In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: K. K. H. and J. C. B., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0854

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
K. K. H. and J. C. B., Parents.

Filed October 28, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Nicollet County District Court
File No. 52-JV-18-156

Steven D. Winkler, Jones Law Office, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant K.K.H.)

Elizabeth Weinandt, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent J.C.B.)

Michelle M. Zehnder Fischer, Nicollet County Attorney, St. Peter, Minnesota (for
respondent Nicollet County Health and Human Services)

Kaylee Koyen, St. Peter, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the termination of her parental rights to her two youngest
children, arguing that the district court (1) abused its discretion by finding that respondent

 Retired judge of the Minneso ta Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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county proved statutory grounds for termination, (2) erred by finding that the county made
reasonable efforts toward reunification, and (3) abused its discretion by finding that it is in
the children’s best interests to terminate her parental rights. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant-mother and respondent-father have twin girls, born in April 2017. At the
time of the twins’ birth, mother’s son with another man was eight years old.1 Father, whom
mother identified as her fiancé, was on intensive supervised release for a 2013 conviction
of second-degree criminal sexual conduct involving the 12-year-old daughter of his then-
girlfriend.
When the twins were one week old, respondent Nicollet County Health and Human
Services (the county) filed a petition alleging that they were children in need of protection
or services (CHIPS) based on concerns about mother’s severe postpartum depression,
including her statements about “having visions of throwing [one of them] across the room,”
and father’s status as a registered sex offender. The twins were briefly placed in emergency
foster care but returned to mother upon her agreement to a safety plan, which required her
to reside with an adult family member and prohibited her from having unsupervised contact
with the twins or from allowing father to have any contact with them. Mother also admitted
that (1) she h as significant mental-health issues that she must address to parent the twins
effectively, (2) she needs parenting education to parent them effectively, and (3) father is
a registered sex offender who is prohibited from having contact with children without court

1 Mother’s parental rights to her son are not at issue here.

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approval and presents a risk to the twins. Based on those admissions, the district court
adjudicated the twins CHIPS and ordered mother to continue the safety plan.
Mother repeatedly had unsupervised contact with the twins and permitted father to
have contact with the m. Consequently, in June, the district court ordered the twins’
removal from mother’s home and placement in foster care. The county established a case
plan that required mother to (1) ensure that father not “have any contact with the children”
and not allow him into her home; (2) have someone with her on a 24-hour basis for support;
(3) allow child-protection workers to do random visits at her home; (4) continue individual
therapy “on a schedule recommended by her therapist ” and comply with her therapist’s
recommendations; and (5) meet with the county workers and follow their
recommendations. Mother signed the case plan, and the district court approved it.
In August, father was terminated from sex-offender treatment and returned to prison
for violating his supervised release.2 While in prison, he delayed and then was terminated
from sex-offender treatment. Because father cannot return to supervised release without
treatment, he may be incarcerated until January 2026, when his sentence expires.
Meanwhile, mother made some progress on the case plan. She continued to attend
individual therapy and participated in a parenting evaluation . She obtained a driver’s
license and a job. And she claimed she was no longer in a relationship with father. By the
end of 2017, the district court determined that mother’s progress was sufficient to justify

2 Father’s violations also included being convicted of disorderly conduct based on a
harassing and threatening phone call to a child -protection worker and maintaining a
forbidden Facebook account under an alias and with mother’s assistance.

