State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0918

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jordan Adrian Walz,
Appellant.

Filed April 20, 2020
Reversed
Worke, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-CR-17-4406

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather Pi penhagen, Assistant County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Pr esiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district c ourt erred by denying his suppression motion
because the inventory search of the vehicle he was driving was unconstitutional. Because

2
the district court clearly erred in its fact ual findings and the police failed to follow the
departmental towing policy, we reverse.
FACTS
On October 25, 2017, appellant Jordan Adri an Walz crashed a vehicle into a tree.
Officer Murr responded to the scene and had the vehicle impounded. During an inventory
search, Officer Murr found a firearm and drug evidence. Walz was charged with unlawful
possession of a firearm, fifth-degree possessi on of a controlled substance, and careless
driving.
Walz moved to suppress the firearm and drug evidence, arguing that the search of
the vehicle was unlawful because impoundment was unnecessary.1 The district court held
an omnibus hearing, at which it recei ved Officer Murr’s body camera footage 2 and heard
Officer Murr’s testimony. The district court also received a copy of the police department’s
vehicle towing and release policy.
Officer Murr’s body camera footage reflected the following. Upon arriving at the
scene, Officer Murr asked the vehicle’s occupants what had happened. They told her that
they were fighting and Walz “jerked the wheel.” Officer Murr asked if they were injured,

1 In response to Walz’s suppression motion, th e state argued that he lacked standing to
challenge the inventory search of the vehicle. In ruling on Walz’s suppression motion, the
district court did not address the state’s argument on standing. On appeal, the state did not
raise an argument about standing in its brief a nd we decline to addre ss the issue as it has
been waived. See State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 198, 193 n.8 (Minn. 1997) (noting that
issues not argued in briefs are deemed waived on appeal).
2 At times, it appears that Officer Murr disabl ed the audio recording on her body camera.
While it is not clear whether this was done in accordance with policies, we caution against
this practice given the purpose of a body camera.

3
and they told her that they were “okay.” Officer Murr then aske d for identification and
who owned the vehicle. Audio from the video is not clear, but context indicates that Walz
mumbled a word that sounded like “mine.” Officer Murr then asked Walz if he had a valid
driver’s license, and he told her he did no t. Officer Murr also requested insurance
information.
Officer Murr asked dispatch to run the occupants’ identifications. Dispatch
informed her that Walz’s license was revoked. Officer Murr provided dispatch with the
vehicle’s license plate number and asked that it be added to the report. After another brief
exchange with the passenger regarding the reason she and Walz were in Hastings, Officer
Murr requested that dispatch call a tow truck.
Officer Murr then informed another officer that she noticed a case in the back of the
vehicle and stated “it’s not their vehicle, of course.” The other officer responded, “oh, well
you’ve got to inventory,” to which Officer Murr responded, “yep, we do.” Officer Murr
picked up a backpack from inside the vehicle and rummaged through it. She also searched
another small bag and looked in the center console.
Next, Officer Murr requested that dispat ch provide her info rmation about the
vehicle’s owner. Dispatch in formed Officer Murr that the owner was from Lino Lakes.
Officer Murr then questioned Walz about his conn ection to the vehicle. Walz stated they
borrowed the vehicle from a friend with the middle name “Nemo.” In continuing the
inventory search, Officer Murr found the firearm and drug evidence.
Officer Murr stated that after learning the vehicle’s occupants’ identities, she “asked
whose vehicle it was because it came back to somebody else—neither of the people inside.”

