State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0866

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ruben Montoya Carbajal,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2020
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Mower County District Court
File No. 50-CR-17-2227

Keith Ellison, Attorney Genera l, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pub lic Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijó,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge, and
Ross, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant was convicted of four counts of criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, he
argues that he is entitled to a new trial beca use his appearance in jail clothes during trial

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violated Minn. R. Crim. Pro. 26.03 and beca use the prosecutor committed misconduct.
Appellant further contends that the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial.
We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2017, L.R.C. reported to police that appellant Ruben Montoya
Carbajal sexually assaulted her on multiple occasions when she was eleven and twice when
she was fourteen. The state charged Carbajal with two counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC) and two counts of second -degree CSC. Carbajal requested a jury
trial.
At a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor ra ised the issue of whether Carbajal had
clothing other than his jail clothes to wear at trial. The prosecutor noted that this was “a
concern” and that he did not think anything was being done by defense counsel to ensure
that Carbajal had civilian clothing available fo r trial. In response, the district court
informed defense counsel that if Carbajal planned to wear civilian attire, Carbajal needed
to provide it. Defense counsel responded, “Okay, Your Honor.”
On the first day of a two-day trial, before voir dire began, Carbajal appeared in his
orange jail clothes. The distri ct court asked Carbajal if he would prefer to wear “street
clothes” for the trial. Carbajal responded: “No, this is fine.” The prosecutor then requested
that the court give a cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard Carbajal’s clothing, but
defense counsel argued against an instruction. Defense counsel asserted that an instruction
would call more attention to Carbajal’s clothing. The district court told the parties that the
court preferred that Carbajal wear civilian attire, not his orange jail clothes, during the trial.

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The district court stated that the jail could wash the clothes that Carbajal wore when he was
brought into custody. Defense counsel did not request to have Carbajal’s civilian clothes
washed or indicate that Carbajal wanted to change out of the jail clothes. The district court
took the state’s request for a cautionary inst ruction under advisement. Carbajal wore his
jail clothing for the first day of trial, but he wore civilian attire for the second day.
At trial, L.R.C. testified that the first instance of sexual conduct occurred on her
11th birthday. Carbajal, who was married to L.R.C.’s mother, entered L.R.C.’s bedroom,
kissed her on the mouth, and then proceeded to touch her breasts and vagina. Carbajal’s
fingers penetrated L.R.C.’s vagina. The incident ended once L.R.C.’s brother knocked on
the bedroom door. L.R.C. testified that Carbajal repeated this behavior for several months.
On two occasions, Carbajal “sli ghtly” penetrated L.R.C.’s va gina. The incidents ceased
when the mother discovered Carbajal in L.R.C.’s bedroom. The mother testified that she
entered the bedroom and saw Carbajal sitting at the foot of L.R.C.’s bed, and L.R.C. was
naked. The mother told Carbajal to leave, but allowed him to move back into the family
home a few months later.
L.R.C. testified that Carbajal resumed the sexual misconduct approximately three
years later when L.R.C. was 14 years old. L.R.C. recounted two specific incidents. During
the first incident, Carbajal entered L.R.C.’s bedroom, kissed her on the mouth, and touched
her sexually. During the second incident, Carbajal and L.R.C. were in a car at the public
library when he kissed her, fondled her, and penetrated her vagina with his hands and penis.
L.R.C. told him to stop. Shortly after this incident, the mother witnessed Carbajal hugging
L.R.C. at a retail store and once again ordered him to move out of their home.