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unsupervised visitation with the twins and extension of the permanency deadline , despite
lingering concerns that mother would “resume” her re lationship with father upon his
release from custody.
By mid-2018, it was apparent that mother had misled the county and the district
court and was committed to continuing a relationship with father. Mother call ed and
emailed him regularly and denied his guilt, maintaining that he was “set up by the system.”
She focused almost exclusively on him during her individual therapy sessions, rather than
addressing her own mental-health concerns. The district court identified mother’s failure
to “recognize that her duty to protect her children requires that she end her relationship
with the children’s father” as the principal barrier to returning the twins to her custody, and
ordered the county to file a permanency petition.
In August 2018, the county filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to
the twins.3 While the petition was pending, mother stopped attending therapy, even though
her therapist advised that weekly sessions continued to be medically necessary.
After a two-day trial in April 2019, the district court terminated mother’s parental
rights, determining that mother neglected her parental duties, she is palpably unfit to parent,
the county’s reasonable efforts to reunify the family have failed to correct the conditions
leading to the twins’ out-of-home placement, and termination is in the twins’ best interests.
Mother appeals.

3 The county also sought, and the district court u ltimately ordered, termination of father’s
parental rights. Father’s parental rights are not at issue in this appeal.

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D E C I S I O N
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we consider whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory termination criteria and are supported by substantial
evidence. In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T. , 814 N.W.2d 76, 8 7 (Minn. App. 2012). We
will affirm a district court’s termination of parental rights when “at least one” statutory
ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence, the county has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and termination is in the child ren’s best interests.
In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county’s
reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions requiring the twins’ out -of-
home placement.

In assessing the statutory grounds for involuntary termination, we review findings
of “underlying or basic facts” for clear error. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805
N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). But the district
court has discretion in determining whether there is clear and convincing evidence of a
particular ground for termination; we will not disturb that determination absent an abuse
of discretion. Id.
The district court determined that the county proved three statutory grounds for
termination—failure of reasonable efforts, neglect of parental duties, and palpable
unfitness. Mother challenges each of those grounds and argues that the county’s
reunification efforts were insufficient. We turn first to the question of reasonable efforts.
When children are placed out of the home, the county must make “reasonable
efforts” to reunite the family. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2018). The nature of the services

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that constitute reasonable efforts “depends on the problem presented.” In re Children of
T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). In determining whether the
county made reasonable efforts, a district court considers whether the county offered
services that were “(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to
meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and
accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn.
Stat. § 260.012(h) (2018). The court must also consider “the length of time the county was
involved and the quality of effort given.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 88 (quotation omitted).
Mother disputes that the county made reasonable reunification efforts. But she does
not identify any error in the district court’s findings regarding the county’s efforts or any
deficiency in the county’s efforts. Rather, she contends the district court failed to
“recognize [her] significant progress.” We are not persuaded. Neither mother’s apparent
progress early in the case plan, nor her overall failure to comply with the case plan, renders
the county’s efforts unreasonable. The county made focused and persistent efforts to
address the safety and stability concerns that led to the twins’ out -of-home placement by
supporting mother’s mental health and parenting abilities and educating her about the
danger father poses to her children. We discern no error in the district court’s finding that
those efforts were reasonable.
We therefore turn to the court’s determination that those efforts ultimately failed.
A district court may terminate parental rights if the county presents clear and convincing
evidence “that following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under
the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’ s

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placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2018). In assessing this ground, the
court considers the parent’s compliance with the court-ordered case plan. Id.
Mother contends that she substantially complied with her court-ordered case plan.
She focuses principally on her ongoing relationship with father, arguing that her refusal to
end the relationship cannot be considered a violation because the case plan did not require
her to do so. This argument is unavailing. While the plan did not expressly require her to
end the relationship, it did require her to protect the twins from the negative influence of
the untreated sex offender who is their father by preventing any contact with him. And the
district court repeatedly advised mother during court hearings that her ongoing relationship
with father was a grave concern and that “her duty to protect her children requires that she
end [the] relationship.” Mother not only continued her relationship with father but refused
to acknowle dge the danger he poses to young children, including the twins . And she
thwarted the county’s efforts to address that mindset by repeated dishonesty with her
therapist and county workers.
To justify her refusal to cut her ties to father, mother argues that his conviction does
not necessarily mean he presents a danger to his own children, and, even if it did, his current
incarceration “reduces his risk” to them . We disagree. Minnesota law recognizes that
father’s conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct poses a risk to his children ;
it is a sufficient statutory basis to justify terminating his parental rights. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(9) (2018) (permitting termination of parental rights when the parent
has been convicted of a crime requiring sex-offender registration). And the district court
squarely rejected mother’s contention that father’s incarceration reduces his risk to the

