In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: K. M. D. and J. M. M., Parents.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0871

In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
K. M. D. and J. M. M., Parents.

Filed November 4, 2019
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-JV-19-297

Cathleen Gabriel, Annandale, Minnesota (for appellant-mother K.M.D.)

Brian Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Kari O’Leary, Assistant County Attorney,
Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Morrison County Social Services)

Amanda Rakow, Little Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Hooten , Presiding Judge; Reilly, Jud ge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant-mother challenges the termination of her parental ri ghts to her child,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the distr ict’s court’s findings that
(1) reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out-of-home
placement; (2) appellant substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or neglected to
comply with the duties imposed b y the parent-and-child relationship; and (3) appellant is

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palpably unfit to be a party to the parent-and-child relationship. Appellant also argues that
the district court abused its discretion by determining that termination of her parental rights
was in the child’s best interest s. Because clear and convincing evidence supports the
finding that reasonable efforts failed to correct the condition s leading to out-of-home
placement, and because the dist rict court did not abuse its dis cretion by determining that
termination was in the child’s best interests, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant K.M.D. (mother) is the biological parent of S.M.D. The child was born
in 2013 and was five years old when mother’s parental rights were terminated. The child’s
biological father, J.M.M., had his parental rights terminated b y default on the day of
mother’s contested termination trial and is not participating in this appeal.
2016-2017 CHIPS Case
On January 19, 2016, law enforcement placed the child on a 72-hour peace officer’s
hold after mother admitted to usi ng methamphetamine and officer s found drugs, drug
paraphernalia, and people using drugs in mother and child’s home. The child was two years
old at the time.1
On January 25, 2016, Morrison County Social Services (MCSS) fil ed a child-in-
need-of-protection-or-services (C HIPS) petition, pursuant to Mi nn. Stat. § 260C.007,
subd. 6(9) (2014), and the district court ordered out-of-home p lacement for the child that

1 As a result of this event, mother was ultimately convicted of gross-misdemeanor child
endangerment (presence of controlled substances).

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day.2 MCSS filed and the court approved an out-of-home placement pla n in March 2016,
and substantially similar case plans were filed and approved ap proximately every six
months thereafter. The case plans focused on providing services to ensure that the child
lived in a drug-free home and had safe and sober caregivers. Mo ther was required to
cooperate with random drug testi ng, follow the recommendations of a rule-25 chemical-
dependency assessment, develop a sober support system, maintain a s a f e l i v i n g
environment free from substance use, cooperate with in-home ski lls work, attend child’s
appointments, and cooperate with MCSS.
In December 2016, the district court found mother to be in subs tantial compliance
with her case plan and approved her for a trial home visit. The child returned to her care
shortly thereafter. The district court held a review hearing on March 15, 2017, and noted
that the trial home visit was going well. On March 29, though, the trial home visit was
terminated because mother tested positive for methamphetamine use and admitted that she
had used on or about March 18—just three days after the review hearing. Mother had not
sought out any support group meetings, contacted her sponsor, or disclosed the relapse to
MCSS.
On May 3, MCSS filed a termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) petition. Mother then
made progress in her case plan, and, on July 13, the district c ourt approved a second trial
home visit at MCSS’s request. MCSS held a family group decision-making conference on

2 The child was adjudicated as in need of protection and services on June 1, 2016, at which
point mother entered an admission that she had parented the child while under the influence
of methamphetamine.

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July 17 with mother, both of the child’s grandmothers, the child’s maternal aunt and uncle,
mother’s friend, two MCSS social workers, a guardian ad litem, and an in-home skills
counselor. The group developed a plan to ensure the child’s safety should mother relapse.
The plan detailed ways that mother could prevent relapse and st eps that she would take if
a relapse occurred. The district court reviewed the matter two days later and admonished
mother that this was her last ch ance to reunify with her child. Mother acknowledged that
she believed she could complete the steps in the plan and that she was not requesting
additional services to achieve r eunification. On August 28, MCS S withdrew the TPR
petition, as mother had engaged with services to remain sober. Mother regained custody of
the child on August 31, and the CHIPS case was closed on November 21, 2017.
2018 January - May Wellness Assessment
In January 2018, mother tested positive for methamphetamine use and admitted to
an MCSS social worker that she was parenting the child while under the influence. Mother
then signed a family safety plan with the social worker, which required that she have no
unsupervised time with the child until after she had provided three consecutive clean tests,
complete a rule-25 chemical-dependency assessment and follow al l recommendations,
attend Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous meetings, meet weekly with a
sponsor, attend therapy, and participate with Adult Rehabilitative Mental Health Services.
Mother complied with the plan, and MCSS closed the assessment in May 2018.
2019 TPR Case
On February 27, 2019, MCSS received a report that mother had a gain been using
methamphetamine. The social worker previously assigned to the c ase called mother and

