money to buy more drugs, a
reasonable inference may be drawn that N.R. was attacked so that appellant and his
confederates could take the money that N.R. had with him. Appellant’s flight is consistent
with guilt.
It is also reasonable to infer that a ppellant intended his ac tions to further the
commission of the robbery. During the robbery, appellant controlled the confrontation and
punched N.R. in the face while E.A. held a gun to N.R.’s head. One of the group took the
$600 from N.R. and threatened N.R. for not taking his debt seriously. In short, it appears
that appellant knew that an aggravated ro bbery was being committed and that appellant
intended his presence and actions to furthe r the commission of the crime. The most-
reasonable inference is that appellant was at least aware of—if not directing—the robbery.
Appellant contends that the circumstances proved are consistent with an alternative
theory of innocence, to wit: that appellant punched N.R. not to a ssist in a robbery, but
because N.R. “talk[ed] bad about” and disres pected appellant. But any “disrespect” was
related to N.R.’s unpaid drug debt. And appe llant’s beating of N.R. coincided with N.R.
giving up $600. Appellant argued to the jury throughout the trial that he was hitting N.R.
for “disrespect” and not to rob hi m. The jury’s verdict estab lishes that the jury rejected
this theory, and we reject it as well because it is not reasonable in light of all the evidence
produced at trial, most especially the evidence from the audio recording.

13
When viewed as a whole, the circumstan ces proved are consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with any other rational inference. We are satisfied that the only reasonable
inference that can be drawn from the evidence and circumstances proved is that appellant’s
assault on N.R. was a knowing part of a robbery.
Appellant also argues that the state was re quired to prove that appellant took N.R.’s
money “knowing he [was] not entitled to the pr operty.” In support of this argument,
appellant contends that, because N.R. owed him $7,000, he had a claim of right to the $600.
Therefore, he argues, he cannot have been guilty of aiding a robbery.
It is axiomatic that fungible cash is not a chattel that can be recovered by force under
a claim of right. See 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 23 (2019). And it is apparent to us that
appellant did, in fact, know that he was not legally entitled to the $600, because the money
taken from N.R. was, at best, money owed on an illegal drug debt. We reject the argument
that extracting money owed on an illegal drug debt by way of a brutal assault is not a
robbery.
The district court’s jury instructions were not plainly erroneous.
Appellant argues that the district court pl ainly erred when it in structed the jury on
the knowledge element of first-degree aggravated robbery using the language provided in
the model jury instructions a nd not the governing statute. See 10 Minnesota Practice,
CRIMJIG 14.04 (2018) (providing that “the defendant knew that (he) (she) was not entitled
to take it.”).

14
Appellant did not object to the jury instru ction at trial, and we therefore review the
instruction for plain error. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). Under the
plain-error standard, a defendant must show “(1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error
must affect substantial rights.” Id. “An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, which is
typically established if the error contravenes ca se law, a rule, or a st andard of conduct.”
State v. Webster , 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). To meet the
substantial-rights requirement, an appellant be ars the burden of showing “that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the ab sence of the error would have had a significant effect on
the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
If all three elements of the plain-error test are met, “we should address the error to ensure
fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings” and “will correct the error only if the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding is seriously affected.”
State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 508 (Minn. 2006) (quotations omitted).
We review jury instructions in thei r entirety when dete rmining whether the
instructions “fairly and adequately explain the law” of the case. State v. Huber , 877
N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 2016). Moreover, “while it is well settled that jury instructions
must define the crime charged and explain th e elements of that cr ime to the jury, we
nevertheless give district courts broad discretion and considerable latitude in choosing the
language of jury instructions.” State v. Milton , 821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012)
(quotation omitted). When decidi ng whether a jury instruction accurately states the law,

15
“we analyze the criminal statute and the case law under it.” State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d
1, 15 (Minn. 2015).
Appellant’s argument that the district cour t erred in its jury instructions proceeds
from the premise, based in caselaw, that one of the elements of first-degree aggravated
robbery is that the defendant took property from another “know[ing] [that] he is not entitled
to the property he takes.” See State v. Charlton, 338 N.W.2d 26, 29-30 (Minn. 1983); State
v. Sandve , 156 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. 1968); State v. Bonga , 153 N.W.2d 127, 130
(Minn. 1967). The pattern jury instruction suggests that the proper instruction on the
knowledge element of the crim e is that the actor took property from another and “knew
that (he) (she) was not entitled to take it.” CRIMJIG 14.04. Here, the district court
instructed the jury that the state was required to prove that $600 was taken “from the person
of” N.R. and that appellant “knew that he was not entitled to take it.” This, appellant
argues, was error, was plain, and affected appellant’s substantial rights.
Without deciding whether th e instruction was erroneous, appellant has failed to
demonstrate on appeal either that any error was plain or that it affected appellant’s
substantial rights.
To the question of whether the claimed ju ry-instruction error was plain, appellant
cites no Minnesota case holding that the instruction as given by the district court here was
erroneous. Appellant argues that the instruction should properly have been worded more
clearly to track the statutory language, but since the claimed error was not brought to the
district court’s attention at trial, any error must have been plain in order to warrant reversal.

16
And in the absence of caselaw showing the claimed error to have been “clear” or “obvious,”
there is no basis for a determination on appeal that the complained-o f error was plain.
Webster, 894 N.W.2d at 787 (quotation omitted). Th e claimed error here—even if it was
error—is not clear or obvious. Any error was therefore not plain.
Appellant must also show that his substan tial rights were affected in order to satisfy
the plain-error test. “An erro neous jury instruction will not ordinarily have a significant
effect on the jury’s verdict if there is considerable evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” State
v. Kelley , 855 N.W.2d 269, 283-84 (M inn. 2014). Here, there is substantial evidence
establishing appellant’s guilt, and there is no re ason to think on this record that any error
in jury instructions led to a guilty verdict that would not otherwise have been reached. For
this reason as well, the district court’s jury instructions were not plainly erroneous.
Affirmed.