A19-0850 A19-0851 A19-0852

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0849
A19-0850
A19-0851
A19-0852

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
K. L. M. Z. and J. C. D. J., Parents (A19-0849, A19-0851),

and

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
K. L. M. Z., A. S. D., and M. M. Z., Parents (A19-0850),

and

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
K. L. M. Z., J. C. D. J., A. S. D., and M. M. Z., Parents (A19-0852).

Filed December 16, 2019
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Scott County District Court
File Nos. 70-JV-19-180, 70-JV-18-5117, 70-JV-18-19093, 70-JV-18-19094

Laura L. Schultz, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant mother K.L.M.Z)

Jodi S. Exsted, Savage, Minnesota (for appellant father M.M.Z.)

James P. Conway, Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A., Shakopee, Minnesota (for
respondent father J.C.D.J.)

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Bryce A.D. Ehrman, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant
County Attorneys, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent Scott County)

Joni Johnson, Chaska, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

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Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Tracy M.
Smith, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
JOHNSON, Judge
These consolidated appeal s arise from juvenile -protection cases concerning four
children. The district court terminated parental rights to three of the children , transferred
custody of the other child, and limited the mother’s visitation with th at child. The
children’s biological mother and the father of one child appeal. We affirm.
FACTS
K.L.M.Z. is the biological mother of four children , whom we will identify as :
Child 1, Child 2, Child 3, and Child 4. J.C.D.J. is the father of Child 1 and Child 2. A.S.D.
is the father of Child 3. M.M.Z. is the father of Child 4. At all relevant times, K.L.M.Z.
and M.M.Z. lived together with Child 1, Child 3, and Child 4. Meanwhile, pursuant to an
informal arrangement, Child 2 lived with J.C.D.J. and visited K.L.M.Z. on weekends.
In September 2017, Child 3, who then was four years old, and Child 4, who then
was two years old, were found unattended in the street near their home two afternoons in a
row. Scott C ounty investigated for neglect. One week later, after a la w-enforcement
officer found seven-year-old Child 1 locked out of the home and Child 3 and Child 4 inside
unattended, the county opened a second investigation for neglect and lack of supervision.
A few months later, in January 2018, a law -enforcement officer found the four
children unattended in a vehicle in a casino parking lot while K.L.M.Z. was inside the
casino. The vehicle was not running, and the outdoor temperature was be low freezing.

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There were no child-safety seats or booster seats in the vehicle. The county opened a third
investigation.
In early March 2018, a teacher overheard Child 1 tell a friend about “the scary things
that happen to me at night.” When the teacher inquired, Child 1 told her, “Sometimes my
dad drinks too much and he does sexy things to me.” She said that her mother told her “to
watch what I say or I could get taken away.” Four days later, a police d etective and a
school counselor interviewed Child 1 at school. Child 1 said that her mother caught a man
“doing stuff that I don’t really know what it’s called” with his private parts in Child 1’s
bedroom. She said that she is unsure “who it is ” but believes that it is her step father,
M.M.Z. When the detective asked whether she had been warned not to talk about it, she
responded in the affirmative. She told the detective that she is afraid of M.M.Z. and that,
when she is home alone with him, she goes to her bedroom and locks the door. All four of
K.L.M.Z.’s children were removed from the home for 72 hours.
Two days later, a nurse at Midwest Children’s Resource Center (MCRC)
interviewed Child 1. In this interview, Child 1 described incidents that happened “a long,
long time ag o,” when she was five years old, which were perpetrated by a former
housemate, not M.M.Z. She explained, “I thought it was my stepdad, but it really wasn’t.”
The nurse later testified that this was the first time in her experience of more than 2,000
cases of child sexual abuse that a child identified two different perpetrators for a particular
instance of abuse . She testified that she had concerns that Child 1 had been coached to
change her story. In an examination by a physician, Child 1 tested positive for chlamydia.
The evidence at trial showed that M.M.Z. was treated for chlamydia in November 2015,

