In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R. V. M., Parent.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0857

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
R. V. M., Parent.

Filed December 9, 2019
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-JV-19-839

Timothy H. Dodd, Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for appellant R.V.M.)

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Anthony J. Weigel, Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent Clay County Social Services)

Laurie Christianson, Moorhead, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the termination of her parental rights to one child, arguing that
termination was inappropriate because respondent-county did not make reasonable
reunification efforts and she actively engaged in her case plan. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county’s reasonable efforts did not
correct the conditions requiring the out-of-home placement, we affirm.

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FACTS
Appellant-mother R.V.M. gave birth to T.B.M. in 2015.1 Both the child and mother
tested positive for opi oids. During the next two years, respondent Clay County Social
Services (county) received reports that mother had threatened another adult with a knife in
the child’s presence , and engaged in drug -seeking behaviors. The county was unable to
locate mother or verify the reports. Mother was also convicted of driving under the
influence of a controlled substance . In April 2018, the county learned that mother was
using drugs, and neglecting and possibly harming the child. The county was again unable
to locate mother.
On April 23, 2018, Moorhead police responded to a report of a child locked in a car.
When officers arrived at the scene, mother was acting erratically; the officers believed she
was under the influence of a controlled substance. When officers unlocked the car, mother
did not immediately go to the child. In the commotion, mother struck the child in the face.
The child was placed into temporary protective care and m other was taken to a hospital
where she tested positive for cocaine, opiates, and marijuana. A search of the car revealed
two syringes that field-tested positive for heroin.
On April 30, mother admitted the child wa s in need of protection or services
(CHIPS). The county developed a case plan that focused on her long-standing mental-

1 T.B.M.’s biological father is not identified or involved in this appeal.

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health and chemical -dependency issues. 2 Mother signed the plan, which also addressed
her ability to parent and history of non -cooperation with the county, and the district court
approved it. The plan required mother to demonstrate long-term stability by undergoing
mental-health treatment and maintaining contact with service providers, participat ing in
services directed toward the child ,3 visiting the child regularly, follow ing chemical-
dependency recommendations, completing random testing for chemicals, being honest and
accurate with service providers, and complet ing a parenting -capacity evaluati on and
following its recommendations.
To implement the plan, the county offered m other a myriad of services. Mother
completed a chemical -health assessment in May, which diagnosed her with opio id-,
marijuana-, and stimulant -use disorders. The county directed her to three different
chemical-dependency treatment programs between June and August , two of which were
residential. And the county assigned a mental -health case manager and a mental -health
services worker, offered supervised visitation with the child, provided independent-living
services, including transportation, and coordinated these “wraparound” services.
Despite receiving these services , mother continued to use controlled substances,
generally refused treatment, and minimized her mental-health issues. She tested positive

2 Beginning in 2009, mother was involved with child -protection services in the State of
Washington regarding three other children who were physically abused. Mother’s parental
rights to two of those children were terminated, either voluntarily or involuntarily.

3 After she was placed in foster care, the child was diagnosed with deprivation/
maltreatment disorder, delayed speech, and severe emotional disturb ance. And the child
has demonstrated “sexually suggestive behaviors.” The child receives numerous services
to address these issues.

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for cocaine and other drugs three times in May, and miss ed multiple requested tests
thereafter. Although mother completed out -patient treatment at Prairie St. John in
December, staff noted that she missed 10 of 17 treatment sessions from August 29 through
October. And testing revealed that she continued to use cocaine, opioids, and marijuana
while she participated in the Prairie St. John program. Mother refused chemical testing
after September; refusals are considered positive tests.
Clinical psychologist Lori Shaleen conducted a parental -capacity evaluation that
had a prominent mental-health component. The evaluation took longer than expected due
to mother’s delays. Dr. Shaleen’s December 3 1 report diagnosed mother with severe
substance-abuse disorder, borderline personality disorder, and possible bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, or schizoaffective disorder. The report recommends that mother participate
in treatment and have further testing. But, as with other recommended services, mother
was reluctant to do either. She did not even agree to take prescribed medications until three
months before trial.
In March 2019, t he county petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights . The
trial took place in May, during which both mother’s case worker and the guardian ad litem
testified that terminatio n of mother’s parental rights i s in the child’s best interest s. The
district court found clear and convincing evidence support ing four statutory grounds for
termination: (1) mother refused or neglected to comply with the duties of the parent-child
relationship, (2) mother is palpably unfit to parent the child, (3) reasonable county efforts
failed to correct the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement, and (4) the child was
neglected and in foster care. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (4), (5), (8) (2018).

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The district court also determined that termination of mother’s parental rights is in the
child’s best interests.4 Mother appeals.
D E C I S I O N
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we consider whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory termination criteria and are supported by substantial
evidence. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). In
assessing the statutory grounds for termination, we review findings of “underlying or basic
facts” for clear error. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn.
App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). But the district court has discretion in
determining whether there is clear and convincing evidence of a particular ground for
termination; we will not disturb that determination absent an abuse of discretion. Id. We
will affirm if a statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing
evidence, the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and termination is
in the child ’s best interests. In re Welfare of Children of A.R.B. , 906 N.W.2d 894, 897
(Minn. App. 2018).
I. The district court did not clearly err in finding that the county made reasonable
efforts to reunify mother and the child.