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During the cross-examination of L.R.C.’s mother, defense counsel concluded his
questioning by asking if she was divorcing Carb ajal because she wanted to have sole
custody of their youngest son. Mother responded: “Yes, correct.” On redirect examination,
the prosecutor then asked if she wanted sole custody of their child because she did not want
her son “being raised by a child molester?” De fense counsel objected to the question as
leading, which the court sustained. In a bench conference immediately following this
question, the court warned the pr osecutor to not use the langua ge “child molester” again.
The prosecutor complied.
At the end of the two-day trial, the ca se was submitted to the jury without a
cautionary instruction regarding Carbajal’s clothing. The jury found Carbajal guilty of all
counts. The district court convicted Carbaj al of one count of first-degree CSC and
sentenced him to 172 months’ imprisonment.
Carbajal appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not err by permitting Carbajal to appear in jail clothing.
Carbajal argues that the district court erred by allowing him to appear in jail clothing
on the first day of trial because it violated the protections of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03,
subd. 2(b). Because Carbajal did not object to wearing jail clothing at trial, we review the
district court’s decision for plain error. State v. Hazley , 901 N.W.2d 452, 453 (Minn.
App. 2017), review denied (Minn. Nov. 14, 2017); Minn . R. Crim. P. 31.02. The
plain-error standard requires Carbajal to show: “(1) error; (2) that was plain; and (3) that
affected substantial rights.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002). “If

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the first three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court considers whether reversal is required
to ensure the fairness, inte grity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d 272, 275 n.5 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). As explained
below, we conclude that Carbajal has not established an error by the district court because
Carbajal waived his right to wear civilian clothes on the first day of trial.
The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Proce dure require that “[d]uring trial, an
incarcerated defendant or witness must not app ear in court in the distinctive attire of a
prisoner.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 2(b). But a defendant can waive the protections
of rule 26.03, subdivision 2(b) if the defendant “refuses” to wear civilian clothes at trial.
Hazley, 901 N.W.2d at 455 (citing to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26 cmt.). A district court is not
required to inquire, or seek a waiver, about a defendant’s choice to wear jail clothes.
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1697 (1976).
Carbajal argues that the district court committed plain error because he did not
“refuse” to wear street clothes and therefor e did not waive his rights under rule 26.03.
Carbajal relies on Hazley to assert that he did not waive his rule 26.03 protections, but his
reliance on Hazley is misplaced. In Hazley, the district court informed the defendant that
he would need to wear street clothes for the trial, but Hazley appeared for trial in jail
clothing without comment or explanation. 901 N.W.2d at 453. On appeal, Hazley argued
that his appearance in jail clothes during trial violated his due-process right to a fair trial
under the Fourteenth Amendment and violated rule 26.03. Id. We held that the Hazley’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated because Hazley was not compelled to wear
jail clothes at trial. Id. at 454. With regard to Hazley’s rule 26.03 argument, we recognized

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that “the record does not reveal that [Hazley] refused to wear street clothes” given that he
did so without comment or explanation. Id. at 454-55. But, we did not decide whether
there was a violation of rule 26.03, subdivision 2(b). Id. at 455. Instead, we held that “even
if there was a rule violation, we see no reversible error” because any rule violation did not
have a significant effect on the verdict. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Hazley case did
not decide the question at issue here—wheth er the defendant’s ri ghts under rule 26.03,
subdivision 2(b) were violated or whether the defendant waived those rights.
In this case, the record demonstrates th at Carbajal waived the protections of
rule 26.03, subdivision 2(b). The district court informed Ca rbajal of his right to wear
civilian clothes at trial. In fact, the district court made multiple inquiries into Carbajal’s
decision to wear jail clothes, and told Carbajal that the court would prefer that Carbajal
appear in civilian clothes. But Carbajal expressly stated that wearing jail clothing was fine.
And defense counsel indicated the same even after the district court expressed its
preference and offered to wash Carbajal’s civilian clothing for Carbajal to wear. And,
unlike in Hazley, where the defendant wore jail clothing without an explanation, Carbajal
informed the district court that he would proceed in jail clothing. Finally, we note that the
district court and the prosecut or made efforts to ensure that Carbajal’s rights under
rule 26.03, subdivision 2(b) were protected. Consequently, we conclude that the district
court’s multiple inquiries, combined with Carbajal’s indication that he wanted to proceed
in jail clothing, constitute a waiver of th e rule 26.03, subdivision 2(b) protections. See
Hazley, 901 N. W.2d at 455. As a result, the district court did not err when it allowed
Carbajal to appear in jail clothing. Because Carbajal has not established any error, it is not

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necessary to address the other prongs of the plain-error analysis. See Montanaro v. State,
802 N.W.2d 726, 732 (Minn. 2011) (stating that all three prongs of the plain-error test must
be satisfied to merit reversal of a conviction, and if an appellate court determines that “any
one of the requirements is not satisfied, [it] need not address any of the others”). Carbajal
is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of his rule 26.03 claim.
II. The prosecutor’s one-time statement is not misconduct.

