A19-0947 A19-0965

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0946
A19-0947
A19-0965

In re the Matter of the Welfare of
the Children of: A.M.P. and S.N.S., Parents (A19-0946, A19-0965)
and In re the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
A.M.P. and J.A.P., Parents (A19-0947).

Filed December 30, 2019
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File Nos. 73-JV-18-7621; 73-JV-17-7741;
73-JV-18-792; 73-JV-18-7622

Kimberly Stommes, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for appellant A.M.P.)

Cathleen Gabriel, Annandale, Minnesota (for appellant S.N.S.)

Katherine Malmanger, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for father J.A.P.)

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent Stearns County)

Enoch Dix, Waite Park, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Klaphake,
Judge.*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
REYES, Judge
In these consolidated appeals, appellant-mother A.M.P. and appellant-father S.N.S.
(parents) separately appeal from the district court ’s order terminating their parental rights
to A.L.S. and M.I.S., arguing that clear and convincing evidence does not support the
findings that (1) they each failed to comply with their duties as a parent; (2) they neglected
their children who were in foster care; (3) Stearns County Human Services (the county)
made reasonable efforts to reunite the family; and (4) that the termination of parental rights
(TPR) served the children’s best interests. Mother also argues that the district court abused
its discretion by invol untarily transferring custody of her two other children, A. P. and
A.C.P., to their paternal grandparents. We affirm.
FACTS
Mother has four children: A.P., A.C.P., A.L.S., and M.I.S. Father lives with mother
and is the biological father of A.L .S. and M.I.S. Mother is legally married to J.A.P., the
biological father of A.P. and A.C.P., though they are currently pursuing dissolution.
In 2016, the county received reports of parents using drugs and neglecting the
educational needs of their childr en, mother’s DUI arrest and later conviction, with three
children in the car, and unsuitable living conditions in their home. Mother tested positive
for Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and methamphetamine at a prenatal appointment while
pregnant with M.I.S., and both mother and M.I.S. tested positive for methamphetamine
when M.I.S. was born.

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On August 29, 2017, the county removed A.L.S. and M.I.S. from parents’ home and
filed a Child in Need of Protection or Services petition because of parents’ drug use and
chronic homelessness. At the time, A.P. and A.C.P. resided with their pat ernal
grandparents. The district court approved case plans for each parent, requiring them to
become sober and demonstrate sobriety through negative urinalysis assessments (UA s),
undergo chemical dependency (CD) evaluations and follow all recommendations, comply
with visitation requirements for both children, and obtain safe, stable, chemical -free, and
affordable housing.
After parents made some progress , the county returned A.L.S. and M.I.S. to their
care for a trial home visit in November 2017. Parents violated their safety plan on March
30, 2018, prompting the county to remove the children again. Over the next year , each
parent participated in 35 UA tests. Mother failed 32 of the tests, and father failed 21.
The county provided parents with referrals to the Effective Living Center (ELC), a
treatment center for CD recovery. Due to the parents’ attendance issues, ELC discharged
mother from treatment after five months and father after one month.
The county petitioned for, and the district court ordered, mother’s and father’s TPR
to A.L.S. and M.L.S., and the involuntary transfer of legal custody and physical custody of
A.P. and A.C.P. t o their paternal grandparents. J.A.P. agreed to a voluntary transfer of
legal custody and physical custody of A.P. and A.C.P. to his parents. The district court
found that (1) parents failed to comply with their parenting duties; (2) the children we re
neglected and in foster care; and (3) following the children ’s out -of-home placement
(OOHP), reasonable efforts failed to correct the conditions leading to the OOHP, and the

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TPR served the children’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subds. 1 (b)(2), (5),
(8) (2018). The district court also found that transferring legal and physical custody of
A.P. and A.C.P. to their paternal grandparents served the children’s best interests. Each
parent appeals.
D E C I S I O N
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion because c lear and convincing
evidence establishes that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite mother
and father with A.L.S. and M.I.S. under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
(1)(b)(5).
Parents argue that (1) the district court failed to analyze whether the county made
reasonable efforts or provided sufficient services, preventing meaningful appellate review;
(2) the county provided insufficient services; and (3) the TPR is against the children’s best
interests.1 We disagree.
Appellate courts will generally affirm the district court’s TPR decision when
(1) clear and convincing evidence supports at least one statutory ground for termination ;
(2) the county made reasonable ef forts to reunite the family and rehabilitate parents ; and
(3) termination serves the best interests of the child. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. ,
744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008 ). We review the district court ’s factual findings for
clear error. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011),
review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is manifestly
contrary to the weight of the evidence. In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656,

1 Because mother’s and father’s arguments are nearly identical and because the majority of
the factual findings pertain to both, we will concurrently analyze them and highlight any
differences.

