State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0906

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jordan Adam Burstad,
Appellant.

Filed March 9, 2020
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Pennington County District Court
File No. 57-CR-18-245

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Seamus P. Duffy, Pennington County Attorney, Stephen R. Moeller, Assistant County
Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Drew J. Hushka, Vogel Law Firm, Fargo, North Dakota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Florey ,
Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress drug
evidence because the police did not possess a reasonable articulable suspicion to seize him
and his custodial arrest was unlawful. We affirm.
FACTS
While on patrol the morning of April 5, 2018, Officer Johnsrud observed a vehicle
exit a parking lot and travel in the opposite direction. Officer Johnsrud recognized the
driver as an individual he knew, Appellant Jordan Adam Burstad. Because Officer
Johnsrud believed there was an active warrant out f or Burstad’s arrest, he made a U-turn
to follow the vehicle, and observed it pull into the parking lot of an apartment building .
Officer Johnsrud then observed Burstad walking quickly towards the front entrance of the
apartment building.
Officer Johnsrud parked his squad car, exited it, and called out for Burstad to stop.
Burstad stopped and informed Officer Johnsrud that he had recently taken care of the
outstanding warrant. When Officer Johnsrud checked Burstad’s warrant status with
dispatch, he was informed that the warrant had been cleared, but Burstad’s driving
privileges had been revoked.
Upon learning that Burstad’s license was revoked, Officer Johnsrud asked Burstad
to provide proof of insurance for the vehicle. Burstad stated that another individual owned
the vehicle and he could not provide Officer Johnsrud with proof of insurance. After
confirming that Burstad’s driver’s license was revoked for lack of insurance, Officer
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Johnsrud arrested Burstad for driving after revocation and failure to provide proof of
insurance. During a search incident to arrest, Officer Johnsrud discovered $2,200 in cash
in Burstad’s wallet, which Burstad claimed he had recently won at the casino. Prior to
leaving the parking lot, Burstad showed Officer Johnsrud that the vehicle was locked and
informed him that the vehicle could be left in the parking lot.
During the booking process, officers found a pipe with white residue in Burstad’s
jacket pocket. The residue field-tested positive for methamphetamine. Based on finding
the pipe with methamphetamine residue and $2,200 in cash on Burstad, officers conducted
a dog sniff of the vehicle Burstad was driving. The dog positively alerted to the presence
of illegal substances in the vehicle. After obtaining a search warrant, officers searched the
vehicle and discovered approximately 20.7 grams of methamphetamine and approximately
0.6 grams of ketamine . Officers subsequently obtained a search warrant for Burstad’s
residence and discovered additional evidence of drug-related activity.
The state charged Burstad with first-degree sale of methamphetamine, third-degree
possession of methamphetamine, and fourth-degree possession of ketamine with the intent
to sell. Burstad moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the seizure, the dog
sniff of his vehicle, and the search of his residence on the grounds that he was subjected to
an unlawful search and seizure.
The district court denied Burstad’s suppression motion. Burstad then stipulated to
the prosecution’s case pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, in order to obtain
appellate review of the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. The parties
stipulated that Burstad’s constitutional challenges to the following issues were dispositive
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of the case: (1) the Terry stop; (2) the expansion of the traffic stop; (3) the custodial arrest;
and (4) the search of his person.
The parties agreed to a stipulated trial on the third-degree possession of
methamphetamine charge and that the state would dismiss the other two charges. The
district court found Burstad guilty of third-degree possession of methamphetamine. The
district court sentenced Burstad to 27 months in prison, stayed for five years, with 90 days
in jail, and placed him on supervised probation for five years. This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Burstad argues that the district court erroneously denied his suppression motion
because (1) he was unlawfully seized; (2) he was subjected to an unlawful custodial arrest;
(3) officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff of his vehicle; and (4) the
search of his residence was unreasonable because the search warrant lacked probable cause.
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a suppression motion, this court
reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de
novo. State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). Because the parties stipulated
to the prosecution’s case pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, our review is further
limited in this case to the issues that the parties stipulated to as being dispositive. Minn.
R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(a). While Burstad challenges the dog sniff of his vehicle and
the search of his residence on appeal, those issues were not included in the stipulation.
Therefore, we decline to consi der them. The remainder of our analysis will address
Burstad’s arguments with respect to the seizure and custodial arrest.
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Seizure
Burstad argues that he was unlawfully seized because Officer Johnsrud’s suspicion
that he had an outstanding warrant was not reasonable.
Officer Johnsrud instructed Burstad to stop walking towards the apartment building,
and Burstad complied with this directive. “A limited investigative stop is permissible if
the officer is able to articulate that he had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting
criminal activity.” State v. Riley, 667 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied
(Minn. Oct. 21, 2003). This assessment is based on “all the circumstances,” which include
“the officer’s general knowledge and experience, the officer’s personal observations,
information the officer has received from other sources, the nature of the offense suspected,
the time, the location, and anything else that is relevant.” Appelgate v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987) (quotation omitted). A stop must not be “the
product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921
(Minn. 1996). Minnesota recognizes that an officer’s “honest, reasonable mistakes of fact
are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 254
(Minn. 2003). Further, “[i]f the facts upon which the officer relies turn out to be mistaken,
those mistaken facts may still support a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a
person of criminal activity” so long as the mistake itself was objectively reasonable. State
v. Poehler, 935 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. 2019).
The district court found that Officer Johnsrud had a reasonable suspicion to stop and
briefly detain Burstad despite his mistaken understanding of Burstad’s warrant status. The
record indicates the following facts. Officer Johnsrud recognized Burstad while he was
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driving a vehicle. While working the previo us weekend, Officer Johnsrud learned that
there was an active warrant for Burstad’s arrest. Officer Johnsrud observed Burstad turn
out of a parking lot and head in the opposite direction. After following Burstad’s vehicle
into the parking lot of an apartment building, Officer Johnsrud observed Burstad exit the
vehicle and walk quickly towards the apartment building that was not his residence. Based
on the record, Officer Johnsrud had a particularized and objective basis to suspect Burstad
of criminal activity, despite his reasonable mistake about Burstad’s outstanding warrant.
Because the investigatory stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity,
the district court did not err by denying Burstad’s suppression motion.
Burstad argues that Johnsrud’s mistake about the outstanding warrant was
unreasonable because he did not avail himself of the resources to confirm or deny the status
of the warrant prior to the seizure. While the record indicates that Officer Johnsrud did not
check Burstad’s warrant status prior to the seizure, Officer Johnsrud testified that he felt
he needed “to take quicker action” because he was concerned that Burstad was driving.
This fact, when viewed in context of the record as a whole, further supports the district
court’s finding that Officer Johnsrud had the requisite reasonable suspicion for the
investigatory stop.
Custodial arrest
Burstad argues that Officer Johnsrud impermissibly subjected him to a custodial
arrest because he “voluntarily ceased driving and did not reasonably appear to be likely to
engage in further criminal activity.” He contends that because he had stopped driving, he
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no longer reasonably appeared to be likely to continue driving with a revoked license or
without proof of insurance.
Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.01, subd. 1(a), provides:
In misdemeanor cases, peace officers who decide to proceed
with prosecution and who act without a warrant must issue a
citation and release the defendant unless it reasonably appears:

(1) the person must be detained to prevent bodily injury to that
person or another;
(2) further criminal conduct will occur; or
(3) a substantial likelihood exists that the person will not
respond to a citation.

The district court determined that exceptions (1) and (3) did not apply . In analyzing
whether further criminal conduct would occur, the district court found that it was
reasonable for Officer Johnsrud “to believe that [ Burstad] would continue to operate the
apparently uninsured vehicle, regardless of his driving status, to get back to his residence.”
The district court concluded that Officer Johnsrud’s determination was reasonable because
of Burstad’s prior citation for driving without proof of insurance and his observation of
Burstad operating the vehicle.
We determine that it was reasonable for Officer Johnsrud to conclude that an arrest
was necessary to prevent further criminal conduct, specifically , to prevent Burstad from
driving with a revoked license and without proof of insurance. The record indicates that
Burstad’s driver’s license was revoked and he was unable to provide Officer Johnsrud with
proof of insurance. Officer Johnsrud observed both of these violations. In addition, Officer
Johnsrud testified that, based on his knowledge, Burstad did not live at the apartment
building where he parked the vehicle. Therefore, it was reasonable for Officer Johnsrud to
8
believe that Burstad would continue to operate the uninsured vehicle without a valid
license.
In support of his position that his custodial arrest was unlawful, Burstad relies solely
on State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998). We note that while Varnado involved
a warrantless misdemeanor arrest, it does not address the circumstances under which an
officer may properly arrest an individual to prevent further cri minal conduct. Therefore,
Varnado does not support Burstad’s position.
Because Officer Johnsrud could reasonably conclude that Burstad’s arrest was
necessary to prevent further criminal activity, the district court did not err by denying his
suppression motion.
Affirmed.