Carbajal next contends that he is en titled to a new trial because the prosecutor
committed misconduct during cross-examination by referring to him as a “child molester.”
Because Carbajal did not object to the prosecutor’s statement at trial on the basis of
prosecutorial misconduct, 1 we review the alleged mi sconduct under the modified
plain-error standard. State v. Peltier , 874 N.W.2d 792, 803 (Minn. 2016). Under this
standard, the appellant bears the initial burde n of establishing erro r that is plain.
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). A pl ain error is one that is “clear or
obvious.” Id. (quotations omitted). If the appellant demonstrates an error that is plain, the
burden then shifts to the state to demons trate that any misconduc t did not prejudice the
appellant’s substantial rights. Id. To meet this burden, the state must show that there is no
reasonable likelihood that the absence of th e misconduct would have had a significant
impact on the jury’s verdict. Id. When reviewing whether an alleged error significantly
affected the jury’s decision, “we consider the strength of the evidence against the
defendant, the pervasiveness of the imprope r suggestions, and whether the defendant had

1 Defense counsel did object to the question as leading, but did not object on the basis that
the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “child molester” constituted misconduct.

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an opportunity to (or made efforts) to rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Davis,
735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007).
Assuming, without deciding, that the prosecutor’s use of the phrase “child molester”
constitutes an error that is plain, we conclude that the state has demonstrated that the error
did not prejudice Carbajal’s substantial rights. We agree with the state that there is no
reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have significantly affected the
jury’s verdict.
First, the state presented a strong and compelling case. L.R.C.’s specific and
detailed account of her experiences, and th e corroborating testimony by her mother,
provide strong evidence of Carbajal’s guilt. Carbajal argues that the state’s evidence was
not “overwhelming” because it re sted largely on whether the ju ry found L.R.C. credible.
Carbajal emphasizes that the state did not present physical evidence of his guilt. But there
is no requirement that the state present physical evidence to prove a CSC charge. In fact,
state law specifically provides that the “testimony of a victim need not be corroborated” in
a CSC prosecution. Minn. Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2018). Here, L.R.C.’s testimony was
corroborated by her mother’s testimony even though the state c ould have relied upon
L.R.C.’s testimony alone to prove its case. Fo r these reasons, we conclude that the state
presented strong evidence of Carbajal’s guilt.
Second, the error was not pervasive. Th e prosecutor used the phrase only once
while posing a question on redirect. The ph rase was not used again during the two-day
trial.

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Third, Carbajal had an opportunity to respond to the alleged error at trial. Defense
counsel objected to the question as leading, a nd the district court sustained the objection.
The district court then immediately told the prosecutor to refrain from using “child
molester,” and the prosecutor complied.
Given the strength of the state’s case, and the limited nature of the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude that the state has demonstrated that there is no
reasonable likelihood that the absence of the alleged misconduct would have had a
significant impact on the jury’s verdict. Because the alleged misconduct did not prejudice
Carbajal’s substantial rights, Carbajal’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct is without merit.
See Davis, 735 N.W.2d at 682 (holding that defe ndant’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim
failed because the state met it s burden to show that the mi sconduct did not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights).
In sum, the district court did not err in allowing Carbajal to appear in jail clothing
on the first day of trial because Carbajal waiv ed his right to appear in civilian clothing
under rule 26.03, subdivision 2(b). And, th e state has demonstrated that the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct did not affect Carbajal’s substantial rights. Because we conclude
that neither Carbajal’s appearance in jail clothing, nor the prosecutor’s statement, constitute
reversible error, it cannot be said that the alleged errors, considered cumulatively, had the
effect of denying Carbajal a fair trial. See State v. Yang , 774 N.W.2d 539, 560
(Minn. 2009) (noting that appellants may be entitled to a new trial in rare cases where the

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“errors, when taken cumulatively, have the effe ct of denying [the] appellant a fair trial”
(quotation omitted)).
Affirmed.