State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0839

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ling Zhou,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2020
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-17-8856

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Pete r R. Marker, Assistan t County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Paul D. Baertschi, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Pr esiding Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JESSON, Judge
After receiving and transferring almo st $300,000, appella nt Ling Zhou was
convicted of receiving stolen property and aiding and abetting theft by swindle. Zhou, who
lived in California, received this money from two men in Minnesota through a financial

2
scheme. On appeal, she challenges the juri sdiction of the state of Minnesota and the
Ramsey County Attorney’s Office . She also raised concerns about the jury instructions
and the sufficiency of the evidence. Because jurisdiction was proper, the jury instructions
were not plainly erroneous, and the evidence is sufficient, we affirm.
FACTS
This case involves a complex financial sw indle. According to trial testimony,
appellant Ling Zhou’s participation in this sw indle began more than a year before the
victims in this case, S.T. and R.B., were s c a m m e d . I n A p r i l 2 015, Zhou met “Gerald
Moretti Roberto Rossi” on a dating website, and they began communicating frequently by
email and text message.1 Their relationship grew serious quickly, and they declared their
love for each other early on. Soon, the co uple planned for Moretti to visit Zhou in
California.
About two weeks after they began their online relationship, Moretti told Zhou that
he was having trouble transferring funds fro m some personal business in Dubai to his
account in the United States. He asked Zhou to help him by sending money so that the
funds would be released. Skep tical that she might be cheate d, Zhou contacted a banker
and was advised not to send the money because the situation was “strange” and that it was
likely a “scam.” She confronted Moretti with this information, but he convinced her that
the transaction was legitimate. She began sending him money, in an apparent hope that he

1 It appears that Moretti may not be an actual person or the actual name of the person with
whom Zhou was communicating. The photos Moretti sent to Zhou of himself were taken
from a celebrity’s Instagram account, and the pass port scan Moretti sent also appeared to
be fake. The authorities had not located Moretti at the time of the trial.

3
would return to the United States and they could be together. Zhou used some of her own
money, loans from family members, and “h ard money lenders” during the myriad of
transactions she facilitated on Moretti’s behalf.
Eventually, Moretti to ld Zhou that he found a way to make money while he was in
Dubai through a “referral business.” At More tti’s instruction, Zhou set up an account in
her name with zoominfo.com and gave him her login information.2 Shortly after, Moretti
told Zhou he was receiving re ferral fees through the account and asked her to establish
bank accounts so that he could monitor the deposits. Zhou did so. She ended up opening
more than a dozen different bank accounts at different financial institutions at Moretti’s
direction. Zhou then provided him the details of these new accounts in her name and her
existing Happy Oceans bank account, which she used for her real estate business. Once he
had her account information, Moretti would in form Zhou when “r eferrals” would be
deposited into her accounts. And he would as k her to move certain funds from specific
accounts to other accounts or send certain fu nds to other individuals , including by wire
transfer and cash withdrawal and deposit. Zh ou did as Moretti directed. For these wire
transfers, Zhou often had to list a “purpose” on the bank’s form. Moretti suggested she put
down “family support” and she did, despite not knowing the recipients of the money. She
even joked about this, calling them her “international criminal families.”
Several times, Zhou expressed suspicion about Moretti and his requests of her. She
wrote him, “I feel you are not honest to me” and questioned how he spent the tens of