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when Child 1 was five years old. The physician made a clinical diagnosis of child sexual
abuse.
Throughout the child-protection proceedings, the county struggled to get K.L.M.Z.
to engage in services . After the initial investigations for neglect and lack of supervision,
the county continued to find the children unattended in the home. In March 2018,
following the report of child sexual abuse, the county met with K.L.M.Z. and developed a
safety plan, which included a promise to not allow any men to stay inside the home. The
day after K.L.M.Z. signed the safety plan , a social worker visited K.L.M.Z.’s home and
found M.M.Z. in a back bedroom with Child 4. The children again were removed from the
home for 72 hours.
On March 20, 2018, the county filed a petition to adjudicate the four children as in
need of protection and services. After an emergency protective -care hearing, the district
court ordered that Child 1, Child 3, and Child 4 be placed in foster care and that Child 2 be
placed in the temporary custody of his father, J.C.D.J. One week later, the district court
ordered that Child 1 also be placed in J.C.D.J.’s temporary custody . The district court
adjudicated all four children as in need of protection or services in May 2018.
During the out -of-home placement, the case plan limited K.L.M.Z.’s contact with
the children to supervised visitation. But the county learned that K.L.M.Z. had picked up
the children for several unapproved, unsupervised visits. On one occasion , K.L.M.Z.
picked up Child 1 from J.C.D.J.’s house and brought her home overnight. On another
occasion, K.L.M.Z. had an unsupervised visit with Child 2 and Child 1 , which she
facilitated by manipulating J.C.D.J. with text messages that suggested that the visit had

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been approved. Child 1 later reported that she saw M.M.Z. during that visit but stayed
close to K.L.M.Z. and locked her bedroom door so the “problem thing” would not happen
again. The county obtained an ex parte order for Child 1’s immediate custody and placed
her in a foster home based on J.C.D.J.’s inability to keep Child 1 away from K.L.M.Z.
In November 2018, the county petitioned to terminate the parental rights of
K.L.M.Z. and A.S.D. to Child 3 and the parental rights of K.L.M.Z. and M.M.Z. to Child
4. A.S.D. did not respond, and his parental rights were terminated by default. The county
also petitioned to transfer permanent legal and physical c ustody of Child 1 and Child 2
from K.L.M.Z. to J.C.D.J. In January 2019, the county amended its permanency petition
concerning Child 1 by seeking to terminate K.L.M.Z.’s and J.C.D.J.’s parental rights. In
February 2019, t he county developed out -of-home-placement plans for K.L.M.Z. with
respect to all four children and for M.M.Z. with respect to Child 4. The plans detailed the
county’s concerns about lack of supervision, neglect, and drug use and listed the steps that
each parent needed to take for the c hildren to return home. In March 2019, K.L.M.Z.
voluntarily transferred permanent legal and physical custody of Child 2 to J.C.D.J., and
K.L.M.Z. and J.C.D.J. agreed that the district court would determine at trial whether
K.L.M.Z. has a right to visitation with Child 2.
The consolidated cases were tried over 12 days in March and April 2019. The
county presented the testimony of 16 witnesses. K.L.M.Z. testified on her own behalf and
called five other witnesses . M.M.Z. testified on his own behalf and called one other
witness. J.C.D.J. testified on his own behalf and called no other witnesses.

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In May 2019, the district court issued separate orders in four case files with findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The district court terminated K.L.M.Z.’s parental rights to
Child 1, Child 3 , and Child 4 on four statutory grounds . T he district court transferred
permanent legal and physical custody of Child 2 to J.C.D.J. and ordered that K.L.M.Z.
could have no visitation with Child 2 “until she makes substantial progress in addressing
her mental health and chemical health needs.” And the district court terminated M.M.Z.’s
parental rights to Child 4 on the statutory ground that he had committed an act of egregious
harm upon a child in his car e. In June 2019, t he district court denied K.L.M.Z.’s motion
for a new trial . K.L.M.Z. and M.M.Z. filed separates notices of appeal. This c ourt
consolidated the appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. Appeal of K.L.M.Z.
K.L.M.Z. argues that the district court erred in granting the county’s petition to
terminate her parental rights to Child 1, Child 3, and Child 4 and in temporarily preventing
her from having visitation with Child 2.
A. Hearsay Evidence
We first consider K.L.M.Z.’s argument that the district court erred by overruling her
objection to hearsay testimony. In general, a district court may admit evidence in a CHIPS
proceeding only if the evidence would be admissible in a civil trial. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
3.02, subd. 1. But a district court may admit out-of-court statements by children under ten
years of age concerning acts of sexual penetration or contact, so long as opposing parties
are notified and the district court finds “sufficient indicia of reliability .” Id., subd. 2; see

