State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0876

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Terrance James Leason,
Appellant.

Filed March 2, 2020
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-13139

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara J . Euteneuer, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges the validity of his guilty plea to third-degree criminal sexual
conduct, arguing that the district court’s unsolicited remarks regarding the state’s proposed
plea agreement made his plea involuntary. Because appellant has failed to establish that
his guilty plea was involuntary under the totality of the circumstances, we affirm.
FACTS
On May 23, 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Terrance James
Leason with third -degree criminal sexual conduct. The complaint alleged that Leason
pushed a 14-year-old child into a closet and had nonconsensual intercourse with her.
At a plea hearing on February 21, 2019, the prosecutor and Leason’s counsel
advised the district court, on the record, that the case could be resolved with a plea
agreement. The terms of that proposal were recited as follows: the state would agree not
to pursue a char ge of first -degree criminal sexual conduct in exchange for Leason’s
agreement to plead guilty to third -degree criminal sexual conduct and serve 70 months in
prison. Leason was present for that recital and informed the district court that he wanted a
“straight plea.” The prosecutor responded that if Leason wanted to plead guilty without an
agreement, the state would orally amend the complaint to increase the charge to first-degree
criminal sexual conduct.
The district court addressed Leason as follows:
DISTRICT COURT: And I’ll just tell you, Mr. Leason,
because I want to be fair and honest with you, you don’t want
to straight plead to me. Take the 70 months. Because even the

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range for 2 [criminal -history] points goes up to 72 months.
And I think 70 accurately reflects what I read in the complaint.
I just want to be upfront with you. I mean, you could maybe
work out a straight plea, but it’s not a good idea. Not with me.
LEASON: All right.
DISTRICT COURT: Okay?
LEASON: Yeah.
DISTRICT COURT: . . . I just want to be straightforward with
you. I don’t want to sandbag you or, you know, say, well,
maybe, you know, who knows. I want to be honest with you.
70 months is where I would probably land, given what I’ve
read. So, ok ay. Do you want to plead according to that
negotiation then?
LEASON: Sure.

Leason pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant
to the plea agreement. Leason waived his right to trial, submitted a plea petition, and
provided a factual basis for his plea. The district court deferred acceptance of Leason’s
guilty plea un til sentencing. At a sentencing hearing two weeks later, the district court
accepted Leason’s guilty plea and sentenced him to serve 70 months in prison.
Leason appeals, claiming that his guilty plea was involuntary and therefore invalid.
D E C I S I O N
A defendant can seek plea withdrawal in a direct appeal if the record is sufficiently
developed to address the issue. State v. Newcombe , 412 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Mi nn. App.
1987), review denied (Minn. Nov. 13, 1987). “A defendant has no absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010).
However, withdrawal is permitted post-sentencing “upon a timely motion and proof to the
satisfaction of the court that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. State v.

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Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Min n. 2007). A defendant has the burden of showing that
his plea was invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The validity of a plea presents a question
of law this court reviews de novo. Id.
To be valid, a guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Perkins v.
State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). Only the voluntariness requirement is at issue
here. “The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to
improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. Improper pressure or coercion
generally requires a threat or promise. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750,
90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970) (“[A]gents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or
threatened physical harm or by mental co ercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”);
Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 861 (Minn. 2016) (noting the fact that a defendant denied
that he had been “subjected to threats or promises” was further evidence that his plea was
voluntary); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (“A guilty plea cannot be
induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises . . . .”). “[J]udicial participation in plea
bargaining negotiations is a specific type of pressure or coercion that is . . . accounted for
by the standard voluntariness inquiry.” Wheeler v. State , 909 N.W.2d 558, 568 (Minn.
2018).
In Wheeler, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed “the principle that a district
court judge should not participate in the plea bargaining negotiation itself.” Id. at 564. The
supreme court explained that
a district court “participates” in the plea bargaining negotiation
when it provides unsolicited comments regarding the propriety
of the parties ’ com peting settlement offers. . . . [W]hen a

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defendant successfully challenges the validity of a guilty plea
because of the district court’s participation, the remedy is not
automatic invalidation and vacatur of the plea. Rather, the plea
is only invalid if it was involuntary under the totality of the
circumstances.

Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
The supreme court “decline [d] to adopt [a] blanket rule of per se invalidity and
automatic plea vacatur.” Id. at 567. It explained:
Plea withdrawal is appropriate when a manifest injustice
occurs, but we are not persuaded that a manifest injustice exists
every time a judge participates in the plea bargaining
negotiation itself. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05. Instead, a
manifest injustice occurs only when the court’s participation in
the plea bargaining negotiation makes the defendant’s plea
involuntary. Whether such a manifest injustice exists depends
on the nature and extent of the judge’s conduct, together with
a variety of other factors bearing on the plea’s validity.

Id. at 567-68. In determining whether the district court’s participation in a plea-bargaining
negotiation ma de the defendant’s guilty plea involuntary, courts consider “all of the
relevant circumstances surrounding” the plea. Id. at 568 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 749,
90 S. Ct. at 1469).
Leason argues that he “must be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because it was
not voluntarily entered due to the district court’s unsolicited participation in plea
negotiations.” The parties disagree regarding whether the district court inappropriately
participated in the plea negotiation in this case . See id. at 565 (stating that a judge may
inquire into the status of negotiations, shar e general sentencing practices , and disclose
nonbinding plea and sentencing information at the joint request of the parties ). We need

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not resolve that dispute because Leason has failed to establish that his guilty plea was
involuntary under the totality of the circumstances.
Even though Leason acknowledges the totality -of-the-circumstances standard set
forth in Wheeler, he relies only on the district court’s statements at the plea hearing to show
that his plea was involuntary. Specifically, he asserts that the district court “persuaded”
him to accept the state’s offer instead of pleading guilty without the benefits of the offer.
He further asserts that the district court “undermined” his “bargaining position” and that
he “had no reasonable choice but to accept the state’s offer,” instead of entering a straight
plea. Leason does not cite authority indicating that a loss of bargaining power is a form of
improper pressure or coercion that can render a guilty plea involuntary. And he does not
address any of the other circumstances surrounding his guilty plea.
The state, however, addresses the totality of the circumstances. As to the totality of
the circumstances, the state argues:
The record established Leason went through the plea petition
with his attorney “in its entirety,” signed the petition in the
presence of his attorney and the court, agreed there were no
threats or promises that made him enter into the plea, and he
had time to consult with his attorney and discuss his rights.
The colloquy demonstrated that Leason’s plea was voluntary
and not secured as the result of improper pressure, coercion, or
inducement.

In addition, the district court reserved accepting the
guilty plea until sentencing, which occurred two weeks after
the plea hearing. At sentencing, Leason expressed no concerns
about the voluntariness of his plea or the court’s words during
the plea hearin g. Instead, defense counsel reiterated the
agreed-upon 70 -month sentence. Leason only raised issues
about his jail credit time, but did not discuss the plea itself.
When asked if he had anything else to tell the court besides the

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jail credit, Leason said “no.” Leason’s actions and words —at
the plea hearing and at sentencing—show the voluntary nature
of the plea.

The state also argues that “the fact Leason expressed his firm desire to plead
guilty—either with a 70 -month agreement or without an agreemen t as to his sentence —
and at no point raised a concern about his plea, is strong evidence of the voluntary nature
of Leason’s plea.” We agree. On this record, Leason has not met his burden to show that
his plea was involuntary under the totality of the ci rcumstances. We therefore conclude
that even if the district court’s statements were improper, Leason’s guilty plea was valid.
Affirmed.