Elsayed M. Elsaid Mahmoud, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0872

Elsayed M. Elsaid Mahmoud,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdi Salad Roble,
Appellant.

Filed March 9, 2020
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CV-19-1221

Ken D. Schueler, Dustin C. Jones, Dunlap & Seeger, P.A., Rochester, Minnesota (for
respondent)

James A. Godwin, Jay S. Adkins, Godwin Dold, Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Kalitowski, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REILLY, Judge
On appeal from the district court’s grant of a harassment restraining order (HRO),
appellant argues that (1) the district court’s findings do not show that appellant engaged in

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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the harassment necessary to support an HRO; (2) the district court’s findings are too vague
to support the issuance of an HRO; and (3) the record does not support the district court’s
findings of fact. Because the district court’s findings show that appellant engaged in
harassment, are adequately specific to support the issuance of the HRO, and are supported
by the record, we affirm.
FACTS
Masjed Abubakr Al -Seddiq is a mosque (the mosque) located in Rochester.
Appellant Abdi Roble is a member of the mosque. Respondent Elsayed Mahm oud is the
prayer leader or Imam of the mosque. There have been disputes at the mosque amongst its
board of directors for years regarding various issues. On February 10, 2019, an arbitration
hearing was scheduled at the mosque to resolve disputes concerning a construction project
and issues with the governance of the mosque. When Mahmoud arrived at the mosque for
the arbitration hearing, he was met by a group of people at the entrance, including Roble.
When Mahmoud went to the door to unlock and open it, he was prevented from opening
the door by someone in the group. Mahmoud sustained bruising on his chest and arm as a
result of this incident. Mahmoud was not able to identify who in the group actually caused
the injuries to his chest and arm. However, Mahmoud knew that Roble had struck him.
Following the incident at the mosque, Mahmoud filed a petition for an HRO with
the district court, alleging in part that Roble and three other individuals physically assaulted
him and frightened him with threatening behavior. The petition allege d that the four
individuals, including Roble, blocked Mahmoud’s entry into the mosque and physically
assaulted him, causing bruising to his right arm and chest. In February 2019, an order on

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the petition was filed and Roble subsequently filed a request for a hearing. The three-day
hearing was held in March 2019.
On the second day of the hearing, Mahmoud was recalled after having completed
his testimony the day before. He testified that during the lunch break that day, he went to
the restroom on his way back to the courtroom. Mahmoud explained that as he was leaving
the restroom, Roble was entering it. Mahmoud testified that Roble called him a li ar,
insulted him, made gestures toward him with his body and hand , and swore at him.
Mahmoud testified that Roble told him, “I’m going to show you what I’m going to do to
you when we’re done here.”
Following the hearing, the district court issued an HRO against Roble. The district
court found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Roble engaged in harassment
of Mahmoud when he committed an “assault of [Mahmoud] by making him reasonably
fear bodily harm by blocking the entrance of the [mosque] . . . and threatening [Mahmoud]
as he tried to enter the [mosque], while using his body to prevent [Mahmoud] from entering
the [mosque].” The district court also found that Roble engaged in harassment by
“approaching and threatening [Mahmoud] during the h earing on the HRO after the lunch
break.” This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Roble argues that the district court erred when it granted a n HRO against him. A
district court may issue an HRO if it finds that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that
the [person] has engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b)(3) (2018). The

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statute provides a two -prong definition of harassment. Id., subd. 1(a)(1) (2018).
Harassment is defined as:
[1] a single incide nt of physical or sexual assault . . . or
[2] repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or
gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended
to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or
privacy of another.

Id. “Because the statutory definition has two prongs, harassment may be proven in either
of two ways.” Peterson v. Johnson, 755 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. App. 2008). An appellate
court will not set aside a district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but this
court will “reverse the issuance of a restraining order if it is not supported by sufficient
evidence.” Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied
(Minn. Sept. 29, 2004) . “Ultimately, the issuance of an HRO is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” Peterson, 755 N.W.2d at 761.
Roble challenges the district court’s issuance of the HRO on both the first and
second prongs. We first consider whether the district court properly issued the HRO under
the second prong. Under this prong, the petitioner is required to prove that the respondent
engaged in “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have
a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety,
security, or privacy of another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1). While the district
court did not explicitly state that it was considering the second prong under the harassment
statute, we construe the district court’s order as relying on the two separate incidents that
occurred on February 10 , 2019, and March 12, 2019 , as the bases for the finding of
harassment under this prong.