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also Minn. Stat. § 260C.165 (2018). This court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of
review to evidentiary rulings in a TPR trial. In re Child of Simon, 662 N.W.2d 155, 160
(Minn. App. 2003).
K.L.M.Z. first contends that t he dist rict court should have excluded the hearsay
statements of Child 1’s eight -year-old cousin , whom Child 1 visited during her out -of-
home placement. The county responds that the exhibit containing the cousin’s statements
“was not actually offered or entered in evidence .” We agree . Thus, K.L.M.Z.’s first
contention is moot.
K.L.M.Z. also contends that the district court should have excluded the testimony
of Child 1 ’s aunt concerning a statement Child 1 made to her cousin , which the aunt
overheard. K.L.M.Z. asserts that the aunt’s testimony is unreliable because the children
were speaking in English and the aunt has limited English-language skills. T he district
court ruled that the aunt had been “vigorously cross -examined” about her ability to
understand English and credited her testimony to the extent that she overheard Child 1 say,
in English, “ [M.M.Z.] . . . touch . . . private parts .” Through an interpreter, the aunt
acknowledged that she does not speak English fluently, but she testified that English -
language conversations are easier to understand when words sound similar to their Spanish
counterparts, which she testified was true on that occasion. The district court did not abuse
its discretion by deeming the aunt’s testimony reliable and by admitting it.
B. Reasonable Efforts
K.L.M.Z. also argues that the district court erred by finding that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite her with the children.

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After a CHIPS adjudication, a county social services agency must make “reasonable
efforts . . . to prevent placement or to eliminate the need for removal and to reunite the
child with the child’s family at the earliest possible time.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2018).
A county must, among other things, “prepare an out -of-home placement plan addressing
the conditions that each parent must meet before the child can be in that parent’s day -to-
day care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.219(a)(2)(i) (2018). An “out-of-home placement plan” is a
written document prepared “jointly with the parent or parents or guardian of the child” that
describes the specific reasons for out -of-home placement and explains the changes and
services needed to allow the child to safely return home. Minn. Stat. § 260C.212,
subd. 1(b), (c)(2) (2018). The plan must signed by the parent, submitted to t he district
court for approval, and explained to all persons involved in its implementation. In re
Welfare of A.R.B. , 906 N.W.2d 894, 897 (Minn. App. 2018). “Reasonable efforts at
rehabilitation are services that go beyond mere matters of form so as to include real,
genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Children of S.W., 727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App.
2007) (quotations omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007). In determining whether
a county has made reasonable efforts, a district court shall consider whether the services
offered were “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet
the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible;
(5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstance s.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260.012(h).
In this case, the district court found that the county made reasonable efforts to
“rehabilitate and reunify the children with” their mother. These efforts included various

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assessments, chemical testing, educational programming, and therapy for both K .L.M.Z.
and the children. K.L.M.Z. contends that the county’s efforts were not reasonable because
the county required K.L.M.Z. to adopt the belief that M.M.Z. abused Child 1. The county
developed multiple case plans, each of which demonstrated concern about K.L.M.Z.’s
ongoing contact with M.M.Z. and sought to keep the children “safe from unsafe people and
sexual abuse in the future.” K.L.M.Z. reviewed and signed each case plan. The district
court approved the case plans. But K.L.M.Z. did not comply with them. Even after the
county made a maltreatment finding against M.M.Z. based on a preponderance of the
evidence, K.L.M.Z. secretly removed the children from their placements and brought them
to her own house, where she exposed them to M.M.Z. The district court later found by
clear and convincing evidence that M.M.Z. committed sexual abuse against Child 1. Thus,
the district court did not err by finding that the county’s efforts to ensure the children’s
safety were reasonable.
C. Statutory Grounds for Termination
K.L.M.Z. next argues that the district court erred by concluding that the county
proved a statutory ground for termination.
We review an order terminating parental rights “to determine whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of Children
of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “ Parental rights are terminated only for
grave and weighty reasons,” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990),
but this court gives “considerable deference to the district court’s deci sion to terminate

