A19-0888 Precedential Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded Processed

State of Minnesota, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed May 18, 2020

The holding in the court’s own words

Thus, we conclude that the evidence cannot sustain Naidu’s conviction for first-degree aggravated robbery of T.B.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

Authorities cited

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Opinion text

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0888

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Angalie Naidu,
Appellant.

Filed May 18, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-23492

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicole Cornale, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Pr esiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
BRATVOLD, Judge
This appeal asks us to examine the suffi ciency of the eviden ce for convictions
following a jury trial. Appellant was one of several bus passengers involved in a physical

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altercation with two other pa ssengers, who were injured and lost property. Because there
is insufficient eviden ce to sustain appellant’s conviction for aiding and abetting in
first-degree aggravated robbery, we reverse that conviction. And because there is sufficient
evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction for fifth-degree assault of one victim, and for
appellant’s conviction of aiding and abetting in third-degree assault of a second victim, we
affirm in part and remand for sentencing of the fifth-degree assault conviction.
FACTS
These facts are from testimony and videotaped evidence received during trial. On
the night of August 30 , 2018, at about 10:00 p.m., T.B. and her boy friend R.V. got on a
Metro Transit bus in downtown Minneapolis and stood together near the front of the bus.
Appellant Angalie Naidu was already on the bus and seated in the middle of the bus.
Sharayah Batchelor, a friend of Naidu’s, was al so on the bus, and seated near the front of
the bus with her child in a st roller. Also on the bus were D.B. and Darryl Billups; Naidu
testified that she had “seen [Billups] around” but did not know him personally.
The bus stopped, and a man exited. As the bus began to pull away from the stop, the
man apparently realized he no longer had his wallet, yelled, tried to get the bus to stop, but
the bus kept moving. R.V. testified that he heard the man yelling, as well as a group of
passengers talking about the contents of the wallet. R.V. walked toward the group, seated
near the middle of the bus, “hoping that they would give [him] the wallet so [he] could
bring it to the bus driver.”
R.V. testified that the group became agitated, so he returned to stand with T.B. near
the front of the bus. R.V. said that, as he did this, he put his hands up in a gesture to attempt

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to “break the tension.” Batchelor, still seated near the front, began arguing with R.V. and
T.B. Billups and D.B. walked to the front of the bus and also began arguing with R.V. and
T.B. while the bus continued to move. At so me point, Batchelor stood up and joined the
others; all five argued in the front of the bus, standing just behind the driver.
Naidu remained seated in the middle of the bus while Batchelor, R.V., T.B., Billups,
and D.B. argued in the front of the bus. When the bus stopped again, the argument
continued. Naidu got up from he r seat and moved a friend’s stroller off the bus while the
friend moved Batchelor’s stroller off the bus , exiting from the middle of the bus. Naidu
reentered the bus, approached the group at the front of the bu s, and put her hands in front
of T.B.’s face and between T. B. and Batchelor. Naidu then swung her arm over T.B. and
knocked off R.V.’s hat. R.V. pushed Naidu onto a nearby seat, and testified that he did so
“[b]ecause she was assaultin g both of us at that point.” Naidu, picked up R.V.’s hat, and
threw it toward him and T.B. D.B. reached up and grabbed the ceiling bars, pulled his
body up, and kicked R.V. in the face. Naidu then took a few swings at T.B., who testified
that Naidu hit her in the face. Naidu then was pushed, fell to the floor, got up, and walked
to the back of the bus.
Billups and D.B. kicked and hit R.V., wh o returned blows, an d the three tumbled
out the front of the bus and kept fighting outsi de, near the front of the bus. While still on
the bus, Batchelor pulled T.B.’s hair and then pulled her off the bus through the same front
exit. Once they were on the sidewalk and grass outside the bus, Batchelor and T.B.
continued to fight. As T.B. landed on the grass, Batchelor ran away. T.B. stood up,