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twins, finding that father “has demonstrated the ability to reach outside the prison walls to
harm others.” The record amply supports this finding. In September 2017, father violated
his ex-wife’s order for protection to manipulate his housing placement in prison . And in
February 2019, he sent a six-page sexual and threatening letter to the mother of his
cellmate’s victim . Father also manipulates mother , and her commitment to father has
materially impaired her ability to care and provide for her children . The record
demonstrates that she talks to father on the phone instead of getting ready for work, making
her late for work “which complicates her ability to maintain gainful employment .” And
she uses her limited resources, sells her personal belongings, and donates plasma (from
shortly after the twins’ birth through trial) to support father and maintain contact with him,
while neglecting rent, utility bills, and transportation for herself and her children . By
prioritizing father over her children, mother violated the letter and spirit of her case plan.
Mother next argues that she substantially co mplied with her case plan because she
attended therapy throughout the CHIPS proceeding, interrupting her sessions only between
September 2018, after the county petition ed to terminate her parental rights, and M arch
2019, just before trial. But this approx imately six -month suspension of treatment that
mother knew was integral to the return of her children represents substantial
noncompliance with the case plan. Moreover, the record supports the district court’s
finding that even when mother was in therapy, she was not compliant because she did not
meaningfully engage with the therapist. See J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89 (recognizing that a
parent’s “formal compliance” with elements of a case plan does not necessarily mean she
is substantively addressing the issues that make her unable to properly care for the child ).

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Instead, mother used the sessions to discuss her concern that the legal system has wronged
father. As a result, the county’s efforts to help mother address her persistent mental-health
problems have failed.
Finally, mother contends that the circumstances that prompted the children’s
removal from her home —her severe postpartum depression and father’s presence —no
longer exist. We decline to view the precipitating c ircumstances so narrowly. As noted
above, the CHIPS adjudication was based on mother’s admissions that she has significant
mental-health issues that must be consistently addressed or she will be unable to effectively
parent the twins. And mother admitted father presents a risk to the children. Despite the
county’s myriad services and an extension of the permanency deadline for these young
children, at the time of trial mother had not made substantial progress toward correcting
the admitted circumstances leading to the twins’ 22-month placement.
In sum, mother refuses to acknowledge the risk father poses to the twins (and her
son), consistently prioritizes her ongoing relationship with father over her children, and has
not addressed her mental health to af ford her ch ildren a safe and stable home. On this
record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that reasonable efforts
have failed to address the safety concerns that led to the twins’ out-of-home placement.4

4 Because the existence of one statutory ground is sufficient to support termination, S.E.P.,
744 N.W.2d at 385, we need not address the other two grounds the district court found
here. But we observe that the substantial evidence of mother’s failure to address her own
mental health and to remove father’s dangerous influence from her children’s lives amply
support the district court’s determination that mother has neglected her parental duties and
is palpably unfit to parent. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4) (2018).

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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that it is in the
children’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental rights.

We review a district court’s determination that termination is in the children’s best
interests for an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905.
Mother contends that it is in the twins’ best interests to remain in her care because
of her “diligence and love” for them. She also reiterates her arguments minimizing the risk
father poses to the twins while incarcerated. These arguments are unavailing in light of the
significant evidence indicating mother’s persistent choice to prioritize her relationship with
an untreated sex offender who, despite his imprisonment, remains a dangerous and
destabilizing influence on mother and her children. Because the district court expressly
considered the statutory best-interests factors and the record overwhelmingly supports the
district court’s finding that mother’s overarching commitment to father is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future, the court did not abus e its discretion by determining that
termination of mother’s parental rights is in the twins’ best interests.
Affirmed.