State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0830

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Alan Danny Woods,
Appellant.

Filed May 4, 2020
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-17-7546

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Publ ic Defender, Sara J. Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and John Smith,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
FLOREY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for sex trafficking and
promotion of prostitution, appellant Alan Danny Woods argues that (1) the district court
erred in denying his presentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that
his counsel had pressured him into accepting the agreement and (2) the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a downward departure based on his particular
amenability to probation and because the offense was significantly less serious than typical.
We affirm.
FACTS
File 1
In March 2017, the roommate of Jamie Drum called 911 to report a domestic assault.
The call disconnected , and dispatch called back and spoke to the roommate (D.H.), who
reported that appellant Alan Danny Woods was assaulting Drum and taking her phone
when she tried to call 911. D.H. also stated that Woods had taken D.H.’s phone when D.H.
tried to call 911. Police responded.
Woods was in a relationship with Drum and has a child in common with her. Woods
was living at the apartment with Drum and D.H. Drum told police that she and Woods had
argued, that Woods called her a “bitch” and other derogatory terms , and that he yelled at
her about her weight. Drum also stated that Woods had stolen her phone, her apartment
keys, and cash from her tax re fund, and that Woods threatene d her. Drum stated that she
was afraid to cooperate with police. Woods was charged with two counts of felony

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domestic assault for both Drum and D.H., gross misdemeanor 911 interference, and felony
theft in File No. 73 -CR-17-2534 (File 1). A pre -trial Domestic-Abuse No-Contact Order
(DANCO) was issued in this case for Drum and her child in common with Woods.
File 2
In June 2017, Drum contacted the police and stated that Woods had violated the
DANCO from File 1. Drum stated that Woods attacked her in the parking lot of her home
in front of the ir child, who was 9 months old at the time. Drum stated that Woods had
punched her twice in the face and grabbed her throat and choked her. Then, Woods
punched her in the stomach. When Drum fell down, Woods stomped on her head. Officers
observed and photographed bruises on Drum’s neck, significant bruising on her eye, and
other injuries. After the assault occurred, Woods began contacting Drum via text message
in violation of the DANCO. The texts included thr eats to kill Drum and her family
members. Woods was charged with eight felonies in File No. 73 -CR-17-5131 (File 2)
including three DANCO violations, three domestic assault—fear/harms, a domestic assault
by strangulation, and terroristic threats.
File 3 – the instant case
During the summer of 2017, police investigator Thompson met with a minor who
reported that both Woods and Drum had been trafficking her (Child A). Child A told
Thompson that she moved in with Drum, who told her that she needed t o start making
“serious money.” According to Child A, Woods facilitated sexual encounters between her
and other individuals and that Drum would keep the money paid in exchange. The sexual
encounters occurred at Woods’s apartment . Child A stated that she was no t allowed to

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have a key to the apartment or a phone and that Woods and Drum would hit her and threaten
her family and friends if she refused to engage in the sexual encounters . This occurred
until Child A was arrested in North Dakota in July 2017.
Investigator Thompson confirmed Child A’s allegations by reviewing Backpage
listings that he tracked to Drum and another accomplice. Thompson reviewed the text
messages from the phone used t o arrange the sexual encounters and contacted the
individuals who had paid for sexual encounters with Child A. The individuals corroborated
the dates and locations of the encounters.
Drum was arrested on August 22 and gave a statement that largely corroborated
Child A’s report. Drum stated that she had engaged in pros titution with Child A and that
she knew that Child A was only seventeen. Drum also conf irmed that she worked for
Woods and that Woods had purchased the phone, provided the apartment, and transported
both Drum and Child A to the encounters. Drum also reported that Woods was trafficking
and abusing her, sometimes in retaliation for refusing to engage in prostitution. Police later
became aware of Drum’s previous reports against Woods in File 1 and File 2.
Woods was charged on August 24 with two counts of sex trafficking in the instant
case (File 3). In June, the complaint was amended to add two additional counts of
prostitution. On June 11, a global resolution was reached by the parties: Woods pleaded
guilty to two counts of sex trafficking from File 3 (Count 2 and 3). The remaining two
charges were dismissed, and the two pending domestic files, File 1 and 2 were also
dismissed. The state agreed to cap its prison argument at 240 months, and Woods was

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allowed to argue for a durational or dispositional departure. The district court accepted
Woods’s guilty plea.
After the plea hearing, but prior to sentencing, Woods’s attorney, Wanda Gierman,
moved to withdraw as counsel. The district court granted her motion. Woods moved to
withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his plea was not intelligent or voluntary because
Gierman told him that he would lose at trial and that he was facing a maximum sentence
of more than 400 months. Woods stated that he believed the maximum he could receive
at trial was 240 months and that Gierman had misled him. At a hearing, the district court
heard testimony from Woods and Gierman. The district court denied Woods’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, concluding it was both vo luntary and intelligent. The district
court also credited Gierman’s testimony.
At sentencing, Woods argued for both downward durational and dispositional
departures. The district court concluded that there were “no grounds to depart whatsoever”
and sentenced Woods to 165 months for count 2 and 240 months concurrent for count 3.
Woods appeals.
D E C I S I O N
First, Woods asserts that the district court erred by refusing to allow him to withdraw
his guilty plea.
A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea after entering it. Withdrawal is permitted in two
circumstances. First, a court must allow withdrawal of a guilty
plea if withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.
Second, a court may allow withdrawal any time before
sentencing if it is fair and just to do so.