4
She also testified that “Nemo” was not aff iliated with the vehicle’s registration. She
testified that when she attempted to ascertain who Nemo was, Walz was unable to provide
his full name. Officer Murr stated that at th at point she was unsure whether the vehicle
was stolen and did not have a chance to contact the owner.
Officer Murr testified that she called fo r a tow truck because the vehicle was
inoperable. She also clarified that the ve hicle was located on private property. After
requesting a tow, she stated that she then began to inventory the vehicle.
When asked about the towi ng policy, Officer Murr stat ed that normally officers
would tow a vehicle that was involved in an accident, disabled, and located on private
property. Officer Murr testified that she followed the towing policy. When asked whether
Walz or the passenger could ha ve made arrangements to tow the vehicle, Officer Murr
agreed that they could have, but stated that she did not allow them that opportunity.
The district court denied Walz’s suppression motion. The district court determined
that, under the circumstances, impoundment was proper to remove the vehicle from private
property. The district court noted that Walz was not the owner of the vehicle and that it
had been reported missing. The district court also determined that Walz initially stated that
the vehicle was his and then could not speci fically identify the person who purportedly
gave him permission to use the vehicle. In denying his motion, the district court relied on
the fact that Officer Murr had reason to believe that Walz was wrongfully in possession of
the vehicle and that impoundment was necessary to safeguard the vehicle and its contents.
The district court further determined th at Officer Murr had followed the towing
policy. In making this determination, the di strict court focused on the language of the

5
towing policy providing that wh en a vehicle is involved in a traffic collision, an officer
shall have a driver select a towing company if reasonably po ssible. The district court
concluded that, in this case, it was not reasonable to release the vehicle to Walz or the
passenger because they did not appear to have authority to possess the vehicle.
Walz stipulated to the prosecution’s case on all three counts pursuant to Minn. R.
Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain review of the district court’s ruling on his suppression
motion. The district court found Walz guilty as charged and this appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
Walz argues that the district court erred by denying his suppression motion,
claiming that the search of the vehicle was illegal. When reviewing a district court’s
pretrial ruling on a motion to suppress eviden ce, this court reviews factual findings for
clear error and legal determinations de novo. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn.
2011). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneou s if, on the entire evidence, we are left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” Id. at 846-47.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Generally, warrantless searches
are unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. State v. Flowers,
734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007). An inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle
is one exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn.
2008). The state has the burden of demonstrating that the inventory exception applies. Id.
To determine whether an inventory search is lawful, an appellate court must “look,
as a threshold inquiry, to the propriety of the impoundment, since the act of impoundment

6
gives rise to the need for and justification of the inventory.” State v. Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d
506, 510 (Minn. 1977). When impounding a vehicle, the state’s interest must outweigh an
individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. The state’s
interest in impounding a vehicle can outwei gh an individual’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures when “public safety is put at risk by leaving the vehicle
in place,” or necessary to safeguard private property from theft and protect the police from
claims that may arise therefrom. State v. Rohde , 852 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Minn. 2014).
Public safety is implicated “when there ha s been a vehicle accident, to permit the
uninterrupted flow of traffic, or when vehicles have viol ated parking ordinances.” Id.
Impoundment and inventory searches are permis sible so long as la w enforcement abides
by standardized criteria. State v. Robb , 605 N.W.2d 96, 104 (Minn. 2000). “If
impoundment is not necessary, then the concomitant search is unreasonable.” Goodrich,
256 N.W.2d at 510.
Factual findings
Walz challenges the district court’s factua l findings, contending that the district
court erred by finding that Walz initially claime d that the vehicle was his and then later
admitted that he did not know the registered owner. But on this record, we conclude that
the district court did not err by making this finding. Officer Murr’s body camera footage
indicates that Walz may have mumbled that the vehicle was his after she inquired about
the vehicle’s ownership. Further, Officer Mu rr did not ask any foll ow-up questions that
would be expected had Walz responded that someone else owned the vehicle. And later,