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removed her bright-pink backpack, dropped it on the grass, and also ran away. As T.B. ran
away, Naidu exited the bus and picked up T.B.’s backpack.
Naidu testified at trial that, after she exited the bus, she picked up T.B.’s backpack
from the ground because her friends yelled, “g rab our sh-t.” She handed T.B.’s backpack
to a friend, who was not involved in the fi ght, and her friend plac ed T.B.’s backpack
in Batchelor’s stroller. T.B. testified th at she never saw her backpack again and it
contained two new smart phones, T.B’s birth certificate, her identification, and college
textbooks. R.V. testified that his wallet and cell phone also were missing after the fight.
As a result of the fight, R.V. had a broken jaw and a fractured nose. He testified that
he lacks feeling in part of his face because of the injuries he sustained. R.V. testified that
he did not know which punches or kicks caused his injuries because they came from
“multiple different people, incl uding [Naidu].” R.V. testified that “[t] hey didn’t seem to
want to fight me one-on-one. It just seemed like they wanted to mob us.” T.B. testified that,
as a result of the fight, her tooth went through her lip and she needed stitches. T.B. testified
that she did not know who caused her lip injury.
The state charged Naidu with two counts of first-degree aggravated robbery under
Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2018), two counts of third-degree assault under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.223, subd. 1 (2018), a nd one count of obstructing or interfering with a transit
operator under Minn. Stat. § 609.855, subd. 2(a) (2018). The state later added two
lesser-included charges—one count of fifth-de gree assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.224,
subd. 1 (2018), and one count of disorderly conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1
(2018).

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At Naidu’s jury trial, R.V. and T.B. tes tified, as did two Metro Transit officers, a
Metro Transit sergeant, and a medical doctor who treated R.V. and T.B.’s injuries. The bus
videos from more than one camera recorded what happened on the bus and some of what
happened off of the bus. Although the videos include audio, it is hard to understand. The
bus videos were played for the jury.
Naidu testified that she knew several pe ople on the bus, including Batchelor, but
she did not get on the bus with Batchelor, Billups, or D.B. Naidu testified that the reason
she reentered the bus after removing her friend’ s stroller was to atte mpt to break up the
fight. She testified that she put her arm out to separate Batchelor from T.B. She also
testified that she told R.V., “Tell your b-tc h to get out of my fri end’s face.” During her
testimony, she agreed that she swung her hand “at somebody” and testified that she did so
because R.V. “just pushed me a little, and so I just got a little aggravated.” She also
admitted that she “did throw a punch” at T.B. When asked if she told a transit officer that
“everybody joined in” on the fight and it “was a gang of all of us together,” she replied,
“Yes.”
The jury found Naidu not guilty of first-degree aggravated robbery against R.V. and
not guilty of third-degree assault against T.B. The jury found Naid u guilty of aiding and
abetting the first-degree aggravated robbery of T.B., one count of fifth-degree assault
against T.B., one count of aidi ng and abetting the third-degree assault of R.V., one count
of obstructing or interfering wi th a transit operator, and one count of disorderly conduct.
The district court entered convictions for all five guilty verdicts, imposed a 75-month
prison sentence for the robbery conviction, a nd a concurrent sentence of 12 months and

6
one day for the third-degree assault of R.V. The district court imposed no sentence for the
fifth-degree assault of T.B. because the court found that the offense was part of the same
behavioral incident under Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2018). This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
When addressing a sufficiency -of-the-evidence challenge, this court’s review “is
limited to a painstaking analysis of the reco rd to determine whethe r the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorab le to the conviction, was suffi cient to permit the jurors to
reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). This
court assumes that “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to
the contrary.” State v. Moore , 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). This court will not
reverse a conviction for insuffici ent evidence “if the jury, ac ting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence” and the need fo r proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could
reasonably conclude that the defendant was gu ilty of the offense. Bernhardt v. State ,
684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).
A two-step analysis is applied when reviewing a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence. State v. Hanson, 800 N.W.2d 618, 622 (Minn. 2011). The first step is identifying
the circumstances proved by deferring to the fact-finder’s “acceptance of the proof of these
circumstances and rejection of evidence” that conflicted with those circumstances.
State v. Silvernail , 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted). Second,
we independently examine “the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from
the circumstances proved” to determine wh ether they are “consistent with guilt and

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inconsistent with any rational hy pothesis except that of guilt” Id. at 599 (quotations
omitted).
I. The evidence is insufficien t to sustain Naidu’s conv iction for aiding and
abetting in the first-degree aggravated robbery of T.B.