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660-61 (Minn. 2008). We review a district court’s decisions on whether a statutory basis
is met, the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family , termination serves the
children’s best interests, as well as the district court’s ultimate TPR determination, for an
abuse of discretion. See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 322-23 (Minn.
App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 21, 2015); J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. The district
court abuses its discretion if it improperly applies the law. D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 322
(quotation omitted).
The district court may presume reasonable efforts failed upon a showing that (1) a
child under age eight at the TPR’s filing has resided out of the parental home under court
order for a cumulative period of six or more months unless the parent maintained regular
contact with the child and complied with the OOHP plan; (2) the district court approved
the OOHP plan; (3) the parent failed to correct the conditions leading to the OOHP, which
is presumed if the parent has not substantially complied with the court’s ord ers and a
reasonable case plan; and (4) the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent
and reunite the family. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1 (b)(5)(i)-(iv). Because the children
have been out of their home since March 2018, more than 12 months before the April 2019
trial, the district court approved their OOHP plan, and the statute repeats OOH P plan
compliance in the second and third factors, our analysis focuses on the third and fourth
factors.
A. The findings of fact are sufficiently particularized.
Particularized findings of fact are necessary to enable appellate review, to ensure
that the district court properly applied the law, and to assure the parties that the district

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court fairly considered and decided the issues. See Reyes v. Schmidt, 403 N.W.2d 291, 293
(Minn. App. 1987). The district court implicitly based its conclusion that the county made
reasonable efforts to reunite parents with their children on the county’s services, which it
lists in its factual findings. Because the district court referred approvingly to the county’s
services after listing them, we have sufficient evidence to review their adequacy.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
reasonable efforts failed.

1. Parents have not corrected the conditions leading to the OOHP.
It must appear that the conditions giving rise to the TPR will continue for a
“prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re Welfare of Child of T.D., 731 N. W.2d 548, 554
(Minn. App. 2007) . However, this court has ruled that minimal progress towards a case
plan or improvements made immediately before TPR proceedings can support the district
court’s conclusion that the present condition will continue and that termination is proper.
See In re Welfare of J.K., 374 N.W.2d 463, 466 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn.
Nov. 25, 1985).
The record shows parents’ continued drug use, as evidenced by failed UAs and
failure to complete CD treatment, chronic homelessness, and the guardian ad litem’s
(GAL) testimony that parents’ drug use caused or exacerbated the children ’s
developmental delays and substantial therapeutic needs. Mother argues that her medical-
marijuana prescription justifies her failed UA tests. But she failed 12 tests for reasons other
than THC use, including three for alcohol and at least nine no-shows, which are presumed
failures. Father relapsed by drinking alcohol on St. Patrick’s Day in March 2019 , in the

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middle of CD treatment. Moreover, father failed 21 out of 35 UA tests, testing positive for
THC or methamphetamine 11 times and failing to provide a valid sample ten times.
Finally, although parents obtained housing on the first day of trial, this late development
did not allow the social worker to assess the housing’s suitability for the children.
Both social workers testified that parents showed no significant progress with their
sobriety. The parents followed what little progress they made with regression. All
caseworkers (both social workers and the GAL) testified that parents did not substantially
comply with their case plan.
Parents cite last-minute improvements such as obtaining housing on the first day of
trial, recently entering into CD treatment program s, and maintaining sobriety . But the
limited duration of these efforts does not provide sufficient indicia of parents’ ability to
maintain sobriety or housing long term. See J.K., 374 N.W.2d at 466. Therefore, clear and
convincing evidence supports the district court ’s conclusion that parents failed to correct
the conditions underlying the OOHP , meeting the third statutory factor . See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1 (b)(5)(iii); S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.
2. The county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate parents and
reunite their family.
District courts consider the following factors to determine if the county made
reasonable efforts: whether services were (1) relevant to the child’s safety; (2) adequate for
the ne eds of the child and the family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and
accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances. Minn. Stat.

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§ 260.012(h)(1)-(6) (2018); In re Welfare of Children of S.W. , 727 N. W.2d 144, 1 49-50
(Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007).
The record supports the district court’s conclusion that the county made reasonable
efforts. These services included referrals for CD evaluations and diagnostic assessments,
assistance finding suitable housing, enrollment for CD treatment, transportation through
Tri-CAP and bus passes, supervised visitation, foster care, medical assistance, random
urinalysis testing, and consultation with a GAL. These services were relevant to the
children’s safety, adequate, accessible, consist ent, timely, and realistic. 2 The county
remained reasonably flexible with parents throughout the process, placing the children
back in their care, giving parents second chances despite failed drug tests, extending the
permanency deadline based on their treatment progress, providing mother with customized
one-on-one thera py to work with her THC use , and connecting father with a new CD
program after he rejected the first one.
Although mother argues that specific additional services would have helped her stay
engaged in treatment and find housing, she did not show that there were faster housing lists
or better CD treatment options. Moreover, her social worker testified that the case timeline
limited the available service options and no additional resources would have changed the
outcome of this case. Father’s argument that the county prematurely stopped trying to
reunite him with his children ignores the fact that the social worker attempted to reunite
them for months without making substantial progress before concluding that the children

