State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0859

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Donald Joseph Hall, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed May 4, 2020
Affirmed
Kalitowski, Judge *

Yellow Medicine County District Court
File No. 87-CR-18-175

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Keith R. Helgeson, Yellow Medicine County Attorney, Granite Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly , Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge .

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KALITOWSKI, Judge
Appellant Donald Joseph Hall, Jr. , challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions for making threats of violence, arguing that the state failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite intent because his statements
were expressions of transitory frustration and anger. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a convictio n,
“our review on appeal is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine
whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was
sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Webb , 440
N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989) . We assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989 ).
The parties do not dispute that the following circumstances were proven at trial:
appellant, who had recently bought a home, left the previous homeowner a series of 25
voicemails expressing his anger and frustration over a broken furnace between 11: 44 p.m.
on February 26, 2018, and 2:48 p.m. on February 27, 2018. The content s of these
voicemails were provided to the jury in a transcript and in a recording. The recipient of
the voicemails listened to most of the voicemails in the morning on February 27. The
voicemails frightened and disturbed him , and he reported them to the Yellow Medicine
County Sheriff’s Office later that day. A deputy from the sheriff’s office responded to the
report and listened to the voicemails with the recipient at his home . The deputy noticed

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that the recipient of the voicemails and his wife appeared frightened about the voicemails.
The deputy then went to appellant’s home to speak with him. While talking to the deputy,
appellant acknowledged leaving the voicemails, but denied that they were threatening.
The jury found appellant guilty of two counts of threats of violence in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016). A person is guilty of making threats of violence if
he (1) “threatens, directly or indirectly,” (2) “to commit any crime of violence,” (3) “with
purpose to terrorize another” or “in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror
or inconvenience.” Id.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the third element of
this crime. This element requires the state to establish that the defendant made a
threatening statement with either an intent to terrorize, State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609,
614 (Minn. 1975) (“Purpose . . . means aim, objective, or intention.”), or a reck less
disregard “of a known, substantial risk ” that such a statement would terrorize another.
State v. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53, 57 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Nov. 17,
2009).
Intent is a “subjective state of mind” that usually can only be established based on
“reasonable inferences from surrounding circumstances.” Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d at 614.
When a conviction is supported by circumstantial evidence, appellate courts must apply a
heightened standard of review. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013);
see also State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (defining circumstantial
evidence as “evidence from which the fact [-]finder can infer whether the facts in dispute
existed or did not exist”) (quotation omitted).

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The h eightened circumstantial-evidence standard involves two steps. Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d at 598 -99. First, we must identify the circumstances proved. Id. at 598. In
doing so, we review the record in the light most favorable to the conviction. Id. at 598-99.
At this step, we assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
contrary evidence. Id. at 599. Second, we must “examine independently the
reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved” to
determine whether they are “consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted). During this step, we give no
deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id. The evidence must “form
a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of
the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than
guilt.” State v. Al -Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010 ). If the evidence is
insufficient, the proper remedy is to reverse the defendant’s conviction without a new trial.
Webb, 440 N.W.2d at 431.
Appellant concedes that the circumstances proved support a reasonable inference
that his words “showed an intent to terrorize [the recipient] or a reckless disregard of the
risk of causing such terror.” But he argues that this is not the only rational hypothesis that
can be gleaned from the circumstantial evidence. Appellant contends that the
circumstances also raise the inference that his statements were merely expressions of
transitory anger without an intent to terrorize. He supports this argument by implying that
the context of the situation—appellant’s frustration with the house he purchased—sho ws
that the phone calls were merely a series of “tactics aimed at trying to motivate [the

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recipient] to remedy t he deficiencies in the house.” Appellant further alleges that he had
back issues that “prevented him from following thro ugh on any perceived threat.”
Appellant asserts that this evidence supports a reasonable inference that his statements
were merely expressions of transitory anger.
Appellant is correct that Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1, does not encompass “verbal
threats expressing transitory anger without intent to terrorize.” State v. Dick, 638 N.W.2d
486, 492-93 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002). Transitory anger is
understood to be a short -lived, spur -of-the-moment expression. State v. Fischer , 354
N.W.2d 29, 34 (Minn. App. 1984) , review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 1984) . In Fischer, the
appellant was convicted for making threats of violence based on a six -hour time s pan
during which he made six phone calls that contained threatening statements and sounds of
gunshots. Id. at 31 -32. He challenged his conviction by arguing that his actions were
expressions of transitory anger and that he was merely “letting off steam.” Id. at 33. We
rejected his argument, stating that “[i]t is a mockery to suggest his actions were spur -of-
the-moment threats” and that there are “other methods of blowing off steam besides”
threatening people. Id. at 34.
The circumstantial evidence here does not support an inference that appellant’s
statements were expressions of transitory anger . Rather, his anger was continuous and
became more aggressive over time. Appellant left 25 voicemails over the span of 14 hours,
all of which used profane language and expressed anger over a broken furnace. He initially
told the recipient of the voicemails that “the f--- ing furnace went out” and he would wait
for him to “call me and tell me what the f---s going on” at 11:44 p.m. At 4:29 a.m. the next

6
morning, by which time appellant had left 11 voicemails, appellant threatened “to put your
face on the curb and smash my f ---ing foot into the back of your head or I can always cut
your head off too you know.” Appellant did not leave another message until 7:32 a .m.,
when he threatened to “walk up the f --- ing road you are at and grab hold of your f --- ing
throat and slam you to the ground and f --- ing stomp on you.” Appellant’s phone calls
persisted until 2:48 p.m. that day. Moreover, appellant persistently expres sed frustratio n
towards the recipient of the voicemails for hours before and after making the threatening
statements for which he was convicted of threats of violence. These circumstances do not
lead to an inference that the threats were made in the heat of the moment. But t he
circumstances do support the hypothesis that appellant either intended to terrorize or did
so in reckless disregard because he made specific threatening statements several hours after
his initial and persistent expressions of anger.
A victim’s reaction to a threat can also be relevant circumstantial evidence to the
element of intent. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d at 614. The recipient of the voicemails
explained at trial that appellant’s threats caused him fear, which was also confirmed by the
deputy, who testified that the recipient appeared scared for his and his wife’s safety on the
date of the incident. This evidence is consistent with the jury’s verdict and does not support
an inference that appellant’s statements were expressions of transitory anger. See
Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 598 -99.
Appellant also asserts that he had a back injury at the time of the incident which
would have prevented him from carrying out any threats and thus he could not h ave had
the requisite intent. This argument fails because the recipient of a threat need not know

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whether or not the person making a threat can actually carry out said threat in order to be
convicted under Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1. T he person making the threat need only
intend, or recklessly disregard the risk, that the threat terrorizes its recipient. Id.
The aggressive persistence of appellant’s voicemails, coupled with the terror that
the recipient experienced, does not lead to a rational hypothesis that appellant was merely
acting in the spur of the moment. Moreover, the only rational hypothesis that can be drawn
from the circumstantial evidence in this case is that appellant either intended to terrorize
the recipient of the v oicemails by escalating the situation to threats of violence or that he
made such threats with reckless disregard to the risk that the recipient would take them
seriously. Therefore, because the circumstantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict and
does not support a contrary rational hypothesis, there was sufficient evidence to find
appellant guilty.
Affirmed.