In re the Matter of:

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A19-0948

In re the Matter of:

Jennifer Lynn Gaughan, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Patrick Michael Gaughan,
Appellant.

Filed November 4, 2019
Affirmed
Rodenberg, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-FA-18-930

Karen I. Linder, Linder, Dittberner & Winter, Ltd., Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Erick G. Kaardal, Mohrman, Kaardal & Erickson, P.A., Minneapoli s, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly,
Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RODENBERG, Judge
Appellant-husband Patrick Gaugha n challenges the district court’s denial of his rule
60.02 motion to vacate the one-year extension of an order for protection (OFP) pursuant to
the parties’ written agreement au thorizing respondent-wife Jenn ifer Gaughan to

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unilaterally seek and obtain the extension. Husband makes an a malgam of arguments in
support of his claim that the ex tension was improper. Because husband, fully competent
and represented by counsel, agr eed to the entry of a one-year O FP without a finding of
domestic abuse and further agreed that wife “shall have the right, at her sole discretion, to
elect to extend the effective period of the [OFP] for one additional year,” the district court
did not err in extending the OFP consistent with the parties’ a greement without the
necessity of an additional hearing. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
Husband and wife were married in 1992. They have six children, three of whom
were minors when, on February 27, 2018, wife petitioned for an OFP under Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01 (2018) on behalf of herself and the parties’ minor ch ildren. Wife also
commenced a separate action for legal separation.
On March 30, 2018, with the advi ce of counsel, the parties stipulated to a one-year
OFP without any finding of domestic abuse. The written stipula tion provided that wife
would have the temporary sole leg al and physical custody of the minor children, and that
either party could raise the issue of custody in the couple’s legal-separation proceeding. It
further provided that, by signing the stipulation, the parties waived their right to an
evidentiary hearing regarding the OFP. Paragraph 23 of the sti pulation specified the
duration of the OFP, as follows:
This Order is effective for a period of 1 year from the date of
this Order, or until modified by further court order; provided,
however, that notwithstanding a ny provision of Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01 to the contrary, [wife] shall have the right, at her
sole discretion, to elect to extend the effective period of thi s

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Order for one additional year, upon the filing of an affidavit
exercising said right. Upon the filing of an affidavit by [wife]
exercising her right to extend the effective period of this Order
for one additional year, this Court shall issue and file its order
extending the effective period of this Order for one additional
year.

On April 2, 2018, the district court issued an order adopting the terms of the parties’
stipulation. On Febr uary 25, 2019, wife filed an affidavit req uesting an extension of the
OFP for an additional year under paragraph 23 of the stipulation. The district court granted
wife’s request and extended the OFP until April 1, 2020.
Husband moved the district court to vacate the order extending the OFP. The district
court denied husband’s motion.
This appeal followed.
D E C I S I O N
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied husband’s motion for
relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.

The sole issue identif ied in husband’s initial brief is whether the district court erred
by denying husband’s rule 60.02 motion to vacate the order extending the OFP.
Under rule 60.02, a party may seek relief from a “final judgme nt . . . , order, or
proceeding” for the following reasons:
(a) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect;
(b) Newly discovered evidence . . . ;
(c) Fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct
of an adverse party;
(d) The judgment is void;
(e) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or

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(f) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment.

Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of rule 60.02 relief for abuse of discretion.
Gams v. Houghton , 884 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Minn. 2016). “A district court abuses i ts
discretion when it acts under a misapprehension of the law . . . or when its factual findings
are clearly erroneous.” Id. (citations omitted). We view the record in the light most
favorable to the district court’s findings and will not reverse unless “we are left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765
N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted). We will not make credibility
determinations or reconcile conflicting evidence. Aljubailah v. James, 903 N.W.2d 638,
643 (Minn. App. 2017).
Husband argues that the distric t court abused its discretion i n two ways when it
denied his rule 60.02 motion. He argues that it erred because it “failed to provide a hearing
on [Minn. Stat. § 518B.01 subd.] 6a’s legislatively-mandated p re-conditions for an
extension of the OFP.” Husband also argues that the court abused its discretion by denying
his rule 60.02 motion because wife “engaged in post-OFP settlem ent agreement
misconduct.”
Paragraph 23 of the parties’ stipulation ef fectively waived the requirements of
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a, concerning extension of the stipulated OFP
where the term of the OFP was not extended beyond the initial two-year period
expressly authorized by Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(b).

