Daniel Lynn Conley, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0855

Daniel Lynn Conley, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed February 3, 2020
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-K8-03-001055

Daniel L. Conley, Lino Lakes, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Connolly,
Judge.

2
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
CONNOLLY, Judge
Pro se appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to correct his
sentence. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
appellant’s sentence was legally authorized, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2003, a Ramsey County jury found appellant Daniel Conley guilty of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, third -degree criminal sexual conduct, soliciting to practice
prostitution, and second-degree assault . The state moved for an upward durational
departure from the presumptive 158-month prison sentence on the first -degree criminal
sexual conduct conviction based on the existence of aggravating factors. The sentencing
judge agreed and imposed a 300-month prison sentence, which included a five-year
conditional-release term. Appellant also received an 18 -month consecutive prison
sentence on the prostitution conviction and a 36-month consecutive prison sentence on the
second-degree assault conviction.
Since then, appellant’s case has had a long procedural history, detailed in this court’s
most recent opinion affirming his sentence. See State v. Conley, No. A11-0278, 2012 WL
360385 (Minn. App. Feb. 6, 2012), review denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2012). After two
remands from this court, the respective sentencin g juries found that one or more

3
aggravating factors existed. Id. at *1-2.1 The sentencing judge thus reimposed a 300 -
month sentence on appellant’s first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction. Id. at *3.
In November 2018, appellant moved to correct his sentence under Minn. R. Crim.
P. 27.03, subd. 9. The district court denied this motion. Although appellant did not timely
file this appeal, we accepted jurisdiction.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues both that the district court erred in denying his motion to correct
his sentence and that the Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) has unlawful ly
administered his conditional-release term.
I. Appellant’s challenge to the DOC’s administration of his sentence is not
properly before us.2

To begin, we consider appellant’s arguments on the DOC’s a dministration of his
sentence. This appeal stems from the denial of a ppellant’s motion to correct his sentence
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9 (allowing a court, at any time, to correct a sentence
not authorized by law).

1 These remands followed Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004),
and State v. Vance, 765 N.W.2d 390 (Minn. 2009). Appellant later petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court. The fe deral district court dismissed his petition with
prejudice. Conley v. United States, Civ. No. 13-1069, 2013 WL 5567453, at *12 (D. Minn.
Oct. 9, 2013) (order adopting R&R).
2 We note that neither the state nor the district court addressed this issue. But whether
appellant used the proper procedure affects our ability to consider his arguments. “We may
affirm the district court on any gro und, including one not relied on by the district court.”
State v. Fellegy, 819 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16,
2012).

4
Appellant asserts first that the DOC unlawfully extended his conditional -release
term. In particular, appellant highlights a 2013 DOC memorandum discussing a policy
change to the administ ration of certain o ffenders’ conditional-release terms. Under this
policy change, certain offenders, like appellant, now serve their conditional -release term
consecutive to, rather than concurrent with , their supervised -release term. Second,
appellant co ntends that the DOC should release him from prison to serve his five -year
conditional-release term after he serves two -thirds of his 300 -month criminal sexual
conduct sentence before serving the imprisonment portion of his other two sentences.
These arguments share a common flaw: they relate to the DOC’s administration of
appellant’s sentence, not to the sentence’s legality. The supreme court’s decision in State
v. Schnagl is instructive. 859 N.W.2d 297 ( Minn. 2015). There, Schnagl received a
mandatory five-year conditional-release term after a conviction for first -degree criminal
sexual conduct. Id. at 299. Following his release from prison, Schnag l twice violated his
supervised-release conditions, leading to the revocation of his supervised release. Id. Once
Schnagl’s conditional-release term began, the commissioner informed him that he would
not receive credit for the time he spent in custody for his supervised-release violations. Id.
Schnagl challenged the extension of his conditional -release date under Minn. R. Crim. P.
27.03, subd. 9. Id. at 299-300. The supreme court held that rule 27.03 does not serve as
the proper method for challenges to the DOC’s administration of a sentence. Id. at 303.
Here too, appellant challenges the DOC’s administration of his conditional-release
term under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, in particular its 2013 policy change. But the
DOC’s policy change affecting appellant’s conditional-release term was an administrative

5
decision. See State v. Schwartz , 628 N.W.2d 134, 140 -41 (Minn. 2001) (observing that
statutes grant the commissioner authority to administer conditional release).3
In sum , we hold that appellant’s challenge to the DOC’s administration of his
sentence is not properly before us. See Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d at 303-04; State v. Andersen,
871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015) (explaining that “a motion in a criminal case is not the
proper procedural vehicle to seek review of the administrative actions of the DOC”).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion to
correct his sentence.