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parental rights,” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. We apply a clear -error standard of review to
a district court’s findings of historical fact, and an abuse -of-discretion standard of review
to a district court’s ultimate finding as to whether a statutory basis for terminating parental
rights is present. In re Welfare of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review
denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
The county alleged four statutory grounds for the termination of K.L.M.Z.’s parental
rights. The district court concluded that the county proved each alleged ground. On appeal,
K.L.M.Z. acknowledges all four statutory grounds but challenges the district court’s
findings and conclusions only with respect to the allegations of palpable unfitness. See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018). She has not made any argument as to why
the district court erred with respect to the three other statutory grounds (that the children
were neglected and in foster care ; that she had refused and neglected to comply with her
parental duties; and that reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions that led to the
children’s out-of-home placement). A termination of parental rights may be affirmed if at
least one statutory ground has been established. In re Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678
N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). The lack of any argument for reversal with respect to three
statutory grounds is a sufficient basis for affirmance. See id. Nonetheless, in the interest
of thorough appellate review, w e will analyze K.L.M.Z.’s argument that the district court
erred by determining that she is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-child relationship.
Specifically, K.L.M.Z. challenges the district court’s findings about the children’s safety
around M.M.Z. and about her drug use.
A district court may terminate parental rights to a child if it finds

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that a parent is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and
child relationship because of a consistent pattern of specific
conduct before the child or of sp ecific conditions directly
relating to the parent and child relationship either of which are
determined by the court to be of a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable, for the reasonably foreseeable
future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental,
or emotional needs of the child.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (2018). Proving palpable unfitness is an onerous
burden. In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 2008). The county
must prove “a consistent pattern of specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the
time of the hearing that appear will continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are
permanently detrimental to the welfare of the child.” Id. (quotation omitted).
K.L.M.Z. offers three reasons why the district court erred in concluding that she is
palpably unfit to parent. First, she contends that she could not have “failed to protect
Child 1 from sexual abuse” because the evidence is insufficient to prov e that M.M.Z.
sexually abused Child 1. K.L.M.Z. notes that Child 1 identified another man by name as
the perpetrator of her sexual abuse and that, at the least, the conflicting evidence makes it
impossible for the county to satisfy its burden of proof. The district court considered these
evidentiary issues thoroughly. In finding that M.M.Z. abused Child 1, the district court
credited the county’s maltreatment finding against M.M.Z. as well as Child 1’s disclosure
on multiple occasions of M.M.Z. as her abuser. The district court also found that Child 1’s
identification of an alternative perpetrator was unreliable given “that she both saw and
heard the perpetrator and held a memory for approximately two years that it was her
stepfather.” The district court found it compelling that Child 1 repeated her identification

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of M.M.Z. as her abuser later in the case. The district court expressly found that M.M.Z.’s
denials are not credible. The district court’s finding that M.M.Z. committed sexual abuse
against Child 1 is not clearly erroneous.
Second, K.L.M.Z. contends that the district court erred by finding that her drug use
rendered her an unfit parent . The district court found that the “totality of the evidence
points to [K.L.M.Z.] having an ongoing methamphetamine addiction” and concluded that
K.L.M.Z. made little progress demonstrating sobriety or acknowledging her drug use. The
evidence supports this finding. In June 2018, the county requested that K.L.M.Z.
demonstrate sobriety or acknowledge a drug problem and work with the county on a
resolution. The county provided “color wheel testing, UAs, hair follicle consultations, hair
follicle testing, [and] chemical dependency assessments.” K.L.M.Z. agreed to submit to
random urine tests but failed to appear for multiple tests and never had a negative urine
test. In November 2018, K.L.M.Z. passed a hair-follicle test but, after suspicions arose
that she had adulterated the hair sample by bleaching her hair, she failed to produce urine
samples for the color -wheel program or submit to a blood test . After testing positive for
methamphetamine use on the first day of trial, K.L.M.Z. admitted in her testimony to using
methamphetamine from December 2018 to March 2019 but denied “any need for treatment
or assistance with her chemical dependency after being offered services and support from”
county social workers, saying that she had quit on her own. A parent who refuses to
complete drug treatment may be found palpably unfit to care for children. See, e.g., In re
Welfare of Child of W.L.P., 678 N.W.2d 703, 710-11 (Minn. App. 2004). Thus, the district