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State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted).
The fair and just standard requires district courts to give
due consideration to two factors: (1) the reasons a defendant
advances to support withdrawal and (2) prejudice granting the
motion would cause the State given reliance on the plea. A
defendant bears the burden of advancing reasons to support
withdrawal. The State bears the burden of showing prejudice
caused by withdrawal. We review a district court’s decision to
deny a withdrawal motion for abuse of discretion, re versing
only in the rare case.

Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
Woods argues that his plea was not voluntary. A guilty plea must not be based on
“any improper pressures or i nducements.” Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn.
1989). “[A] plea is involuntary when it is induced by coercive or deceptive action.” Dikken
v. State , 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017 ). Woods argues that he was improperly
pressured and was “betwe en a rock and a hard place” with respect to taking the plea or
going to trial. As the state correctly points out, a plea is not involuntary simply because
the defendant does not like his choices. Id. (“[Defendant] had meaningful choices, just not
the specific choice he preferred.”).
Here, Woods had meaningful options, including the option to go to trial. Woods
confirms that he discussed those options with Gierman. Woods also testified that he had
not been threatened or coerced into making his plea. We conclude Woods has not shown
that his plea was involuntary. Accordingly, we reject this argument.
Second, Woods argues that his plea was not intelligent. To be intel ligent, a plea
“must represent a knowing and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
available.” Id. (citation omitted). “Whether a plea is intelligent depends on what the

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defendant knew at the time he entered the plea —specifically . . . whether [he] understood
the charges against him, the rights he waived, and the consequences of the plea.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
Here, despite Woods’s representations that he did not understand the consequences
of his plea because he believed Gierman exaggerated the maximum sentence he faced, the
record reflects tha t Woods understood the charges against him, that he was waiving his
rights, and the consequences of doing so. The district court credited Gierman’s testimony
that she had e xplained his potential maximum sentence , including the possibility of
consecutive sentencing. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
finding that Woods’s plea was intelligent.
Third, Woods argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel which
somehow renders his plea invalid. The district court heard testimony from Gierman, which
it credited. The district court did not credit Woods’s testimony with respect to Gierman’s
representation. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
Woods’s petition to withdraw his guilty plea because Woods did not make the required
showing that it would be “fair and just” to allow withdrawal.
Finally, Woods asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion for a downward durational and dispositional departu re. “We ‘afford the [district]
court great discretion in the imposition of sentences’ and reverse sentencing decisions only
for an abuse of that discretion.” State v. Soto , 855 N.W.2d 303, 307 -08 (Minn. 2014)
(quoting State v. Spain, 590 N.W.2d 85, 88 (M inn. 1999)). A district court may refuse a

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sentencing departure as long as it considers the departure ’s basis. See State v. Van Ruler,
378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985).
Here, Woods argues that the court should have granted him a dispositional departure
because he showed remorse, demonstrated a motivation to change, and is particularly
amenable to probation. Woods also argues that his young age, community support, and
motivation to be a good father all support the grant of a dispositional departure. The record
belies this argument. Woods repeatedly violated his prior probation and was already on
supervision from the Domestic Violence Court when the trafficking violations at issue here
occurred. The district court considered Woods’s arguments for a dispositional departure
and rejected them. Based on the record, we conclude that this decision was not an abuse
of discretion.
Similarly, Woods argues that he is entitled to a durational departure because his
offense was less serious than is typical. Hi s support for this argument is that his victim
was seventeen and almost eighteen when he trafficked her, and that he only trafficked her
for a period of months, not years. He points to cases where the trafficked children were
younger and trafficked for lo nger. However, the mere fact that other trafficking victims
were younger does not negate the seriousness of Woods’s conduct nor render it “less
serious than is typical.” See State v. Herrmann, 479 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn. App. 1992).
Woods also argues th at he is entitled to a departure because his co -defendants
received less-serious sentences. As the state points out, Woods’s sentence of 240 months
is already below the presumptive range. And Woods had a significantly higher criminal -
history score than h is co-defendants, making his comparison to their sentences unhelpful

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in this instance. Once again, the district court heard and rejected these arguments. Woods
agreed to a plea deal, and as part of that deal, the state was limited to asking for a maximum
sentence of 240 months. Woods was allowed to request departures, but was not entitled to
receive them. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting
Woods’s motion for a departure from his sentence.
Affirmed.