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requested that she submit to a urine test, but mother denied use and would not submit to a
test. The child was placed on a 72-hour peace officer’s hold. M other did not comply with
repeated requests for a urine test until March 1, but MCSS informed her that too much time
had passed since the initial report of methamphetamine use and requested a hair-follicle
test instead. Mother eventually complied with hair-follicle testing on March 4.
On March 5, MCSS filed the TPR petition that led to the termination on review in
this case. The district court held an emergency protective-care hearing that same day, where
mother denied any drug use. The results of the March 4 hair-follicle test were still pending.
The district court granted MCSS’s request for out-of-home place ment and noted that it
could revisit the issue after the test results returned. Mother’s March 4 test later came back
positive for methamphetamines, and a March 18 hair-follicle tes t was positive for both
methamphetamines and THC metabo lite. Random urine tests on Marc h 22, March 25,
March 31, April 9, April 18, and April 22 were positive for synthetic cannabinoids. Mother
produced two clean tests before the May 9, 2019 TPR trial. At the time of the trial, she was
in an outpatient chemical-dependency treatment program.
The TPR Trial
At trial, the district court heard testimony from two MCSS soci al workers; the
child’s paternal grandmother, previous and current guardians ad litem, therapist, and
maternal grandmother; mother; and mother’s friend. The child’s paternal grandmother was
her foster caregiver at the time. Mother testified that the chi ld does well and is generally
happy with her paternal grandmother.

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The child’s paternal grandmother testified that she would be co ncerned for the
child’s safety if the child returned to mother’s care. She beli eves mother’s chemical
dependency exposes the child to unsafe people. The paternal grandmother gave an example
from winter 2018 where she came to pick the child up around 10:00 a.m. on a Sunday and
found the door unlocked, the child unsupervised in the living r oom, and a man asleep on
the floor. Mother was at work, and the child’s maternal grandmother was asleep in another
room.
The child’s therapist testified that the child has a diagnosis of generalized anxiety
d i s o r d e r a n d a t t e n d s t h e r a p y t h r e e t i m e s p e r w e e k . T h e t h e r a p i st testified that parental
chemical abuse impacts a child’s m ental health due to lack of c aregiver stability, out-of-
home placement, and parental inability to respond to the child’s needs due to chemical use.
The child struggles with tantrums, which the therapist indicated were especially concerning
at age five and are connected with the child’s anxiety disorder. The therapist noted that the
child needs stability and a caregiv er who understands her behav iors, can set clear limits,
and can provide structure.
Mother was 25 years old at the time of the trial and testified that she began using
methamphetamine at age 16. She t estified that she has been to f ive treatment programs,
including her current one, but that she relapsed after the firs t four. She conceded that her
chemical use has a negative impact on her child, specifically in regards to the child’s mental
health. She also admitted that s he knowingly lied at the March 5 emergency protective-
care hearing when she represented that her hair-follicle test w ould come back clean. She

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conceded that she needs more time before she can be a full-time, sober parent for her child
and that she still has “a long ways to go” towards maintaining sobriety.
Mother’s current case manager testified that mother’s pattern o f dishonesty
regarding her drug use is concer ning and that mother will not b e able to meet the child’s
basic needs in the reasonably foreseeable future. The child’s former guardian ad litem and
current guardian ad litem each testified that they believe it i s in the child’s best interests
that mother’s parental rights be t erminated. They expressed con cern about the child’s
behavioral issues and mental health and their belief that the c hild needs consistency and
stability that mother cannot prov ide. Though they believe mothe r and the child have a
strong and loving bond, they believe termination of rights is nevertheless in the child’s best
interests.
On June 3, 2019, the district court issued an order terminatin g mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 subd. 1(b)(2), (4), and (5) (2018).
This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Parental rights should not be terminated “except for grave and weighty reasons.” In
re Welfare of HGB, 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1981). “[T]ermination of parental rights
is always discretionary with the juvenile court.” In re Welfare of Child of R.D.L. , 853
N.W.2d 127, 136 (Minn. 2014). Appellate courts affirm a distric t court’s termination of
parental rights when (1) at least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear
and convincing evidence, (2) termination is in the best interests of the child, and (3) unless
not required, the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family. In re Welfare of

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Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). Appellate courts apply a cl ear-
error standard of review to the district court’s factual findin gs and review the statutory
basis for termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of
J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012). We review a district court ’s decision that
termination is in a child’s best interests under an abuse-of-di scretion standard. In re
Welfare of Children of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 2008).
Mother argues that the district court erred by finding that cle ar and convincing
evidence supports at least one sta tutory ground for termination and that the district court
abused its discretion in deciding that termination is in the best interests of the child.
I. The record supports the district court’s finding of a statut ory basis for
termination under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).

