State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0895

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Manuel Christopher Ramat,
Appellant.

Filed March 2, 2020
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-17-5014

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation following his termination from sex -offender treatment because (1) the record

2
does not support its findings that (a) he intentionally violated his probation and (b) the need
for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation and (2) it found and relied on
a violation not alleged in the probation-violation report. We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2017, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Manuel
Christopher Ramat with first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of
Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2016), and 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2016), respectively.
Appellant pleaded guilty to the first-degree offense. He admitted to perform ing oral sex
for approximately ten minutes on his then -girlfriend’s 12 -year-old daughter. Appellant
was 33 years old at the time. In exchange for his guilty plea, the state agreed to drop the
second-degree charge and to support a downward dispositional departure base d on
appellant taking responsibility for the offense and relieving the victim from testifying.
At appellant’s sentencing hearing in March 2018, the state informed the district
court that it expected appellant to “ follow every single condition of the plea a greement”
and if he did not, it would ask for execution of his sentence . Before accepting appellant’s
plea, the district court stated,
This is a very distasteful plea agreement that we agreed
to . . . . And the reason that we’re doing it and the reason I
agreed to it was for the victim. . . . [O]ther than that, there’s
nothing really supporting a departure, but, of course, that piece
with the victim is huge.

The district court reiterated to appellant that “[t]he state is going to expect perfection” and
cautioned that “ any slipups, [the state] has indicated [it] will ask that we execute the
sentence and send you to prison. There’s no leeway on this one . There just isn’t.” The

3
district court accepted appellant’s plea, dismissed the second-degree offense, and convicted
appellant of the first -degree offense. It imposed a stayed sentence of 201 months and 30
years of probation, with 365 days in loc al jail. Appellant’s probation had more than 20
conditions, including remaining law abiding, submitting to ra ndom urinalysis testing, and
entering into and completing sex-offender treatment.
Appellant admitted to violating his probation by testing positive for marijuana three
times from August 2018 to October 2018 . Rather than brin ging appellant to the district
court for this violation, his probation officer allowed him to sign a sanction agreement,
under which appellant agreed to complete a chemical-dependency (CD) evaluation within
30 days and to follow its recommendations. Appellant completed the evaluation but did
not enter CD treatment as the evaluation directed.
Appellant entered sex -offender treatment at Alpha Human Services (Alpha) and
attended its program orientation in October 2018. Alpha expects its clients to attend every
group session and not arrive more than 20 minutes late , provide 24-hour notice to miss a
session or pay a $30 fee, and take only one excused absence every three months. Grant-
funded c lients, such as appellant , must pay a $20 or $30 co pay before attending each
session. In extenuating circumstances, clients may miss a payment and pay it at the next
session if their balance does not exceed $40.
Appellant missed his sex-offender-treatment session on December 1, 2018, stating
he forgot about it, as well as a rescheduled session on December 8, 2018, again stating he
forgot about it. He arrived more than three hours late for his next session on December 14,
2018, but his therapist accommodated him. Next, on December 15, 2018, he arrived 30

4
minutes late for a group session and did not have his copay, so he could not attend. He
was already on a payment plan for the fees from his prior missed sessions.
Appellant’s therapist considered terminating him from treatment , but decided to
give him one more opportunity a fter consulting with his probation officer. The therapist
communicated this to appellant, including the expectation that he attend his next group
session on December 29, 2018, and appellant agreed.
Appellant called Alpha the morning of his group session but did not arrive to the
session. His therapist later learned that appellant and his landlord, who had paid his copay,
called during the session to say that appellant’s bus was running late but that he would be
there soon. They both later called to say that appellant had taken an Uber, ordered by his
landlord, to the wrong location. His landlord said she entered the incorrect destination
based on appellant’s direction of where to find Alpha’s address . Appellant’s therapist
called appellant thereafter, reminded him about the expectations they had discussed, and
told him that Alpha is terminating him from the program.
Anoka County Corrections filed a probation -violation report on January 14, 2019,
recommending revocation of appellant’s probation. The d istrict court held a probation -
violation hearing in March 2019. It found appellant’s violations “willful and intentional”
and revoked his probation. The district court concluded by stating that:
Mr. Ramat, the underlying crime is obviously one that
is very serious. This court has . . . serious concerns about
public safety based on the violations in this matter. As [the
state] indicated and I said earlier, you had the ability to obtain
employment, to make arrangements to get to that employment,
but yet w hen it came to the treatment program that you were
ordered to participate in, that did not become a priority and you

5
did not attend that program. And at this point I just think the
need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation.

The district court executed appellant’s 201-month sentence. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
We give broad deference to a district court’s determination that there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation. State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). A
district court may revoke probation “[w]hen it appears that the defendant has violated any
of the conditions of probation or intermediate sanction. ” Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1(a)
(2018). But its decision must not be “a reflexive reaction to an accumulation of technical
violations.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted).
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that appellant
intentionally violated probation and that the need for confinement outweighed
the policies favoring probation.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
(1) he willfully and intentionally failed to attend treatment sessions and (2) the need for
confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. We disagree.
In revoking probation, the district court must (1) specify the condition or conditions
that the probationer violated; (2) find that the probationer intentionally or inexcusably
violated the condition; and (3) “find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the policies
favoring probation.” Id. at 250. Appellant challenges only the district court’s findings on
factors two and three. A district court may base its Austin findings on the original offense
and the probationer’s intervening conduct. State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn.