2 This service provides contact information for potential customers or clients.

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thousands of dollars she sent him so quickly. And she told Moretti, “I have to went to [two
banks] in order [to not] look like a criminal .” She asked him several times if he was
laundering money. Expressing fear that she was jeopardizing her residency in the United
States, she said, “I did help you sen[d] th e referral money which is stolen from another
innocent people’s money, I looked like a crimin al.” But despite all of these fears, she
continued to help Moretti.
Victim S.T.
In September 2016, S.T. was preparing to close on a new house in Eden Prairie.
During this process, he worked with Ed gewater Title Group, a company based in
Minnesota. With the closing date approach ing, S.T. emailed his contact at the title
company for the final payment details. Late r that same morning, he received emails
providing the date, time, and address for the closing, as well as final payment wiring
instructions. The instruc tions provided account and r outing numbers for an account
identified as “Happy Oceans INC 10633 165th St W Lake ville, MN 55044,” allegedly
located at a Bank of Am erica in Minneapolis. 3 S.T. even received follow-up emails to
confirm he had wired the final payment as instructed, which he had.
On the day of the closing, S.T. learned that these emails we re not from the title
company and that it had never received his fi nal payment of $205,704.11. S.T. and the
title company representative comp ared communications and rea lized that S.T. received

3 This address in Lakeville was Edgewater Ti tle Group’s actual address. But the actual
Happy Oceans account was registered at a California address, consistent with Zhou’s real
estate business.

5
fraudulent emails and had neve r received the email with the proper wiring instructions.
After realizing this, they contacted police.
Victim R.B.
In 2016, R.B.—a St. Paul resident—met “Teresa Hill” on a dating website. The two
communicated through email and text, and even had more than ten phone conversations,
but never met in person.
After a few weeks, Hill told R.B. that she was traveling to Dubai for her work as a
“gems dealer.” While in Duba i, Hill told R.B. that she ran out of mone y and needed
$14,000 for “shipping, taxes, [and] whatever else Dubai was throwing on her.” Hill
promised to pay R.B. back once she got back to the United States, so R.B. sent her the
money. Hill directed R.B. to send the money to her “broker,” and provided the details for
the Happy Oceans account.4 After he wired $14,000 to th e Happy Oceans account, there
were more obstacles Hill allegedly had to overcome to come back to the United States. At
Hill’s request, R.B. sent three more payments ($7,000, $20,000, and $49,000) to the Happy
Oceans account, in the form of personal checks. Eventually, the police informed R.B. that
he was being scammed.
Police Investigation
Lakeville police first investigated S.T.’s wire transfer into Zh ou’s account. In
October 2016, the bank closed Zhou’s Happy Oceans account after S.T. reported the fraud.

4 Again, this was Zhou’s business account. R.B. testified that Hill mentioned Gerald
Moretti’s name to him as “another contact that could be used to send transfers to.”

6
Zhou immediately texted Moretti to let him know, telling him that the bank believed the
account was being used for money laundering.
Around this time, Lakeville police contacted a detective in Santa Clara, California,
asking him to speak to Zhou because she lived in his jurisdiction. In December 2016, the
detective visited Zhou and aske d her about S.T.’s transfer. Zhou told police that she did
not know about the specific deposit but that she would ask her cousin with whom she did
business and let them know.
This was a lie. After the police left, Zhou texted Moretti telling him that law
enforcement was investigating stolen money deposited into her Happy Oceans account.
Moretti and Zhou discussed what she should tell police. Zhou later emailed the police with
alleged proof that the deposit in her account was legitimate: a series of undated emails
between Moretti and a third part y about work Moretti did fo r him, for which he sent
$205,704 to the Happy Oceans account. The detective believed this series of emails to be
“a scam” and “fraudulent.”
An agent with the Minnesota Commerce Fraud Bureau began assisting the Lakeville
Police Department in investigating this case . The police discovered that the funds from
both S.T. and R.B. ini tially went into the Happy Oceans accounts owned by Zhou. The
agent first tracked the deposits and subsequent transfers out of the accounts. And the agent
connected the various communications in th e case with the bank records to map the
movement of the money that Zhou initiated at the direction of Moretti.
The agent interviewe d Zhou again about the case. And she finally told him the
truth: that she was in love with Moretti and that she trusted him and was trying to help him.