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court did not clearly err by finding that K.L.M.Z. failed to make significant progress in
demonstrating sobriety or acknowledging a drug problem.
Third, K.L.M.Z. contends that the district court erred by finding that her “unresolved
issues” with her mental health support the conclusion that she is palpably unfit. The
evidence supports the district court’s finding. According to K.L.M.Z.’s psychological
evaluation, she has narcissistic and histrionic personality disorders, marked by “turbulent”
behavior and an “unpredictable temperament.” Her evaluator concluded that her diagnoses
were “likely to impact her parenting” and recommended that she participate in group and
individual DBT therapy for her personality disorder, as well as parenting classes. K.L.M.Z.
completed only one of four DBT therapy module s and did not start family therapy. The
district court credited the testimony of social workers who testified that K.L.M.Z.’s chronic
tardiness for supervised visitations had a negative impact on her children. The district court
also heard K.L.M.Z.’s own testimony that she prioritized her relationship with M.M.Z.
over making progress on her case plan.
The district court may consider the impact of a parent’s mental health if it
“manifest[s] in negative behaviors toward” children. In re Welfare of Children of B.M. ,
845 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Minn. App. 2014). The evidence indicates that K.L.M.Z.’s mental
health has caused turbulent behavior and that her behavior has had a nd would continue to
have a negative impact on her children. Thus, the district court did not clearly err by
considering K.L.M.Z.’s mental health in its analysis of the palpable-unfitness issue.

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In sum, the district court did not err by finding that the county proved by clear and
convincing evidence that K.L.M.Z. is palpably unfit to parent. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(4).
D. Visitation
K.L.M.Z. last argues that the district court erred by temporarily preventing her from
having any visitation with Child 2. K.L.M.Z. voluntarily transferred permanent legal and
physical custody of Child 2 to J.C.D.J. She executed an affidavit in which she asked the
district court to approve the transfer and stated:
The parties have agreed that t he Court will decide the
issue of my visitation with [Child 2] after the trial that will be
heard by the Court pertaining to my other three children. I
understand that this visitation order will be made by the Court
in [Child 2’s] best interests, and shall be binding upon me and
[J.C.D.J.].

K.L.M.Z. confirmed the terms of this agreement at a pre -trial hearing the same day,
waiving her right to trial on the custody issue and agreeing that the district court would
decide the matter of her “visitation and pa renting time” with Child 2. J.C.D.J. “agreed to
try to the Court the issue of what [K.L.M.Z.’s] contact with [Child 2] looks like following
the conclusion of this case.” For purposes of this opinion , we assume without deciding
that, by agreement, a district court may determine parental visitation time in connection
with a permanent transfer of physical and legal custody. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd.
4(3) (2018).
In this case, the district court concluded that it was in “ Child 2’s best interests to
completely restrict Mother’s parenting time until she takes substantial steps to address her

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mental and chemical health.” The district court found that visitation with K.L.M.Z. likely
would endanger Child 2’s emotional health and impair his emotional development, voicing
concern about Child 2’s young age and about K.L.M.Z.’s history of manipulation . The
district court found that transferring custody “gives Mother substantially more time to
make progress” on correcting the conditions that led to out -of-home placement under the
CHIPS adjudication. The district court indefinitely suspended K.L.M.Z.’s visitation “until
she makes substantial progress in addressing her mental health and chemical health needs,”
explaining:
Substantial progress may be demon strated in a manner that
includes but is not limited to providing a letter from a treating
therapist as to [ K.L.M.Z.’s] progress in individual and DBT
therapy, completion of a chemical use assessment, . . .
demonstrated follow through with all recommendations, and
demonstration of at least six months of sobriety as evidence by
UAs, hair follicle, or other appropriate testing.

