In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Nicole Marie Stensrud.

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0900

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Nicole Marie Stensrud.

Filed November 18, 2019
Vacated
Slieter, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-PR-19-30

Adam J. Schrader, Amundson & Johnson, P.A., Spicer, Minnesota (for appellant Nicole
Marie Stensrud)

Shane D. Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent
Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
SLIETER, Judge
Kandiyohi County Health and Human Services (KCHHS) petitioned the district
court to commit appellant Nicole Marie Stensrud—a former Kandiyohi County resident
who moved to Fargo, North Dakota—as mentally ill and chemically dependent , pursuant
to the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act (MCTA), Minn. Stat. § § 253B.01-.24
(2018), based on a mental health and chemical dependency crisis experienced by Stensrud
while in Fargo. Stensrud moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal jurisdiction .
The district court denied her motion and granted the commitment petition. Because the

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district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction , we need not address a lack of personal
jurisdiction. We vacate the commitment order.
FACTS
Stensrud is a former resident of Kandiyohi County. In February 2019, Stensrud was
fully discharged from a civil commitment initiated in Kandiyohi County. In March 2019,
Stensrud relocated to live with her husband who was already residing in Fargo, North
Dakota.
While living in Fargo, Stensrud’s relationship with her husband deteriorated.
Eventually, Stensrud began to live out of her car in Fargo. The parties agree that on April 4,
2019, local law enforcement responded to a report that Stensrud was making suicidal
statements. Law enforcement took Stensrud into custody and brought her to Essential
Health Emergency Department in Fargo . Stensrud was later transported to Prairie St .
John’s Psychiatric Hospital in Fargo where she tested positive for methamphetamine.
Prairie St. John ’s Hospital contacted Kandiyohi County. Based on this contact,
KCHHS prepared a prepetition screening team report1 and petitioned in Minnesota district
court to commit Stensrud as mentally ill and chemically dependent. The district court in
Kandiyohi County issued a hold order, and it scheduled preliminary and final commitment
hearings. Stensrud was personally served with the commitment petition, hold order, and
other documentation related to the petition in Fargo . Kandiyohi County transported

1 “Prior to filing a petition for commitment of or early intervention for a proposed patient,
an interested person shall apply to the designated agency in the county of financial
responsibility or the county where the proposed patient is present for conduct of a
preliminary investigation, . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 253B.07, subd. 1(a).

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Stensrud from the Fargo hospital to the courthouse to attend the preliminary commitment
hearing.
On April 18, 2019, the district court held a final commitment hearing on the petition.
Kandiyohi County again transported Stensrud to the hearing. The district court first
addressed Stensrud’s challenge that it lacked personal jurisdiction over her. Counsel for
both Stensrud and KCHH S acknowledged that Stensrud moved to Fargo in March 2019 ,
after being fully discharged in February 2019 from her previous commitment, which also
was commenced in Kandiyohi County. The parties also agreed that, at the time of the filing
of the current petition, Stensrud was not subject to any supervision by Minnesota and she
was residing in North Dakota.
The district court found that Stensrud was not present in Minnesota at the time of
the alleged incident that prompted the petition , and that the evide nce showed that she
intended to remain living in Fargo. Based on these facts, the district court determined that
it lacked personal jurisdiction over Stensrud when the petition was filed. Despite this
determination, the district court denied appellant’s dismissal motion for lack of personal
jurisdiction and proceeded with the commitment hearing because it construed Stensrud’s
presence in Minnesota at the time of the hearing sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
The district court granted the pet ition and committed Sten srud as mentally ill and
chemically dependent with said commitment to expire on October 19, 2019. This appeal
follows.2

2 Although our opinion is released after the commitment order was set to expire, this matter
is not moot. “The doctrine of mootness requires that we decide only actu al controversies

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D E C I S I O N
The parties initially based their arguments before this court solely on personal
jurisdiction. Following oral arguments, we requested supplemental briefing on the issue
of subject-matter jurisdiction “[b]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the authority
of the court to hear a particular class of actions, lack of subject -matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time.” Irwin v. Goodno, 686 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation
omitted).
“Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that [appellate courts] review de
novo.” See In re Civil Commitment of Giem , 742 N.W.2d 422, 425 -26 (Minn. 2007).
“Subject-matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine the particular
questions the court assumes to decide.” In re Civil Commitment of Nielsen , 863 N.W.2d
399, 402-03 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Apr. 14, 2015). “While the grant of
subject-matter jurisdiction to the district courts is broad, the district court has only that
jurisdiction conferred by the Minnesota Constitution or by law.” Carlson v. Chermak, 639
N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. App. 2002); see also Minn. Const. art. VI, § 3 (“The district court
has original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases and shall have appellate jurisdiction
as prescribed by law.”).

and avoid advisory opinions.” See In re McCaskill , 603 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. 1999).
A case is not considered moot if “collateral consequences attach to the judgment.” Id. A
commitment as mentally ill presents collateral consequences because of the MCTA’s early-
intervention provisions. Id. at 330-31; see also Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.064-.066 (providing
early-intervention commitments for persons who have a prior mental-illness commitment
within the last three years). Because the district c ourt committed Stensrud as mentally ill
and chemically dependent, the commitment causes colla teral consequences and therefore
this matter is not moot.