After a child is placed out of home, the county must make “reasonable efforts” to
reunite the family. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2018). The particular services constituting
reasonable efforts “depend[] on the problem presented.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R.,
750 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted) ; see In re Welfare of Child of

4 Mother does not challenge the best-interests determination on appeal.

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J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012) (“The county’s efforts must be aimed at
alleviating the conditions that gave rise to out-of-home placement, and they must conform
to the problems presented.”). In determining whether a county’s efforts were reasonable,
the district court considers whether the services offered were “(1) relevant to the safety and
protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family; (3) culturally
appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under
the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2018).
Mother does not dispute the district court’s findings regarding the nature and extent
of the services the county offered to her. And she does not argue the services provided
were inappropriate. Rather, she contends the county’s efforts were not reasonable because
they did not include one particular type of mental-health treatment—dialectical behavior
therapy (DBT). We are not persuaded. Mother cites no legal support for her contention
that failure to provide one of a number of recommended services constitutes failure to make
reasonable efforts. And the record belies her assertion that the county “barely considered”
her mental-health concerns.
Mother’s mental -health issues were identified from the outset of the CHIPS
proceeding. At her request, mother participated in outpatient treatment at Prairie St. John,
a program that treats both mental-health and substance -abuse disorders. Program staff
“attempted to refer [mother] for psychiatric services and therapy” but mother told them
“she would be able to cope and manage with the skills she learned during her [c hemical-
dependency] treatment,” and she “did not follow through with psychiatric medications.”

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The county also attempted to address mother’s mental-health concerns through
therapy and medications and by assigning specific professionals to monitor her men tal
health and extensive services. Mother’s case manager testified that mother was specifically
referred for mental-health treatment in April 2018 and was assigned a mental -health case
worker at that time . But the case manager explained that mother refus ed to meet with
individual therapists or take prescribed medications. Likewise, Dr. Shaleen testified that
mother “consistently refused medications” and maintained “ that she wanted individual
therapy but never . . . follow[ed] through with it.” Dr. Shale en explained that therapy
would not be an appropriate treatment modality until mother completed testing to
determine whether she had schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder, which require
medication. Mother did not begin taking prescribed mental-health medications until three
months before trial. And at trial, mother only acknowledged having depression and
anxiety.
On this record, we discern no clear error in the district court’s finding that the
various services offered to mother , including mental-health services , were reasonable.
Indeed, the extensive services were tailored to mother’ s unique circumstances. We also
note that because mother did not stop using controlled substances, such use alone prevented
her from safely parenting the child, and any deficiency in her mental-health programming
would have made no difference. See In re Welfare of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648,
657 (Minn. App. 2018) (rejecting a parent’s argument that the county’s mental-health
efforts were not reasonable when “[t]he f ocus of the county’s efforts was, for obvious
reasons, mother’s profound and recurring chemical dependency” and “[t]he county’s

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efforts were interrupted by mother’s repeated relapses and failures to submit to drug
testing”).
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county’s
reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions requiring the child’s out -of-
home placement.

A district court may terminate parental rights if the county presents clear and
convincing evidence “t hat following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable
efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the
child’s placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). To assess this ground, the
district court considers the parent’s compliance with the court-ordered case plan. Id.
Mother argues that the district court failed to recognize that she was actively
engaged and had made significant progress in her case plan, and that termination of her
parental rights was premature . She asserts that she successfully completed chemical -
dependency treatment and was fully engaged in supervised visitation, even though she
acknowledges being “criticized for the manner in which she interacted with the Child
during visits.”5 The record shows otherwise.
While mother may have gone through the motions of attending chemical -
dependency treatment, she has not demonstrate d sobriety or even a reduction in her
chemical use. A staff member of one of the treatment facilities indicated mother was only
“passively involved in treatment.” And mother did not progress to unsupervised visitation

5 During visitation observed by Dr. Shaleen on November 7 , 2018, mother often ignored
the child, failed to attend to the child’s needs, and rejected the child’s attempts to engage
with her.

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during the more than 12 months this young child was out of home. She was unable to do
so because she refused to demonstrate sobriety, minimized and refused treatment for her
mental illness, and was not otherwise prepared to parent the child. Indeed, during May
2019, the month during which the trial took place, mother fell asleep during a supervised
visit, exhibited “bizarre behavior,” and again refused chemical testing. Mother testified
that she is making progress and always participated in chemical testing when asked . But
the district court did not credit this testimony, instead relying on the testimony of others
who tried to work with mother, to find that she lacks insight on her chemical-dependency
and mental-health issues, was deceitful about her chemical use, and rejected help with
parenting skills.6 It is not this court’s role to s econd-guess the district court’s credibility
determinations. Benson v. Webb, 356 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Minn. App. 1984).
On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the
county’s reasonable efforts failed to correct the c onditions that led to the child’s out -of-
home placement.7
Affirmed.

6 When confronted with her positive drug screenings at Prairie St. John, mother suggested
that they were for another person who had her identical name.

7 Because the existence of one statutory ground is sufficient to support termination, S.E.P.,
744 N.W.2d at 385, we need not address the other three grounds the district court found
here.