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Roble argues that we must reverse the district court’s issuance of the HRO because
the district court’s findings that he threatened Mahmoud on two separate occasions are too
vague. We are not persuaded. Here, the district court made findings of fact with respect
to the threats Roble made toward Mahmoud. Regarding February 10, 2019, the district
court found that Roble was “threatening [Mahmoud] as h e tried to enter the [mosque].”
Regarding March 12, 2019, the district court found that Roble “yelled at [Mahmoud] in a
language [Mahmoud] could not understand, except [Mahmoud] recognized several swear
words. [Roble] also told [Mahmoud] th at he need [ed] to watch his back.” The district
court found that on this date, Roble engaged in harassment by “approaching and
threatening [Mahmoud] during the hearing on the HRO after the lunch break.” We
conclude that the district court’s findings that Roble threatened Mahmoud on two separate
occasions are specific enough to allow meaningful review. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 ,
1985 advisory comm. note (“The purpose of requiring findings is to permit meaningful
review u pon appeal.”). As such, we reject Roble’s argument that the district court’s
issuance of the HRO must be reversed for lack of specific findings.
Roble next contends that even if this court were to conclude that the district court’s
findings were adequately specific, the district court failed to make findings regarding
whether Roble’s behaviors had or were “intended to have a substantial adverse effect on
the safety, security, or privacy of [respondent]” as required under the second prong of the
harassment definition. Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1).
Roble is correct that the district court did not use the statute’s language explicitly in
its order. However, Roble does not cite to any legal authority to support his contention that

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such an error requires reversal of the district court’s order. See State, Dep’t of Labor &
Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declini ng to
address an inadequately briefed issue). We conclude that even if the district court’s failure
to use the specific statutory language in its order was an error, that error is harmless because
the district court’s factual findings support the conclusi on that Roble’s behaviors had or
were “intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of
[Mahmoud].” See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (“ [N]o error or defect in any ruling or order or in
anything done or omitted by the court . . . is ground for granting a new trial or for setting
aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice.”).
Finally, Roble argue s that even if this court concludes that the district court’s
findings can support the issuance of an HRO, the district court’s findings as to the events
of February 10, 2019 , and March 12, 2019, are clearly erroneous. Roble first challenges
the district court’s finding that Mahmoud was in reasonable fear of bodily harm when his
entrance to the mosque was blocked by Roble. We discern no error in the district court’s
findings. The record shows that Mahmoud testified that he believed Roble was standing
in front of the door to the m osque on February 10, 2019 , for two reasons: the first reason
was “to scare [him]” and the second reason was “to prevent the people to get into the
[mosque].” When asked if he was “immediately scared of Mr. Roble” when he arrived at
the mosque on February 10, 2019, Mahmoud responded, “Yes, this is the truth.”
Additionally, when asked if he is concerned for his physical safety when near Roble,

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Mahmoud answered, “Yes, of course.” The district court’s finding that Mahmoud was in
reasonable fear of bodily harm due to his entrance being blocked by Roble is not clearly
erroneous.
Second, Roble argues that the district court’s finding that Mahmoud was threatened
by Roble on March 12, 2019 , is clearly erroneous. We are not persuaded. Mahmoud
testified that after the lunch break during the HRO hearing, he returned to the government
center and went to the restroom. As he was leaving the restroom, Roble was entering it.
Mahmoud testified that Roble “was giving [him] his finger,” making gestures with his body
and cursing at him. Mahmoud also testified that Roble said to him , “I’m going to show
you what I’m going to do to you when we’re done here.” While this statement is different
from the one the district court included in its findings—“[Roble] also told [Mahmoud] that
he need[ed] to watch his back”—we discern no error in the district court’s conclusion that
Roble threatened Mahmoud during the ir encounter in the restroom. This finding is not
clearly erroneous.
We conclude that the di strict court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an HRO
based on the second prong of the statu tory definition of harassment. Because harassment
need only be proved in one way, we need not consider whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting the HRO under the first prong of the statute.
Affirmed.