State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 8).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0898

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdifatah Abdullahi Hassan,
Appellant.

Filed May 26, 2020
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Kirk, Judge *

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-18-4143

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County
Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Segal, Chief Judge; Rodenberg, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK, Judge
The district court ordered a competency examination for appellant Abdifatah
Abdullahi Hassan after the state charged him with attempted first-degree criminal sexual
conduct and kidnapping. Two examiners concluded that Hassan was competent. Based on
the experts’ reports, t he district court found Hassan to be competent, and Hassan pleaded
guilty. On appeal, Hassan challenges his convictions on the basis that his guilty pleas were
invalid. He a lternatively seeks to vacate the district court’s sentence imposing a ten-year
conditional-release term. Because the district court followed proper procedures in
determining that Hassan was competent and because there was an adequate factual basis
for the attempted first -degree criminal -sexual-conduct plea, we affirm Hassan’s
convictions. But because a ten-year conditional-release term cannot be imposed for an
attempt offense, we reverse and remand for the district court to vacate the conditional -
release term.
FACTS
The state charged Hassan with five counts, including attempted first-degree criminal
sexual conduct and kidnapping. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i), .25, subd. 1(2),
.17, subd. 1 (2016). The complaint alleged that in June 2018, Hassan approached an adult
woman at a bus stop, began conversing with her, and made a sexual inquiry , which she
turned down. They got on the bus together, and when the woman got off, Hassan follo wed
her. He eventually grabbed the woman , dragged her behind a pillar, pulled out his penis ,
and tried to force her to perform oral sex. T he woman repeatedly screamed “No!” and he

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tried to cover her mouth and nose, causing her nose to bleed. A bystander called the police,
and officers arrived shortly thereafter, ordered Hassan t o the ground, and detained him.
At an omnibus hearing Hassan’s attorney requested a competency examinatio n
under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.01 and an examination to determine the
possibility of a mental -illness defense under rule 20.02. The district court ordered the
examinations.
Dr. Mark Kleiman examined Hassan and submitted rule 20 reports to the district
court. In his rule 20.01 report, Dr. Kleiman opined that Hassan was competent to stand
trial. This conclusion was based on observations made in his interview with Hassan, during
which Dr. Kleiman noted that Hassan could describe the charges against him in general
terms, understood different actors’ roles in the judicial system, could explain the concept
of a plea bargain, and recognized the importance of telling the truth under oath. Dr.
Kleiman nonetheless diagnosed Hassan with schizophrenia and alcohol -use disorder,
noting that Hassan had a long history of delusions, paranoia, hallucinations, and suicidal
thoughts, and that he even expressed “some delusional beliefs about his case.” Dr. Kleiman
concluded that Hassan was “technically competent in terms of his factual knowledge of the
court” and in his ability “to participate in his own defense,” but that he wo uld remain in
that condition “only when he is remaining consistent in taking his psychotrop ic
medication.” In his rule 20.02 report, Dr. Kleiman concluded that Hassan was “not
criminally responsible for his conduct” at the time he committed the offense, me aning that
a mental-illness defe nse would be available to him.

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At the review hearing, both parties challenged Dr. Kleiman’s evaluation . Hassan
contested the finding of competence under rule 20.01, and the state contested the find ing
supporting a mental-illness defense under rule 20.02. Per the parties’ agreement, the district
court ordered a second rule 20 examination and appointed Dr. Chimnoy Gulrajani as the
examiner.
Before the second examination occurred, Anoka County Social Services petitio ned
for Hassan to be civilly committed. The commitment court found that, while Hassan was
in jail awaiting trial, he was experiencing hallucinations, had threatened suicide, and
believed that people in the jail were trying to kill him. On one occasion, Hassan had been
found with a sheet wrapped around his neck and tied in a knot. On October 30, 2018, the
district court ordered Hassan to be civilly committed to the Commissioner of Human
Services as a person who is mentally ill . The initial commitment period was to last no
longer than six months.
In November 2018, Dr. Gulrajani submitted his rule 20 reports to the district court.
He concluded in his rule 20.01 report that Hassan was competent to stand trial, opining that
he “had the ability to rationally consult with counsel” and “possessed the ability to
understand the proceedings and participate in his defense.” Dr. Gulrajani observed during
his interview of Hassan that Hassan was able to “rationally engage” with him, showed an
understanding of the charges, was aware of the plea options, and could “comprehend, retain
and recall new information provided to him.” In his rule 20.02 report, Dr. Gulrajani
concluded that Hassan did not understand the nature of the offense at the time he committed
it, but attributed it to alcohol intoxication rather than schizophrenia.