7
And through Zhou’s communicati ons with Moretti, police disc overed that Zhou realized
that the money in her accounts was stolen, a nd that she felt bad for the people who lost
their money. The state charged Zhou with two crimes: (1) felony aiding and abetting theft
by swindle, for the S.T. tran saction and the R.B. transacti ons, and (2) felony receiving
stolen property, for the final R.B. transaction of $49,000.
Zhou was tried by a jury over four days. At trial, the state presented testimony from
S.T., R.B., an employee from the title company, police, and the agent. The agent provided
detailed testimony, with help from several e xhibits, about his meticulous tracking of the
financial transactions and his review of Zhou and Moretti’s conversations. After the state
rested, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence, lack
of jurisdiction, and improper venue. The district court denied the request and the defense
presented two character witnesses on behalf of Zhou before it rested.
After closing arguments, the district court read the jury the pattern jury instructions,
including those for liability for the crimes of another and theft by swindle. And the jury
found Zhou guilty of both counts. The district court sentenced her to a stay of imposition,
five years of probation, and community servi ce. And the court or dered her to pay full
restitution to S.T. and R.B. Zhou appeals.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal, Zhou raises four issues. First, she argues that the state lacked jurisdiction
to prosecute her for these crimes. Second , according to Zhou, the Ramsey County
Attorney’s Office lacked authority to prosecute her. Thir d, she contends that there were

8
errors in the jury instructions . Finally, she asserts that ther e was insufficient evidence to
support her convictions. We review each argument in turn.
I. The State of Minnesota had ju risdiction to prosecute Zhou.
Zhou argues that Minnesota lacked author ity to prosecute this case. We review
questions of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 257-58
(Minn. 2014). Subject-matter jurisdiction is “the court’s power to hear and decide the
dispute.” State v. Eibensteiner, 690 N.W.2d 140, 149 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied
(Minn. Mar. 15, 2005). Under Minnesota law:
A person may be convicted and sentenced under the law of this
state if the person:

(1) commits an offense in whole or in part within this state; or

(2) being without the state, caus es, aids or abets another to
commit a crime within the state; or

(3) being without the state, intentionally causes a result within
the state prohibited by the criminal laws of this state.

Minn. Stat. § 609.025 (2016).
Minnesota courts also rely on the operative-event test in determining whether crimes
occurred in Minnesota for the purposes of subject-matter jurisdiction. State v. Simion ,
745 N.W.2d 830, 838-39 (Minn. 2008). Courts consider “whether some operative event, a
triggering event, for the crime occurred in Minnesota. . . . [S]ome part of the crime charged
must be committed with in the jurisdiction.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). And
when an act is committed outside of Minnesota and causes a crime to result in Minnesota,

9
it could satisfy this test “if the result is part of the crime or related to an element of the
crime.” Id. at 839.
We turn first to Zhou’s theft-by-swindle conviction as an accomplice. Under that
charge, jurisdiction in Minnesota is authorized under section 609.025(2). Zhou was outside
the state of Minnesota when she lived and acted in California. And she aided or abetted
Moretti’s swindle in Minnesota: S.T. and R.B. were both Minnesota residents when they
lost their money. The operativ e-event test is satisfied here. The critical ev ents for this
crime were the transfers from S.T. and R.B. to accounts owned by Zhou. Both men were
in Minnesota when they were swindled and sent their money from Minnesota. And the
result of these transfers was that S.T. and R.B. gave up possession of their money to Zhou’s
account, which is relevant to the elements of the crimes. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52,
subd. 2(a)(4) (2016). Theref ore, Zhou’s crimes satisfy the statutory requirements for
Minnesota to have jurisdiction with regard to this crime.
Next, we turn to Zhou’s receiving-stolen-p roperty conviction. Jurisdiction over this
crime in Minnesota is authorized under section 609.025(3). While outside of Minnesota,
Zhou intentionally received and transferred stolen property. And the result—R.B. losing
his money—occurred in Minnesota. Under the operative-event test, the key event for this
crime was the final transfer fro m R.B. to Zhou’s account. This transfer was sent from
Minnesota. Thus, because a transfer of money occurred within the State of Minnesota, the
state has subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute Zhou for these crimes.
Still, Zhou advances two ar guments regarding why Minnesota lacks jurisdiction.
First, she asserts that because she has never been to Minnesota and never acted within the