6
2005) (citing Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251). It must provide substantive reasons and the
evidence upon which it relied in making its findings. Id. at 608.
Under the second Austin factor, a probation violation is unintentional or excusable
and may not justify revocation if it occurs “through no fault of [the probationer’s] own,”
such as when an indigent probationer cannot pay fines or restitution. See State v. Cottew,
746 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660, 668-69 n.9, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 2070-71 n.9 (1983). Appellant argues that neither
the record nor the district co urt’s reasoning support s the finding that his violation was
“willful and intentio nal.” He argues that he tried everything to attend the December 29,
2018 session and that his failure to attend and his subsequent termination from sex-offender
treatment were not willful.
In finding appellant’s violation willful, the district court considered appellant’s
explanation that he missed his first two treatment sessions because he forgot about them in
light of his probation officer’s testimony that he and appellant discussed the December 1
session just three days before it. Appellant did not provide any explanation for arriving 30
minutes late to his December 15 session. The district court contrasted appellant’s difficulty
in getting to his treatment sessions, which were “a number one priority” of his probation,
with his apparent ability to get to and from work. The record supports the conclusion that
appellant’s failure to attend sex-offender treatment, and his subsequent termination from
it, did not occur “through no fault of his own.” See Cottew, 746 N.W.2d at 636.
For the third Austin factor, district courts “must balance ‘the probationer’s interest
in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public safety,’ and

7
base their decisions ‘on sound judgment and not just their will.’” Modtland, 695 N.W.2d
at 607 (quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250 -51). Within the third factor, d istrict courts
“should refer to” whether “ (i) confinement is necessary to protect the public,” “(ii) the
offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he
is confined,” or (iii) not revoking probation “would unduly depreciate the seriousness of
the violation.” Id. (quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251).
Appellant argues that the district court did not indicate which facts it relied upon in
reaching its conclusion , that this is only “ his second violation and the first to resul t in a
hearing,” and that the district court did not make findings on all of the “subfactors” in the
third Austin factor.
First, the district court is not required to make findings on all of the considerations
under the third Austin factor. See id . (quoting statement in Austin that d istrict courts
“should refer to” these considerations, which are linked by “or”). Second, the district court
discussed the seriousness of the underlying offense and stated it had “ serious concerns
about public safety based on the violations.” Appellant’s failure to attend his sex-offender-
treatment sessions further supports a finding that his treatment would be provided most
effectively if he were confined instead of in the community. While “policy considerations
may require that probation not be revoked even though the facts may allow it ,” that is not
the case here . See Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250 -51 (concluding revocation required when
appellant failed to take advantage of CD treatment or show commitment to it). The district
court provided substantive reasons for its findings on each of the Austin factors and

8
discussed the evidence on which it relied . It therefore did not abuse its discretion by
revoking appellant’s probation.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding and relying on a
violation that probation did not allege as a new violation.

Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion because it relied on his
failure to enter CD treatment as a violation , which probation did not allege as a new
violation and of which he therefore lacked notice. We disagree that the district court relied
on this as a violation.
A probationer must be “given written notice of the alleged grounds for revocation.”
Id. at 252. The notice need not be the “best possible,” but it must be “adequate to warn the
appellant of the issues that could come up at the hearing.” See id. at 252 n.1.
Appellant’s probation -violation report listed his discharge from sex -offender
treatment before completion as the “alleged violation.” A section on “ prior violations”
highlighted his earlier violation of testing positive for marijuana, and both that section and
the “comments/adjustments” section stated that he had not entered CD treatment as his CD
evaluation recommended two weeks earlier . At the start of his revocation hearing,
appellant’s counsel agreed that the district court would consider “[a]nything else in the
record.”
The district court stated that appellant’s termination from sex -offender treatment
was the “big violation.” It described his failure to enter CD treatment as the “other piece,”
but it concluded its bench ruling by emphasizing only appellant’s failure to attend sex -

9
offender treatment. Appellant’s violation of being terminated from sex-offender treatment
alone provided sufficient grounds for revocation.
Appellant cites to no authority limiting a district court to consideration of only the
facts in the “alleged violation” section of a probation-violation report, and we can find
none. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04 (describing procedural requiremen ts for probation
revocation). Nonetheless, because we conclude that the district court relied on appellant’s
termination from sex-offender treatment as his violation, and that alone provides sufficient
grounds for revocation, we need not decide whether a district court may revoke probation
based on a violati on not listed in the “alleged violation” section of a probation-violation
report. The district court did not ab use its discretion by referencing appellant’s failure to
enter CD treatment when revoking his probation.
Affirmed.