A robbery occurs when one “having knowledge of not being entitled thereto, takes
personal property from the person or in the pres ence of another and uses or threatens the
imminent use of force against any person to overcome the person’s resistance or powers of
resistance to, or to compel acquiescence in, the taking or carrying away of the property.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.24 (2018). A person commits first-degree aggravated robbery when
she “while committing a robbery . . . inflic ts bodily harm upon another.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.245, subd. 1. “A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the
person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures
the other to commit the crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2018). An accomplice must
know that her “alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime and the defendant intended
[her] presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Huber ,
877 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
Naidu argues that the state failed to offe r evidence that a robb ery occurred. Naidu
contends that the evidence shows that neither she nor Batchelor took T.B.’s backpack from
her. Rather, T.B. dropped her backpack volunt arily and then ran away at about the same
time that Naidu exited the bus. She argues that “picking up an item of personal property
from the ground where its owner has discarded it, without force or threat of force—is not

8
a robbery.” In its brief to this court, the state concedes that T.B. “dropped her backpack”
and ran away before “Naidu picked up” the backpack.
We agree with Naidu’s summa ry of the evidence. The bus video depicted T.B.
wearing a bright-pink backpack when she entered the bus an d throughout the fight. Once
Batchelor forced T.B. outside the bus, they continued to fight unti l Batchelor ran away.
The bus video also depicted that, after Batc helor ran away, T.B. removed her backpack,
dropped it on the ground, and then ran away. The bus video finally depicted that, as
Batchelor and T.B. fled, Naidu exited the bus, picked up T.B.’s backpack from the ground,
and handed it to a third person, who placed the backpack in Batchelor’s stroller.
Because T.B.’s backpack was not taken by force, no robbery occurred. Aggravated
robbery “requires only that the use of force or threats precede or accompany either the
taking or the carrying away and that the force or threats be used to overcome the victim’s
resistance or compel his acquiescence in the taking or carrying away.” State v. Kvale ,
302 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. 1981). As explai ned in a recent supr eme court decision,
“[t]he use of force is the characteristic element that differentiates robbery from theft.” State
v. Townsend , 941 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Minn. 2020). “S imple robbery is basically a theft
accomplished by means of an assaultive act.” State v. Stanifer , 382 N.W.2d 213, 220
(Minn. App. 1986). Although there may be su fficient record evidence to show that Naidu
aided and abetted in a theft, the state did not charge her with nor was she convicted of theft.
Thus, we conclude that the evidence cannot sustain Naidu’s conviction for first-degree

9
aggravated robbery of T.B. and we reverse in part and remand to vacate the conviction and
sentence imposed for this offense.1
II. The evidence is sufficient to support Naidu’s conviction for fifth-degree assault
of T.B.

In the alternative to her sufficiency challenge to the aggravated robbery conviction,
Naidu argues that her convicti on for fifth-degree assault of T.B. should be reversed and
remanded to the district court to be vacate d because it is a lesser-included offense of
aggravated robbery. “Whoever . . . (1) commits an act with intent to cause fear in
another of immediate bodily harm or death; or (2) intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict
bodily harm upon anothe r” is guilty of fifth-degree assa ult. Minn. Stat. 609.224, subd. 1.
Fifth-degree assault is a lesser-included offense of simple robbery. Stanifer, 382 N.W.2d
at 220. Because we have re versed Naidu’s conviction fo r aggravated robbery, her
lesser-included argument fails. And because Naidu admitted at trial that she swung at and
punched T.B., there is sufficient evidence to sustain her fifth-degree assault conviction. As
a result, we affirm Naidu’s conviction for fi fth-degree assault of T.B. and remand for
sentencing.
III. The evidence is sufficient to sustain Naidu’s conviction for aiding and abetting
in the third-degree assault of R.V.