When appellate courts review a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights
pursuant to the statutory grounds in Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, su bd. 1(b), they “determine
whether the district court’s findings address the statutory cri teria and whether the . . .
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d at 385. Appellate courts “give considerable deference to the district c ourt’s
decision to terminate parental rights” but “closely inquire int o the sufficiency of the
evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.” Id. Findings are clearly
erroneous if they are not reasona bly supported by the evidence as a whole or if they are
“manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.” In re Children of T.R. , 750 N.W.2d
656, 660-61 (Minn. 2008). Here, the district court terminated m other’s rights on three
statutory grounds, any one of which is independently sufficient to show the existence of a

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statutory basis to terminate parental rights. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 subd. 1(b). We
begin our review with Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
Section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(5), provides that a district court may terminate
a parent’s rights if reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct
the conditions leading to out-of-home placement. Reasonable efforts are presumed to have
failed upon a showing that: (1) a child has resided out of the home for a cumulative period
of 12 months within the preceding 22 months or, if the child is under the age of eight, has
resided out of the home for 6 or more months unless the parent maintained regular contact
with the child and complied with the out-of-home placement plan ; (2) the district court
approved the out-of-home placement plan; (3) the conditions have not been corrected; and
(4) the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification. Id., subd. 1(b)(5)(i)-(iv).
Regarding factor (3), “[i]t is p resumed that conditions leading to a child’s out-of-
home placement have not been corre cted upon a showing that the parent or parents have
not substantially complied with t he court’s orders and a reason able case plan.” Id., subd.
1(b)(5)(iii). However, “[r]easonabl e efforts encompass more tha n just a case plan,” and
“[t]he county’s efforts must be aimed at alleviating the conditions that gave rise to out-of-
home placement.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 88. “The critical issue is not whether the pare nt
formally complied with the case plan, but whether the parent is presently able to assume
the responsibilities of caring for the child.” Id. at 89.

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Mother does not appear to dispute that factor (1) is satisfied, conceding that, at the
time of the TPR trial, the child had been in out-of-home placement “for 21 months.”3 The
record supports the concession that factor (1) is satisfied, bu t for a different reason. The
child had not been out of the home for 12 of the 22 months prec eding trial. But, based on
the district court’s findings, which are supported by the recor d, the child was under eight
years old and had resided out of the home for more than 6 month s in total. In addition, as
found by the district court and as supported by the record, mot her’s substance use
constituted noncompliance with an out-of-home placement plan. T hus, factor (1) is
satisfied.
Mother also concedes factor (2)—that the district court approve d the out-of-home
placement plan. This concession, too, is supported by the record.
Mother does contest that factors (3) and (4) were satisfied, ar guing that she
“complied with the services offered and conditions provided for in the case plan” and that
it is “questionable whether or not conditions leading to the ou t-of-home placement were
adequately addressed by reasonabl e efforts of the agency.” We e valuate these arguments
in the reverse order, beginning with factor (4)—whether the county made reasonable efforts
to reunite mother and her child.
A. The county made reasonable efforts toward reunification.
The district court determined that MCSS made reasonable efforts to reunite mother
and her child, referencing the “multitude of services” detailed in its factual findings.

3 It appears, from the record, that this number may be closer to 20 months.

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MCSS’s efforts included ongoing case-management services, supervised and unsupervised
visits, random drug testing, rul e-25 chemical-dependency evalua tions, inpatient and
outpatient treatment, a diagnostic assessment, individual therapy, in-home parenting skills,
safety planning, a family group decision-making conference, and a s s i s t a n c e w i t h
transportation. Nothing in the record or briefing suggests that there was any particular form
of assistance that MCSS should or could have provided but did n ot provide. To the
contrary, mother’s case manager testified, after summarizing all of the services MCSS had
offered mother, that there were no other services that could ha ve been offered to help
mother obtain sobriety. Further, the evidence in the record sup ports the district court’s
finding that MCSS’s efforts were reasonable because, when mothe r engaged with these
services, she made progress and was even able to regain custody of the child. The
difficulties arose when she was out of treatment, relapsed, did not follow her relapse plan,
and did not tell anyone until her drug use was discovered. The evidence is sufficient to
support the district court’s finding that MCSS made reasonable efforts to reunite the child
with mother.
B . T h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t l e d t o o ut-of-home placement have not be en
corrected.