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After Dr. Gulrajani submitted his reports, the district court conducted a review
hearing. Neither pa rty objected to the reports being received into evidence . T he district
court found Hassan competent.
A plea hearing was held in February 2019, at which Hassan agreed to plead guilty
to attempted first-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping, and the state ag reed to
dismiss the remaining three counts. Hassan entered a Norgaard plea by which he claimed
that he could not remember the offense due to intoxication but agreed that the state’s
evidence was sufficient to find him guilty. Hassan reviewed the plea petit ions and the
district court conducted a plea colloquy. The prosecutor then summarized the evidence
supporting the crimes. The district court found that Hassan had knowingly and voluntarily
waived his rights and that there was an adequate factual basis for the offenses, and it
accepted Hassan’s guilty pleas.
The district court sentenced Hassan to 72 months in prison on the attempted first -
degree criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, to be served concurrent with a 48-month
sentence on the kidnapping conviction . The district court also imposed a ten-year
conditional-release period for the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction. Hassan appeals.
D E C I S I O N
Hassan challenges his convictions, arguing that his guilty pleas were invalid because
the district court did not ensure that Hassan was competent when he entered into them and
because the record lacked an adequate factual basis for the attempted first-degree criminal -
sexual-conduct count. He alternatively seeks to vacate the ten-year conditional-release

6
term, arguing that the district court cannot impose a conditional-release term for an attempt
crime. We grant relief on the conditional-release argument, but otherwise affirm .
I
Hassan argues that his guilty pleas were invalid because the district court did not
take proper measures to ensure that he was competent when he entered his pleas. A criminal
defendant cannot plead guilty or be convicted if he is incompetent. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S. Ct. 836, 838 (1966); Mi nn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2. A
defendant is considered incompetent if a mental illness or cognitive impairment renders
him unable to either “rationally consult with counsel” or “understand the proceedings or
participate in the defense.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2(a)-(b). Here, the state bore the
burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Hassan was competent.
See State v. Ganpat , 732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007).
A district court’s failure to follow adequate procedures to protect a defendant’s right
not to be convicted while incompetent deprives him of his due -process rights. See Pate,
383 U.S. at 378, 86 S. Ct. at 838; State v. Bauer, 245 N.W.2d 848, 854 -55 (Minn. 1976).
Whether the district court followed adequate procedures is a different question than
whether the defendant is incompetent, and it requires the reviewing court to determine the
narrower issue of whether the district court should have conducted further inquiry. Bonga
v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011). When the evidence relating to the defendant’s
mental condition is undisputed and the district court did not further inquire into the
defendant’s competence, we review the record “to determine whether the district court gave

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proper weight to the information s uggesting incompetence.” State v. Camacho , 561
N.W.2d 160, 174 (Minn. 1997).
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.01 lays out the procedures that the district
court must follow for competency proceedings. If the district court determines, on its own
initiative or upon motion of either party, that there are reasons to question the defendant’s
competence, then it must order a competency evaluation. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3.
In felony cases, the district court must determine probable cause then appoint an examiner,
who will evaluate the defendant’s mental condition and submit a report to the district court.
Id., subds. 3(b), 4(a). If a party timely objects to the competency report, the district court
must hold a competency hearing, at which the parti es may introduce evidence. Id.,
subd. 5(a)(1), (3). But if no party files any objections, the district court may determine the
issue of competency based on the examiner’s report. Id., subd. 5(b). If the district court
finds “by the greater weight of the evidence that the defendant is competent,” then criminal
proceedings resume. Id., subds. 5(c), 6(a).
A review of the record shows that the district court complied with the competency
procedures under rule 20.01. Upon Hassan’s request, the district court ordered a rule 20.01
competency evaluation and appointed an examiner. The examiner, Dr. Kleiman, submitted
his report, which concluded that Hassan was “technically competent” but expressed
reservations about Hassan’s ability to participate in his own defense u nless he were taking
medication. Hassan’s attorney orally contested the report’s finding of competence without
filing a written objection as required by the rule , and the district court ordered a second
competency evaluation. The second examiner, Dr. Gulrajani, also concluded that Hassan