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Pursuant to the MCTA, “[t]he district court has subject -matter jurisdiction over
judicial commitments.” In re Ivey, 687 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied
(Minn. Dec. 22, 2004); see also State ex rel. Anderson v. U.S. Veterans Hosp., 128 N.W.2d
710, 715 (Minn. 1964) (“The fact that the probate court has jurisdiction over comm itment
proceedings by virtue of our constitution has long been established.”) (footnote omitted).
Although Minnesota district courts have the authority to hear civil -commitment matters,
this case presents the question of whether the Minnesota district court has subject-matter
jurisdiction to commit a nonresident3 who was not present in Minnesota when the actions
prompting the commitment petition occurred.
The MCTA is silent on its territorial scope. Consistent with this court’s decision in
Ivey, we are persuaded to look at criminal caselaw in addressing the territorial scope of the
MCTA. See 687 N.W.2d at 671 n.1 (explaining that the court was persuaded that criminal
cases apply in civil commitments because “all of these matters involve a similar lo ss of
liberty”). In criminal cases, Minnesota courts recognize the limitation of the district court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction when actions giving rise to criminal charges take place entirely
outside the state. See, e.g., State v. Smith , 421 N.W.2d 31 5, 316 (Minn. 1988); State v.
McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624 , 624 (Minn. 1978). “Both the Minnesota and the United
States Constitutions preserve the theory of territorial jurisdiction to some degree.” Smith,
421 N.W.2d at 318. Modern statutes, however, have expanded criminal subject -matter

3 The district court found that Stensrud does not reside in Minnesota and has no intention
to return to Minnesota. Both parties agree on appeal that Stensrud is not a resident of
Minnesota following her move to Fargo.

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jurisdiction to some degree permitting the existence of subject -matter jurisdiction but
“some territorial aspects remain” requiring “some operative event, a triggering event if you
will, . . . occur[s] within the jurisdiction for the court to have power to act.” Id.
KCHHS argues that Stensrud’s mental health history and chemical dependency
history while she resided in Minnesota are sufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction
over her commitment in Minnesota. The law compels our disagreement.
A district court may civilly commit a person when it “finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the proposed patient is a person who is mentally ill, developmentally
disabled, or chemically dependent and after careful consideration of reasonable alternative
dispositions . . . it finds that there is no suitable alternative to judicial commitment.” Minn.
Stat. § 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (emphasis added). “Where commitment is ordered, the findings
of fact and conclusions of law shall specifically state the proposed patient’s conduct which
is a basis for determining that each of the requisites for commitment is met.” Id., subd. 2.
The common meaning of the word “is” in section 253B.09, subdivision 1, reflects a
present state of a pe rson being mentally ill, developmentally disabled, or chemically
dependent. See In re Kottke , 433 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Minn. 1988) (applying the common
meaning of “serious physical harm” to the MCTA when no definition was provided); see
also The American Heri tage Dictionary of the English Language 928 (5th ed. 2018)
(defining “is” as “[t]hird person singular present indicative of be”). A proposed patient’s
history of mental illness or chemical dependency may be relevant in contextualizing their
current condition or when considering a least restrictive program, but under the MCTA an

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individual’s past alone is insufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon the district
court.
Although Stensrud has a history of mental illness and chemical dependency, the
record establishes that all the triggering events in April 2019, which led to the commitment
petition, occurred in North Dakota. Smith, 421 N.W.2d at 318. Stensrud was not then a
Minnesota resident, and she was not physically present in Minnesota at the time of the
relevant events supporting this commitment. It is insufficient to establish subject -matter
jurisdiction over this commitment merely based on Stensrud’s previous history of mental
illness or chemical dependency because the important issue is not whether Stensrud had a
history of those conditions when she resided in Minnesota. Instead, the important issue is
whether her condition at the time of the petition presents operative facts , which implicate
a Minnesota district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
The district court lacked subject -matter jurisdiction to address this commitment
proceeding over Stensrud, a nonresident who was not present in Minnesota during the time
of the relevant behavior prompting the petition . We vacate Stensrud’s judgment of
commitment.4 Because of this holding, we decline to address the issue of personal
jurisdiction.
Vacated.

4 Despite the result of this opinion, we recognize the laudable intentions of KCHHS in
promptly responding to Stensrud’s mental -illness issues and chemical-dependency issues
that arose in North Dakota and for which KCHHS had a history of providing services when
appellant resided in Minnesota.