Third-degree assault occurs when one “assa ults another and in flicts substantial
bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1. Substantial bodily harm “means bodily injury

1 Because we conclude that the evidence is in sufficient to prove that a robbery occurred,
we do not reach Naidu’s alternate argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that she intentionally aided the aggravated robbery.

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which involves a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but
substantial loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which
causes a fracture of any bodily member.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a (2018). Liability
for aiding and abetting occurs wh en one “intentionally aids, ad vises, hires, counsels, or
conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit [the] crime.” Minn. Stat.
§ 609.05, subd. 1. For accomplice liability, the state must show more than a person’s mere
presence at the scene of the cr ime. Presence “does not alone prove that a person aided or
abetted, because inaction, knowledge or passive acquiescence does not rise to the level of
criminal culpability.” State v. Ostrem, 535 N.W.2d 916, 924 (M inn. 1995). To impose
liability for aiding and abetting a crime, the state must prove that Naidu “knew [her] alleged
accomplices were going to co mmit a crime and that [she] intended [her] presence or
actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Mahkuk 736 N.W.2d 675, 682
(Minn. 2007).
Naidu admits that R.V. suffered a brok en jaw and a broken nose, and that these
injuries are substantial bodily harm. She, however, contests her role in the assault of R.V.,
arguing that she entered the fight only to stop the argument and that she “neither knew D.B.
would break [R.V.’s] bones nor intended to aid D.B. in assaulting [R.V.]”
Knowledge and intent are generally proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Ali,
775 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Minn. App. 2009) review denied (Minn. Feb. 16, 2010). Thus, we
identify the circumstances pr oved for the assault of R.V.: (1) Naidu, Billups, D.B.,
Batchelor, R.V., and T.B. were all passengers on the same bus; (2) while standing near the
front of the bus, R.V., T.B., Batchelor, Billu ps, and D.B. engaged in a verbal argument;

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(3) while the verbal argument continued, Nai du walked from the middle of the bus to the
front of the bus and put her hands in T.B.’s face and between T.B. and Batchelor; (4) Naidu
then swung her arm over T.B., knocking off R.V.’s hat; (5) R.V. pushed Naidu onto a
nearby seat; (6) D.B. pulled himself up on the ceiling bars and ki cked R.V.’s face;
(7) Naidu then stood up and swung at T.B., who testified Naidu hit her in the face; (8) after
being pushed, Naidu fell, then got up and walked to the back of the bus, and did not
reengage in the fight; (9) Batchelor and T. B. continued physically to fight on the bus;
(10) D.B. and Billups kicked and hit R.V., who returned some blows; (11) while exiting
the front bus door, D.B. and Billups continued to fight R.V. outside the bus; and (12) as a
result of the fight, R.V. sustained a broken jaw and nose.
Naidu claims that the evidence is insufficient to show that she knew that Batchelor,
Billups, and D.B. would inflict substantial bodily harm on R. V. We are not persuaded.
Naidu knowingly involved herself physically in the bus fight. She inserted herself into the
fight while it was going on; in fact, it appears there were no physical blows until after she
approached the group arguing at the front of the bus. Naidu waved her hands in T.B.’s face,
placed her arm between T.B. and Batchelor, and, as Naidu swung at T.B., Naidu knocked
off R.V.’s hat. R.V. pushed Naidu, knocking her onto nearby a seat. Right after Naidu and
R.V. interacted, D.B. kicked R.V. in the face. Naidu then rejoined the fight and punched
T.B. D.B. and Billups contin ued to fight with R.V., while Batchelor fought with T.B.
Naidu then extricated herself from the fight and moved to the back of the bus. Billups and
D.B. continued to hit and kick R.V.

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Even though Naidu may have only hit T.B. , she made physical contact with R.V.
by knocking off his hat. When we view the ev idence favorably to th e jury’s verdict, it
shows that Naidu intended her pr esence to assist D.B. and B illups’s assault of R.V. by
keeping T.B. occupied. It is not reasonable to contend otherwise. Because there is sufficient
evidence to support the jury’s determination that Naidu took a knowing role in R.V.’s
assault, we affirm her conviction for aiding and abetting the third-degree assault on R.V.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.