7
after Officer Murr began the inventory search , Walz told her that he had borrowed the
vehicle but did not know the vehicle’s registered owner.
Walz also argues that the district cour t erred by finding that dispatch informed
Officer Murr that the owner reported the vehicle missing. We agree. The state conceded
that there is no indication in the record that O fficer Murr learned that the vehicle was
reported missing prior to the impoundment. And our review of the record indicates that,
while Officer Murr learned the identity of the vehicle’s owner from dispatch after she began
the inventory search, she did not learn that the vehicle wa s stolen until the following day
when she contacted the registered owner. Ther efore, the district court clearly erred by
making this finding.
Reasonableness of impoundment
Walz argues that impoundment was unrea sonable because he was uninjured and
able to make arrangements to remove the ve hicle. He argues that the towing policy
required Officer Murr to allow him, as the driver, to select a towing company. We agree.
The towing policy, in relevant part, provides,
REMOVAL OF VEHICLE DI SABLED IN A TRAFFIC
COLLISION
When a vehicle has been in volved in a traffic collision
and must be removed from the scene, the officer shall have the
driver select a towing compa ny, if reasonably possible, and
shall relay the request for the specified towing company to the
dispatcher. When there is no preferred company requested, a
company will be selected by the on scene officer.

If the owner is incapacitated or for any reason it is
necessary for the Department to assume respon sibility for a
vehicle involved in a collision, the officer shall request the
dispatcher to call a company se lected from the list of towing

8
companies. The officer will then conduct an inventory and
store the vehicle using a CJIIN Tow Sheet.

Thus, the towing policy required Officer Murr to ask Walz, as the driver of the vehicle,
whether he had a preference about the towing company an d only perm itted the
impoundment of the vehicle when necessary fo r the department to assume responsibility
for it.
During her testimony, Officer Murr confirmed that the vehicle was not parked on a
paved highway or roadway, neither occupant was incapacitated, the vehicle was not being
held for an investigation, the vehicle was not obstructing traffic in violation of any state or
local regulations, and it was not a traffic hazard. Prior to the search, the only reason Officer
Murr had to arrest Walz was because he had been driving with a revoked license. Neither
Walz nor the passenger were arrested until af ter the search. Office r Murr confirmed that
she did not have probable cause to search the vehicle when she arrived at the scene, there
were no emergency circumstances to search the vehicle, no evidence had been in plain
view, and she did not ask Walz for consent to search the vehicle. Finally, Officer Murr
stated that she was unsure about whether th e vehicle had been stolen at the time of
impoundment because she did no t learn that information until contacting the registered
owner “[a] day after the accident.” Therefor e, law enforcement had no reason to take
responsibility for the vehicle. See Gauster, 752 N.W.2d at 504-06 (noting police had no
reason to take responsibility of vehicle when driver was not under arrest prior to
impoundment, vehicle did not c onstitute a traffic hazard, ve hicle was not parked in a

9
manner that violated parking restrictions, a nd driver was available to take custody of
vehicle and make arrangements).
Further, at the time of impoundment, Offi cer Murr knew only that Walz’s license
had been revoked and that the insurance liste d the apparent registered owner. However,
simply not being the registered owner of a vehicle, by itself, does not provide law
enforcement with a valid basis for impoundment. See Goodrich, 256 N.W.2d at 511 (“The
mere fact that the automobile was not register ed to defendant, in the absence of reason to
believe that the defendant was wrongfully in possession of it, does not render impoundment
reasonable . . . .”).
Because Officer Murr did no t have adequate informa tion regarding whether the
vehicle was stolen at the time of impoundment and there was no other reason necessitating
that the department take possession of the ve hicle, the impoundment was unreasonable.
Therefore, the district court erred by dete rmining that impoundment was reasonable and
denying Walz’s suppression motion.
Officers could have easily avoided vi olating Walz’s right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures by waiting until they had more information about the
vehicle’s owner and determining whether Walz was an authorized use r. This case also
demonstrates the importance of law enforcement having updated towing policies and police
departments ensuring that its officers are knowledgeable about such policies. The towing
policy in this case does not appear to have been updated for quite some time given that it
references statutes that were renumbered in 2012. Further, it does no t appear that any of
the other officers on scene were knowledgeable about the towing policy given that they did

10
not remind Officer Murr about its terms. While we understand the r ealities that officers
face when conducting their duti es in the field, complianc e with towing policies is
imperative to ensure the correct balance in protecting the interests of both individuals and
law enforcement.
Reversed.