Husband argues that we should reverse the district court’s one -year extension of the
OFP because the statute requires “application, notice, hearing and satisfaction of the
statutorily-created criteria,” before the OFP could be extended.

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We begin with the fact of the p arties’ negotiated stipulation for a one-year OFP
without any finding of domestic abuse. That stipulation was a settlement agreement. A
settlement agreement “is contractual in nature.” Voicestream Minn., Inc. v. RPC
Properties, Inc., 743 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Minn. 2008). “As a general rule, the enforcement
of a settlement agreement requires a hearing if the issues are sharply conflicting and there
are questions of fact for the fact finder to decide.” Id. at 272. However, the district court
has “the inherent power to summarily enforce a settlement agree ment as a matter of law
when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous.” Id. (quotations omitted). It
will “read contract terms in the context of the entire contract and will not construe the terms
so as to lead to a harsh and absurd result.” Brookfield Trade Cent., Inc. v. Cty. of Ramsey,
584 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Minn. 1998).
Parties may, by stipulation, “ag ree to incur certain obligatio ns which the [district]
court, acting under its statutory authority, is not empowered t o impose.” In re LaBelle’s
Tr., 223 N.W.2d 400, 401 (Minn. 1974). Courts may not, however, a pprove an action to
which parties stipulate that is explicitly prohibited by statute. Leifur v. Leifur, 820 N.W.2d
40, 43 (Minn. App. 2012), review dismissed (Minn. Nov. 1, 2012). The Minnesota
Supreme Court has made clear that when parties bargain for obli gations that are not
prohibited, those obligations may be honored and enforced by the district court. LaBelle’s
Tr., 223 N.W.2d at 411; see Anderson v. Anderson , 225 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. 1975)
(affirming a district court’s enforcement of a stipulated contract provision agreed upon by
the parties). In determining the enforceability of a stipulate d agreement, we consider

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whether parties to a stipulated agreement were represented by c ounsel. Anderson, 225
N.W.2d at 841.
The statute authorizes the district court to grant OFP relief for a period not to exceed
two years. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(b). Here, the parties agreed to an OFP without
any domestic-abuse finding for a period of one year, and they a greed that wife had the
“right, at her sole discretion” to seek and obtain an extension of the OFP for “one additional
year.”
Relying on the precedent established in the cases discussed above, the district court
determined that the parties’ agreement dispensed with the need for a hearing under Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a, in order to extend the stipulated OFP for the agreed-upon “one
additional year.” It correctly noted that, “[t]he burden of proof in a proceeding under Rule
60.02 is on the party seeking relief.” City of Barnum v. Sabri, 657 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Minn.
App. 2003).
The record supports the distric t court’s conclusion that husba nd understood the
meaning and potential ramifications of paragraph 23 of the stip ulation that he and his
attorney signed. That paragraph unambiguously provides that wi fe “shall have the right,
at her sole discretion, to elect to extend the effective period of this Order for one additional
year, upon the filing of an affidavit exercising said right.” And the agreement provided an
evident benefit to husband—the OFP was entered without any finding of domestic abuse.
In obtaining the extension of the OFP, wife followed the proced ure to which the parties
agreed, and the overall period of the OFP—two years—was within the authority of the
district court under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6(b).

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Husband asserts that the district court erred when it found th at husband waived his
right to notice and a hearing under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a, because “the paragraph
speaks only for [wife] and does not state that [husband] waived his right to a hearing.”
We review the district court’s determination that husband waiv e d h i s r i g h t t o a
hearing for clear error. In re Civil Commitment of Giem , 742 N.W2d 422, 432 (Minn.
2007). A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court i s “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Thompson v. Thompson, 739 N.W.2d 424,
429 (Minn. App. 2007). When considering whether the factual fi ndings are clearly
erroneous, “we view the record in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings.”
Id.
A “valid waiver requires two elements: (1) knowledge of the right, and (2) an intent
to waive the right.” White v. City of Elk River, 840 N.W.2d 43, 51 (Minn. 2013). A waiver
may be express or implied. Frandsen v. Fo rd Motor Co. , 801 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn.
2011). “[K]nowledge may be actual or constructive and the intent to waive may be inferred
from conduct.” Valspar Refinish, Inc. v. Gaylord’s Inc. , 764 N.W.2d 359, 367 (Minn.
2009) (quotation omitted).
The district court found that husband knowingly waived his rig ht to notice and a
hearing under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a, if wife followed t he pa r t i e s ’ a gr e e m e nt
concerning a one-year extension o f the OFP. The record support s that finding. And, as
discussed, wife followed the procedure upon which the parties agreed.