The district court ’s analysis is supported by evidence in the record. K.L.M.Z.
admitted to using methamphetamine but does not believe that she needs treatment. She
has not demonstrated sobriety through testing, and she has not made substantial progress
in therapy for her personality disorder s. The district court’s suspension of visitation is
reasonably based on Child 2’s best interests . Thus, t he district court did not err by
suspending K.L.M.Z.’s visitation time until she makes progress on her mental and chemical
health.
II. Appeal of M.M.Z.
M.M.Z. argues that , for five reasons, the distr ict court erred in terminating his
parental rights to Child 4.

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A. Reliance on Proposed Findings
We first consider M.M.Z.’s argument that the district court erred by adopting
verbatim the county’s proposed findings of fact. The supreme court has stated that, if a
party submits proposed findings of fact, a district court should “independently develop its
own findings.” In re Children of T.A.A. , 702 N. W.2d 703, 707 n.2 (Minn. 2005) (citing
Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn. 2002)). The supreme court has encouraged
district courts to write findings that “reflect the district court’s independent assessment of
the evidence” and to exercise its “own skill and judgment in drafting its findings.” Id. But
the supreme court has “declined to adopt a blanket prohibition on the practice” of verbatim
adoption of proposed findings in child-protection cases, acknowledging the “short deadline
facing district courts in issuing an order on a petition to terminate parental rights.” Id.
In this case, the county submitted proposed findings of fact. As in many termination
cases, the district court’s termination order bears some resemblance to the county’s
proposed order. But the two documents are not similar enough to raise concerns of th e
type previously expressed by the supreme court. M.M.Z. concedes that the district court
modified many of the proposed findings . The district court rejected others entirely. The
district court made numerous findings that were not proposed by the county. On the whole,
the district court’s findings sufficiently “reflect the district court’s independent assessment
of the evidence” and the exercise of its “own skill and judgment in drafting its findings.”
See id. Thus, the district court did not err by a dopting some of the county’s proposed
findings.

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B. Findings Regarding Sexual Abuse of Child 1
M.M.Z. argues that the district court erred by finding that he sexually abused Child
1. Specifically, M.M.Z. contends that the district court erred by deeming Child 1 ’s
identification of him reliable in light of her young age and her initial disclosure to the
detective that she was not sure who had abused her. He also contends that the district court
erred by relying on the county’s four witnesses, despite their expressions of doubt about
the reliability of Child 1’s identification of an alternative perpetrator.
As discussed above, the district court did not rely solely on Child 1’s interview with
the detective. Child 1 spontaneously disclosed M.M.Z. as her abuser to eleven individuals
over an extended period of time, identified an alternative perpetrator for only a short period
of time, and later repeated her identification of M.M.Z. The county made a maltreatment
finding against M.M.Z. based on interviews with multiple parties, including the children
who shared a bedroom with Child 1. The district court also found the results of M.M.Z.’s
psycho-social assessment and parenting assessment unpersuasive, based on the examiner’s
methodologies. The reconciliation of conflicting evidence is “exclusively the province” of
the district court as fact-finder. Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn. App. 2004).
Given the conflicting evidence , we do not have a “definite and firm conviction that a
mistake occurred.” See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Minn.
App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015) . Thus, the district court did not clearly
err by finding that M.M.Z. sexually abused Child 1.