The district court also found that the conditions that led to o ut-of-home placement
have not been corrected. Without question, the primary conditio n that led to the child’s
out-of-home placement is mother’s chemical dependency. At the time of the trial, mother
was in outpatient treatment for her chemical dependency and had produced two clean tests.
Her last positive urine drug test, though, was from April 22, so the district court found that

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she had “abstained from chemicals for no more than the last two to three weeks before
trial.” It also found that mother had consistently denied and m inimized her chemical use
and that she had a “long-standing pattern” of failing to mainta in her sobriety, “even after
receiving intensive services starting in January 2016.” Moreover, mother acknowledged in
her testimony that she needs more time before she can be a full -time, sober parent for her
child and that she still has “a long ways to go” towards maintaining sobriety.
On this record, the district court did not err by determining t hat the conditions
leading to out-of-home placement have not been corrected. And, regardless of whether the
statutory presumption that reaso nable efforts have failed is sa tisfied, “the critical issue is
. . . whether the parent is presently able to assume the respon sibilities of caring for the
child.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 89. Though mother is working to achieve sobriet y, she
admittedly is not presently able to be a full-time, sober caregiver for the child. The district
court did not err by finding that the evidence supports termina tion under Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). We therefore need not address any other statutory basis.
II. The district court did not ab use its discretion by deciding that termination of
appellant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

Even if a statutory basis for terminating parental rights exis ts, a district court must
also find that termination of the parent’s rights is in the bes t interests of the child. In re
Welfare of Children of R.W. , 678 N.W.2d 49, 55 (Minn. 2004). The court balances three
factors in analyzing the child’s best interests: “(1) the child ’s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserv ing the parent-child
relationship; and (3) any competi ng interest of the child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492

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N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). “Competing interests” include th ings like “a stable
environment, health considerations a n d t h e c h i l d ’ s p r e f e r e n c e s .” Id. The district court
“must consider a child’s best in terests and explain its rationa le in its findings and
conclusions.” In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Minn. App. 2003).
Mother argues that the district court failed to adequately exa mine her child’s best
interests and that “the only ev idence presented in this matter suggests it is detrimental to
[the child] to be separated from [mother] and that they are bon ded with a very loving
relationship.”
The county points to the district court’s examination of the ch ild’s best interests in
its findings and order and argues that, although the evidence i s clear that mother and the
child love each other, “the child ’s need for permanency with a sober parent who can
provide[] consistency outweighs any interests the parent or the child has in maintaining the
relationship.”
The district court found that termination is in the child’s bes t interests because it
“will facilitate a more permanent placement for the child and provide her with the stability,
safety and support that she needs.” This finding is based on th e fact that, for about three
and a half years, mother has been unable to maintain her sobrie ty, even after receiving
“intensive services.”
The district court also made detailed factual findings regarding the testimony of the
child’s guardians ad litem and found them both credible. Both o f the child’s guardians ad
litem testified that they believe termination is in the child’s best interests. The child’s first
guardian ad litem testified that she believes mother’s overall attitude towards relapses is

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nonchalant and that mother appears not to take them seriously. She believes mother “didn’t
ever think that she was going to run out of chances because she had so many.” She testified
that the child needs permanency and that, even though mother and the child have a strong
bond, termination of mother’s p arental rights is in the child’s best interests. The child’s
second guardian ad litem testified that the child has behaviora l issues when moving from
place to place, but, once she becomes established, the issues seem to stabilize. She believes
that, although mother loves the child, she continuously puts her chemical use first, which
necessitates the child’s removal from the home and causes trauma for the child. The second
guardian ad litem also expressed concern about mother’s pattern of relapse and lack of
truthfulness about her use.
Contrary to mother’s argument here, the district court thoroug hly examined the
child’s best interests and made detailed findings on this issue, which were supported by the
record. In some cases, a child’s “immediate need for permanency as well as stable,
nurturing, drug-free caretakers outweighs any competing interests.” In re Welfare of Child
of W.L.P. , 678 N.W.2d 703, 711 (Minn. App. 2004). In light of mother’s h istory of
substance abuse and the child’s need for stability and structur e, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interests.
Affirmed.