10
state, it lacks jurisdiction. But, by using phrases like “bei ng without the state” and “aids
or abets another to commit a crime within the state,” the statute contemplates (and provides
jurisdiction for) situations in which a criminal actor particip ates in a crime in Minnesota
even if the actor is not physically here. See Minn. Stat. § 609.025.
Second, Zhou argues that the state failed to elicit testimony th at, when they were
swindled, S.T. and R.B. lived within the jurisdiction of the Minnesota court. But S.T.
testified that at the time of trial he lived in Eden Prairie and that he moved “here” from
Wisconsin about three years ea rlier. And later, he testifie d that he sold his home in
Madison to “move to Minneapolis” and that, at the time of the transfer, he “was in south
Minneapolis.” Three years before the trial, in January 2019, would be January 2016. His
transfer occurred in September 2016, so S.T. lived “here” in Minnesota at the time of his
wire transfer. From this testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that “here” related to
Minnesota.
And R.B. testified that he lives on the ea st side of St. Paul, Minnesota and is a
resident of Ramsey County. The checks he wrote to Happy Oceans in 2016 have his
address listed as in St. Paul. He further tes tified that he “just went to the bank and had
them do a transfer.” This suggests that his transfers were done at a bank in Minnesota.
In sum, the record contains evidence that both victims lived in Minnesota and
transferred their money to Zhou from Minnesota. This sufficiently confers jurisdiction.
As a result, the district court did not err by denying Zhou’s motion for acquittal.

11
II. The Ramsey Coun ty Attorney’s Office had authority to prosecute Zhou.

Next, Zhou argues that the Ramsey County Attorney lacked authority to prosecute
these crimes, which we construe as an argument about venue. Challenges to venue raise
questions of law that we review do novo. State v. Pierce , 792 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn.
App. 2010).
Because we have determined that jurisdiction over these crimes exists in Minnesota,
a determination of the precise county for tr ial, or the venue, is “less significant.”
Eibensteiner, 690 N.W.2d at 150 (quotation omitted). Venue is a matter of convenience.
Id. at 149. Minnesota law provides the Ramsey County Attorney authority to prosecute
felony violations of state law that occur in Ramsey County. See Minn. Stat. §§ 388.051,
subd. 1(3), 484.87, subd 2 (2016); see also State v. Ali , 752 N.W.2d 98, 107 (Minn.
App. 2008) (noting that the Hennepin Coun ty Attorney’s Office was the appropriate
prosecuting authority wh en the offense occurred in Hennepin County), review denied
(Minn. May 27, 2009). And “every criminal cau se shall be tried in the county where the
offense was committed,” meaning “where any element of the offense was committed or
any county where the property involved in an offense is or has been located.” Minn.
Stat. § 627.01, subds. 1-2 (2016). Zhou’s crimes were violations of state law that occurred
in Minnesota, as described above, and her crime relating to R.B. occurred in Ramsey
County.
Because the state aggregated the offenses relating to R.B. and S.T., the Ramsey
County Attorney’s Office had appropriate authority to try these crimes in Ramsey County.
Under rule 24.01 of the Minnes ota Rules of Criminal Procedur e, a “case must be tried in

12
the county where the offense was committed unless these rules direct otherwise.” And
“when two or more offe nses are committed by the same pers on in two or more counties,
the accused may be prosecuted in any county in which one of the offenses was committed
for all of the offenses aggregated under this paragraph.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52,
subd. 3(5) (2016). While S.T. was not in Ramsey County, this aggregation permits the
Ramsey County Attorney’s O ffice to charge Zhou’s crimes as to both victims. And
because Zhou’s crimes were felony violations of state law that occurred, at least in part,
within Ramsey County, it is w ithin the Ramsey County Attorn ey’s Office’s authority to
prosecute Zhou. Venue in Ramsey County was proper.5
III. The district court did not provi de erroneous jury instructions.
According to Zhou, the distri ct court misled the jury on the burden of proof as to
aiding and abetting theft in the jury instructions. Zhou furt her explains that the error
occurred when the court failed to include th e accomplice-liability in struction within the
elements for theft by swindle. Because tr ial courts enjoy broad discretion over jury
instructions, unless they have abused that discretion, we will not reverse. State v. Milton,
821 N.W.2d 789, 805 (Minn. 2012). But if a jury instruction materially misstates the law,
it is erroneous. State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 2001).