A district court’s denial of a motion to correct a sentence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Munt v. State, 920 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Minn. 2018). “A postconviction court
abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against
logic and the facts in the record.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422 ( Minn. 2018)
(quotation omitted). We interpret Minnesota’s statutes and rules of criminal procedure de
novo. Reynolds, 888 N.W.2d at 129-30.
As noted above, Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, allows a court to correct an
unauthorized sentence at any time. “A sentence is unauthorized [under Minn. R. Crim. P.
27.03, subd. 9,] if it is contrary to law or applicable statutes.” Munt, 920 N.W.2d at 414
(quotation omitted). To that end, we must consider the legality of appellant’s sentence.

3 An offender may use Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, to correct a district court’s
imposition of an unlawful conditional-release term when the district court has originally
imposed an incorrect sentence. See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 130 ( Minn.
2016). As discussed below, the sentencing c ourt here correctly imposed a five-year
conditional-release term.

6
Sentences for persons convicted of felony crimes in Minnesota after 1993 have two
components: “(1) a specified minimum term of imprisonment that is equivalent to two -
thirds of the executed sentence; and (2) a specified maximum supervised release term that
is equal to one-third of the executed sentence.” Minn. Stat. § 244.101, subd. 1 (2018); see
also State ex rel Ford v. Schnell , 933 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Minn. 2019). Yet appellant’s
sex offense also required the imposition of a five-year conditional-release term under Minn.
Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7(a) (2002), the statute in effect at the time of his crime.
We conclude that appellant’s sentence is legally authorized. Appellant received
consecutive sentences. For consecutive sentences, “[t]he institutional records officer will
aggregate the separate durations into a single fixed sentence, as well as aggregate the terms
of imprisonment and the periods of supervised release.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt.
II.F.02 (2002). A ppellant’s sentence totals 354 months. 4 This means that he becomes
eligible to serve the supervised release portion of his sentence after serving two-thirds of
that time, or 236 months in prison.5 The district court also properly imposed a five-year
conditional-release term under Minn. Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7(a). This sentence follows
the law and applicable statutes. See Munt, 920 N.W.2d at 414.
Appellant offers three additional arguments for reversal. First, he contends that the
district court unlawfully lengthened his conditional -release term from five years to ten
years because its order stated “[appellant] is subject to a ten -year conditional release
period.” This statement was incorrect. But the order also stated that appellant’s initial

4 300 months + 18 months + 36 months = 354 months.
5 200 months + 12 months + 24 months = 236 months.

7
sentence included a five-year conditional-release term, and because Minn. Stat. § 609.109,
subd. 7(a), controlled appellant’s conditional -release term , his conditional-release term
remains five years.
Second, appellant posits that a statement from the sentencing judge invalidates his
sentence. When pronouncing appellant’s most recent sentence in 2010, the judge
expressed her understanding that conditional release would begin after appellant served the
two-thirds imprisonment portion of his sentence . Appellant now claims his sentence is
invalid because the DOC will administer his conditional-release term consecutive to his
supervised-release term. But the sentencing court impose d the s tatutorily required
conditional-release term. See Minn. Stat. § 609.109, subd. 7(a). While the DOC later
changed its policy on the administration of conditional release, this policy change does not
affect the legality of the originally imposed sentence.
Lastly, appellant raises a separation of powers issue , arguing that the district court
had a duty to prevent the DOC from modifying his sentence. For this argument, he relies
on State v. Ford . 539 N.W.2d 214 ( Minn. 1995). Ford held that the district court erred
when it delegated its sentencing authority to the DOC to modify an offender’s sentence.
Id. at 230. But Ford is distinguishable because here, the sentencing judge did not authorize
the DOC to modify appellant’s sentence. Indeed, the record shows that the DOC
independently changed its conditional -release pol icy and did not encroach on the
judiciary’s sentencing power.
Affirmed.