8
was competent, expressing greater confidence than Dr. Kleiman regarding Hassan’s ability
to participate in his own defense. Foll owing submi ssion of Dr. Gulrajani’s report , the
district court conducted a review hearing and found Hassan competent. Because neither
party filed any objections to the second report , the district court properly made its
competency determination based solel y on Dr. Kleiman’s and Dr. Gulrajani’s reports . In
light of the fact that both examiners concluded that Hassan was competent and that Hassan
did not object to the second report, the district court followed the proper procedures in
reaching its competency d etermination.
Hassan maintains that the district court erred by ordering a second competency
evaluation rather than holding a contested hearing as rule 20.01, subdivision 5(a)(1)
requires. The argument overlooks that Hassan filed no written objection to the competency
report, as the rule directs . And a s the district court noted in its order , the second
examination was the result of the parties’ mutual agreement , with Hassan requesting a
second examiner to conduct a rule 20.01 competency examination and the state requesting
the same second examiner to conduct a rule 20.02 mental-illness examination. Moreover,
rule 20.01 permits the appointment of multiple examiners. See id., subd. 4(a) (“The court
must appoint at least one examiner . . . to examine the defendant and report to the court on
the defendant’s mental condition.”). Because Hassan agreed to the appointment of Dr.
Gulrajani as a second examiner, and did not object to his report after he submitted it, we
see no error in the district court ordering a second examination. Hassan also insists that the
district court did not require the state to prove that Hassan was competent, but the district

9
court made its competency decision based on the two experts’ reports, both of which
concluded that Hassan was compete nt.
Hassan argues that other circumstances raised “substantial questions” about his
competence and should have alerted the district court to take additional measures to ensure
that he was competent. We are not persuaded. Hassan points to his civil commitme nt,
hospitalization, and suicide attempts while the second competency evaluation was pending.
These facts were accounted for in Dr. Gulrajani’s report, as he interviewed Hassan a few
weeks after the start of the civil commitment, and the expert report discussed the mental -
health problems that Hassan experienced while in the county jail after his arrest. By relying
on Dr. Gulrajani’s report, the district court gave proper weight to Hassan’s civil
commitment and other mental -health issues. We also note that civil commitment and
incompetency are governed by different standards. A person is to be civilly committed “[i]f
the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed patient is a person who
is mentally ill, developmentally disabled, or chemica lly dependent,” and “that there is no
suitable alternative to judicial commitment.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2018).
Incompetency, on the other hand, requires a showing that the defendant, “due to mental
illness or cognitive impairment,” is unable to rationally consult with counsel or understand
the proceedings or participate in the defense. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 2. A different
showing is necessary to find incompetence , as a defendant’s mental illness is only one
element. The district cour t could properly conclude that Hassan was m entally ill and
subject to civil commitment but still able to rationally consult with counsel, understand the
proceedings, and participate in his defense.

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Hassan further argues that statements that he made at the plea hearing indicated that
he did not understand the proceedings or was mentally ill , circumstances which follo wed
the district court’s earlier competency finding but preceded this plea. He points to portions
of the transcript in which Hassan gave confused responses to the district court’s
questioning. These appear to be isolated instances. Hassan otherwise responded coherently
to the district court’s questions, and he indicated that he understood his plea and the terms
of the plea agreement. Hassan’s conduct at the plea hearing did not necessitate additional
procedures to examine his competency.
The district court had already ordered two examinations, and both examiners
determined that Hassan was competent. The district court relied on the two reports and
gave proper weight to the other evidence before it when finding Hassan competent. And
the circumstances following the district court’s November 2018 determination of Hassan’s
competency did not require the district court to reevaluate its competency findin g or
conduct further inquiry by initiating a second round of competency proceedings. We reject
Hassan’s request to invalidate his guilty pleas on this basis.
II
Hassan next argues that his guilty plea was invalid for the attempted first-degree
criminal-sexual-conduct count because it was not accurate with respect to the specific -
intent element. For a guilty plea to be valid, it must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.
State v. Trott , 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). Whether a guilty plea is valid is a
question of law that we review de novo. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010).