5 We also note that Zhou summarily argued for the first time that venue in Ramsey County
was improper in a verbal mo tion for acquittal following the state’s case-in-chief. But
“objections to improper venue are deemed waived where a defendant does not object to the
venue before trial.” State v. Blooflat , 524 N.W.2d 482, 484 (M inn. App. 1994). Thus,
Zhou waived any challenge when she failed to object to venue before trial.

13
Because Zhou did not object to the instructions at trial, we consider whether the
instructions amounted to plain error th at affected her substantial rights.
State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn. 2001). According to Zhou, the
instructions failed to require the jury to find that she knowingly and intentionally aided in
the theft by swindle. Here, the state had to prove that Zhou knew Moretti was committing
a crime and that she intended her actions to aid in the commission of the crime. See, e.g.,
State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 682 (M inn. 2007). A jury in struction for accomplice
liability must explain the “intentionally aiding” element. State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269,
275 (Minn. 2014) (citing Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 808).
Here, the district court read to the jury the pattern jury instructions for liability for
the crimes of another. Those instructions defined “intentionally aiding” as requiring two
elements: “first, the defendant knew anot her person was going to commit or was
committing a crime. Second, the defendant intended that her actions aided the commission
of the crimes.” Then, the c ourt stated, “[y]ou shall apply th is instruction to determine
whether the defendant aided a nother person in committing the o ffense of theft-swindle.”
Next, the court read the instructions for theft by swindle.
These instructions meet the requirements set forth in our casel aw. And providing
the instructions in this way, rather than “incorporating” them as Zhou suggests, has been
encouraged by the Minnesota Supreme Court. See State v. Huber, 877 N.W.2d 519, 524-25
n.3 (Minn. 2016).
Zhou provides no legal authority to demonstrate that the provided jury instructions
were erroneous because they failed to weave together the elements of aiding and abetting

14
with the elements for theft by swindle. And she gives no example of what would have
been an appropriate instruction. Accordingly, we discern no error, let alone error that is
plain, in the district court’s use of the pattern instructions here.
IV. There is sufficient evidence to support Zhou’s convictions.

Finally, according to Zhou, the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions.
When reviewing claims about sufficiency of the evidence, this court “carefully examine[s]
the record to determine whether the facts a nd the legitimate inferences drawn from them
would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of which [she] was convicted.” State v. Griffin ,
887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). The evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, and we assume that the jury “disbelieved any evidence
that conflicted with the verdict.” Id.
Here, Zhou challenges the su fficiency of the ev idence related to her intent and
knowledge for both cr imes. Because intent and knowle dge are generally proved by
circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial-evidence standard of review is appropriate. See
State v. Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997). Under this standard, this court applies
a two-step analysis. State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, this
court identifies the circumstances proved, considering only those consistent with the
verdict. Id. at 598-99. Second, this court determin es “whether the circumstances proved
are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt,”
examining independently the reas onableness of the inferences. Id. (quotations omitted).
With this standard in mind, we review the evidence supporting each of Zhou’s convictions.