2 The cultural appropriateness of these services is not at issue in this case.

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should be placed elsewhere . Clear and convincing evidence establishes the fourth factor
and supports the presumption that the county’s reasonable efforts fa iled. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 1 (b)(5)(iv).
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the
TPR serves the best interests of A.L.S. and M.I.S.
The district court must balance three factors when considering the children ’s best
interests: (1) the children ’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship ; (2) the
parents’ interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interests
of the children. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii); In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d
1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992) . Competing interests include a stable environment, health
considerations, and the children’s preferences. Id. When the district court concludes that
a statutory basis for TPR exists, if the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of
the child are paramount. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2018).
The district court found that, even though parents had an interest in maintaining a
relationship with their children, the children’s need for stability and a living environment
suitable to address their needs supported the TPR. The record supports the district court’s
finding. Neither A.L.S. nor M.I.S. are old enough to express a placement preference. The
parents love their children and genuinely wish to facilita te their relationship with them.
But the caseworkers testified that the children need stable and consistent housing and care,
and that parents failed to complete CD treatment and demonstrate that they could maintain
stable or sober housing. Further, the GAL testified that parents could not take care of
themselves and had to learn how to do so effectively before they could properly take care

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of their children. By contrast, the GAL testified that the c hildren’s foster parents were
successfully meeting their needs.
All three caseworkers testified that the TPR served the children’s best interests. The
fact that father maintained sobriety for less than a month, mother for less than four months,
and neither obtained housing until the first day of trial, supports the consistency concerns
expressed by all caseworkers. The caseworkers’ testimony on the importance of a stable
environment and consistent care, and parents’ failure to demonstrate an ability to
consistently perform their parenting responsibilities , supports the district court ’s
conclusion that termination meets the children’s best interests.
Because clear and convincing evidence supports at least one statutory basis for the
TPR, the county’s efforts as reasonable, and the district court’s best-interests analysis, the
district court properly terminated mother and father’s parental rights. Although the district
court provided three bases for terminating appellants’ parental rights, the statute requires
only one, so we need not address the other two bases.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by permanently transferring
mother’s legal custody and physical custody of A.P. and A.C.P. to their
paternal grandparents.
Mother’s argument s on transfer are identical to her termination arguments .
Mother’s arguments are not persuasive.
Appellate courts apply a two -part standard of review to assess a permanent
placement order transferring legal custody. See D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321-22. First, we
review factual findings to determine whether they address the statutory criteria and whether
substantial evidence supports them or whether they are clearly erroneous. In Re Welfare

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of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990 ). Second, we review the ultimate decision
that there is a statutory basis for a permanency disposition for an abuse of discretion.
D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d at 321-22.
The district court “may order permanent legal and physical custody to a fit and
willing relative in the best interests of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.515, subd. 4 (2018).
An order permanently transferring legal custody and physical custody must establish, by
clear and convincing evidence (1) how the order serves the children’s best interests; (2) the
nature and extent of the county’s efforts to reunify the child ren with the parents ; (3) the
parents’ efforts and ability to use services to correct the conditions leading to OOHP; and
(4) that the parents failed to correct the conditions leading to the OOHP. Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.517(a) (2018) . When making a permanency disposition, “the court must
. . . include[e] a review of the relationship between the child [ren] and relatives and the
child[ren] and other important persons with whom the child [ren] ha[ve] resided or had
significant contact.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(b) (2018).
Here, the district court noted that the children had a good relationship with their
paternal grandparents because they were willing to take custody of the children, had been
involved with them s ince birth, and the children expressed a desire to stay with their
grandparents. The district court also noted that when the children still resided with mother,
they had school-attendance issues and were often dirty and hungry. But since being placed
with their grandparents, their school attendance has become regular, and their basic needs
have been met.

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Clear and convincing evidence supports all four elements: (1) Transferring custody
of the children to their paternal grandparents served the children’s best interests because
these foster parents were willing to, and capable of , caring for them, had a strong
relationship with them since birth, and the children expressed a preference to stay with the
grandparents; (2) the county provided mother with flexible and reasonable services in its
efforts to reunify her with her children ; (3) mother’s efforts to address the conditions
leading to the OOHP were too little and too late; and (4) mother consistently neglected her
parenting duties by failing to adequately or consistent ly address her drug use, treatment,
and housing issues. As such, the district court did not abuse its discretion by permanently
transferring custody of A.P. and A.C.P. to their paternal grandparents.
Affirmed.