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The district court acted well within its discretion when it de termined that rule 60.02
does not entitle husband to relief where he agreed in writing and with the advice of counsel
to a process for extending the OFP within the purview of the statute.
Wife’s alleged misconduct does not entitle husband to rule 60.02 relief.
Husband also argues that he is entitled to rule 60.02 relief b ecause wife “fabricated
an OFP violation that did not exist to get [husband] arrested” and because wife “fabricated
extreme domestic and child abuse” to deprive him of parenting time.
First, husband provided no legal authority to the district cou rt, and he provides none
on appeal, in support of his argument that such circumstances give rise to rule 60.02 relief
in a case such as this, where the parties agreed to the challenged extension provision with
the advice of counsel. See In re Estate of Grote , 766 N.W.2d 82, 88 (Minn. App. 2009)
(stating that “[t]his court dec lines to address allegations uns upported by legal analysis or
citation”).
Second, and importantly, husband’s argument on appeal seems to presume that the
parties’ stipulation to an OFP without any finding of domestic abuse means that there was
no domestic abuse. The agreement means no such thing. The parties agreed that the OFP
would be entered without such a finding, and that the initial t erm of the OFP would only
be one year, despite the statutory provision authorizing a district court to enter an OFP for
an initial period “not to exceed two years.” Minn. Stat. § 518 B.01, subd. 6(b). The
stipulation allowed husband to bo th avoid the prospect of a dom estic-abuse finding and
limit the OFP to one year unless wife followed the extension procedure on which the parties
agreed. If the district court were to have determined that the one-year-extension provision

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was for some reason not enforceab le, the proper remedy would no t be to excise that
provision from the parties’ stipulation and revert to the statutory extension procedure while
leaving all of the agreement’s remaining terms intact. Rule 60 .02 is not a mechanism for
avoiding an isolated part of a counseled stipulation.
Finally, and as the district c ourt properly recognized, the st i p u l a t e d O F P a l l o w s
either party to raise custody-and-parenting-time issues in the legal-separation proceeding.
To the extent that husband seeks relief because wife has improperly denied him parenting
time by “fabricated” OFP-violati on claims, the parties have exp ressly agreed on a
procedure and a forum to address those issues. That forum is w ell-suited to resolving
husband’s arguments while preserving the parties’ stipulated OF P. See M i n n .
Stat. § 518.09 (2018) (providing that proceedings for dissoluti on and legal separation are
commenced by the same process).
The district court acted within its discretion when it denied husband’s motion over
his claims concerning wife’s all eged misconduct, where the part ies agreed that those
concerns could be addressed in another available forum.
Husband’s additional arguments are meritless.

While husband’s initial brief expressly identified the sole is sue on appeal as whether
the district court abused its discretion by denying his rule 60.02 motion, he makes a series
of related but unpersuasive arguments which merit brief discussion.
Husband briefly argues that settlements in domestic-abuse proc eedings in which
parties stipulate to terms in OFPs without being required to ex pressly waive statutory
provisions “is a continuing significant legal error in our state courts that must be stopped.”

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Setting aside that the district court properly resolved the waiver issue, as discussed above,
husband has provided no evidence o f the purported continuing pr actice of district courts
routinely extending OFPs. Ours is an error-correcting court. Lake George Park, L.L.C. v.
IBM Mid-America Emps. Fed. Credit Union , 576 N.W.2d 463, 466 (Minn. App. 1998),
review denied (Minn. June 17, 1998). It is not for us to make sweeping pron ouncements
about what district courts should do in other cases.
Husband also asserts that the district court was divested of su bject-matter
jurisdiction when it failed to strictly construe the notice and hearing requirements of section
518B.01, subdivision 6(b). Subj ect-matter jurisdiction and sta tutory interpretation are
questions of law which are reviewed de novo. Johnson v. Murray, 648 N.W.2d 664, 670
(Minn. 2002).
Both the United States Supreme Court and Minnesota Supreme Cou rt have
acknowledged that courts and parties often use concepts and lan guage regarding
“jurisdiction” imprecisely to refer to non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules imposed by
statutes or rules. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 510, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1242
(2006) (providing that “jurisdiction” “is a word of many, too many, meanings” (quotation
omitted)). There is a “critical difference between a rule gove rning subject-matter
jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing rule.” Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S.
12, 13, 126 S. Ct. 403, 403, (2005). “Jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear and
decide disputes.” State v. Smith , 421 N.W.2d 315, 318 (Minn. 1988). “Subject-matter
jurisdiction refers to a court’ s statutory or constitutional po wer to adjudicate the case.”
Giersdorf v. A & M Constr., Inc. , 820 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).