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C. Findings Regarding Coaching of Child 1
M.M.Z. also argues that t he district court erred by finding that K.L.M.Z. coached
Child 1 to identify another man as her abuser . He contends that the district court ignored
improper questioning by the detective during his first interview of Child 1.
The district court found, based on “all reasonable inferences to be made from” the
trial testimony, that K.L.M.Z. coached Child 1 to identify an alternative perpetrator. The
district court credited the testimony of five professionals and found K.L.M.Z.’s testimony
not credible on that issue . The district court found that the circumstances indicated that
K.L.M.Z. had spoken to Child 1 before the MCRC interview: “Unlike the time leading into
the first interview at the school, Mother, who had re peatedly discouraged Child 1 from
reporting the sexual abuse, was aware that sexual abuse would be discussed and had access
to Child 1 before this evaluation.” The district court found that Child 1 was aware of what
would be discussed at the MCRC intervie w and indicated that she was not supposed to
discuss the “problem thing.”
The evidence supports the district court’s findings. Child 1 spontaneously identified
M.M.Z. as the perpetrator when talking to her teacher and indicated that her mother warned
her that she could get “taken away” for discussing the topic. Child 1 said that “mom gets
mad” when she tells others about the abuse. Before the MCRC interview, Child 1 was in
frequent telephone contact with K.L.M.Z. After Child 1 changed her story, the MCRC
physician and nurse formed the opinion that Child 1 was coached or primed to identify an
alternative perpetrator. To the extent that M.M.Z. argues that the detective improperly
questioned Child 1 during her initial interview, M.M.Z. provides no support for this claim.

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Thus, the district court did not clearly err by finding that K.L.M.Z. coached Child 1 to
identify another man as her abuser.
D. Statutory Grounds for Termination
M.M.Z. also argues that the district court erred by finding that the county proved a
statutory ground for the termination of his parental rights to Child 4.
The district court concluded that the county proved that a child had experienced
egregious harm in M.M.Z.’s care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(6). Egregious
harm is defined by statute to mean “the infliction of bodily harm to a child . . . which
demonstrates a grossly inadequate ability to provide minimally adequate parent al care.”
Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 14 (2018). To justify the termination of parental rights,
egregious harm must be of a “nature, duration, or chronicity that indicates a lack of regard
for the child’s well -being, such that a reasonable person would believe it contrary to the
best interest of the child or of any child to be in the parent’s care.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(6). “The statute does not require that the parent has inflicted egregious harm on
his own child, but rather, that a child has experienced egregious harm in the parent’s care.”
In re Child of A.S. , 698 N.W.2d 190, 197 -98 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn.
Sept. 20, 2005).
The district court found that Child 1 was a victim of criminal sexual conduct,
“making her a child wh o has been subjected to egr egious harm.” The district court also
found that M.M.Z., Child 1’s stepfather, was the perpetrator of this abuse. For the reasons
stated above, t he evidentiary record supports the district court’s finding that M.M.Z.
sexually abused Child 1. See supra parts I.C, II.B. Furthermore, t he district court found

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that Child 1 was a child in M.M.Z.’s care. That finding is supported by evidence that
M.M.Z. was Child 1’s stepfather at the time of the reported abuse and that M.M.Z. watched
the children when K.L.M.Z. slept or worked. Thus, the district court did not clearly err by
finding that a child experienced egregious harm in M.M.Z.’s care.
E. Best Interests
M.M.Z. last argues that the district court erred by finding that the termination of his
parental rights to Child 4 is in her best interests.
In termination cases, “the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration,
and conflicts between the rights of the child and rights of the parents are resolved in favor
of the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 902; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. A
district court “must balance three factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent -
child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship; and
(3) any competing interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.
App. 1992); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (2019). Competing interests of
the child include a “stable environment, health considerations, and the child’s preference.”
R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4. The district court “must . . . explain its rationale in its findings
and conclusions.” In re Tanghe , 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003). This court
applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s best-interests finding.
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
In this case, the district court found that it was in Child 4’s best interests to terminate
M.M.Z.’s parental rights , reasoning that Child 4 ’s need for safety, stability, and
permanency outweighed M.M.Z.’s interest in his parental rights. The district court found

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that M.M.Z. “loves his child and that his child loves him.” But the district court found that
there was a serious concern about Child 4’s safety and stability if she were left in M.M.Z.’s
care. The district court made findings on the three best-interests factors and concluded that
“this little girl’s interest in being safe from sexual abuse far outweighs ” any interest in
preserving the parent-child relationship. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
so finding.
Affirmed.