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For a guilty plea to be accurate, a proper factual basis must be established. State v.
Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Ordinarily, an adequate factual basis is
established by the district court questioning the defendant and asking him to explain in his
own words the circumstances surrounding his commission of the crime. Id. When, as here,
the defendant enters a Norgaard plea, he pleads guilty but claims a loss of memory, due to
amnesia or intoxication, regarding the circumstances of the offense. Id. at 716-17 (citing
State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1961)). To establish an adequate
factual basis for a Norgaard plea, “the record must establish that the evidence against the
defendant is sufficient to persuade the defendant and his or her counsel that the defendant
is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged.” Id. at 716. A factual basis must be
established for all elements of the offense to which the defendant is pleading guilty. State
v. Jones, 921 N.W.2d 774, 779 (Minn. App. 2018), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019).
To convict a defendant of first -degree criminal sexual conduct causin g personal
injury, the state must prove that the defendant engaged in sexual pe netration of another
person, that he caused personal injury to the victim, and that he used force or coercion to
accomplish the act. Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i). Because Hassan was charged with
attempting this offense, the state had to prove that he intended to commit the crime and
that he did an act that was a substantial step towards commission of the crime. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.17, subd. 1. Hassan maintains that the reco rd did not contain any evidence showing
that he intended to cause personal injury to the victim. We are not persuaded.
We first question an implicit premise underlying Hassan’s argument. Attempt-based
charges require proof of specific intent to commit a c rime, see State v. Bakdash , 830

12
N.W.2d 906, 615 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2013). But we question
whether any showing of Hassan’s specific intent to cause his victim personal injury was
necessary when the record shows she suffered a personal injury. The state’s summary of
alleged facts in which Hassan caused personal injury and used force, and it was the lacking
element of penetration for which Hassan’s specific intent to commit the crime was relevant.
Regardless, a criminal defendant possesses the requisite intent if he “either has a
purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if successful,
will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2016). Intent “is generally proved
by inferences drawn from a person’s words or actions in light of all the surround ing
circumstances.” State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1996). And such inferences
regarding intent are sufficient to show that a proper factual basis was established for a
guilty plea. See Nelson v. State , 880 N.W.2d 852, 859 -60 (Minn. 2016) (determining that
defendant’s statements made during plea colloquy regarding the circumstances of the
offense were sufficient to support a finding that defendant intended to kill victim). The
facts presented here were sufficient to infer that Hassan possessed the necessary intent.
The state established the factual basis for the offenses by having the prosecutor
summarize the evidence that the state intended to present, including the victim ’s expected
testimony. This was a permissible method to show a strong factual basis. See State v. Theis,
742 N.W.2d 643, 6 49 (Minn. 2007) (recognizing that, when a defendant pleads guilty but
does not admit guilt, a factual basis may be supported through an interrogation of the
defendant of the underlying conduct and the evidence that would be introduced at trial, the
introduction of documents or witness statements, or both parties’ stipulation to a factual

13
statement submitted to the court ). The prosecutor here explained that the victim would
testify that Hassan grabbed her, that he forcibly dragged her behind a pillar, that she
screamed repeatedly and tried to get away from him, that he covered her mouth and nose
with his hand and caused her to nose to bl eed, that he tried to push her head towards his
penis, and that she sustained bruises and cuts as she resisted him. Based on Hassan’s use
of force against the victim and her continual resistance, a jury could infer that Hassan either
had a purpose to cause injury to the victim or that he believed that she would be injured as
a result of his actions. We note also that a complaint may provide the factual basis
supporting a plea and that we may consider a complaint to assess the accuracy of a
defendant’s plea. See Sanchez v. State, 868 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Minn. App. 2015), aff’d, 890
N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2017). The complaint likewise described Hassan’s use of force, his
victim’s resistance, and her injuries. Because there was an adequate factual basis to
establish all elements of attempted first -degree criminal sexual conduct, including the
intent element, Hassan’s guilty plea on this count was accurate.
III
Hassan also argues that the ten-year conditional-release term must be vacated
because conditional release cannot be imposed for an attempt offense. We may at any time
correct a sentence that is not authorized by law. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. A
sentence is unauthorized if it is contrary to law or statute. Munt v. State , 920 N.W.2d 410,
414 (Minn. 2018). We review de novo whether a sentence is unauthorized. See id.
A conviction for first -degree criminal sexual conduct carries with it a mandatory
ten-year conditional-release period. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2016). The district

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court imposed this perio d when it sentenced Hassan for attempted first -degree criminal
sexual conduct. The supreme court held in State v. Noggle, however, that section 609.3455,
subdivision 6, does not authorize the imposition of a ten-year conditional-release term for
an attempt crime. 881 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Minn. 2016). The state concedes that the district
court erred by imposing the conditional -release term. We therefore reverse the district
court’s sentence and remand with instructions to vacate the ten-year conditional-release
term.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.