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Non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules are rules designed “t o promote the orderly
progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certa in procedural steps at certain
specified times.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S. Ct.
1197, 1203 (2011). A rule is “ju risdictional” if the legislatu re “clearly states that a
threshold limitation” on the scope of a statute is jurisdictional. Arbaugh, 546 U.W. at 502,
126 S. Ct. at 1237. If the legislature fails to do so, courts will treat the statute as a non-
jurisdictional claim-processing rule. Id.
Here, the district court was not divested of jurisdiction when it followed the parties’
stipulation to extend the OFP without requiring notice and a hearing under section 518B.01,
subdivision 6a. That section is a claim-processing rule. It i s not jurisdictional. Husband
presents no caselaw to the contrary. In McCullough & Sons, Inc. v. City of Vadnais
Heights, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that, while jurisdictional requirements
“cannot be expanded to account for parties’ litigation conduct,” claim-processing rules may
be forfeited or waived. 883 N.W.2d 580, 588 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted).
As discussed above, parties may stipulate to processes not exp ressly provided by
statute. See LaBelle’s Tr. , 223 N.W.2d at 408. And here, husband agreed to an OFP-
extension procedure with the adv ice of counsel. Husband’s argu ment that, despite the
parties’ stipulation, the notice and hearing requirements of Mi nn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd.
6a, are jurisdictional and must be strictly construed, is witho ut merit. Burkstrand v.
Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 213 (Minn. 2001); see Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436, 131 U.S.
at 1203 (explaining that, when d etermining whether a procedure or rule is jurisdictional,
courts consider whether there is any clear indication that the legislature intended the rule

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to be jurisdictional). The district court’s jurisdiction is identified in Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 3. Plainly, the district court had subject-matter and personal jurisdiction here.
Husband also appears to argue that his due-process rights were violated when the
district court extended the OFP without a hearing because doing so changed the effective
date for him to obtain joint legal custody of his minor children. He argues that there were
“sharply conflicting” issues and “questions of fact for the fact finder to decide.”
Husband’s argument stems from his related legal-separation cas e. In that case, the
district court determined that husband would have joint legal custody of his children by the
end of 2018. By extending the OFP in this case, however, the d istrict court effectively
granted wife sole legal and physical custody until April 2020, absent some amendment to
the terms of the OFP, the order(s) in the legal separation file, or both.
As discussed, it remains available to husband to contest the c ustody issues in the
legal-separation case. As the district court noted, the possib ility of the OFP having some
impact on the custody of the children “should come as no surprise to [husband] because he
clearly agreed to its possibility when he agreed to [wife]’s so l e l e g a l c u s t o d y i n t h e
stipulated OFP, as well as her right to extend the [OFP] by one year.” If that custody
arrangement no longer serves the best interests of the children, amendment to the custody
order(s) in the legal-separation case is the proper remedy.
Finally, husband contended at oral argument that Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a,
requires a showing that the mi nor children reasonably fear physical harm before the OFP
may be extended. This argument is not properly before us because it was not raised to the
district court and was raised for the first time on appeal. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580,

13
582 (Minn. 1988) (providing that an appellate court will genera lly not address issues that
were not presented to, consider ed by, and passed on by the dist rict court). Moreover,
because husband’s initial brief made no reference to this argument we need not address it.
See id.
Even overlooking all of that, husband’s argument has no merit. T h e s t a t u t o r y
provision involved—which was waived by the parties’ stipulation—provides that an OFP
may be extended “upon a showing that . . . the petitioner is re asonably in fear of physical
harm from the respondent.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a(b)(2). Husband would have
us rewrite the statute to provid e that no OFP extension involvi ng minor children is
permissible unless and until the district court hears from the minor children and determines
that the children are also reasonably in fear of physical harm from the respondent. Courts
may not add words to a statute. Dupey v. State, 868 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Minn. 2015). Even if
husband had not forfeited this argument, we would surely decline the invitation to become
a super-legislature and rewrite the OFP statute to include words that the legislature omitted.
Affirmed.