15
Theft by Swindle
Zhou argues that, because she did not know about the communications with S.T.
and R.B. that led to them sendi ng money, she could not have knowingly aided Moretti in
committing the theft by swindle.
To convict Zhou for aiding and abetting, the state had to prove that she intentionally
aided, advised, or conspired with an other to commit theft by swindle. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2016). And theft by swindle requires the state to prove that through
a swindle—“artifice, trick, device, or a ny other means”—Zhou obtained property from
another person. Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(4).
Relevant to these elements, the state proved the following circumstances. Zhou
wanted to help Moretti leave Dubai and transfer his money. Zhou created an online account
in her name for Moretti to search for business contacts and gave him access to it. He then
engaged in some “referral” business that resulted in several deposits into Zhou’s accounts.
This money was, in part, from S.T. and R.B. At Moretti’s direction, Zhou transferred
money in and out of these accounts and wire d money to several individuals she did not
know. And Zhou opened add itional bank accounts with ma ny financial institutions at
Moretti’s direction, and she provided him the information so that her new accounts could
receive more deposits. Zhou also lied to the banks at Moretti’s direction, saying that the
wire transfers were for “family support” to people who were not her family and for
“services” to people who did no t provide her with any servic es. One of Zhou’s accounts
was closed because of the fraudulent S.T. transaction, and the bank and police told her that

16
the money was stolen. And she lied to police about the origin of S.T.’s money in her
account. At times, Zhou asked Moretti if he was laundering money or committing a crime.
Considering the circumstances proved, th e second step of the analysis is to
determine whether these circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d at 599. Here, the
circumstances reveal Zhou’s guilt. They sh ow that someone caused money to appear in
Zhou’s accounts and that she transferred the money out. She did these transfers at Moretti’s
direction, in an attempt to benefit him or he lp with his “business. ” The bank closed her
account because of fraud, and the police told he r that some deposite d funds were stolen
money, but she continued to participate . Further, Zhou’s lying ab out the origins of the
money to the police and the purpose for the tr ansfers to the banks reveals she felt she had
to hide the truth about her conduct.
Zhou does not offer what her rational alternative hypothesis is, but it appears to be
that she did not communicate with S.T. and R. B. personally or cause them to send their
money to her accounts. But this specific co mmunication is unnecessa ry to be guilty of
aiding and abetting this crime. Thus, the circ umstances proven are consistent solely with
guilt and inconsistent with any rational alte rnative hypothesis. Sufficient evidence
supports Zhou’s conviction for aiding and abetting theft by swindle.
Receiving Stolen Property
Zhou also contends that she did not kno w the money she received was stolen. This
charge relates only to R.B.’s final $49,000 check to Zhou’s Happy Oceans account, sent in
November 2016. To convict he r for receiving stolen property, the state had to prove that

17
she received, possessed, transferred, or concealed any stolen property, with knowledge or
with reason to know that the property was stolen. Minn. Stat. § 609.53, subd. 1 (2016).
The circumstances proved as described above are also relevant here. Particularly,
that the bank closed her account in mid-Oc tober because of suspected fraud, and she
received R.B.’s $49,000 on November 30. Shortly after that, the police came to her door
and asked her about the S.T. transaction from late September. She then lied to them about
the money that ha d been deposited by S.T. and worked with Moretti on a cover story.
These circumstances are consis tent with guilt and demonstr ate her knowledge that the
money that was being deposited in her account was stolen.
Moving on to the second step , Zhou’s alternative rational hypothesis appears to be
that she thought she was being paid back with the $49,000, meaning that she was entitled
to the money. But within a week after R.B.’s money was deposited, Zhou had transferred
it between her accounts and then wired it to people in South Africa, stating that it was for
“family support.” And in her communications with Moretti at this time, which appear to
be about this transaction, she did not assert that the funds co ming in were hers when he
told her to transfer them. We are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to convict Zhou
of receiving stolen property on this record.
In sum, the State of Minnesota and the Ramsey County Attorney’s Office had
sufficient authority to prosecute Zhou for these crimes. An d the district court did not
provide erroneous jury instructions. Finally, there is sufficient evidence to sustain Zhou’s
convictions. While Zhou appears to have been a pawn in this financial scheme, personally

18
losing a significant amount of money, that doe s not change the fact that she also aided
Moretti in the swindle and received stolen property. For these reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.